Preface

The present volume contains the pre-proceedings of the sixth IPM International Conference on Fundamentals of Software Engineering (FSEN), Tehran, Iran, April 22-24, 2015. This event, FSEN 2015, is organized by the School of Computer Science at the Institute for Research in Fundamental Sciences (IPM) in Iran, in cooperation with the ACM SIGSOFT and IFIP WG 2.2.

The topics of interest in FSEN span over all aspects of formal methods, especially those related to advancing the application of formal methods in software industry and promoting their integration with practical engineering techniques. The program committee of FSEN 2015 consists of 46 top researchers from 38 different academic institutes in 17 countries. We have received a total of 62 submissions from 22 countries out of which we have accepted 16 regular papers, 5 short papers and 6 posters. Each submission is reviewed by at least 3 independent referees, for its quality, originality, contribution, clarity of presentation, and its relevance to the conference topics.

Three distinguished keynote speakers deliver their lectures at FSEN 2015. Holger Giese presents his work on "Towards Smart Systems of Systems", John Hughes gives a presentation on "Experiences with Property-based Testing: Testing the Hard Stuff and Staying Sane". We thank the Institute for Research in Fundamental Sciences (IPM), Tehran, Iran for their financial support and local organization of FSEN 2015. We also thank the members of the program committee for their time, effort, and excellent contributions to making FSEN a quality conference. We thank Hossein Hojjat for his help in preparing this volume. Last but not least, our thanks go to our authors and conference participants, without whose submissions and participation FSEN would not have been possible.

January 31, 2015

Mehdi Dastani
Marjan Sirjani
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Invited Papers
Automated Integration of Service-oriented Software Systems

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Abstract. In the near future we will be surrounded by a virtually infinite number of software applications that provide services in the digital space. This situation radically changes the way software will be produced and used: (i) software is increasingly produced according to specific goals and by integrating existing software; (ii) the focus of software production will be shifted towards reuse of third-parties software, typically black-box, that is often provided without a machine readable documentation. The evidence underlying this scenario is that the price to pay for this software availability is a lack of knowledge on the software itself, notably on its interaction behaviour. A producer will operate with software artefacts that are not completely known in terms of their functional and non-functional characteristics. The general problem is therefore directed to the ability of interacting with the artefacts to the extent the goal is reached. This is not a trivial problem given the virtually infinite interaction protocols that can be defined at application level. Different software artefacts with heterogeneous interaction protocols may need to interoperate in order to reach the goal. In this paper we focus on techniques and tools for integration code synthesis, which are able to deal with partial knowledge and automatically produce correct-by-construction service-oriented systems with respect to functional goals. The research approach we propose builds around two phases: elicit and integrate. The first concerns observation theories and techniques to elicit functional behavioural models of the interaction protocol of black-box services. The second deals with compositional theories and techniques to automatically synthesize appropriate integration means to compose the services together in order to realize a service choreography that satisfies the goal.

1 Introduction

In the near future we will be increasingly surrounded by a virtually infinite number of software services that can be composed to build new added value applications in the Digital Space. According to John Musser, founder of ProgrammableWeb\(^1\), the production of Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) grows exponentially and some companies are accounting for billions of dollars in revenue per year via API links to their services. Moreover, the evolution of

\(^1\) http://www.programmableweb.com.
today Internet is expected to lead to an ultra large number of available services, hence increasing their number to billions of services in the near future. This situation radically changes the way software will be produced and used: (i) software is increasingly produced according to specific goals and by integrating existing software; (ii) the focus of software production is on integration of third party and typically black-box software, that is only provided with an interface that exposes the available functionalities but does not provide the assumed interaction protocol. The first characteristic implies a goal oriented, opportunistic use of the software being integrated, i.e., the producer will only use a subset of the available functionalities, some of which may not even be (completely) known. The second one implies the need to (a) extract suitable interaction models from discoverable and accessible pieces of software, which are made available as services in the digital space, and (b) devise appropriate integration means (e.g., architectures, connectors, mediators, integration patterns) that ease the composition of existing services so to achieve the goal.

The aim of the proposed research is to provide automatic support to the production of software systems by integrating existing software services according to a specified goal.

Our proposal builds on the model-based software production paradigm while accounting for the inherent incompleteness of information about existing software. This evidence suggests the use of an experimental approach, as opposed to a creationistic one, to the production of software. Software development has been so far biased towards a creationist view: a producer is the owner of the artefact and, if needed, she can declaratively supply any needed piece of information (interfaces, behaviours, contracts, etc.). The digital space promotes a different experimental view: the knowledge of a software artefact is limited to what can be observed of it. The more powerful and extensive the observations are, the deeper the knowledge will be; the knowledge will always remain partial, though. Indeed, there is a theoretical barrier that limits, in general, the power and the extent of observations.

Beyond automation, a further big challenge underlying this scenario is therefore to live up with the fact that this immense software resources availability corresponds to a lack of knowledge about the software, notably on its behaviour. A software producer will know less and less the precise behaviour of a third-party software service, nevertheless she will try to use it to build her own application. This very same problem recognized in the software engineering domain [16] is faced in many other computer science domains, e.g., exploratory search [39] and search computing [12].

In order to face this problem and provide a producer with a supporting framework to realize software applications via automated integration, we envision a process that implements a radically new perspective. First results can be found in [22]. This process builds around elicitation and integrate phases.

From now on, when referring to models of services we always mean models of the interaction protocols of the services, that is models of the sequences of
actions/messages exchange that need to be performed in order to consume the service, e.g., “login” and “get authorized”, before “access bank account”.

The elicit phase automatically produces an interaction protocol model for each service that has been discovered as a candidate to provide a desired functionality with respect to a specified system goal. This model is complete enough to allow the service to be integrated with others in order to satisfy the goal.

The integrate phase assists the producer in creating the appropriate integration means to compose the observed services together in order to produce a system that satisfies the goal.

In this paper we present a specific instance of the above reuse-based elicit-integrate development process, which is suitable for service-oriented systems.

The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes an instance of the elicit phase, which is suitable for the automatic elicitation of the interaction protocol of a Web Service. Section 3 discusses in detail an instance of the integrate phase, which allows the producer to automatically enforce the realization of a specific form of service composition, namely a choreography. Thus, this instance is suitable for the automatic production of choreography-based service-oriented systems. Section 4 discusses related work in the domains of behavioral model elicitation techniques and of service choreography development. Section 5 discusses final remarks and future research directions.

2 The elicit phase

Given a software service $S$ that has been discovered as a candidate to provide a desired functionality with respect to a system goal $G$, elicitation techniques must be defined to produce interaction protocol models that are complete enough to allow the service to be integrated with others in order to satisfy $G$. This means that we admit partial models of the service interaction protocols. For the integration phases to be automated, a goal $G$ specification is a machine-readable model achieved by the producer by operationalizing the needs and preferences of the user [36].

Referring to Figure 1, a concrete example of a goal specification can be found in [7], where domain expert and user goals are operationalized into a BPMN2\(^2\)

\[^2\]http://www.omg.org/spec/BPMN/2.0.
choreography specification, after being transformed into a CTT (ConcurTask-Trees) intermediate model [32]. The elicit phase is composed of two steps, namely observation and construction [22]. For each service to be integrated, the observation step is driven by $G$ and collects a set of observation data. We focus on observations devoted to the identification of a set of functional behaviours, e.g., the SOAP response to a Web-Service (WS) operation invocation. Construction takes as input the set of observation data and produces a (partial) model of the observed service. This model represents the observed behaviours enriched with inferred information that is relevant for achieving $G$. For instance, as done in [11], the collection of the SOAP responses to WS operation invocations, enriched with the inferred partial order of the invocations, can be represented as an automaton that models the interaction protocol of the observed WS. Note that, as it is shown in Section 3, having a partial model of the interaction protocol, for each observed WS to be integrated, is sufficient to automatically synthesize the code of proxies that allow for integrating the WSs so to realize the specified BPMN2 choreography. An important aspect is that the elicitation phase produces models that, although partial, are still good enough to achieve $G$. Goal driven elicitation can be very effective, e.g., as observed on the Amazon E-commerce WS (AEWS) where we apply the approach in [11] to elicit the AEWS interaction protocol. The experiment considered a goal-independent elicitation versus a goal-driven one [5]. Starting from the AEWS WSDL consisting of 85 XML schema type definitions and 23 WSDL operation definitions, the goal independent elicitation resulted in an interaction protocol made of 24 states and 288 transitions by using $10^6$ test cases, each executed in $10^{-2}$ secs, e.g., few hours of testing. By considering a goal specification that the user wished to “develop a client for cart management only”, the interaction protocol computed was made of 6 state and 21 transitions only. The goal driven elicitation required the generation and execution of $10^5$ test cases, e.g., few seconds of testing.

As it is shown in Section 3, having a partial model of the interaction protocol, for each observed WS to be integrated, is sufficient to automatically synthesize the code of additional software entities that, proxying the WSs, allow for integrating them so to realize the specified BPMN2 choreography. An important aspect is that the elicitation phase produces models that, although partial, are still good enough to achieve $G$.

Goal driven elicitation can be very effective, e.g., as observed on the Amazon E-commerce WS (AEWS) where we apply the approach in [11] to elicit the AEWS interaction protocol. The experiment considered a goal independent elicitation versus a goal driven one [5]. Starting from the AEWS WSDL consisting of 85 XML schema type definitions and 23 WSDL operation definitions, the goal independent elicitation resulted in an interaction protocol made of 24 states and 288 transitions by using $10^6$ test cases, each executed in $10^{-2}$ secs, e.g., few hours of testing. By considering a goal specification that the user wished to “develop a client for cart management only”, the interaction protocol computed was made of 6 state and 21 transitions only. The goal driven elicitation required the generation and execution of $10^5$ test cases, e.g., few seconds of testing.
The following section summarizes the elicit technique that we describe in detail in [11]. It represents a specific realization of the elicit phase, which is suitable for producing the interaction protocol of a WS.

2.1 StrawBerry: automated synthesis of WS interaction protocols

By taking as input a syntactical description of the WS signature, expressed by means of the WSDL notation, StrawBerry [11] derives in an automated way a partial ordering relation among the invocations of the different WSDL operations. This partial ordering relation is represented as an automaton that we call Behavior Protocol automaton. It models the interaction protocol that a client has to follow in order to correctly interact with the WS. This automaton also explicitly models the information that has to be passed to the WS operations. StrawBerry is a black-box and extra-procedural method. It is black-box since it takes into account only the WSDL of the WS. It is extra-procedural since it focuses on synthesizing a model of the behavior that is assumed when interacting with the WS from outside, as opposed to intra-procedural methods that synthesize a model of the implementation logic of the single WS operations [29,38].

Figure 2 graphically represents StrawBerry as a process that is split in five main activities that realize its observation and construction phases.

![Fig. 2. Overview of the StrawBerry technique](image)

**Observation**: the observation phase is in turn organized in two sub-phases. The first sub-phase exploits the WSDL of the WS, and performs data type analysis. The Dependencies Elicitation activity elicits data dependencies between the I/O parameters of the operations defined in the WSDL. A dependency is recorded whenever the type of the output of an operation (called source) matches with the type of the input of another operation (called sink). The match is syntactic. The elicited set of I/O dependencies (Input/Output Dependencies in Figure 2) may be optimized under some heuristics [11]. It is used for constructing a data-flow model (Saturated Dependencies Automaton Synthesis activity and Saturated Dependencies Automaton artifact) where each node stores data dependencies.
that concern the output parameters of a specific operation and directed arcs are used to model syntactic matches between output parameters of an operation and input parameters of another operation. This model is completed by applying a saturation rule. This rule adds new dependencies that model the possibility for a client to invoke a WS operation by directly providing its input parameters.

The second sub-phase validates the dependencies automaton through testing against the WS to verify conformance (Dependencies Automaton Refinement Through Testing activity). The testing phase takes as input the SOAP messages produced by the Test-cases Generation activity. The latter, driven by coverage criteria, automatically derives a suite of test cases (i.e., SOAP envelop messages) for the operations to be tested, according to the WSDL of the WS. Tests are generated from the WSDL and aim at validating whether the synthesized automaton is a correct abstraction of the service implementation. Testing is used to refine the syntactic dependencies by discovering those that are semantically wrong. By construction, the inferred set of dependencies is syntactically correct. However, it might not be correct semantically since it may contain false positives. The testing activity is organized into three steps. StrawBerry runs positive tests in the first step and negative tests in the second step. Positive test cases reproduce the elicited data dependencies and are used to reject fake dependencies: if a positive test invocation returns an error answer, StrawBerry concludes that the tested dependency does not exist. Negative test cases are instead used to confirm uncertain dependencies: StrawBerry provides in input to the sink operation a random test case of the expected type. If this test invocation returns an error answer, then StrawBerry concludes that the WS was indeed expecting as input the output produced by the source operation, and it confirms the hypothesized dependency as certain. If uncertain dependencies remain after the two steps, StrawBerry resolves the uncertainty by assuming that the hypothesized dependencies do not exist.

Construction: the construction phase consists in a synthesis stage which aims at transforming the validated dependency automaton (a data-flow model) into an automaton defining the behavior protocol (a control-flow model), see the Behavior Protocol Synthesis activity in Figure 2. This automaton explicitly models also the data that has to be passed to the WS operations. More precisely, the states of the behavior protocol automaton are WS execution states and the transitions, labeled with operation names plus I/O data, model possible operation invocations from the client of the WS.

3 The integrate phase

The integrate phase assists the producer in creating the appropriate integration means to compose the observed services together in order to produce a system that satisfies G. Multiple models may exist for each service (e.g., behavioural, interfaces, stochastic or Bayesian), each of them representing a view of the interaction protocol. Model transformation techniques ensure coherence and consistency among the different views, hence providing a systematic support to model
interoperability [14, 19]. Model and code synthesis techniques produce an Integration Architecture (IA), including the corresponding code for the actual integration, out of the elicited models by suitably instantiating architectural styles [34] and integration patterns [15]. If needed, extra integration logic can be synthesized as connectors, coordinators, mediators and adapters [7, 23, 24, 30] to guarantee correctness of the IA with respect to $G$.

Continuing the example introduced above, Figure 3 shows a possible concrete instance of the Integrate phase [7, 8]. Here, the elicit phase has produced the interaction protocol of each participant service in the choreography specified by $G$ (AEWS included). Starting from $G$ and the elicited models, the Integrate phase synthesizes a set of software coordinators. The synthesis exploits model transformations implemented by means of the Atlas Transformation Language (ATL$^3$). The developed ATL transformations consist of a number of rules each devoted to the management of specific BPMN2 Choreography Diagram modeling constructs. Coordinators are implemented in Java and their deployment descriptors are codified in XML. By instantiating a fully distributed architectural style, coordinators are interposed among the participant services that need to be coordinated. By exploiting a request/response delegation pattern, coordinators proxify the services and coordinate their interaction in a way that the resulting collaboration realizes $G$.

Fig. 3. Integrate phase

Next section briefly describes the integration synthesis techniques we have implemented in the CHOReOSynt tool. More details can be found in [7, 8].

3.1 CHOReOSynt: automated synthesis of service choreographies

From the BPMN2 specification of a choreography (i.e., the goal $G$), CHOReOSynt allows for deriving the coordinators, hereafter called Coordination Delegates (CD). CHOReOSynt offers bespoke functionalities to:

$^3$ ATL is a domain specific language for realizing model-to-model transformations - www.eclipse.org/atl
– start the synthesis process giving as input a BPMN 2.0 Choreography Diagram;
– transform the BPMN2 Choreography Diagram into an intermediate automata-based model, which is amenable to automated reasoning;
– derive a set of Coordination Models containing information that serve to coordinate the services involved in the choreography in a distributed way;
– extract the participants of the choreography and project the choreography on their behavioral role;
– simulate the behavioral role of the participants in the choreography against the interaction protocol of the services discovered by the service discovery;
– generate the Coordination Delegate artefacts and the so called “ChorSpec” specification to be used by the Enactment Engine component for deploying and enacting the choreography;

We have implemented these functionalities in a set of REST (Representational State Transfer) services, which are called by CHOReOSynt as shown in Figure 4 and described below.

**M2M Transformator** – The Model-to-Model (M2M) Transformator offers a set of model transformations. Specifically, it offers an operation \texttt{bpmn2clts()} that takes as input the BPMN2 specification of the choreography and transforms it into a model called CLTS. The latter is an extended Labeled Transition System (LTS) that allows for automatically handling complex constructs of BPMN2 Choreography Diagrams, such as gateways, loops, forks and joins.

![Fig. 4. CHOReOSynt REST architecture](image)

Then, starting from the CLTS, CHOReOSynt extracts the list of the participants and, applying a further M2M transformation, automatically derives, for each participant, the CLTS model of the expected behavior with
respect to the specified choreography. To this end another operation named
extractParticipants() is offered. The CLTS model of expected behavior is
achieved by projecting (projection()) the choreography onto the participant,
hence filtering out those transitions, and related states, that do not belong to
the participant. Basically, for each participant, this CLTS specifies the interaction
protocol that a candidate service (to be discovered) has to support to play the
role of the participant in the choreography.

**Synthesis Discovery Manager** – The Synthesis process and the Discovery
process interact each other to retrieve, from the service registry, those candidate
services that are suitable for playing the participant roles, and hence, those ser-
vices whose (offered and required) operations and protocol are compatible with
the CLTS models of the expected behavior. In particular, for each participant,
the call to the discoverServices() operation is performed. It takes the par-
ticipant (abstract) CLTS as input. Then, a query is issued to the eXtensible
Service Discovery (XSD) component (not in the focus of this paper). Note that,
although for each choreography participant a suitable third-party service may
have been discovered (and hence, its interaction protocol fits the behavior of the
participant in isolation), the uncontrolled (or wrongly coordinated) composite
behavior of all the discovered services may show undesired interactions that pre-
vent the choreography realization. For a detailed and formal description of the
notion of undesired interaction, refer to [4,6,9].

**Behavior Simulator** – Once a set of concrete candidate services has been
discovered, the synthesis process has to select them by checking, for each partic-
ipant, if its expected behavior can be simulated by some candidate service. Note
that, for a given participant, behavioral simulation is required since, although
the discovered candidate services for it are able to offer and require (at least) the
operations needed to play the role of the participant, one cannot be sure that
the candidate services are able to support the operations flow as expected by the
choreography. Thus, in order to simulate the expected behavior of a participant
with the behavior of a service, the Behavior Simulator offers an operation named
simulate() that takes as input the projected (abstract) CLTS of the participant
and the extended (concrete) LTS of the service as retrieved by the URI returned
by the discovery service. It might be interesting to mention that the simulation
method implemented a notion of strong simulation suitably extended to treat
the CLTSs and extended the LTSs we use in CHOReOS. After simulation, if
all the participant roles have been “covered” by (some of) the discovered ser-
vices, the abstract CLTS is concretized with the actual names of the selected
services and the actual names of the offered and requested operations. Then, the
automated synthesis process distributes the coordination logic specified by the
obtained CLTS into a set of Coordination Models by means of the functionality
cltstocoord().

**Coordination Delegate Generator** – Once the services have been selected
for all the choreography participants, and hence the CLTS has been concretized,
the synthesis processor can generate the Coordination Delegates through the
operation `generateCDs()` offered by the Coordination Delegate Generator component.

**Next step in the process** — Once the Coordination Delegates have been generated, the Coordination Delegate Generator component can further generate a specification of the choreography (called `ChorSpec`) to be passed to the choreography Enactment Engine (not in the focus of this paper). To this end, the operation `createChorSpec()` is offered. It takes as input the selected services and the coordination delegates generated for them. The `ChorSpec` is an XML-based declarative description of the choreography that specifies the locations of the selected services and of the generated Coordination Delegate artifacts that can be deployed. Indeed, before passing the `ChorSpec` to the Enactment Engine, the Choreography Offline Testing process activity is performed to assess the quality of the choreography specification, its well formedness, etc.

# 4 Related work

In this section we discuss related work in the domains of behavioral model elicitation techniques and of service choreography development.

**Elicitation techniques.** We focus on black-box/grey-box techniques able to elicit behavioural models of the software. The reader interested on white-box techniques can refer to [3,37,38] and references therein.

LearnLib [21] is a framework to automatically construct a finite automaton through automata learning and experimentation. Active automata learning tries to automatically construct a finite automaton that matches the behavior of a given target automaton on the basis of active interrogation of target systems and observation of the produced behavior.

The work described in [27] presents a comprehensive approach for building parametrized behaviour models of existing black-box components for performance prediction. Those parameters represent three performance-influencing factor, i.e., usage, assembly, and deployment context; this makes the models sensitive to changing load situations, connected components, and the underlying hardware. The approach makes use of static and dynamic analysis and search-based approaches, namely genetic programming. These techniques take as input monitoring data, runtime bytecode counts, and static bytecode analysis.

SPY [17] is an approach to infer a formal specification of stateful black-box components that behave as data abstractions (Java classes that behave as data containers) by observing their run-time behavior. SPY proceeds in two main stages: first, SPY infers a partial model of the considered Java class; second, through graph transformation, this partial model is generalized to deal with data values beyond the ones specified by the given instance pools. The inferred model is partial since it models the intentional behavior of the class with respect to only a set of instance pools provided as input, which are used to get values for method parameters, and an upper bound on the number of states of the model.

GK-Tail [29] is a technique to automatically generate behavioral models from (object-oriented) system execution traces. GK-Tail assumes that execution
traces are obtained by monitoring the system through message logging frameworks. For each system method, an Extended Finite State Machine (EFSM) is generated. It models the interaction between the components forming the system in terms of sequences of method invocations and data constraints on these invocations. The correctness of these data constraints depends on the completeness of the set of monitored traces with respect to all the possible system executions that might be infinite.

The work described in [10] presents an approach for inferring state machines with an infinite state space. By observing the output that the system produces when stimulated with selected inputs, they extend existing algorithms for regular inference (which infer finite state machines) to deal with infinite-state systems. This approach makes the problem of dealing with an infinite state space tractable, but may suffer a higher degree of model approximation.

The work described in [31] presents a learning-based black-box testing approach in which the problem of testing functional correctness is reduced to a constraint solving problem. Functional correctness is modeled by pre- and post-conditions that are first-order predicate formulas. A successful black-box test is an execution of the program on a set of input values satisfying the pre-condition, which terminates by retrieving a set of output values violating the post-condition. Black-box functional testing is the search for successful tests with respect to the program pre- and post-conditions. As coverage criterion the authors formulate a convergence criterion on function approximation.

The work in [13] presents an approach that, through a combination of systematic test case generation (by means of the TAUTOKO tool) and typestate mining, infers models of program behavior in the form of finite state automata describing transitions between object states. The generation of test cases permits to cover previously unobserved behavior, and systematically extends the execution space, and enriches the inferred behavior model. In this sense, it can be said this approach goes in an opposite direction with respect to StrawBerry.

The work in [2] concerns an application of active learning whose aim is to establish the correctness of protocol implementations relative to a given reference implementation. The work in [1] shows how to fully-automatically construct the typical abstractions needed to perform automata learning.

**Choreography realization techniques.** CHOReOSynt is related to several approaches developed for automated choreography enforcement.

The approach described in [18] enforces a choreography’s realizability by automatically generating monitors. Each monitor acts as a local controller for its peer. Monitors are built by iterating equivalence-checking steps between two centralized models of the whole system. A monitor is similar to our coordination delegate (CD). However, our approach synthesizes CDs without producing a centralized model of the whole system, hence preventing state explosion.

The method described in [26] checks the conformance between the choreography specification and the composition of participant implementations. Their framework can model and analyze compositions in which the interactions can also be asynchronous and the messages can be stored in unbounded queues and
reordered if needed. Following this line of research, the authors of [26] provided a hierarchy of realizability notions that forms the basis for a more flexible analysis regarding classic realizability checks [25, 26]. These two approaches are novel in that they characterize relevant properties to check a certain degree of realizability. However, they statically check realizability and do not enforce it.

The ASTRO toolset [35] supports automated composition of Web services and the monitoring of their execution. It aims to compose a service starting from a business requirement and the description of the protocols defining available external services. Unlike our approach, ASTRO deals with centralized orchestration-based business processes rather than fully decentralized choreography-based ones.

The CIGAR (Concurrent and Interleaving Goal and Activity Recognition) framework aims for multigoal recognition [20]. CIGAR decomposes an observed sequence of multigoal activities into a set of action sequences, one for each goal, specifying whether a goal is active in a specific action. Although such goal decomposition somewhat recalls CHOReOSynt’s choreography decentralization, goal recognition represents a fundamentally different problem regarding realizability enforcement.

Given a set of candidate services offering the desired functionalities, the TCP-Compose* algorithm [33] identifies the set of composite services that best fit the user-specified qualitative preferences over non-functional attributes. CHOReOSynt could exploit this research to extend the discovery process to enable more flexible selection of services from the registry.

The research we described in this paper is an advance over our previous research [4, 6]. Although the synthesis process described in our previous research treated most BPMN2 constructs, it considered a simplified version of their actual semantics. For instance, as in [18], the selection of conditional branches was simply abstracted as a non-deterministic choice, regardless of the run-time evaluation of their enabling conditions. Analogously, the synthesis process enforced parallel flows by non-deterministically choosing one of their linearizations obtained through interleaving, thus losing the actual degree of parallelism. To overcome these limitations, CHOReOSynt relies on a choreography model that, being more expressive than the choreography model in CIGAR and TCP-Compose*, preserves the BPMN2 constructs’ actual semantics. Relying on a more expressive model led us to define a novel, more effective distributed coordination algorithm [9].

5 Final remarks and future perspectives

Our past experience in behavioural models elicitation and integration code synthesis gives a first evidence, yet concrete, that the proposed approach is viable once referring to specific application domains, e.g., choreography-based systems.

Our experiments with strawberry have shown that it is practical and realistic in that it only assumes: (i) the availability of the WSDL; and (ii) the possibility to derive a partial oracle that can distinguish between regular and error answers. Furthermore, we observed that strawberry nicely converges to a
realistic automaton. In future work, we intend to investigate if and how assumption (ii) could be relaxed.

Our experiments with CHOReOSynt demonstrated that considering domain-specific interaction patterns mitigates the complexity of coordination enforceability when recurrent business protocols must be enforced. Generally, choreography synthesis is difficult in that not all possible collaborations can be automatically realized. This suggests we could improve CHOReOSynt with a combination of domain-specific choreography patterns, as well as protocol interaction patterns that correspond to service collaborations that are tractable through exogenous coordination. Currently, CHOReOSynt supports pure coordination. It doesn’t deal with protocol adaptation because it doesn’t account for mismatches at the level of service operations and related I/O parameter types. To support data-based coordination through the elicitation and application of complex data mappings, CHOReOSynt should be enhanced to automatically infer mappings to match the data types of messages sent or received by mismatching participant services. This means effectively coping with heterogeneous service interfaces and dealing with as many Enterprise Integration Patterns [15] and protocol mediation patterns [28] as possible, in a fully automatic way. Toward that end, we achieved promising results in automated synthesis of modular mediators [24].

We want to enable the market acceptance and further enhancement of CHOReOSynt by third-party developers, especially small and medium enterprises, including development of applications for commercialization. So, we released CHOReOSynt under the umbrella of the Future Internet Software and Services Initiative (FISSI⁴). Using a market-oriented approach, FISSi aims to develop awareness of OW2 Future Internet software in both FISSi members and non-members and both open source vendors and proprietary vendors. Our primary objective, to be achieved in the near future, is to establish a community of developers and third-party market stakeholders (for example, users, application vendors, and policy makers) around CHOReOSynt.

Last but not least, an interesting future direction is the investigation of non-functional properties at the level of the elicited interaction protocols and of the synthesized choreography. For instance, this requires considering operation invocation response time, extending the choreography specification with performance or reliability attributes, and accounting for them in the CDs synthesis process.

Acknowledgments

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⁴ http://www.ow2.org/view/Future_Internet/CHOReOS
References

Experiences with property-based testing: testing the hard stuff and staying sane

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Abstract. QuickCheck is a testing tool originally developed in and for Haskell, which generates random tests from a formal specification in the form of properties, and minimizes any counterexamples found to small, easily understandable test cases. For the last seven years, QuickCheck has been deployed in industry and has helped track down innumerable bugs in telecom systems, databases, embedded vehicle software, and many others. In this talk I will introduce QuickCheck and describe some of these applications, including debugging notorious race conditions that plagued the DBMS delivered along with Erlang for years.
Towards Smart Systems of Systems

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Abstract. Systems of Systems (SoS) have started to emerge as a consequence of the general trend toward the integration of beforehand isolated systems. To unleash the full potential, the contained systems must be able to operate as elements in open, dynamic, and deviating SoS architectures and to adapt to open and dynamic contexts while being developed, operated, evolved, and governed independently. We name the resulting advanced SoS to be smart as they must be self-adaptive at the level of the individual systems and self-organizing at the SoS level to cope with the emergent behavior at that level. In this paper we analyze the open challenges for the envisioned smart SoS. In addition, we discuss our ideas for tackling this vision with our SMARTSOS approach that employs open and adaptive collaborations and models at runtime. In particular, we focus on preliminary ideas for the construction and assurance of smart SoS.

1 Introduction

Systems of Systems (SoS) [1, 2] nowadays become a highly relevant challenge as the general trend can be observed that beforehand isolated systems are integrated into larger federations of systems. To unleash the full potential of such federations, SoS must be smart such that the contained systems are able to operate as elements in open, dynamic, and deviating SoS architectures and to adapt to open and dynamic contexts while being developed, operated, evolved, and governed independently. Therefore, the resulting smart SoS must be self-adaptive at the level of the individual systems and self-organizing at the SoS level to cope with the emergent behavior at that level.

For a smart SoS holds that each of its systems has to be independent in the sense that it is developed, operated, evolved, and governed independently from the other systems in the SoS. Furthermore, these systems interact with each other in an open and dynamic world (cf. [5]), which causes individual systems to dynamically join or leave the SoS over time, the SoS architecture to deviate, and

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1 Similar needs are observed for specific cases of SoS, such as ultra-large-scale systems [3] focusing on issues arising from the complexity of SoS or cyber-physical systems [4] emphasizing the integration of the physical and cyber world.
emergent behavior at the SoS level. Moreover, each independent system must adapt its behavior autonomously according to its own needs and peer systems in the SoS (self-adaptation \([6, 7]\)) while considering the interplay between its own behavior, the other systems' behavior, and the required SoS-level behavior (self-organization \([8]\)). The envisioned interaction between the systems involves independently developed systems and requires means for exchanging knowledge between these systems at runtime. This knowledge covers aspects of a running system itself and the context or the requirements of a running system. While the outlined rich interaction is key, the development of the systems has to scale and thus only can take into account the publicly available knowledge about possible collaborations with the other systems. Finally, the systems as part of a smart SoS will evolve in order to adjust to new needs or changing regulations (cf. software evolution \([9]\)). Since it seems today improbable or even impossible that all the required evolution steps can be covered automatically by a system itself (e.g., by self-adaptation or self-organization), it must still be possible that required evolution steps for each individually governed system are performed during the operation of the SoS. These challenges for engineering smart SoS are currently hardly covered by the available approaches.

The current state of the art suggests constructing SoS using an architecture perspective and services (cf. \([10]\)) employing, for example, the Service oriented architecture Modeling Language (SoaML) \([11]\) and the Unified Modeling Language (UML) \([12]\) to specify the cooperation of systems by means of service contracts and collaborations. In these collaborations, roles with dedicated interfaces describe the behavior of the systems while the SoS-level behavior emerges from the interactions of these roles.

The use of collaborations for the modeling of services \([13, 14]\), the use of class diagrams for the structure and graph transformations for the behavior modeling \([15, 16]\), and a formal model of ensembles \([17]\) have been proposed. However, none of these approaches supports the construction of dynamic collaborations as required for smart SoS where systems dynamically join or leave the federation. And even though well-established formal approaches such as $\pi$-calculus \([18]\) or bigraphs \([19]\) tackle such structural dynamics, to the best of our knowledge no work exists that especially covers the problem of providing assurances for dynamic collaborations of arbitrary size. Either the approaches require an initial system configuration and only support finite state systems (or systems for which an abstract finite state model of moderate size exist) \([15, 20–24]\) or they lack the expressive power to describe typical problems concerning the structural dynamics \([25, 26]\).

In our own Mechatronic UML approach (mUML) \([27]\) for the model-driven development of self-optimizing embedded real-time systems, we already support collaborations of self-optimizing autonomous systems in a rigorous manner by means of role protocols. For mUML and its collaboration concepts an overall assurance scheme has been presented in \([28]\); it combines a modular verification approach \([29]\) for the component hierarchies of the autonomous systems, the compositional verification \([30]\) of ad hoc real-time collaborations between
the autonomous systems, and a fully automatic checker for inductive invariants of graph transformation system rules [31] describing the possible changes of the dynamic architecture at the SoS level. Additional work on assurances for mUML employs a multi-agent system view on an SoS to study how commitments between the collaborating systems can be modeled and analyzed [32]. Therefore, with mUML an approach exists that provides assurances for systems that combine self-adaptive autonomous systems similar to an SoS. However, in contrast to the challenges of smart SoS, which are discussed in the next section, mUML provides no solution for collaborations with structural dynamics of the roles, is restricted to homogeneous systems (i.e., systems that evolve jointly and similarly and that have complete knowledge about each other), and does not support the runtime exchange of complex knowledge. Moreover, the self-adaptation is limited to pre-planned reconfigurations in hierarchical architectures.

Our Executable Runtime Megamodels approach (EUREMA) [33] for the model-driven engineering of self-adaptive systems supports – in contrast to mUML – the flexible specification of self-adaptation by allowing us to employ abstract runtime models (cf. [34]) of the context and the system itself such that the self-adaptation behavior can be specified by rules operating on such abstractions. However, EUREMA is so far limited to centralized and non-distributed systems and does not address collaborations or the self-organizing SoS level.

In this paper, we will first analyze open challenges for engineering smart SoS. We will then discuss our Software with Models at Runtime for Systems of Systems (SMARTSOS) vision that employs collaborations and generic models at runtime for trustworthy self-organization and evolution of the systems at the SoS level and self-adaptation within the systems while taking the independent development, operation, management, and evolution of these systems into account. We will particularly outline the formal foundations underlying SMARTSOS based on graph transformation systems [35,36] which cover in principle the identified challenges for the construction and assurance of smart SoS.

The rest of the paper is structured as follows: In Section 2, we discuss open challenges for smart SoS. Afterwards, our SMARTSOS vision is outlined in Section 3. Then, the concepts for constructing smart SoS with collaborations, components, and runtime models are outlined in Section 4. Afterwards, the results that enable the assurance for the smart SoS are presented in Section 5. The paper closes with a discussion of these results in Section 6 and provides in Section 7 some concluding remarks and an outlook on future work.

2 Challenges

SoS as a composition of systems that are operationally and managerially independent from each other [1] is characterized by uncoordinated evolution steps and geographic distribution of these systems (cf. [37]). Additionally, dynamic configuration capabilities, resilience, the ability to dynamically adapt and absorb deviations in the SoS structure, and the ability to deal with emergent behavior in context of self-organization that goes beyond developing contractual
Table 1. Summary of the Identified Challenges.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Challenge</th>
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<tr>
<td>Construction/Assurance of Self-Adaptation (C1/A1)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Construction/Assurance of SoS-Level Interactions for Self-Organization (C2/A2)</td>
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<td>Construction/Assurance of SoS-Level Structural Dynamics (C3/A3)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Construction/Assurance of SoS-Level Runtime Knowledge Exchange (C4/A4)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Construction/Assurance of Evolution of Smart SoS (C5/A5)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Scalable Construction/Assurance of Smart SoS (C6/A6)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Construction/Assurance of Smart SoS with Restricted Knowledge (C7/A7)</td>
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descriptions are crucial [2] for smart SoS. These issues are challenging since each system as part of a smart SoS is independent in the sense that it is developed, operated, evolved, and governed independently from the other systems in the same SoS. Furthermore, the systems interact with each other in an open and dynamic world (cf. [5]), which causes individual systems to dynamically join or leave the smart SoS over time, the SoS architecture to deviate, and emergent behavior at the SoS level. Consequently, the SoS-level architecture and behavior are not controlled by a single, centralized authority.

As example in this paper we consider a large-scale transport system where different organizations operate fleets of autonomously driving shuttles that share a track system. This constitutes an SoS since the shuttles are operated, managed, and evolved by different authorities, they dynamically interact with each other (e.g., to build convoys), and they adapt to their own and the other shuttle’s states and behavior (e.g., to decrease the speed when the shuttle’s own battery level is low or when the speed of the shuttle running ahead decreases).²

Engineering such smart SoS imposes several challenges that we outline in Table 1. All of them aim for means for the construction and assurance of smart SoS and its individual systems, which must take the operational and managerial independence of the individual systems and the emergent behavior at the SoS level into account.

The first challenge considers the Construction/Assurance of Self-Adaptation (C1/A1) of the individual systems as each system within a smart SoS must adapt its behavior according to its own needs and the behavior of other systems as well as the emergent SoS-level behavior (cf. [38, 39]). For instance, a shuttle adapts its speed to its battery level, to the speed of the shuttle running ahead, or to an agreement established by shuttles in a convoy. Such changes of the behavior must be systematically constructed and assured to enable trustworthy operation and in particular self-adaptation [6, 7].

Due to the operational and managerial independence of the systems, the Construction/Assurance of SoS-Level Interactions for Self-Organization (C2/A2) challenge captures that the interactions among these systems must be self-organized (cf. [8]) to achieve the SoS-level goals. For example, shuttles from different organization must interact to avoid collisions or they may even cooperate to build convoys in order to save energy. Such interplays of autonomous shuttles must be systematically constructed and assured to provide confidence for satisfying SoS-level goals (e.g., reliable and safe rail traffic).

² See http://www.railcab.de for an example with the outlined characteristics.
Furthermore, since the operational context changes or the systems dynamically join or leave the SoS such that the SoS-level architecture dynamically changes, the challenge of the Construction/Assurance of SoS-Level Structural Dynamics (C3/A3) must be supported. For instance, autonomous shuttles may join or leave a convoy and the other shuttles already part of the convoy must account for it. Such dynamics must be constructed and assured to guarantee certain SoS-level behavior resulting from the interactions.

Additionally to the structural dynamics, the Construction/Assurance of SoS-Level Runtime Knowledge Exchange (C4/A4) is required since no system in the SoS typically has all the knowledge needed to achieve the SoS-level goals at runtime. This calls for exchanging knowledge between interacting systems. This knowledge refers to the current state, context, and requirements of individual systems. For instance, shuttles establishing a convoy may exchange their driving modes to agree on a common mode for the whole convoy. Such a knowledge exchange must be constructed and assured when engineering interactions to gain confidence that the SoS-level goals can be achieved.

In parallel to the self-adaptive and self-organizing behavior of systems in the SoS, the systems evolve in an uncoordinated way as they are managed independently from each other by different organizations. Evolution is caused by the permanent need to change the software in response to changing requirements of the stakeholders, no longer valid assumptions, or changing regulations the software has to adhere to (cf. software evolution [9]). With evolution, we refer to introducing new or removing existing types of systems or interactions (and therefore, also behavior) from the SoS. For example, new shuttle versions that support new cooperation mechanisms are integrated into the SoS and they must not interfere with the already existing versions. To handle such radical changes in a trustworthy manner and to support the long-term existence of the SoS, the Construction/Assurance of Evolution of Smart SoS (C5/A5) is a main challenge.

In general, engineering smart SoS is challenging due to the ultra-large scale and complexity of such systems and due to the different authorities managing such systems. Therefore, the Scalable Construction/Assurance of Smart SoS (C6/A6) and the Construction/Assurance of Smart SoS with Restricted Knowledge (C7/A7) are also important aspects for the engineering. The first aspect is motivated by the fact that it is not feasible to construct the whole SoS upfront before its deployment, or to analyze all possible SoS configurations or architectures that grow exponentially with the number of participating systems. For instance, any number of shuttles of arbitrary types may run on the track system or may cooperate in a convoy. Thus, the construction and assurances for SoS must scale with the size of the SoS. The second aspect refers to the construction and assurances for smart SoS, which must work despite the restricted knowledge that participants of the SoS have. An organization responsible for an individual system in the SoS or the system itself might have no global view of the SoS and no concrete information about the other participants and possible interactions among participants. Nevertheless, assurances for each system and the SoS must be provided to enable trustworthy operations. For example, when constructing
and assuring a new shuttle versions supporting a certain interaction, details about other organizations’ shuttle versions that are potential cooperators for the interaction might not be available. However, the construction and assurance must cope with the limited knowledge available.

These open challenges, each with a construction and assurance dimension as summarized in Table 1, reveal the difficulty of engineering and ruling smart SoS due to the complexity, dynamics, emergence, and decentralized management and governance.

3 SMARTSOS

In our vision SMARTSOS, we suggest combining the benefits of mUML and EUREMA to tackle the challenges for smart SoS. However, we do not suggest simply integrating the ideas of both approaches. Instead we developed a radically different and more abstract perspective on the SoS-level interactions to overcome the limitations of the state-of-the-art and former approaches and to master the complexity of smart SoS. This novel perspective is based on the combination of runtime models and collaborations.

3.1 Runtime Models

To realize the challenge of the Construction/Assurance of SoS-Level Runtime Knowledge Exchange (C4/A4), SMARTSOS employs models at runtime [34] that suggest following model-driven engineering principles to engineer abstract runtime representations of running systems or their contexts and requirements. Such models are said to be causally connected to the running system, which means that changes in the system are reflected in the model and vice versa. Thus, “change agents (e.g., software maintainers, software-based agents) use [abstract] runtime models to modify executing software in a controlled manner” [40, p. 39] rather than directly adapting the running software at the code level.

With EUREMA we have extended this perspective by providing runtime models at different levels of abstraction [41] and by specifying the adaptation itself, that is, software-based agents, using runtime models [33]. The latter aspect leverages the flexibility of runtime models for managing the change agents at runtime in addition to the running systems. In SMARTSOS, we go another step further and suggest using generic in contrast to highly specific and optimized runtime models, which eases interoperability and evolution of systems in an SoS. This avoids complications of achieving interoperability and evolution of many systems if each of them has its individual optimization and specific solution.

For an individual system in a smart SoS, such generic runtime models may capture the system’s state, context, requirements, and adaptation logic. These models may be used locally for self-adaptation and assurances that each system fulfills its requirements. As discussed in the following, they may also be used for collaborations among systems leading to the self-organization of the SoS, which requires the exchange of runtime knowledge.
The basic idea to integrate runtime models and collaborations for the construction of smart SoS is depicted in Fig. 1. At first, each running system living in the cyber world may have a view on its physical context and its own state in the cyber and physical world by means of runtime models of the context and the self. In general, we consider runtime descriptions reflecting the running system and its context as Reflection Models. Particularly, System Models (Self in Fig. 1) reflect about architectural and behavioral key aspects of the system and they are causally connected to the system. Context Models (Context in Fig. 1) describe the environmental situation of a system (cf. [42, 43]). In our example, models of the Context and Self are depicted in the individual Shuttle systems in Fig. 1. This supports designing the self-adaptation of the shuttles as MAPE-K feedback loops (Monitor/Analyze/Plan/Execute-Knowledge) [44] while the knowledge part is implemented by the runtime models. Such feedback loops are realized by analyze and plan activities that operate on the basis of the runtime models while linking the runtime models to the system and context is realized by the monitor and execute activities. The Self and Context runtime models can refer to the local state of a shuttle (e.g., the Mode and Battery status) as well as the available information about the context (e.g., whether there is another shuttle driving on the tracks ahead of the shuttle). This context does not only consist of the physical context such as the shuttle’s position, the topology of the track system, and the positions of other shuttles nearby, but additionally the context in the cyber world. This cyber-world context covers, for instance, the established collaboration instances and context shared with other roles of these collaboration instances.
As depicted in Fig. 1, these runtime models of the context and self constitute an overall local runtime model, that is, the Reflection Model, for each Shuttle system. As described in Fig. 2 in more detail, each system does not only operate on information about its own local context and itself, but can also get access to the information stored in runtime models of the context and system themselves of other systems. In our example, the left most Shuttle system has also access to information in form of runtime models in quite different ways. The directly visible elements are the information available local to the shuttle by means of runtime models (white with solid frame). Additional information like the position of the shuttle in front of it, which is encoded by the on edge between that shuttle and its current track, is accessible for shuttles that knows the Coord collaboration type (gray with dashed frame). Finally, information about the mode of the shuttle system in front of it is accessible for a shuttle, if it is connected to this via a Coord collaboration instance (gray with solid frame).

Likewise to EUREMA, the behavior of the systems in reaction to particular situations can now be directly described based on such overall local runtime models. This is illustrated at the top of the left-hand side of Fig. 2 showing the feedback loop (i.e., the monitor, analyze, plan, and execute activities) of a shuttle realizing the self-adaptation and therefore, addressing the Construction of Self-Adaptation (C1) challenge. In the following, we will elaborate the use of such generic runtime models in the context of collaborations. In general, such models as employed by SMARTSOS provide an idealization of the systems and contexts, which is discussed in Section 4.3.

In the case of heterogeneous local runtime models, efficient model synchronization techniques such as Triple Graph Grammars (TGGs) [45] can be employed. Such techniques realize required translation steps between runtime models that are specified in different modeling languages but that capture similar content. We already applied TGGs to create and maintain multiple runtime models of the system in [41].
3.2 Collaborations

To approach the challenges of the Construction/A Assurance of SoS-Level Interactions for Self-Organization (C2/A2) and the Construction/A Assurance of SoS-Level Structural Dynamics (C3/A3) while taking aspects of the Scalable Construction/A Assurance of Smart SoS (C6/A6) and the Construction/A Assurance of Smart SoS with Restricted Knowledge (C7/A7) into account, SoaML and UML provide basic concepts of modeling collaborations. They support specifying abstract collaboration types and corresponding roles. The interaction of roles is defined by sequence or activity diagrams and UML interface descriptions (in form of class diagrams). Role behavior may be also covered by protocol state machines. The mUML approach extends the ideas of SoaML and UML by describing the possible interaction always via real-time variant of state machines for each role and the communication medium. Due to the well-defined semantics and formalism for the employed real-time variant of state machines, mUML enables the basic verification of the interactions through model checking.

SMARTSOS supports a more flexible concept for collaborations compared to mUML and SoaML/UML. In SMARTSOS a richer language to specify the collaborations is provided, which also covers the exchange of complex information as well as specifying strctural dynamics covering, for example, how systems can join the collaboration, leave the collaboration, or how the structure of the collaboration may change at runtime. In order to ensure interoperability and achieve trustworthy behavior at the SoS level, we furthermore need also more sophisticated analysis capabilities, for example, to investigate the impact from one system part to another through collaborations.

The basic idea of separating the required interactions into separated collaborations is depicted in Fig. 1. The autonomous systems of the SoS can connect with each other as specified by the collaboration types and can establish collaboration instances to cooperate as needed. For example, the two left most Shuttle instances in Fig. 1 are linked by a Coord collaboration instance to build a temporary convoy and the right most Shuttle instance is linked to a Station instance by an Allocate collaboration instance.

It has to be noted that different collaboration types and their involved views on the physical or cyber world may not be disjoint. In such a case, the construction and assurance for the collaboration types that share some of their elements of the physical or cyber world have to take such overlapping into account. The required concepts for abstract shared collaborations types that includes runtime models with overlapping entities are discussed in Section 4.3.

The elements of the Coord collaboration type are defined in the class diagram depicted on the left hand side of Fig. 3. The Coord collaboration element as well as the Shuttle role with its Mode and Battery status are introduced using the stereotypes ≪collab≫ for collaborations and ≪role≫ for roles. The class diagram also defines the track topology, that is, multiple Track elements connected with each other by the next relationship, as well as the positioning of the Shuttles on the tracks by the on relationship.
Fig. 3. Class diagram of the collaboration type Coord (left); properties of the collaboration type Coord as forbidden SPs (middle and right).

The class diagram of a collaboration type implicitly specifies in form of all valid object configurations for the class diagram the possible states the collaboration may be in. Later on, we define rules that refer to such object configurations to capture the system behavior. We formally define these object configurations as attributed graphs in Section 4.

Fig. 4. Behavior rules for the Shuttle role of the Coord collaboration as SPs.

To capture the laws that should hold for the different collaboration types, we specify behavior rules with Story Patterns (SPs) [45] that define the permitted and mandatory behavior of each role, read rules with SPs having no side effects that define the visibility of shared runtime models, and the properties the collaboration has to ensure. These properties are described by SPs without side effects in the case of simple state properties and with Timed Story Sequence Diagrams (TSSDs) [46] in the case of sequence properties. A major duty for the SoS-level assurance is to ensure that the properties are the guaranteed outcome of the roles’ behavior.

Fig. 4 depicts the behavior rules, that is, the SPs defining the permitted and mandatory behavior of each role of the Coord collaboration (we refer to [47] for the complete set of behavior rules). The SP called move in coordination on the lower right-hand side of Fig. 4, for example, describes that after the building of a
platoon encoded by the existence of the Coord instance, the rear shuttle instance can move with a reduced distance behind the front shuttle instance and therefore, both shuttle instances may even be positioned on the same Track instance. The instance name self used in a rule determines the role of the collaboration, for which this rule is intended, in this example, for the shuttle role (cf. self:Shuttle element). Furthermore, the create coordination SP defines that shuttles must create a collaboration if they are on neighboring tracks and do not yet collaborate (i.e., there is no Coord instance yet).

A simple SP denotes two graphs at once. The first one is the left-hand-side graph $L$ that you try to find in the current system state encoded in the graph $G$ and that consists of all unmarked elements and those marked with $\ll$destroy$\gg$. The second one is right-hand-side graph $R$ that consists of all unmarked elements and those marked with $\ll$create$\gg$. If $L$ can be matched in $G$, the SP rule can be applied. A rule application on $G$ results in the replacement of the match of $L$ in $G$ by $R$. In the case of complex SPs that have a negative application condition (NAC) that defines a graph $L'$ resulting from extending $L$ by all the crossed-out elements. Then, besides finding the left-hand-side graph $L$ in $G$ there must exist no match for the NAC $L'$ in $G$ that extends that match for $L$. Otherwise, the rule cannot be applied.

On the upper right-hand side of Fig. 4, the move SP specifies using such a NAC that shuttles can move forward along the track over time if there is no other shuttle on the next track. Additionally, the SP defines a temporal condition that a shuttle must stay on a track at least ten time units before it can move to the next track. This temporal condition ensures that the move SP can only be applied with respect to realistic physical movement conditions of the shuttles. If the shuttle moves, the on reference is created on the t2 Track and the clock attribute timeAtTrack of the shuttle is reseted to zero. As a consequence, the shuttle has to stay on the next track again at least for ten time units before the move SP can be applied again.

Fig. 5 shows an example of an application of a graph transformation rule. If we consider the instance situation (start graph) on the left-hand side and apply the move SP rule from Figure 4, first a match for the move SP has to be found. Thereby, we can find a match, where the shuttle instance self from Figure 4 is matched to the s1 shuttle instance on the left side in Figure 5. Because there is no other shuttle on the next track t2, the move SP can be applied for the found match with the consequence that the on link from shuttle s1 to track t1 is deleted and a new on link from shuttle s1 to track t2 is created. Thus, we

Fig. 5. Application of the move SP from Figure 4 on an exemplary instance situation.
obtain the instance situation (result graph) as depicted on the left-hand side on Figure 5.

The properties the collaboration type Coord should guarantee are depicted in Fig. 3. We have the forbidden situations collision and missing collaboration that must not happen. Hence, these properties are marked with ¬∃. For example, the collision SP in the middle of Fig. 3 shows the situation where two shuttles that are not collaborating with each other are on the same track, that is, these two shuttles may collide. Furthermore, the missing collaboration SP on the right-hand side of Fig. 3 reflects the faulty situation where two shuttles are on neighboring tracks but they do not collaborate with each other. Both situations have to be excluded to ensure a proper operation of the collaboration. For both instance situations in Figure 5 must hold that all specified properties are fulfilled (that the forbidden collision and missing collaboration SP cannot be matched).

The read rules for the collaboration type Coord are depicted in Fig. 6 using SPs and so called path expressions that allow us to describe the fraction of the runtime models that can be accessed in a more compact form than standard SPs without such path expressions. In general, read rules on the one hand describe what the roles can access (read) but also imply on the other hand that the other roles somehow have to provide the related information. In any case, the self instance name in a read rule that must always be present determines for which role this rule specifies access to other runtime models. The optional provider instance name if present in a rule indicates whether a related role is in charge of providing that information.

The first read rule, called common, describes that it is assumed that a shuttle (marked with the self instance name) has access to the complete track topology because the path expression \( \text{next}[0..\ast] \) denotes any finite path between two Tracks with arbitrary many omitted and thus not visible nodes in between. Looking at the class diagram in Fig. 3, it reveals that the omitted nodes must always be of type Track and thus, the path expression represents all sequences of Tracks connected by next edges. As this read rule does not require any instance of the Coord collaboration, it denotes that each shuttle knows the track topology on its own (a possible implementation would be that each shuttle has a map of the track topology).

The read rule detect-obstacle for the Shuttle role (cf. self instance name) employs the path expression \( \text{next}[0..3] \) to denote a path between two Tracks with 0 to 3 not visible Tracks in between. The provider instance name for the other Shuttle role indicates that this role must provide this fragments of its runtime model. As this read rule does not require any instance of the Coord collaboration, it defines that the shuttles are able to see other shuttles nearby even though
no collaboration has been established yet (a possible implementation can be based on GPS and a related protocol to broadcast position data to the shuttle’s vicinity [48]). The read rule share-mode for the Shuttle role (cf. self instance name) is different as it always requires an instance of the Coord collaboration. Otherwise, it does not allow a shuttle to retrieve (read) the mode of the other Shuttle role. The provider instance name for that Shuttle role indicates that this role must provide this data.

4 Construction

To cover in particular the challenges of the Construction of SoS-Level Interactions for Self-Organization (C2), Construction of SoS-Level Structural Dynamics (C3), Construction of SoS-Level Runtime Knowledge Exchange (C4), Construction of Evolution of Smart SoS (C5), and Scalable Construction of Smart SoS (C6), SMARTSOS supports collaborations with a dynamic number of roles, runtime models, the independent evolution of the autonomous systems and their collaborations, and the specification of individual autonomous systems without having complete knowledge about the overall SoS. These aspects require at first a solid foundation for the concepts used for the construction and assurance of smart SoS. Based on this foundation we then can formally introduce types and instances of collaborations, systems, and SoS as well as the notions of runtime models and overlapping collaborations. Finally, we cover the evolution of smart SoS, that is, the set of types and instances of the SoS evolve (e.g., new types and instances are introduced).

4.1 Foundation

The formal foundation of SMARTSOS can be based on our former results in the context of mUML and experience in formal models for self-adaptive systems [49] and model transformations [50] based on graph transformation systems. In this context, graphs serve as a formal model to represent object configurations capturing the SoS-level architecture and runtime models (see the formal model depicted in Fig. 1) while the graph transformation rules such as SPs denote the behavior of the collaboration roles and graph conditions the required properties. To address various software aspects, we have developed extended attributed graph transformations systems covering real-time [51], probabilistic [52], and hybrid [47,53,54] behavior. These extensions can be used in the formal foundation of SMARTSOS.

In this paper, we will only introduce the basic ideas of the underlying formal model and refer to [54] for more details. The formal model we use can be described as follows:

Typed attributed graphs $G$ with attributes describe the states of our model elements (system of systems, systems, and collaborations). They relate to the possible object configurations that a class diagram $CD$ defines (cf. Figure 3 for the Coord collaboration). We use $G_\emptyset(CD)$ to denote all those possible typed
attributed graphs that fit to a class diagram $CD$ and do not contain any role objects. We will further refer to the empty graph as $G_\emptyset$. An example of an object configuration is depicted in Figure 2, where two shuttles are linked by a Coord collaboration. The corresponding elements can also be found in the formal model depicted on top of Fig. 1.

Sets of graph transformation rules $\mathcal{R}$ define the behavior. They related to the SPs we employed earlier (cf. Figure 4 for the Coord collaboration). Rules $r \in \mathcal{R}$ can match a certain fragment of a graph representing the state and in addition describe how the graph changes when the rule is applied. Given a start graph and a number of rule applications we get a path $\pi$.

Furthermore, a suitable logic for state and sequence properties is assumed and we can describe whether a sequence property $\phi$ holds for a path $\pi$ ($\pi \models \phi$) or for all paths generated by a start graph $G$ and a set of rules $\mathcal{R}$ applied on $G$ ($G, \mathcal{R} \models \phi$). Simple state conditions are specified by SPs without side effects (cf. Fig. 3), while TSSDs [46] can be employed to describe sequence properties.

Additionally, we use a refinement notion for graph transformation rule sets $\mathcal{R}' \subseteq \mathcal{R}$ that guarantees preservation of safety properties while allowing us to extend the rules unless guaranteed behavior will be blocked.

We further exploit the fact that the different elements in our formal model are by construction separated either by their types or so-called pseudo types\footnote{Two rules are separated by their types if they have no node and edge type in common. They are separated by their pseudo types, if for all nodes of shared type holds that always a link to a special node with not shared type at the instance level is demanded.\footnote{The terminology used in [54] has been adjusted and extended in this paper to better fit the concepts of SoS.}}

For two rules separated by their types or pseudo types holds that the behavior cannot interfere in unexpected ways.

### 4.2 Collaborations, Systems, and System of Systems

**Collaborations** Similar to SoaML and mUML, collaborations are the main elements to address the interactions among individual systems in SMARTSOS. However, we need an extended formalization as presented in more detail in [54] to cover also the structural dynamics such as joining a collaboration, leaving a collaboration, or changing the structure of a collaboration.\footnote{The terminology used in [54] has been adjusted and extended in this paper to better fit the concepts of SoS.} At first and in addition to the simplified view depicted in Fig. 1, we have to add extra nodes in the graphs for the role instances of a collaboration:

**Definition 1 (see [54]).** A role type $ro^1$ equals a node type $ro_i$.

In our application example, the Shuttle element of the Coord collaboration is such a role type.

In addition to the basic notion of collaborations used in SoaML/UML and the extended one provided by mUML, we have to cover more information for a collaboration type as depicted in Fig. 1, 2, 3, and 4.
Definition 2 (see [54]). A collaboration type \( \text{Col}_i = (\text{col}_i, (\text{ro}_i^1, \ldots, \text{ro}_i^n), CD_i, R_i, \Phi_i) \) consists of a collaboration type node \( \text{col}_i \), a number of role types \( \text{ro}_i^1 \), an UML class diagram \( CD_i \), a function \( R_i : \{ \text{col}_i, \text{ro}_i^1, \ldots, \text{ro}_i^n \} \to 2^R \) assigning rules to role types, and a guaranteed property \( \Phi_i \).

A collaboration instance of collaboration type \( \text{Col}_i \) is represented by a node of type \( \text{col}_i \). In our example we have the \( \text{Coord} \) and \( \text{Allocate} \) collaboration types (see related dashed oval shapes in Fig. 1) as well as single \( \text{:Coord} \) and \( \text{:Allocate} \) collaboration instances (see related solid oval shapes in Fig. 1).

For two different role types \( \text{ro}_i^k \) and \( \text{ro}_i^l \) the set of assigned rules has to be disjoint \( R_i(\text{ro}_i^k) \cap R_i(\text{ro}_i^l) = \emptyset \). The creation of collaboration instances of collaboration type \( \text{Col}_i \) is only possible through the collaboration type’s roles \( \text{ro}_i^k \) and their assigned behavior \( R_i(\text{ro}_i^k) \). E.g., see the \text{create shuttle} SP in Fig. 4.

The relation among the collaboration \( \text{Col}_i \)'s role types \( \text{ro}_i^1, \ldots, \text{ro}_i^n \) and any additional data types that are used within the collaboration are specified by the class diagram \( CD_i \). The class diagrams of different collaborations have to be separated by different name spaces.

In our example, we have a role type \( \text{Shuttle} \) and its behavior rules are given by the set \{ \text{create shuttle}, \text{move}, \text{create coordination}, \text{move in coordination} \} of SPs as depicted in Fig. 4. The corresponding class diagram \( CD_i \) defines the roles and all the other elements in the rules is depicted on the left-hand side of Fig. 3. The guaranteed property \( \Phi_i \) in our example the and-combination of two forbidden properties \text{collision} and \text{missing collaboration} depicted in the middle and right-hand side of Fig. 3. The read rules that are depicted in Fig. 6 are not explicitly covered in the formal model but the behavioral rules of the systems that realize the roles have to take them into account. This issue will be discussed in Section 4.3.

Within a collaboration many styles of interactions, particularly, synchronous or asynchronous ones can be used. For asynchronous message passing, the following scheme can be employed: an instance of the \( \text{Shuttle} \) role creates a new message (i.e., a node in the graph) and links it to another instance of the \( \text{Shuttle} \) role that should be the receiver of the message. The latter shuttle instance can afterwards process the message that has been linked to this instance. For synchronous interactions, an instance of a role may directly modify links and data of another instance. For example, an instance of the \( \text{Shuttle} \) role may directly changes the \text{mode} of another instance of the \( \text{Shuttle} \) role (cf. Fig. 1).

**Systems** Similar to UML and SoaML, we employ components to represent systems that interact through collaborations by realizing the related roles. Our specification of a system further comprises safety properties that have to be fulfilled by the system’s implementation.

Definition 3 (see [54]). A system type \( \text{Sys}_i = (\text{sys}_i, (\text{ro}_i^1, \ldots, \text{ro}_i^{m_i}), CD_i, R_i, I_i, \Psi_i) \) consists of a system type node \( \text{sys}_i \), a number of role types \( \text{ro}_i^1 \), a class diagram \( CD_i \), a function \( R_i : \{ \text{sys}_i, \text{ro}_i^1, \ldots, \text{ro}_i^{m_i} \} \to 2^R \) assigning rules to role types, a set of initial rules \( I_i \subseteq R_i(\text{sys}_i) \), and a safety property \( \Psi_i \).
A system as an instance of system type \( \text{Sys}_i \) is represented by a node of type \( \text{sys}_i \), which also fulfills the pseudo-typing requirements and thus separates elements from each other that belong to different systems. In our example we have the Shuttle and Station system types (see related dashed boxes in Fig. 1) as well as several :Shuttle and one :Station system of the corresponding types (see related solid boxes in Fig. 1).

All rules of \( \text{Sys}_i \) preserve a pseudo-typing linking of all nodes to \( \text{sys}_i \). The function \( R_i \) is defined as for collaboration types (see Definition 2). The only way a system/instance of type \( \text{Sys}_i \) can be created is through the execution of any of the creation rules in \( I_i \). The system type’s class diagram \( CD_i \) contains all class diagrams of the collaboration types that are used by the system type. Additionally, the system itself represented by a class \( \text{sys}_i \) (node type) and all data types required by the system are contained in \( CD_i \). We further write \( R_i(\text{role}_i^k) \subseteq R_i(\text{sys}_i) \) to refer to the set of all rules that belong to the system \( \text{Sys}_i \)’s implementation of role \( \text{role}_i^k \).

**System of Systems** To cover SoS, we employ system of system types and instances. System of systems combine collaboration and system types to a conceptual unit (depicted by the outer dashed box in Fig. 1).

**Definition 4 (see [54]).** A system of system type \( \text{SoS} = ((\text{Col}_1, \ldots, \text{Col}_n), (\text{Sys}_1, \ldots, \text{Sys}_m)) \) consists of a number of collaborations types \( \text{Col}_i \) and a number of system types \( \text{Sys}_j \).

**Definition 5 (see [54]).** A system of system instance is a pair \( \text{sys} = (\text{SoS}, G_{\text{sys}}) \) with system of system type \( \text{SoS} = ((\text{Col}_1, \ldots, \text{Col}_n), (\text{Sys}_1, \ldots, \text{Sys}_m)) \) and an initial configuration \( G_{\text{sys}} \) that is type conform to \( \text{SoS} \).

As this paper does not include the details of a system type and system of system type for our example, we refer to [47, 54] to obtain these details and an example that cover abstract system specifications and a system of system type.

### 4.3 Runtime Models

As depicted in Fig. 1, in our formal model an idealized view of the context is directly visible and accessible by the shuttle systems. This idealization reflects that the systems handle the related information about the physical and cyber world by means of runtime models and their exchange. The idea of the read rules depicted in Fig. 6 generalizes the concept of [32] to capture the capabilities of sensors and actuators for the physical world as graphs. Consequently, the formal model describes what can be read directly by local sensors or indirectly by the exchange of runtime models reflecting the context or the other systems’ internal states.

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6 A system type uses a collaboration type if it implements a role that has been defined for this collaboration type.
The read rules are not formalized but the behavior rules of the systems have to adhere to them, that is, the rules must not access information that should not be visible to them through local runtime models or the exchange/sharing of runtime models. In the example of Fig. 1, this visible information of the local and shared runtime models relates to the local context as well as the mode and battery status of the shuttle itself, the topology as given by the common read rule, the position of the shuttles nearby as given by the detect-obstacle read rule, and the mode of the other shuttles that are connected by a Coord collaboration instance as given by the share-mode read rule (cf. Fig. 6).

It has to be noted that the outlined formal model is an idealization. It assumes that the systems operate on consistent and not delayed observations and ignore the risk of partial failures. However, it many cases the outlined idealization is quite reasonable. At first, any solution that would not work for the idealization will also likely not work under more realistic assumptions. Secondly, a more detailed design would in particular acknowledge that the effects due to partial failures and delayed and inconsistent observations are limited to the extent which can be tolerated for the considered problem addressed by the collaboration type (e.g., see the protocol developed in [48] that covers the loss of connection while preserving a basis for a safe behavior).

Another issue that has to be taken into account is that even though different collaborations can be employed to talk about different required interactions, as soon as they refer to the same phenomena of the physical or cyber world, the observations in the different collaborations must be consistent. Therefore, we require that in these cases an initial collaboration has to cover the interrelated phenomena of the domain that should be considered in a consistent manner and share these phenomena with the other collaborations.

If other and more specific collaboration types take a subset of the phenomena of the physical or cyber world covered by such an initial collaboration type into account, they have to extend the initial collaboration type. Then, these more specific collaboration types cannot be specified completely separated from each other and the shared one.

**Definition 6.** An overlapping collaboration type $\text{Col}_i = (\text{col}_i, (\text{ro}_{i1}, \ldots, \text{ro}_{in_i}), CD_i, R_i, \Phi_i)$ extending a shared collaboration type $\text{Col}_j = (\text{col}_j, (\text{ro}_{j1}, \ldots, \text{ro}_{jn_j}), CD_j, R_j, \Phi_j)$ consists of a collaboration type node $\text{col}_i$, a number of roles $\text{ro}_{il}$ with $n_i > n_j$ and for all $1 \leq l \leq n_j \; \text{ro}_{il} = \text{ro}_{jl}$, an UML class diagram $CD_i$ extending $CD_j$, a function $R_i : \{\text{col}_i, \text{ro}_{i1}, \ldots, \text{ro}_{in_i}\} \rightarrow 2^R$ extending $R_j$ assigning rules to roles, and a guaranteed property $\Phi_i$.

In our example depicted in Fig. 1, the Allocate collaboration type refines the Coord collaboration type and therefore is aware that the shuttles may move.

### 4.4 Evolution

One aspect of our motivation for this work is that individual systems in a smart SoS are subject to independent changes (evolution), which has to be handled
by construction and assurance. In the following, we will explicitly consider the
modeling of evolution, which is not addressed by SoaML or mUML.

**Definition 7 (see [54]).** An extended evolution sequence is a sequence of system
of systems \((\text{SoS}_1, G^1_S), \ldots, (\text{SoS}_n, G^n_S)\) such that (1) \(\text{SoS}_{i+1}\) only extends \(\text{SoS}_i\) by additional collaboration and system types, (2) \(G^i_S\) is also type conform to \(\text{SoS}_i\), and (2) \(G^{i+1}_S\) can be reached from \(G^i_S\) in the system of system \((\text{SoS}_i, G^i_S)\).

An evolution sequence is a sequence of system of system types \(\text{SoS}_1, \ldots, \text{SoS}_n\)
such that at least one related extended evolution sequence \((\text{SoS}_1, G^1_S), \ldots, (\text{SoS}_n, G^n_S)\) exists.

As presented in [54], type conformance for the introduced evolution concepts can be defined that ensure a proper typing of collaborations, systems, and system of systems.

### 5 Assurance

The problem of assurance for smart SoS is that existing instance-based formal approaches do not scale and are often not applicable to the specific settings of SoS such as openness, dynamic structures, and independent evolution. Thus, the challenges of establishing Assurance of SoS-Level Interactions for Self-Organization (A2), Assurance of SoS-Level Structural Dynamics (A3), and Assurance of Evolution of Smart SoS (A5) and in particular the Scalable Assurance of Smart SoS (A6) and the Assurance of Smart SoS with Restricted Knowledge (A7) are not covered.

Therefore and similar to the mUML approach, we propose establishing the required guarantees for the assurance by referring only to the collaboration and system types rather than to the instance level. For the verification at the type level we show that the correctness proven for the collaboration and system types and only type conformance for the system of systems type will by construction imply that the related correctness also holds at the instance level for any possible configurations of the related system of systems. The scalability of our approach comes from the fact that the size of the type level is independent of the size of the instance level. However, we have to show as a general property of our approach that the results we yield for the type level are also valid for the instance level.

To tackle assurance for the envisioned SMARTSOS approach, we will first address the correctness at the type level looking into collaboration and system types. Then, we will look at the instances of collaboration and system types and show that the correctness established for the types can be transferred to the instances. Afterwards, we outline how the special case of collaborations with overlapping runtime models can be handled. Finally, we cover evolution where the set of types and instances of a SoS may evolve.
5.1 Collaboration and System Types

We start our considerations with defining what we mean by correct types for collaborations and systems (see dashed inner elements in Fig. 1).

**Definition 8 (see [54]).** A collaboration type \( \text{Col}_i = (\text{col}_i, (\text{ro}_1^i, \ldots, \text{ro}_{n_i}^i), CD_i, R_i, \Phi_i) \) is correct if for all initial configurations \( G_I \in G_0(CD_i) \) holds that for \( R_i(\text{col}_i) = R_i(\text{ro}_1^i) \cup \cdots \cup R_i(\text{ro}_{n_i}^i) \cup R_i(\text{col}_i) \) the overall behavior of the collaboration the reachable collaboration configurations are correct: \( G_I, R_i(\text{col}_i) \models \Phi_i \).

Please note that looking only at the behavior of all roles and to consider only the initial object configurations \( G_I \) without any roles is sufficient to cover all possible behavior, as we have a closed model where only the behavior of the roles is allowed to create or delete roles or any other considered elements.

For our example and the behavior rules of the Coord collaboration type as depicted in Fig. 4, it can be formally verified that the collaboration type is correct employing an automated checker (cf. [47, 51]). These checks only work for state properties and operate at the level of the types. Therefore, they do not have to consider the instance situation that would require checking infinite many and arbitrary large object configurations over arbitrary long sequences of steps. Another option that would allow us to cover sequence properties might be to use incomplete techniques such as simulation/testing or bounded or statistical model checking to establish a certain confidence for the correctness of a specific collaboration type.

A correct system type requires that the resulting behavior ensures the guarantees and that the system’s implementation refines the combined role behavior.

**Definition 9 (see [54]).** A system type \( \text{Sys}_i = (\text{sys}_i, (\text{ro}_1^i, \ldots, \text{ro}_{m_i}^i), CD_i, I_i, \Psi_i) \) is correct if for all initial configurations \( G_I \in G_0(CD_i) \) holds that the reachable configurations are correct \( G_I, R_i(\text{sys}_i) \cup \text{COMP}(\text{Sys}_i) \cup I_i \models \Psi_i \) (1) and the system behavior \( R_i(\text{sys}_i) \) refines the orthogonally combined role behavior and creation behavior

\[
R_i(\text{sys}_i) \subseteq R_i(\text{ro}_1^i) \cup \cdots \cup R_i(\text{ro}_{m_i}^i) \cup I_i. \quad (2)
\]

To add the collaboration behavior to the system behavior for each role without the role itself, we employ here \( \text{COMP}(\text{Sys}_i) = \bigcup_{1 \leq j \leq m_i} \text{COMP}(\text{Sys}_i, \text{ro}_j^i) \) with \( \text{COMP}(\text{Sys}_i, \text{ro}_j^i) = R_j(\text{Col}_j) \) which is covered by \( R_i(\text{sys}_i) \) to derive a related closed behavior.

Due to lack of space, we do not discuss an example for a correct system type and refer to [47, 54] for such an example and its formal verification. Again, another option might be to employ incomplete techniques such as simulation/testing or bounded or statistical model checking to establish a certain confidence for the correctness of a specific system type.
5.2 Collaborations and System Instances

After defining our notion of correctness for the types, we have to define the related notion of correctness at the instance level (cf. the solid elements in Fig. 1).

**Definition 10 (see [54]).** A concrete system of system sos = (SoS, G_sos) with system of system type SoS = ((Col_1, ..., Col_n), (Sys_1, ..., Sys_m)) is correct if it holds:

\[ G_s, R(sys_1) \cup \cdots \cup R(sys_m) \cup R(col_1) \cup \cdots \cup R(col_n) \models \Phi_1 \land \cdots \land \Phi_n \land \Psi_1 \land \cdots \land \Psi_m. \]

Then, we can show in the following Theorem 1 that the type conformance of the system of system type and the correctness of collaboration types and system types ensures correctness at the instance level for the system of system.

**Theorem 1 ( [54]).** A system of systems sos = (SoS, G_∅) with system of system type SoS = ((Col_1, ..., Col_n), (Sys_1, ..., Sys_m)) is correct if (1) the system of system type SoS is type conform, (2) all collaboration types Col_1, ..., Col_n are correct, and (3) all system types Sys_1, ..., Sys_m are correct.

Theorem 1 provides sufficient but not necessary conditions to ensure the correctness. It permits us to straightforward establish the required correctness of the types by checking refinement and the guarantees for the properties using the rule sets as employed in condition (2) and (3).\(^7\)

Due to lack of space, we do not present an example for a correct system of system type here and refer to [47, 54] for such an example. In general, at the system of systems level, we only have to collect the evidence for correctness that is provided for the collaboration and system types being part of this system of systems.

5.3 Runtime Models

The sharing of runtime models by a single collaboration type as depicted in Fig. 1 for the Coord collaboration can be covered with the introduced basic concepts for collaborations. Thus, the results of Theorem 1 also apply in such cases and permit us to provide the required assurance. However, this does not hold for overlapping collaborations.

For collaboration types that refine a shared collaboration type we can exploit the following Definition 12 and Lemma 1 that outline under which circumstances the correctness of the composition of all overlapping collaboration types can be derived only on the basis of the correctness of all the overlapping collaboration types, the correctness of the refined shared collaboration type, and the compatibility of their roles.

\(^7\) As outlined in [54] in detail, based on the refinement of the rule sets for the involved roles the result of Theorem 1 can also be extended to abstract system and collaboration types.
Definition 11. An overlapping collaboration type $\text{Col}_i = (\text{col}_i, (\text{ro}_1^i, \ldots, \text{ro}_{n_i}^i), CD_i, R_i, \Phi_i)$ extending the shared collaboration type $\text{Col}_j = (\text{col}_j, (\text{ro}_1^j, \ldots, \text{ro}_{n_j}^j), CD_j, R_j, \Phi_j)$ is correct if for all initial configurations $G_1 \in G_0(CD_i)$ holds that the reachable collaboration configurations are correct $G_1, R_i(\text{col}_i) \models \Phi_j \land \Phi_i$ for $R_i(\text{col}_i) = R_i(\text{ro}_1^i) \cup \cdots \cup R_i(\text{ro}_{n_i}^i) \cup R_i(\text{col}_i)$ the overall behavior of the collaboration and that all added roles refine roles of the refined shared collaboration type: $\forall l \in [n_j + 1, n_i] \exists k \in [1, n_j] R_i(\text{ro}_l^j) \sqsubseteq R_i(\text{ro}_k^i)$.

We can combine a set of overlapping collaboration types of the same shared refined collaboration type to obtain the related resulting collaboration type.

Definition 12. For a set of overlapping collaboration types $\text{Col}_{i_1}, \ldots, \text{Col}_{i_m}$ extending a shared collaboration type $\text{Col}_0 = (\text{col}_0, (\text{ro}_1^0, \ldots, \text{ro}_{n_0}^0), CD_0, R_0, \Phi_0)$ the resulting collaboration type is defined as $\text{Col}_i = (\text{col}_i, (\text{ro}_1^i, \ldots, \text{ro}_{n_i}^i), CD_i, R_i, \Phi_i)$ with a collaboration type node $\text{col}_i$, a set of roles that unites the roles sets of $\text{Col}_0, \text{Col}_{i_1}, \ldots, \text{Col}_{i_m}$, an UML class diagram $CD_i = CD_0 \cup \bigcup_{1 \leq k \leq m} CD_{i_k}$ a function $R_i : \{\text{col}_i, \text{ro}_1^i, \ldots, \text{ro}_{n_i}^i\} \rightarrow 2^R$ extending $R_0$ and all $R_{ik}$ for $1 \leq k \leq m$ assigning rules to roles, and a guaranteed property $\Phi_i = \Phi_0 \land (\land_{1 \leq k \leq m} \Phi_{ik})$.

In a next step we can show with the following Lemma that the resulting collaboration type is correct, if all overlapping collaboration types of the related shared collaboration types are correct.

Lemma 1. If all overlapping collaboration types $\text{Col}_{i_1}, \ldots, \text{Col}_{i_m}$ and the shared refined collaboration type $\text{Col}_0 = (\text{col}_0, (\text{ro}_1^0, \ldots, \text{ro}_{n_0}^0), CD_0, R_0, \Phi_0)$ are correct, then the resulting collaboration type $\text{Col}_i = (\text{col}_i, (\text{ro}_1^i, \ldots, \text{ro}_{n_i}^i), CD_i, R_i, \Phi_i)$ is also correct.

Proof. For any correct overlapping collaboration type $\text{Col}_{i_k} = (\text{col}_{i_k}, (\text{ro}_1^{i_k}, \ldots, \text{ro}_{n_{i_k}}^{i_k}), CD_{i_k}, R_{i_k}, \Phi_{i_k})$ of the shared refined collaboration type $\text{Col}_0 = (\text{col}_0, (\text{ro}_1^0, \ldots, \text{ro}_{n_0}^0), CD_0, R_0, \Phi_0)$ holds that $G_1, R_{i_k}(\text{col}_{i_k}) \models \Phi_0 \land \Phi_{i_k}$. As the extension of each overlapping collaboration type is disjoint and the shared behavior is refining the roles of the shared collaboration, we can conclude that also $G_1, R_i(\text{col}_i) \models \Phi_{i_k}$ will hold. As $\Phi_i = \Phi_0 \land (\land_{1 \leq k \leq m} \Phi_{i_k})$ we only have to combine this finding for all $1 \leq k \leq m$ and get $G_1, R_i(\text{col}_i) \models \land_{1 \leq k \leq m} \Phi_{i_k}$ and thus $G_1, R_i(\text{col}_i) \models \Phi_i$ such that $\text{Col}_i$ is correct. □

Due to Lemma 1 we can now employ Theorem 1 to cover overlapping collaborations.

5.4 Evolution

So far the presented results for assurance do not cover the evolution of SoS. Therefore, we will extend the former results to cover typical evolution scenarios such as adding new collaboration or system types. If we look at our former results in more detail, we can notice that the assumption has been made that all types are known at verification time. This assumption is not true for a steadily
evolving system where new type definitions are added over time. Furthermore, the different organizations involved in an SoS will only have a partial view and thus do not know all currently existing types in the SoS. For a given extended evolution sequence (cf. Definition 7) we can define correctness as follows:

**Definition 13 (see [54]).** An extended evolution sequence \((\text{SoS}_1, G_1^S), \ldots, (\text{SoS}_n, G_n^S)\) with \(\text{SoS}_n = (((\text{Col}_1), \ldots, \text{Col}_p), ((\text{Sys}_1), \ldots, \text{Sys}_q))\) is correct if for any combined path \(\pi_1 \circ \cdots \circ \pi_n\) such that \(\pi_i\) is a path in \(\text{SoS}_i\) leading from \(G_i^S\) to \(G_i^{S+1}\) for \(i < n\) and that \(\pi_n\) is a path in \(\text{SoS}_n\) starting from \(G_n^S\) holds: \(\pi_1 \circ \cdots \circ \pi_n \models \Phi^1 \land \cdots \land \Phi^p \land \Psi^1 \land \cdots \land \Psi^q\). An evolution sequence \(\text{SoS}_1, \ldots, \text{SoS}_n\) is correct if all possible related extended evolution sequence \((\text{SoS}_1, G_1^S), \ldots, (\text{SoS}_n, G_n^S)\) are correct.

A first observation is that \(\text{SoS}_n\) contains all types defined in any \(\text{SoS}_i\). However, for a combined path \(\pi_1 \circ \cdots \circ \pi_n\) such that \(\pi_i\) is a path in \(\text{SoS}_i\) leading from \(G_i^S\) to \(G_i^{S+1}\) for \(i < n\) does not hold in general that an equal path \(\pi\) in \(\text{SoS}_n\) exists that goes through all \(G_i^S\), as the rules added by later added types may influence the possible outcomes if added at the start.\(^8\) Another observation is that the properties guaranteed for newly introduced collaboration or system types have to be true as long as the types have not yet been introduced as otherwise the evolution cannot be correct. We can exploit these observations and construct related collaboration types \(E(\text{Col}_i)\) and system types \(E(\text{Sys}_j)\) encoding that the types come into existence later. Based on this we can then define \(E(\text{SoS}_1, \text{SoS}_n)\) as that system of system type where the types of \(\text{SoS}_n\) not present in \(\text{SoS}_1\) can come into existence later. \(E(\text{SoS}_1, \text{SoS}_n)\) therefore includes all possible combined paths of any possible extended evolution sequences for a given evolution sequence \(\text{SoS}_1, \ldots, \text{SoS}_n\).

We can then use the fact that the related dynamically evolving system of system type includes all possible extended evolution sequences to check also the correctness for all possible evolution sequences.

**Theorem 2 (see [54]).** An evolution sequence of systems \(\text{SoS}_1, \ldots, \text{SoS}_n\) is correct if the related dynamic evolving system of system type \(E(\text{SoS}_1, \text{SoS}_n)\) is correct.

**Lemma 2 (see [54]).** For a correct collaboration type \(\text{Col}\) holds also that its dynamic extension \(E(\text{Col})\) is correct. For a correct system type \(\text{Sys}\) holds also that its dynamic extension \(E(\text{Sys})\) is correct.

Due to Lemma 2, it is sufficient to simply check the collaboration and system types and this already guarantees that any extended evolution sequence will also show correct behavior.

Moreover, due to Theorem 2 and Lemma 2, an organization that wants to extend the system of system type accordingly does not require any knowledge about all the other types besides those which are refined. Furthermore, if two

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\(^8\) For example, in a refined model there may be urgent rules that have to be executed if enabled and thus may preempt other rules when added during the evolution.
independent extensions are done which do not refer to each other, the concrete order of these extensions does not matter as the checks remain the same. Therefore, each organization can simply check its own extension by means of added collaboration and system types without considering when the other extensions are enacted.

Due to lack of space, we do not present an example for a correct system of system type with evolution here and refer to [47,54] for such an example.

6 Discussion

In SMARTSOS, we combine ideas from mUML and EUREMA to tackle the challenges for smart SoS that are discussed in Section 2. A radically different and more abstract perspective on the SoS-level interactions based on runtime models and collaborations is employed to overcome the limitations of the state-of-the-art and former approaches and to master the complexity of smart SoS. In the following, we will discuss which challenges are addressed by the proposed ideas, particularly, by the concepts of collaborations and runtime models, the novelty of these ideas, and the additional benefits of these ideas.

6.1 Runtime Models

As discussed for the envisioned SMARTSOS approach in Section 3 and its formal model in Sections 4 and 5, SMARTSOS employs generic runtime models.

On the one hand, this supports the engineering of the self-adaptation for individual systems in the smart SoS as required by the challenge of Construction/Assurance of Self-Adaptation (C1/A1) (cf. Section 2). Similar to EUREMA, the self-adaptation for each system is implemented in SMARTSOS by a feedback loop with monitor, analyze, plan, and execute activities that operate on the generic runtime models. For instance, the self-adaptive behavior of each shuttle in the large-scale transport system is specified by such feedback loops operating on partially shared runtime models that reflect the shuttle itself and the shuttle’s context (cf. top of the left-hand side of Fig. 2).

On the other hand, SMARTSOS uses the generic runtime models to exchange information between individual collaborating systems, which addresses the challenge of Construction/Assurance of SoS-Level Runtime Knowledge Exchange (C4/A4). This aspect distinguishes SMARTSOS from the state of the art in engineering SoS that employ specific and optimized runtime models without exchanging them among individual systems.

Therefore, SMARTSOS goes beyond the mUML approach and the state of the art by supporting generic runtime models of the contexts and the systems in the SoS. SMARTSOS also goes beyond EUREMA and the state of the art by supporting the runtime exchange of these models between the individual collaborating systems in an SoS. In the context of collaborations, such runtime models reflect agreements between the collaborating systems which is a prerequisite for
jointly achieving the SoS-level goals. Thereby, such collaborations may be established in a self-organizing manner while each system still evolves and self-adapts independently from the other systems in the SoS.

While the generic nature of the runtime models used in SMARTSOS clearly leads to a higher complexity of the models compared to the state of the art, it also leverages a number of benefits: (B1) As a “success in regulation implies that a sufficiently similar model must have been built,” [55], it is consequently unavoidable that the software captures all the relevant variety of the controlled system itself, the requirements, and the context to be able to control their variability effectively. (B2) Herbert A. Simon observed for the example of an ant that “[t]he apparent complexity of its behavior over time is largely a reflection of the complexity of the environment in which it finds itself” [56, p. 52]. Thus, it can be expected that including the physical and cyber environment by runtime models will in fact help to reduce the complexity of the remaining software solution that operates on the basis of these runtime models. Finally, (B3) while specialized solutions that only capture a minimal amount of information about the environments lead to simpler software in the short run, it can be expected that the envisioned generic runtime models without such optimizations result in a direct-mapping [57] between the original (e.g., the system or context) and the model. Such a mapping is usually more stable in the long run and considerably eases interoperability. The latter aspect is a critical issue to achieve open and dynamic collaborations in smart SoS.

6.2 Collaborations

Based on the generic runtime models, SMARTSOS employs open and dynamic collaborations (cf. Section 3) to achieve self-organizing interactions between individual systems of the smart SoS. The collaboration concept of SMARTSOS is also covered in the formal model for the construction and assurance of smart SoS (cf. Sections 4 and 5). In contrast to state of the art approaches, this perspective on the SoS-level interactions addresses the challenges of Construction/Assurance of SoS-Level Interactions for Self-Organization (C2/A2) and Construction/Assurance of SoS-Level Structural Dynamics (C3/A3) (cf. Section 2). Moreover, it is key to address the challenges of Construction/Assurance of Evolution of Smart SoS (C5/A5), Scalable Construction/Assurance of Smart SoS (C6/A6), and Construction/Assurance of Smart SoS with Restricted Knowledge (C7/A7).

In this context, SMARTSOS extends EUREMA that does not consider collaborations at all since EUREMA focuses on centralized and non-distributed systems. In contrast to mUML, SMARTSOS employs open and more dynamic collaborations that are governed by laws supporting self-organization at the SoS level and that support the structural dynamics of smart SoS where, for example, systems may dynamically join or leave the SoS. The collaboration concept of SMARTSOS supports abstracting details of individual systems in the SoS by means of roles, runtime models, and behavioral contracts while distinguishing
the type and instance levels (cf. Section 3). This collaboration concept lever-
ages the independent development, operation, management, and evolution of
these systems (cf. Sections 4 and 5). Thus, the evolution of smart SoS and its
contained systems with respect to construction (cf. Section 4.4) and assurance
(cf. Section 5.4) aspects is supported. By abstraction and explicitly distinguis-
ning the type and instance levels of smart SoS, the construction and assurance
are scalable as they mainly work at the type level – hence abstracting from the
sheer scale and number of different instance situations the SoS can be in. In the
same line of reasoning, the construction and assurance of smart SoS works de-
spite not considering the complete instance situation and thus all details of the
SoS. Therefore, SMARTSOS can handle the restricted knowledge of SoS caused
by multiple authorities governing the SoS.

In general, the collaboration concept of SMARTSOS is motivated by the
beneficial observations that (B4) in our society we have established legal domains
which we consider independent of each other. We can expect that the individuals
behave according to the laws of each of these legal domains independent of the
other domains. This approach allows us to cooperate even though the systems
and legal domains evolve and adapt in principle independently from each other
(cf. law-governed interaction [58]). In the traffic domain, for example, rules for
driving vehicles and related regulations and laws impose what individual drivers
are allowed to do while within these bounds the individuals are free to act. In
our example, the Coord collaboration in Fig. 1 establishes such a solution with
respect to the driving behavior of the shuttles. As another example, individuals
in the traffic domain may establish contracts with each other to allocate parking
slots. In our example, a Shuttle may establish such a contract to have the privilege
to stop at a specific platform of a Station by means of an Allocate collaboration
instance as depicted in Fig. 1.

7 Conclusion and Future Work

In this paper we analyzed the open challenges for the envisioned smart SoS
looking in particular into construction and assurance of such SoS. In this con-
text, we presented our ideas how to tackle this vision with our SMARTSOS ap-
proach, specifically, by employing open and adaptive collaborations and generic
models at runtime. We discussed that by supporting generic runtime models
at the SoS level, the challenge of Construction/Assurance of SoS-Level Run-
time Knowledge Exchange (C4/A4) can be covered by SMARTSOS. Further-
more, based on such runtime models, the SMARTSOS collaboration concept
directly covers the challenges of Construction/Assurance of SoS-Level Interac-
tions for Self-Organization (C2/A2) and Construction/Assurance of SoS-Level
Structural Dynamics (C3/A3). Moreover, it provides the required foundation
to tackle the challenges of Construction/Assurance of Evolution of Smart SoS
(C5/A5), Scalable Construction/Assurance of Smart SoS (C6/A6), and Construc-
tion/Assurance of Smart SoS with Restricted Knowledge (C7/A7). While
SMARTSOS addresses the challenges related to the SoS level, the challenge of
Construction/Assurance of Self-Adaptation (C1/A1) of individual systems in the SoS is mainly addressed by our former work on mUML and EUREMA.

Our plans for future work are to further elaborate SMARTSOS by extending the model-driven EUREMA approach [33] with open and adaptive collaborations and means for the distributed management of runtime models. Additionally, we plan to further strengthen the links between runtime and development-time models [59] and model-driven techniques in runtime scenarios [45].

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References


Regular & Short Papers
Efficient Architecture-Level Configuration of Large-Scale Embedded Software Systems

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Abstract. Configuration is a recurring problem in many domains. In our earlier work, we focused on architecture-level configuration of large-scale embedded software systems and proposed a methodology that enables engineers to configure products by instantiating a given reference architecture model. Products have to satisfy a number of constraints specified in the reference architecture model. If not, the engineers have to backtrack their configuration decisions to rebuild a configured product that satisfies the constraints. Backtracking configuration decisions makes the configuration process considerably slow. In this paper, we improve our earlier work and propose a backtrack-free configuration mechanism. Specifically, given a cycle-free generic reference architecture model, we propose an algorithm that computes an ordering over configuration parameters that yields a consistent configuration without any need to backtrack. We evaluated our approach on a simplified model of an industrial case study. We show that our ordering approach eliminates backtracking. It reduces the overall configuration time by both reducing the required number of value assignments, and reducing the time that it takes to complete one configuration iteration. Furthermore, we show that the latter has a linear growth with the size of the configuration problem.

Keywords: Model-based configuration, CSP, Backtracking, UML/OCL.

1 Introduction

Configuration is a recurring problem in many embedded software system domains such as energy, automotive, and avionics. In these domains, product-line engineering approaches \cite{27, 22} are largely applied to develop various configurations of a reference architecture. Briefly, a reference architecture provides a common, high-level, and customizable structure for all members of the product family \cite{27} by specifying different types of components and configurable parameters, as well as, constraints capturing relationships between these parameters. Through configuration, engineers develop each product by creating component instances and assigning values to their parameters such that the constraints over parameters are satisfied.

Normally, configuring embedded systems involves assigning values to tens of thousands of interdependent parameters, and ensuring their consistency. Typically, 15 to 20 percent of these parameters are interdependent. Finding consistent values for interdependent parameters without any automated support is
challenging. Manual configuration – the common practice in many companies – is time-consuming and error-prone, especially for large-scale systems. During the last three decades, researchers have developed a large number of approaches to automate various configuration use cases [6]. Most of these approaches concern consistency of configuration decisions, and rely on constraint solvers (e.g., [13, 23, 19]) or SAT solvers (e.g., [20]) for ensuring consistency.

In our earlier work [4], we proposed an iterative approach for configuring large embedded systems where at each iteration the value for one parameter is specified. If at some point during configuration, a value assignment violates some constraints, then the engineers may have to backtrack some of their recent choices until they can find a configuration assignment consistent with the constraints in the reference architecture. Backtracking configuration decisions makes the configuration process considerably expensive.

In this paper, we extend our earlier work [4] and propose a new approach that eliminates backtracking during configuration by configuring parameters in a certain order. We explain how such an ordering is extracted from an acyclic reference architecture model, and argue that if the ordering is followed, our algorithm generates consistent and complete configured products without any need to backtrack a decision. We argue that elimination of backtracking considerably improves the performance of our configuration approach. We show this by applying our approach to a simplified excerpt of an industrial case study from the oil and gas domain. The experiment shows that our ordering approach reduces the overall configuration time by both reducing the required number of value assignments, and reducing the time that it takes to complete one configuration iteration. Further, we demonstrate that in our backtrack-free configuration approach the time required for completing one configuration iteration grows linearly with the size of the configuration problem. In our original configuration approach, this time has a quadratic growth.

In the rest of the paper, we first present the related work and position our work in the literature. Section 3 provides an overview of the main concepts in product family modeling and configuration. Our ordering approach for eliminating backtracking, and the resulting backtrack-free configuration algorithm are presented in Section 4. In Section 5, we experimentally evaluate the efficiency and scalability of our approach. A discussion of the potentials and limitations of the work is presented in Section 6. Finally, we conclude the work in Section 7.

2 Related Work

Existing configuration approaches fall into two general categories, non-interactive and interactive. Most configuration approaches belong to the first category,
where the objective is to produce some final configured products without requiring intermediate input from users. They may either find an optimized solution based on some given optimization criteria (e.g., [13, 19]) or find all configuration solutions (e.g., [7, 11, 23]). The non-interactive approaches may either rely on meta-heuristic search approaches [14, 16, 21], or on systematic search techniques used in constraint solvers [9, 10, 18], or on symbolic decision procedures [8]. Among these, meta-heuristic search approaches are generally faster and require less memory. However, since meta-heuristic search is stochastic and incomplete, it cannot support an interactive process where engineers have to be provided with precise and complete guidance information at each iteration.

Interactive configuration methods (e.g., [17, 20, 30, 31]) mostly rely on constraint solvers or symbolic reasoning approaches. Backtracking is required whenever an inconsistency arises, even though it may make the process considerably slower. In general, constraint solvers alleviate the drawbacks of backtracking by employing heuristics such as back-jumping [12], identifying no-goods constraints [1, 2], and ordering the search [15]. None of these improvements, however, totally eliminates the possibility of backtracking. In addition, it is open whether these heuristics can be tailored to interactive configuration solutions.

Some more recent interactive configuration approaches [17, 30] have eliminated backtracking by adding an offline preprocessing phase to configuration, during which all consistent configurations are computed and used to direct the user during the interactive phase, preventing the user to make any decision that gives rise to an inconsistency. These approaches only scale when the space of all consistent configurations can be encoded and computed within the available memory. In the case of large-scale embedded software systems, the complexity of constraints and the size of the configuration space is so large\(^2\), making it impossible to compute the set of all possible configurations in an offline mode.

In our work, using information provided in reference architecture model, we identify an ordering over variables and show that by following this ordering, backtracking does not arise during the configuration of a single product. Our approach applies to architecture-level configuration of embedded software systems with architectural dependencies and constraints specified in First-Order Logic (FOL) [29]. Computation of ordering in our work is fast and performed based on static analysis of architectural models and the constraints syntax.

\section{Preliminaries}

The work presented in this paper is based on a model-based configuration framework presented in [4]. In this section, we present the reference architecture model, and exemplify the main concepts in modeling and configuration of embedded software systems. In addition, we propose the notion of a configuration tree.

\(^2\) Creating a product usually involves configuring tens of thousands of parameters. The configuration space, which is in fact the combinatorial space created for these parameters is, as well, significantly large.
3.1 The reference architecture model

In our approach, a reference architecture model defines a hierarchy of component types. Each component has a number of configurable parameters, and may as well contain other configurable elements. We consider configurable parameters as one type of configurable elements. Furthermore, the reference architecture model specifies constraints among the configurable parameters. The SimPL methodology [5] is an approach for creating such reference architecture models. As mentioned earlier, during configuration, products are created by creating component instances and configuring their parameters. In the following, we explain components as the main building blocks of products, and constraints as they play a key role in ensuring the consistency of products. A complete specification of the reference architecture model and its formal semantics is given in [4].

3.1.1 Components

Each component in a product is an instance of a component type in the corresponding reference architecture. We define a component $c$ as a tuple $(id, V)$, where $id$ is a unique identifier, and $V$ is a set of configurable elements. Each configurable element in $V$ is a tuple $e = (id_e, t_e)$, where $id_e$ is the name of the element, and $t_e$ is the type of the element. Figure 1 gives a grammar for the types of elements in $V$.

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fig.1. A simplified grammar for types.
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In Figure 1, primitive_type represents a set of terminals for primitive types ‘integer’ and ‘boolean’ (we do not consider ‘strings’), and user_defined_type denotes a set of terminals each corresponding to a component type defined in the reference architecture model.

Configurable elements of a primitive type or a referenced type represent configurable parameters. A configurable element of a user defined type represents a sub-component of $c$ (i.e., the sub-component is a component $c' = (id', V')$ itself).

3.1.2 Constraints

Let $c = (id, V)$ be a component. We use $\Phi_{id}$ to denote the set of constraints defined in the context of $c$ (i.e., specifying relations among elements of $c$). Each member of the set $\Phi_{id}$ is a boolean expression denoting a constraint $\phi$. A simplified grammar for the language of boolean expressions is given in Figure 2. This grammar maps to a subset of the Object Constraint Language (OCL) [26] that we use in the SimPL methodology. The grammar allows the basic OCL
operators including for-all, exists, arithmetic, relational and logical operators. In Figure 2, \textit{FA} represents the universal quantifier, which maps to OCL forAll operator. Similarly, \textit{EX} represents the existential quantifier, which maps to OCL exists operator.

\begin{verbatim}
bool_expr ::= bool_term (OR bool_term)*;
bool_term ::= bool_factor (AND bool_factor)*;
bool_factor ::= bool_literal | bool_qName | var |
\quad (' bool_expr ') | rel_expr | NOT bool_factor |
\quad FA (' var in ' array_qName ',' bool_expr ')
\quad EX (' var in ' array_qName ',' bool_expr ')
rel_expr ::= num_expr (GT | LT | GEQ | LEQ | EQ | NEQ) num_expr;
num_expr ::= num_term ((PLUS | MINUS) num_term)*;
num_term ::= num_factor ((MUL | DIV) num_factor)*;
num_factor ::= num_literal | int_qName | var |
\quad (' num_expr ') | NEG num_factor;
\end{verbatim}

Fig. 2. A simplified grammar of boolean formulas.

Three types of qualified names (i.e., \textit{bool}_qName, \textit{int}_qName, and \textit{array}_qName) are used in the production rules of the grammar given in Figure 2. Qualified names together with literals and operators create numerical, relational, and boolean expressions. Qualified names of numerical types (i.e., integer or a user defined enumeration) form one type of numerical factors and are used in creating relational expressions. Qualified names of type boolean form one type of boolean factors. Qualified names representing collections of items can be combined with set quantifiers (i.e., for all and exists) to form another group of boolean factors. In addition to these, variables (i.e., \textit{var}) may be used as integer or boolean factors. Variables are used in combination with quantifiers.

### 3.1.3 A configuration example

Figure 3 is a class diagram showing an excerpt of a simplified reference architecture for a family of subsea oil production systems. It is part of a larger case study, which is presented in [5, 4]. Each class in Figure 3 represents a component type, and each attribute in a class represents a configurable parameter. In addition, two OCL constraints are defined in the context of class ElectronicConnections.

To make a product, one has to create and configure an instance of a 	extit{XmasTree}. To do so, engineers have to specify the number of electronic boards on each of the Subsea Electronic Modules\(^3\) (SEMs) by initializing the \textit{eBoards} array in each of the two SEMs (each XmasTree instance has two SEM instances) and assign a value to each item in those arrays, create a number of electronic connections by setting the size of array \textit{myConnections}, and assigning values to \textit{relatedSEM}, \textit{pinIndex} and \textit{blIndex} attributes of each ElectronicConnection instance.

\(^3\) A Subsea Electronic Module is an electronic unit, with software deployed on it. It is the main component in a subsea control system.
Example 1. Suppose that, at some point in the configuration of a product, a user configures an ElectronicConnection by first setting its \textit{bIndex} to 5, then setting its \textit{pinIndex} to 20, and finally setting its relatedSEM to one of the SEM instances. At this point, if the chosen SEM instance has less than 5 electronic boards, or its \textit{eBoards[5]} is less than 20, an inconsistency happens. In this case, the user has to backtrack to fix the inconsistency, for example by changing the value of \textit{pinIndex} or \textit{bIndex}. Alternatively, to eliminate backtracking, the user can first configure \textit{relatedSEM}, then assign a value to \textit{bIndex}, and finally configure \textit{pinIndex}.

In this paper, based on a static analysis of the constraints, we propose an approach for identifying configuration orderings that eliminate backtracking.

3.2 The configuration tree

A product is usually represented by a configuration tree. We denote a configuration tree by a tuple \((N, E)\), where \(N\) is the set of nodes, and \(E\) is the set of edges of the tree. In our approach, each node in a configuration tree has a type and a value, and each edge has a label. The type of a node belongs to the language of types in Figure 1. Based on this, we identify four types of nodes: primitive nodes, component nodes (if the node is typed by a user defined type), reference nodes, and array nodes. Figure 4 shows two example configuration trees.

Primitive nodes and reference nodes represent configurable parameters, and are always leaf nodes in the tree. The value of a leaf node must conform to its type. A missing value for a leaf node means that the corresponding configurable parameter is not yet configured. Nodes \texttt{m13} and \texttt{m15} in Figure 4-(b) are primitive and reference nodes, respectively. Both nodes are unconfigured.

Each array node has a child node of type ‘int’, which is connected to it by an edge labeled ‘size()’. We refer to this node as the array’s size node. An array node is called \textit{uninitialized} if its size node does not have a value, and is called \textit{initialized} otherwise. An initialized array node of size \(n\), and type \textit{‘single_type[]’} has \(n\) additional child nodes. Each of these child nodes is typed by \textit{‘single_type’}, and is connected to the array node via an edge labeled ‘\textit{at(i)}’, where \(i\) is an integer in \([1..n]\). Node \texttt{m2} in Figure 4-(a) is an initialized array node of size two.

A component node represents a component. Such a node is typed by a user defined type, and its value is the identifier of the corresponding component. Let

Fig. 3. An excerpt of the reference architecture model of a subsea oil production system.
Fig. 4. Configuration subtrees representing two components. Text inside a circle represents the type and value (in parenthesis) of the node. The text next to a node is a unique name to refer to the node in our explanation of the approach. (a) an instance of XmasTree, and (b) an instance of ElectronicConnection.

$m$ be the component node representing the component $c = (id, V)$. For each $(id_c, t_c) \in V$, there is a child node for $m$ typed by $t_c$ and connected to $m$ via an edge labeled $id_c$. Node $m1$ in Figure 4-(a) is a component node of type XmasTree, representing a component with identifier xt1. To avoid cluttering, we have not shown the type of the component (i.e., XmasTree) in the text inside node $m1$. The subtree beneath $m1$ shows the configurable elements of xt1. None of these elements are configured in Figure 4-(a). One possible partial configuration is given in Figure 5.

Fig. 5. One possible partial configuration of node $m1$ in Figure 4-(a).

4 The configuration process

Our model-based configuration approach presented in [4] validates configuration decisions automatically and interactively. For this purpose, we use the config-
uration tree and the constraints defined in the reference architecture model to create a constraint network [24]. A constraint network is a finite set of variables, each associated with a finite domain of discrete values, and a number of constraints over those variables. The problem of finding a consistent configuration maps to a constraint satisfaction problem, where the objective is to find a consistent assignment of values to all the variables in the constraint network. Each configurable parameter (a leaf node in the configuration tree) maps to a variable in the constraint network. The domain of the variable corresponding to configurable parameter \( p \) is a finite set of literals that can be assigned to \( p \). Each constraint in the reference architecture model is rewritten in terms of the variables in the constraint network, and is added to the constraint network. During configuration, new variables or constraints may be added to the constraint network. We call this the dynamic growth of the constraint network.

To ensure the consistency of configuration decisions, we use constraint propagation over finite domains [28]. Constraint propagation provides a sound approximation of consistency: it does not eliminate any consistent solution, but it may fail to identify all inconsistent value-assignments. In other words, constraint propagation prunes the search space, but it does not enumerate all possible solutions. The benefit of using constraint propagation is that it is fast, and therefore applicable in an interactive context. Its drawback is that it does not eliminate all inconsistent value-assignments, and therefore, backtracking may be needed to ensure consistency. This can be avoided by imposing some restrictions on the reference architecture model of the product family. In particular, the model of the product family should not contain any cyclic constraints.

Another reason for requiring backtracking in our original configuration approach is the dynamic growth of the constraint network. New constraints that are added to the constraint network may be inconsistent with some of the previously made decisions. To avoid this, we configure parameters in a particular order. In the following, before presenting our approach for ordering configuration decisions, we first present the notion of qualified names. Then, based on the proposed ordering approach, we present a backtrack-free configuration algorithm.

4.1 Qualified names

Figure 6 shows a grammar for qualified names. A qualified name (e.g., int_qName) represents a typed variable (e.g., a configurable parameter) and may represent an individual item (e.g., int_qName) or a collection of items (i.e., array_qName). The last rule in Figure 6 is added to explicitly define int_qName and bool_qName as primitive qualified names. Primitive qualified names represent configurable parameters, and together with array qualified names are used in the grammar of boolean expressions in Figure 2.

A qualified name can be created by traversing a configuration tree. Let \( CT \) be a configuration tree, and \( n \) be a node representing a component \( c = (id, V) \) in the configuration tree. Each node \( n' \) in the subtree rooted at \( n \) can be uniquely identified by a string created using \( id \) and edge labels. To do so, we start with
string \( \text{str} = "\text{id}" \), and follow the edges that bring us to \( n' \). After traversing each edge, we concatenate \( \text{str} \) with \( \text{".l"} \), where \( l \) is the label of the last traversed edge\(^4\). Using this approach each node in the tree may be represented by more than one string, depending on the starting node. A string should always start with the label of a component node.

\[
\begin{align*}
1 \text{ int\_qName} & \ ::= \text{element\_qName}'\cdot\text{int\_prop\_name} | \\
2 \quad \text{array\_qName} & \ ::= \text{".size\() \ | \\
3 \quad \text{int\_factor} & \ ::= \text{int\_literal} | \text{int\_qName}; \\
4 \quad \text{int\_array\_qName} & \ ::= \text{int\_factor} | \\
5 \quad \text{element\_qName} & \ ::= \text{element\_qName}'\cdot\text{int\_array\_prop\_name}; \\
6 \quad \text{element\_id} & \ ::= \text{component\_id} | \\
7 \quad \text{element\_prop\_name} & \ ::= \text{element\_qName}'\cdot\text{element\_prop\_name} | \\
8 \quad \text{element\_array\_qName} & \ ::= \text{element\_array\_qName}'\cdot\text{element\_array\_prop\_name}; \\
9 \quad \text{bool\_qName} & \ ::= \text{element\_qName}'\cdot\text{bool\_prop\_name}; \\
10 \quad \text{bool\_array\_qName} & \ ::= \text{bool\_array\_qName}'\cdot\text{bool\_array\_prop\_name}; \\
11 \quad \text{array\_qName} & \ ::= \text{array\_qName} | \text{bool\_array\_qName}; \\
12 \quad \text{element\_array\_qName} & \ ::= \text{element\_array\_qName}; \\
13 \quad \text{primitive\_qName} & \ ::= \text{int\_qName} | \text{bool\_qName};
\end{align*}
\]

Fig. 6. The grammar of qualified names.

4.1.1 Semantically valid qualified names
Let \( CT \) be a configuration tree representing a possibly partially-configured product derived from a given reference architecture. A subset of the qualified names created using the grammar in Figure 6 are semantically valid with respect to the configuration tree \( CT \). We use \( Q(CT) \) to denote this subset. A qualified name \( q \) belongs to \( Q(CT) \) iff one of the following holds:

- \( q \) is the label of a component node in \( CT \),
- \( q = q_1.t \), where \( q_1 \in Q(CT) \), and \( q_1 \) represents a component \( c = (id, V) \), such that \( t \) is the name of an element in \( V \),
- \( q = q_1[q_2] \), where \( q_1 \in Q(CT) \), \( q_1 \) represents an arrayed element, and \( q_2 \) is either an integer literal or a semantically valid qualified name representing an integer parameter,
- \( q = q_1.size() \), where \( q_1 \in Q(CT) \), and \( q_1 \) is an arrayed element.

4.1.2 Mapped and unmapped qualified names
Let \( CT \) be a configuration tree, and \( q \) be a semantically valid qualified name in \( Q(CT) \). If \( q \) corresponds to a node in \( CT \), then we call \( q \) a mapped qualified name, otherwise, it is called an unmapped qualified name. A qualified name \( q \) is unmapped if any of the following conditions holds:

\(^4\) In the rest of this paper, for the sake of conciseness, we use \( a[i] \) to denote \( a.at(i) \), where \( a \) represents an array node in the configuration tree, and \( i \) is an integer literal.
– a prefix of $q$ maps to an unconfigured reference node,
– $q$ is of the form $q_1[q_2]$, where $q_2$ represents an unconfigured parameter,
– $q$ is of the form $q_1[q_2]$, where $q_1$ is an uninitialized array ($q_1\.size()$ is not configured).

In each case, a parameter is unconfigured. For a semantically valid unmapped qualified name $q$, we use $U(q)$ to denote the set of all such unconfigured parameters. For a qualified name $q$ mapped to a leaf node, we use $M(q)$ to denote the corresponding configurable parameter.

Let $CT$ be the configuration tree in Figure 5. Then $xt1\.mySEM[1]$ is mapped, and $sem1\.eBoards[1]$ is an unmapped semantically valid qualified name in $Q(CT)$. An unmapped qualified name can become mapped as parameters are configured and the tree is expanded. For example, $sem1\.eBoards[1]$ becomes mapped after configuring the size of $sem1\.eBoards$.

### 4.2 Ordering configuration decisions

Example 1 in Section 3.1.3 shows an example of inconsistencies that arise due to the dynamic growth. In this example, the two constraints in Figure 3 cannot be evaluated until $relatedSEM$ is configured. This is because $relatedSEM\.eBoards$, appeared in both constraints, is unmapped as it does not correspond to a unique node in the tree. By configuring $relatedSEM$ both constraints become ready-to-evaluate, can be added to the constraint network, and can be used in constraint propagation to validate the values assigned to $pinIndex$ and $blIndex$ or to eliminate inconsistent values for them if they were not configured. We call a constraint that is not yet ready-to-evaluate, a pending constraint. Such a constraint contains one or more unmapped qualified names and is pending on one or more parameters to be configured. These parameters should be configured to make the unmapped qualified names mapped. For example, the constraints in Example 1 are pending on $relatedSEM$ to be configured. In each configuration iteration, each constraint is either pending or ready-to-evaluate. Figure 7 shows the state transition diagram of a constraint. As a consequence of configuring parameters, a pending constraint may become ready-to-evaluate. Only ready-to-evaluate constraints can be included in the constraint network.

Consider the $i$th step of configuration and let $c$ be a pending binary constraint, containing two qualified names $q_1$ and $q_2$. Suppose that $q_1$ is unmapped, and $q_2$ is mapped to the configurable parameter $p$ (i.e., $M(q_2) = p$). This parameter cannot be configured until $c$ becomes ready-to-evaluate (i.e., until $q_1$ becomes a mapped qualified name). We refer to such a parameter as a pending parameter. Let parameters $p_1, ..., p_n$ be the parameters that should be configured to make $q_1$ a mapped qualified name (i.e., $U(q_1) = \{p_1, ..., p_n\}$). To eliminate backtracking, parameter $p$ should be configured after all $p_i$s are configured. This is shown in Figure 8. Before a parameter reaches the state ready, the set $X$, which is the set of all $p_i$s as described above, should be empty. As shown in Figure 8, a parameter can be configured only when it is in state ready. Note that, as suggested by the formulation of $X$, in general $p$ may be involved in more than one constraint.
In other words, in each configuration iteration, the set of all unconfigured parameters is partitioned into two sets: pending and ready-to-configure parameters. This partitioning of parameters, together with the stepwise configuration, which in each iteration may add new unconfigured parameters to the system, imposes an ordering on the configuration decisions. Note that, in each iteration, there is no ordering among the ready-to-configure parameters. The acyclic property of the reference architecture model guarantees that every parameter eventually reaches the state ready.

4.3 Backtrack-free configuration

Algorithm 1 is our backtrack free configuration algorithm, which implements the ordering approach explained above. Input to the algorithm is a cycle-free reference architecture, which contains a class diagram and a set of constraints. The output is a configuration tree CT. We maintain three sets of parameters: configured (C), ready-to-configure (R), and pending parameters (P); and two sets of constraints: ready-to-evaluate (Φ), and pending (Φ′) constraints. Using the input reference architecture model, we initialize all these sets and the configuration tree in line 1 of the algorithm.

![Fig. 7. States of constraint c = φ(q1, q2).](image)

![Fig. 8. States of parameter p. X is {p′ | ∃c = φ(q1, q2). p′ ∈ U(q1) ∧ M(q2) = p}.](image)

**Algorithm 1. BTFreeConfig**

**Input:** A reference architecture RA  
**Output:** a configuration tree CT  
1 (CT, C, R, P, Φ, Φ′) ← initializeConfigurationProblem(RA)  
2 D ← computeValidDomains(C, R, Φ)  
3 while R ≠ ∅ do  
4 read(i) \(\triangleright \) i: INDEX OF THE SELECTED UNCONFIGURED PARAMETER  
5 read(v) \(\triangleright \) VALUE TO BE ASSIGNED TO THE SELECTED PARAMETER  
6 \(\triangleright \) v must be in \(D[i]\) (THE DOMAIN OF THE SELECTED PARAMETER)  
7 while not \(v \in D[i]\) do  
8 read(v)  
9 applyConfiguration(CT, C, R, P, Φ, Φ′, i, tmp)  
10 D ← updateValidDomains(C, R, Φ)  
11 if some domains in D are empty then  
12 throwException()  
13 return CT
In line 2, domains of the unconfigured parameters are computed using the routine `computeValidDomains`. In this routine, we use a constraint solver to prune the domains by removing values that are inconsistent with one or more constraints in $\Phi$ or some values in $C$. Note that only the ready-to-evaluate constraints and their variables are considered when pruning the domains (i.e., $P$ and $Q$ are not included in the computation).

The while loop in lines 3-12 repeats while there are some ready-to-configure parameters (i.e., $R \neq \emptyset$). In each iteration, one parameter is configured. Both the parameter and its value are selected by the human user in lines 4 and 5 of the algorithm. Lines 7 and 8 guarantee that the selected value is within the domain of the selected parameter and is, therefore, consistent. As a result of assigning a value $v$ to a parameter $R[i]$, one or more of the following may happen:

- new nodes may be added to the configuration tree, therefore new elements may be added to $R$ and $P$
- if a constraint is pending on $R[i]$, it may become ready-to-evaluate, and
- some of the parameters that are pending on $R[i]$ may become ready for configuration. We move them to the set of ready-to-configure parameters $R$.

These actions are performed in line 9 by calling the routine `applyConfiguration`. The constraint solver is again invoked in line 10 to update the valid domains. If some domains become empty, the algorithm throws an exception in line 12. Otherwise, it continues to the next iteration. Eventually, a completely and consistently configured configuration tree is returned in line 13.

In [4], we showed that our original configuration algorithm produces complete and consistent products. A product is complete if it does not contain any unconfigured parameters, and is consistent if it satisfies all the constraints in the reference architecture model. In our technical report [3], we have shown that Algorithm 1 produces complete and consistent products, but without requiring backtracking. In other words, for any given acyclic reference architecture model, Algorithm 1 terminates without ever reaching line 12.

### 5 Evaluation

To evaluate the efficiency brought by our ordering approach, we performed an experiment using the reference architecture model presented in Figure 3. For this purpose, 1600 random configuration scenarios were created (800 scenarios for each of our original and backtrack-free configuration approaches). In each case, we started by configuring three parameters that identify the size of the configuration problem, then randomly configured the rest of the parameters. The first three parameters were configured as listed in Table 1. This is done merely to control the number of parameters in each case to simplify the analysis of the results. For each case in Table 1, we randomly generated 100 sample configuration scenarios using our original configuration approach, and 100 sample configuration scenarios using the backtrack-free configuration approach. Figure 9 shows the average response time in each iteration for both cases.
In our original configuration approach, a complete configuration iteration, in addition to validating the decision and propagating it, may involve several decision roll-backs, and is therefore time consuming. On the other hand, a complete configuration iteration in the backtrack-free configuration approach involves validating and propagating the decision, and updating the ordering (i.e., updating lists of pending constraints and parameters). By using the ordering, we eliminate all the roll-backs and their costs. This explains why for most cases in Figure 9, an average iteration in the original configuration approach takes much longer than that in the backtrack-free configuration approach. This experiment shows that for configuration scenarios with more than 50 parameters, the time overhead of computing the ordering is negligible compared to the time that should otherwise be spent on rolling-back the decisions.

In our original configuration approach, for fixing an inconsistency, in addition to rolling back some of the decisions, new values must be assigned to the parameters that might have caused that inconsistency. In our experiment, on average 23.6 different values were tried per parameter to achieve a consistent configuration. This high number is a result of our current naive implementation of backtracking. By exploiting heuristics such as back jumping [12], this number can be reduced significantly. Table 2 shows the number of decisions that were needed to achieve a consistent configuration.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th># Parameters</th>
<th># Elect.</th>
<th># eBoards on SEMs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>2,3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>4,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>6,10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>125</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>12,14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>150</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>17,25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>175</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>11,14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>200</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>25,25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1. Configuration settings.

Fig. 9. A comparison of the average response time for our original and backtrack-free configuration approaches.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th># Parameters</th>
<th>25</th>
<th>50</th>
<th>75</th>
<th>100</th>
<th>125</th>
<th>150</th>
<th>175</th>
<th>200</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Avg. # Decisions</td>
<td>174.85</td>
<td>949.60</td>
<td>1773.49</td>
<td>2678.15</td>
<td>3426.29</td>
<td>2112.34</td>
<td>6301.47</td>
<td>3842.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avg. Ratio</td>
<td>6.99</td>
<td>18.99</td>
<td>23.65</td>
<td>26.78</td>
<td>27.41</td>
<td>14.08</td>
<td>36.00</td>
<td>19.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Avg. Ratio (average number of decisions per parameter)</td>
<td>23.62</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2. Overhead of backtracking.
To provide a better insight into the time complexity of our configuration approaches, we performed another experiment. The result of this experiment is shown in Figures 10 and 11. In each case, we measured the average response time for randomly generated configuration scenarios. Figure 10 shows that for our original approach the response time (i.e., the time that it takes to complete one configuration iteration) grows quadratically with the size of the configuration problem (i.e., the number of configurable parameters). On the other hand, as shown in Figure 11, in the case of our backtrack-free configuration approach, this growth is linear with the size of the configuration problem.

![Figure 10](image1.png)  
**Fig. 10.** Quadratic growth of the average response time in our original configuration approach.

![Figure 11](image2.png)  
**Fig. 11.** Linear growth of the average response time in our backtrack-free configuration approach.

Furthermore, Figure 11 gives an insight into the usability of our backtrack-free configuration approach. According to a study reported in [25], 0.1 second is about the limit for having the user feel that the system is reacting instantaneously. Figure 11 shows that our backtrack-free configuration approach can respond instantly even for configuration problems with up to 2000 parameters.

6 Discussion

Normally, backtracking is used to explore the search space, in order to resolve inconsistencies, or to find all solutions. In our configuration approach [4], we use backtracking to resolve inconsistencies that may arise while configuring a single product. Analyzing configuration scenarios shows that, in our approach, most of these inconsistencies are due to early configuration of parameters that are involved in some pending constraints. By delaying the configuration of such parameters, using our ordering approach, we can prevent inconsistent configurations. One should note that our approach cannot generally eliminate backtracking for every use-case, such as enumerating all configurations, or resolving inconsistencies that may arise due to cyclic constraints.

For our backtrack-free configuration approach to be able to produce consistent and complete products, the input reference architecture model must be
cycle-free. In particular, to guarantee the termination of the configuration algorithm, the component hierarchy must be acyclic. Achieving this property for embedded software systems, where the software architecture follows, to a great extent, the architecture of hardware, is straightforward. To guarantee consistency, without requiring backtracking, the model should contain no cyclic constraints. Whether this restriction can negatively affect the applicability of our approach is a question that requires further investigation. Identifying the likelihood of embedded systems with cyclic constraints and proposing heuristics for ensuring their consistency with a minimum number of backtracks is left for future work. Finally, our proposed ordering approach may introduce some rigidity. Whether this rigidity affects usability negatively or not is an open question that should be studied in future.

7 Conclusion

Constraint solving is generally used to ensure consistency of configurations, which are an essential part of software development in today’s industries. A drawback of these techniques is the need for backtracking, which in the case of interactive configuration drastically hampers usability. In this paper, we proposed a partial ordering over the configurable parameters. The ordering is derived from a static analysis of the constraints between the parameters. Using the ordering approach, we have implemented a backtrack-free configuration tool. We performed a number of experiments using a case study from an industry partner. Results of our experiments show that our backtrack-free configuration tool ensures consistency, while preventing the need for backtracking. Furthermore, our approach significantly reduces the overall configuration time.

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References

Linear Evolution of Domain Architecture in Service-Oriented Software Product Lines

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Abstract. In service-oriented software product lines, when a change occurs in the business process variability model, designing the domain architecture from scratch imposes costs of re-architecture, high costs of change in the domain-level assets; and high costs of change in many products based on the new domain architecture. In this paper, focusing on the linear evolution scenario in service-oriented product lines, which refers to propagating changes in some assets to some other assets, both in the domain level, we deal with the problem of propagating changes in domain requirements (the business process variability model) to the domain architecture level, in a cost-optimal and consistency-preserving way. We present a method to suggest the optimal change propagation options to reach the aforementioned goals. The method showed promising to provide minimal change costs as well as to fully preserve consistency of the target models if no human intervention exists in the change propagation results.

Keywords: variability. service-oriented product line. linear evolution. Pareto optimization. consistency.

1 Introduction

A software product line is a collection of software-intensive systems that share common properties and are developed aiming at meeting specific market needs or special missions based on a set of core assets [1]. Indeed, a software product line contains a family of software systems that share a number of common functionalities and a number of variable ones. To address the common and variable functionalities, reusable core assets (such as requirements, design artifacts, components, test cases, etc.) are developed, which can be reused by different members of the family[2].

There are two main lifecycles in software product line engineering: domain engineering and application engineering[3]. In the domain engineering lifecycle, the main emphasis is on defining the commonalities and the differences, or in other words determining variability among the aimed products, based on which, the reusable artifacts (the core assets) are developed or obtained. Meanwhile, in application engineering, the core assets are reused in developing particular products of the product line, using the common (mandatory) product elements
and selecting optional and variant product elements, both determined in domain engineering lifecycle.

In a service-oriented software product line, the software architecture building blocks are services, which are identified and specified based on the business processes[4]. The business processes are continually changing and hence, a domain engineer may decide to reflect the changes of the business processes to other artifacts in the software product line. Such a change, therefore, can widely affect artifacts both in the domain and application engineering lifecycles [3].

In general, changing or evolution of a software product line can take place in terms of one or a combination of six evolution scenarios, namely, linear evolution, synchronization, merge, propagation, cloning and derivation [5] (see Table 1). These evolution scenarios are different in the change source and change target. For instance, in the linear evolution scenario, the change source and the change target are both in the domain-level.

Table 1: SPL evolution scenarios [5]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scenario</th>
<th>Change Source</th>
<th>Change Target</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Linear Evolution</td>
<td>Domain Variability Models</td>
<td>Domain Variability Models</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Synchronization</td>
<td>Domain Variability Models</td>
<td>Product Configurations</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Merge</td>
<td>Product Configurations</td>
<td>Domain Variability Models</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Propagation</td>
<td>Product Configurations</td>
<td>Other Product Configurations</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cloning</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>New Product Configuration</td>
<td>Based on current product configurations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Derivation</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>New Product Configuration</td>
<td>Based on domain variability models</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The scope of research in this paper includes the linear evolution scenario, to propagate changes in a service-oriented software product line, from the requirements-level variability model (which is the business process variability model) to the architecture-level variability model (which mainly includes the variability of services). One way to achieve the mentioned propagation is re-architecting the target architecture model back from scratch based on the changed domain requirements. However, using this way will impose costs, not only for the re-architecture itself, but also for providing new single services and service compositions that may be too distant from their previous versions, and thus will result to: (A) wide changes in the core assets in the domain level; and hence, (B) wide changes in the products that are built by reusing them.

On this basis, in this research we aim to: “propose a semi-automatic method for linear evolution of service-oriented architecture-level variability model due to the changes in the business process variability model in a way that the costs of change are minimized and that the consistency of the changed model is preserved”.

To reach this goal, we were inspired by the MAPE-K control loop which is widely adopted in software adaptation in response to changes [6] and we made use of multi-objective Pareto optimization mechanisms to minimize change costs.

Decision making for applying the changes may depend on other factors (such as economic conditions, state of the market, etc.) that cannot be comprehensively determined and formulated in terms of computerized processes; therefore, although it is desirable that the change propagation process be fully automated, we emphasize on a semi-automatic method to avoid missing the role of human
factors and expertise in the change decisions. We expect that the method minimizes the change costs and preserves the consistency of the target model, keeping it free from logical conflicts.

1.1 Motivating Example

As a simple example, suppose that a service-oriented Office Letter Submission (OLS) product line is established by a company. For such a product line, a business process family model is designed, based on which, a service variability model was carried out. Fig. 1 depicts the business process variability model in terms of a Business Process Family Model (BPFM), which is a notation proposed by Moon and her team [7, 8]. It is an extended UML activity diagram augmented with variability-specific elements, such as variation points, optional versus mandatory activities, variant regions (set of variant activities that generally form an optional sub-process), variability relationships (either excludes or requires constraint), etc.

Moreover, we consider the service variability model (which we name SVM for ease) as a set of services and their interfaces (including operations and messages), along with their variability attributes (optional versus mandatory services, operations and messages) and variability relationships (“excludes”, “requires”, and “or” relationships between services and between operations). An SVM for the sample OLS product line is depicted in Fig. 3.

Suppose that the models represented in Fig. 1 and 3 both belong to the current version (version \( i \)) of the sample OLS product line. Note that, for convenience, we have only included the identifiers of activities that are realized by the corresponding service operations in the services; for example in Fig. 3, optional service “Serv1” includes an optional operation “Oper1” that realizes activity “Create Draft for Internal Letters”. It has a set of incoming and outgoing messages that are not depicted in Fig. 3, as they are not necessary for the purposes of the current running example.

Let us suppose that the BPFM is requested to change to version \( i+1 \) as depicted in Fig. 2. As it is obvious, the following items of change have occurred in BPFM version \( i+1 \) regarding its previous version.

- Mandatory activity (4) is removed.
- Mandatory activity (7) is changed to optional.
- Mandatory activity (9) is added.

Considering specifically the addition of the new activity (9), we have five change options in the SVM: adding the new operation to: “Serv1”, “Serv2”, “Serv3”, “Serv4”, or a new empty service “Serv5”. If, for example, for the abstract architecture-level service “Serv1” two concrete services CS1 and CS2 are developed, and if there are 20 configurations in which, CS1 or CS2 are invoked, then a change in “Serv1” propagates not only to those two concrete services, but also to 20 products. Similarly, we would have a number of concrete services for other abstract services in the SVM, each of which could be invoked in a
Fig. 1: Current version (i) of the BPFM diagram for the sample Office Letter Submission (OLS) product line

number of product configurations. Therefore, it is crucial to find an optimal set of changes to the SVM so that the change cost, in terms of number of affected artifacts, is minimized.

Moreover, a method to deal with this problem is expected to preserve consistency in the new version of SVM. An inconsistent SVM contains internal logical conflicts between its elements. For example, if there is an “excludes” relationship between two mandatory services, then it is not consistent, since being mandatory implies that in every product configuration, both services are invoked; and the “excludes” relationship implies that only one of them can be invoked in a product configuration, which is contradictory. In another work in progress, we have derived and articulated inconsistency conditions to be checked automatically on SVM models.

In short, the research problem is how to find the set of proper changes in the SVM among a set of change options, so that the cost of change is minimized and the consistency of the target model is preserved. The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In section 2, we take a glance at the previous work on this subject; afterwards, in section 3 we fully describe the proposed method. Section 4 is dedicated to evaluation of the research, while section 5 concludes the paper and proposes a few trends for the future work.

2 State of the Art

The previous work regarding the subject of this research can be divided into two main categories: research works related to software product line evolution, and the research reports on evolution of variability in services and the service-oriented product lines.

Irrespective of service-orientation, there are a number of research works reported for managing and controlling evolution in software product lines (refer to
Fig. 2: New version \((i+1)\) of the BPFM diagram for the sample Office Letter Submission (OLS) product line

[9] for a wide survey in this regard). The common notion among most of these works is two-fold: emphasis on minimizing the cost of change [10–12], and emphasis on consistency preservation in the product line artifacts which are subject to change [10–13].

Another common point of focus among these works is the steps of encountering a change request. For instance, Ajila and Kaba in [11] propose evolution management mechanisms that fit in a four-phased process, which includes change identification, change impact analysis, change propagation, and change validation. The same has been proposed in service evolution (irrespective of the product line engineering) [14]; for example for services self-adaptation, the well-known MAPE-K loop has been suggested to Monitor, Analyze, Plan and Execute changes, providing and consuming some change Knowledge [6]. However, all of the research works in this first category are feature-model-based; while in a service-oriented product line, we need to support the business processes; thus these methods cannot fit to our problem.

The research works reported on evolving software with respect to the variability of services within or out of the scopes of a product line, fall into two subcategories: (A) Reports on using the concept of variability to support a set of pre-determined changes in single service-oriented software systems (such as [15] and [16]), none of which are in the scope of a software product line, and thus the works in this subcategory does not fit to our problem.

(B) Reports on supporting some type of evolution in service-oriented product lines (such as [12] and [17]); however, in this subcategory, although the research works are within the scopes of service-oriented product lines, there are no emphasis on the business processes as the main source of continuous change. Gomaa and Hashimoto [17] propose a general service-oriented variability model which uses feature models as the main requirements-level variability model, and do not focus on business process variability model. They concentrate on the basics of self-adaptation in service-oriented product lines. Moreover, Hinchey et al.
[12] discuss general issues in dynamic product lines and do not specifically address evolution scenarios in the service-oriented product lines emerging from the changes in the business processes. Hence, the research works in this subcategory, either, cannot be leveraged to solve the problem mentioned in this paper.

3 The Proposed Method

Considering the linear evolution scenario, the source of changes in the domain architecture of a service-oriented product line is the business process variability model. In this research, we specifically chose the Business Process Family Model (BPFM) notation [7, 8] for the purpose of specifying the business process variability. Meanwhile, the change target is the service variability model (SVM). SVM is basically a set of mandatory and/or optional services, each of which contains a nonempty set of mandatory and/or optional operations. Among services and among operations, there can be variability relationships, including, “or”, “excludes”, and “requires” relationships. Thus, if we consider the proposed method as a black box, then the input to it will be a BPFM’ (the changed version of the current BPFM), and the output from it will be an SVM’ (the changed version of the current SVM). Inside the black box, we embed four main units and a knowledge repository, which support four main operations by sharing some knowledge among them. These four main operations are: change identification, change impact analysis, change planning and change execution, which can continue over to the change identification operation if the result of change execution is exposed to some new change. Fig. 4 depicts these four main operations besides the knowledge repository in which, all of the changes, their details, and rationales are stored. This paper focuses mostly on the first two operations of the proposed cycle.

Fig. 3: Current version (i) of the SVM diagram for the sample Office Letter Submission (OLS) product line

Fig. 4: The proposed change cycle for linear evolution in service-oriented product line
3.1 Change Identification

“Change identification” operation includes the identification of the elements in the source model (BPFM) that are added, removed, or modified. The result, which we represent by $\Delta B$, is in fact, the set of differences of BPFM' (the new version) with BPFM (the old version). Each change item in $\Delta B$, can be an element ($e$) or a variability relationship ($r$) between the elements in the BPFM, where each element $e$ (such as an activity, a variation point, or a variants region) is a member of all BPFM elements ($E$); and each relationship $r$ (such as a control flow, a connection or a constraint) is a member of all BPFM relationships ($R$). Elements can be added, removed or modified, while relationships can only be added or removed. On this basis we will have formula (1), in which $add$ means adding an element or a relationship, $rem$ means removing an element or a relationship, and $mod$ denotes modifying an element.

\[
\text{ChangeItem} : = add \ e \ | \ mod \ e \ | \ rem \ e \ | \ add \ r \ | \ rem \ r
\]

(1)

Elements and relationships each have their quadruple structures specified in formulas (2) and (3). Formula (2) states that each element has a type (e.g., it is an activity, a variation point, or a variants region), a name, an attribute type, and an attribute value; while formula (3) denotes that a relationship has a category, a type, a source and a target (see [7, 8] for details of BPFM).

\[
e = (\text{etype}, \text{name}, \text{eattrtype}, \text{eattrvalue})
\]

(2)

\[
r = (\text{rcat}, \text{rtype}, \text{rsource}, \text{rdestin})
\]

(3)

In the example in subsection 1.1, we depicted a list of change items that occurred to the OLS BPFM.

3.2 Change Impact Analysis

The goal of “change impact analysis” operation is to (1) determine all change options for reflecting the change items of BPFM to SVM; (2) calculating the cost of applying each change option; and (3) providing a set of optimal change options for the architects and the domain engineers to help them in decision making about which change options to apply.

Determining SVM Change Options: To designate the changes to SVM ($\Delta S$) as a result of changes in BPFM, we should determine all potential change items that can take place in the SVM (we call them change options) in reflection to each change item existing in $\Delta B$; and then we should analyze costs of each change option. Let $CI$ be the set of all change items residing in $\Delta B$, and $CO_i$ be the set of all possible change options in SVM in response to a change item $CI_i$. As an example, if currently there exists three services $S_1$ to $S_3$ in the SVM, and some $CI_1$ corresponds to adding a mandatory activity “a” to the BPFM, then each of the following four items makes up a change option in the set $CO_i$:
adding a new operation corresponding to activity “a” to (1) $S_1$, (2) $S_2$, (3) $S_3$, and (4) a new empty service $S_4$. Then a set $CO$ is formed from the union of all change options $co_j$ in each $CO_i$. Fig. 5 depicts the relationship between sets $CI$ and $CO$. For our running OLS example in subsection 1.1, the set of change items and change options are depicted in Fig. 6.

![Fig. 5: The relationship between change items in BPFM and change options in SVM](image)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Change Items (CI)</th>
<th>$CI_1$</th>
<th>$CI_2$</th>
<th>$CI_3$</th>
<th>...</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Change Options in SVM (CO)</td>
<td>$co_1$</td>
<td>$co_2$</td>
<td>$co_3$</td>
<td>$co_4$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selection Vector</td>
<td>$v_1$</td>
<td>$v_2$</td>
<td>$v_3$</td>
<td>$v_4$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Moreover, to build up a single solution (a potential $\Delta S$) we need to select one of the change options for each change item. The selection is done by designating a Boolean selection vector as shown in Fig. 5, with the constraint that for each change item $CI_i$ one and only one of the corresponding change options should be set to 1, and the rest should be set to zero. Fig. 6 depicts the possible selection vectors as well as the affected services by each change option and the values of three Boolean coefficients (which will be discussed later in this subsection).

**Analyzing Costs of Change in SVM:** We define the total cost of reflecting the changes of BPFM to SVM as a function of (1) the costs due to the changes in service interfaces ($ICost$) and (2) the costs imposed by the changes in relationships between the services ($RCost$).

Since the calculation of economical costs of change is not within the scope of this research, we consider the change cost as the number of affected artifacts. Here, artifacts are classified into two main classes: first, the domain-level concrete services, and second, the application-level products that use the domain-level services in their configurations.
Therefore, \textit{ICost} imparts two costs: costs due to changes of (domain-level) concrete services developed internally or consumed from external repositories that implement and realize the abstract architecture-level services that are subject to change; and second, costs of change to all (application-level) configured products derived from the product line, which invoke those affected concrete services. The interface cost is calculated in formula (4) in which, \( z \) denotes a solution (a potential \( \Delta S \)), and \( N_{csi} \) and \( N_{app} \) represent the number of concrete services and the applications affected by the changes to the interface, respectively.

Similarly, \textit{RCost} can be calculated. However, changes that are imposed by changing the relationships between services do not impose any effects on the domain-level concrete services; however, the products are affected, since it is crucial to keep the products “conforming” to the domain level, i.e., the new constraints (relationships) should hold in each product configuration. Otherwise, products will deviate from the product line, and this imposes extra costs for maintaining the product line. Hence, since product reconfiguration may be required, we will have formula 5, in which, \( z \) denotes a potential solution and \( N_{app} \) represents the number of application that need to be reconfigured due to the changes to the relationships between services. Furthermore, changes to relationships in BPFM, require a re-extraction of relationships in SVM. This is achieved by Algorithm 1, which uses the possible configurations that can be derived from the BPFM and the set of services (from the SVM) to generate the SVM which is modified in its variability relationships (we proposed this algorithm in a previous work [18], which aimed at automating extraction of an SVM from a BPFM).

\[
\text{ICost}(z) = N_{csi} + N_{appi}
\]

\[
\text{RCost}(z) = N_{appi}
\]

A change item, regarding its effect on SVM, may result in changes to either the concrete services, the products, both or neither (either impacting their interface or relationships or both). Therefore for each change item, we can define Boolean coefficients \( c_1, c_2 \) and \( c_3 \), which show whether the change necessitates considering costs for changing interfaces of concrete services (\( c_1 \)), costs for changing products because of interface changes in concrete services (\( c_2 \)), and costs for reconfiguring the products due to the changes in the relationships (\( c_3 \)). Table 2 lists the values of \( c_1 \) to \( c_3 \) per each potential feasible change scenario in SVM. These coefficients for our running OLS example are listed for each change option in Fig. 6.

For a set of potential solutions, \( Z \), we can form a set \( \text{Obj}_z \), which is populated with individual objective vectors as ordered pairs of \( (\text{ICost}, \text{RCost}) \) to be minimized. We will use these objective vectors to find a set of the most cost-
Algorithm 1 Service Variability Identification

Input: Service Set (SS), BPFM Configuration Set (CS)
Output: Service variability Model (SVM)

1: SVM ← NIL
2: for each service in SS do
3:   for each c in CS do
4:     if !(IsUsed(service, c)) then
5:       // service is not used in configuration c
6:       add service to SVM.OptionalServiceSet
7:       ServiceIsOptional ← True
8:       break
9:   end if
10:  if !ServiceIsOptional then
11:    add service to SVM.MandatoryServiceSet
12:  end if
13: end for
14: for each s_i in optionalServiceSet do
15:   for each s_j ≠ s_i in optionalServiceSet do
16:     for each c in CS do
17:       if !(IsUsed(s_i, c) ⊕ IsUsed(s_j, c)) then
18:         AreAlt ← false
19:       end if
20:       if !(IsUsed(s_i, c) ∨ IsUsed(s_j, c)) then
21:         AreOR ← false
22:       end if
23:       if !(IsUsed(s_i, c) ∨ IsUsed(s_j, c)) then
24:         AreIncl ← false
25:       end if
26:     end for
27:   end for
28:   if !(AreAlt = false) ∧ (s_j,s_i) ∉ SVM.AltRelations then
29:     add (s_i, s_j) to SVM.AltRelations
30:   end if
31:   if !(AreOr = false) ∧ (s_j,s_i) ∉ SVM.OrRelations then
32:     add (s_i, s_j) to SVM.OrRelations
33:   end if
34:   if !(AreIncl = false) then
35:     add (s_i, s_j) to SVM.IncRelations
36:   end if
37: end for
38: end for
39: return SVM

Determining the Most Cost-Effective solution: In this step, for each change item in ∆B we should determine which change options are the least effective change options in the target SVM in response to the changes in the corresponding BPFM.
costly. For this purpose, we utilize multi-objective Pareto optimization [19]. If there is a solution $z$, whose $ICost$ and $RCost$ are both less than all other change options’ $ICost$ and $RCost$ respectively, then $z$ is announced the most cost-effective solution which dominates all other solutions in cost-effectiveness. However, the problem arises when we reach a set of solutions, in which, some solutions have lower $ICost$s but higher $RCost$s, or have higher $ICost$s but lower $RCost$s compared with the other ones. In this case, no single solution can be announced as “dominating”; instead, we only can select a set of solutions, that although not dominating other solutions, are not dominated by other solutions either; that is, the set of “non-dominated” solutions that form the “Pareto-optimal” set of solutions [19]. The results of this step are used in the next step for decision-making on the Pareto-optimal set of solutions. Algorithm 2 represents the triple steps of change impact analysis.

For our OLS example, considering the concrete services and the configured products using them as denoted in Table 3, the objective vectors are those represented in Table 4. Since solution $z_2$ (see Fig. 6) is selected as the Pareto optimal solution, and assuming that the change is approved by the decision makers, the changes are executed and the new version of SVM (i.e., version $i + 1$) is depicted in Fig. 7. In the new version of SVM, operation “Oper$4$” is removed from service “Serv$2$”, operation “Oper$7$” in “Serv$4$” has changed from mandatory to optional, and a new operation “Oper$9$” is added to “Serv$2$” (there is no need to remind that each operation “Oper $i$” is an operation to realize activity $i$ in the BPMF). No change was made to the variability attributes of the services, and no relationship exists among the services, and thus the new SVM cannot be inconsistent.

Table 2: General change options in SVM due to the change items in BPFM and the corresponding coefficient values

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Change Item in BPFM</th>
<th>Change Option in SVM</th>
<th>( \alpha )</th>
<th>( \beta )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Remove a mandatory activity</td>
<td>Remove mandatory operation from the mandatory service, and the service does not get empty to be removed</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Remove a non-mandatory (optional or variant) activity</td>
<td>Remove non-mandatory operation from the mandatory service, and the service gets empty and is removed</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Modify variability attribute of the operation from optional to mandatory, if the service was mandatory before change</td>
<td>Modify variability attribute of the operation from the optional service, and the service gets empty and is removed</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Move activity from outside variant regions or vice versa (has impact on relationships between services)</td>
<td>Move activity outside variant regions or vice versa (has impact on relationships between services)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Modify cardinality from ((x,y)) to ((x',y')) where (x &gt; x') &amp; (y &lt; y') (has no impact on service interfaces and their relationships)</td>
<td>Modify cardinality from ((x,y)) to ((x',y')) where (x &gt; x') &amp; (y &lt; y') (has no impact on service interfaces and their relationships)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Add a new mandatory activity</td>
<td>Add a new mandatory operation to a mandatory service</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Modify variability attribute of the operation from mandatory to optional, if the service remains mandatory</td>
<td>Modify variability attribute of the operation from the mandatory service, and the service becomes optional</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Add a new non-mandatory (optional or variant) activity</td>
<td>Add a new non-mandatory operation to an optional service</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Add a new constraint (relationship) (i'')’s activities</td>
<td>Add a new optional operation to an optional service</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Modify the variability attribute of an activity from mandatory to optional</td>
<td>Add a new mandatory operation to a new empty service</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Remove non-mandatory operation from the mandatory service</td>
<td>Remove a non-mandatory operation from the mandatory service, and the service does not get empty to be removed</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Modify the variability attribute of an activity from optional to mandatory, if the service becomes optional</td>
<td>Remove non-mandatory operation from the optional service, and the service gets empty and is removed</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Add a new non-mandatory (optional or variant) activity</td>
<td>Remove a non-mandatory operation from the optional service, and the service becomes empty and is removed</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Add a new constraint (relationship) (i'')’s activities</td>
<td>Remove a non-mandatory operation from the optional service, and the service becomes empty and is removed</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Modify the variability attribute of an activity from mandatory to optional</td>
<td>Change Constraint in SVM</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Modify the variability attribute of an activity from optional to mandatory</td>
<td>Change Option in BPFM</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Move activity outside variant regions</td>
<td>Remove mandatory operation from the mandatory service, and the service does not get empty to be removed</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Add a new mandatory activity</td>
<td>Remove an operation in the same service that it currently resides</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Add a new non-mandatory (optional or variant) activity</td>
<td>Add a new optional operation to a new empty service</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Modify the variability attribute of an activity from mandatory to optional</td>
<td>Add a new optional operation to an optional service</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Modify the variability attribute of an activity from optional to mandatory</td>
<td>Add a new mandatory operation to a mandatory service</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Move activity outside variant regions</td>
<td>Add a new non-mandatory activity to an empty service</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Add a new non-mandatory (optional or variant) activity</td>
<td>Add a new optional operation to a new empty service</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Modify the variability attribute of an activity from mandatory to optional</td>
<td>Add a new mandatory operation to a mandatory service</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Move activity outside variant regions</td>
<td>Add a new non-mandatory activity to an empty service</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Add a new non-mandatory (optional or variant) activity</td>
<td>Add a new optional operation to an optional service</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Algorithm 2 Change Impact Analysis

Input: BPFM, BPFM′, SVM
Output: Pareto optimal set of change solutions (POSC)

1: \( \text{POSC} \leftarrow \text{NIL} \)
2: \( \Delta B \leftarrow \text{CalculateDelta}(\text{BPFM}, \text{BPFM}' \)\)
3: \( \text{Obj} \leftarrow \text{NIL} \)
4: \textbf{for} each \( CI_i \) in \( \Delta B \) \textbf{do}
5: \( CO_i \leftarrow \text{all potential change options to reflect } CI_i \text{ in SVM (}) \)
6: \text{fetch coefficients())}
7: \textbf{end for}
8: \text{Generate } Z \text{ //all possible solutions}
9: \textbf{for} each \( z_i \) in \( Z \) \textbf{do}
10: \( \text{ICost} \leftarrow \text{CalculateICost}(z_i) \)
11: \( \text{RCost} \leftarrow \text{CalculateRCost}(z_i) \)
12: \( \text{Obj} \leftarrow \text{Obj} \cup (\text{ICost, RCost}) \)
13: \textbf{end for}
14: \( \text{POSC} \leftarrow \text{FindPaertoOptimalSet}(Z, \text{Obj}) \)
15: \textbf{return } \text{POSC} \)

Table 3: Concrete services and currently existing products (before change)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>abstract service in SVM</th>
<th>concrete services</th>
<th>existing configurations (products)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>S1</td>
<td>CS1</td>
<td>app1, app2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S2</td>
<td>CS2</td>
<td>app1, app2, app3, app4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S3</td>
<td>CS3</td>
<td>app3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S4</td>
<td>CS4</td>
<td>app1, app2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CS5</td>
<td>app3, app4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4: Values of Objective functions for the potential solutions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Obj ((z1))</th>
<th>ICost</th>
<th>RCost</th>
<th>Selected in Pareto Optimal Set</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Obj(z1))</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Obj(z2))</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Obj(z3))</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Obj(z4))</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Obj(z5))</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.3 Change Planning and Decision Making

In this step, domain architects and engineers decide between change options among the Pareto-optimal set of change options, and may even disapprove a change item to take place in the product line.

As stated earlier, change cost is not necessarily the main and single factor to consider when deciding on a change; on the contrary, there can be a multitude...
of other factors such as market state, specific metrics and measures, and other particular features that exists especially for the external services; or other costs and benefits, and miscellaneous priorities that affect the decision, which cannot necessarily be grabbed in a formula to be calculated and included in the optimization process. That is why we emphasize on the human factor and the role the experts play in this regard. Therefore, a fully-automated method is not advisable for propagating the changes from the business process variability model to the abstract and concrete services and to the applications configured based on them; since it is unlikely to identify all effective factors. Details of this step is outside the scope of this research and can be achieved by utilizing different decision making processes such as AHP and its variants.

### 3.4 Change Execution

A potential way to execute the changes that are determined in the selected change items ($\Delta S$) is using model driven methods, and more specifically, model transformation. The advantage of applying these methods is preserving consistency in the target models by setting consistency constraints on the meta-model (e.g. in OCL) that will prevent inconsistent models to form. Using the change items in $\Delta S$, the modified version of SVM, SVM’, is formed.

### 3.5 Version Control

For supporting traceability between the versions of the product line, we utilize an evolution graph (similar to what is proposed in [20]) as follows: in this graph, the nodes denote different product line versions, and directed edges denote a transition from a version to another. The nodes are attributed with the version number, and other version-related attributes such as creation date, approver, etc., while the edges are attributed with $\Delta B$, $\Delta S$, rationale for transitioning from the previous version to the new one, decisions made, etc. Every approved change in the product line domain must be reflected to and documented in the evolution graph, which acts as a shared knowledge among the four operations. Apache SVN can be utilized as a well-known version (revision) control tool.
4 Evaluation

To evaluate the method, we utilized the GQM approach [21] and controlled experimentation, performed on three experimental cases. In GQM, evaluation goal, evaluation questions and metrics that are measured to answer the evaluation questions are determined. We define the evaluation goal, questions and metric as follows:

Evaluation Goal (G): To analyze the proposed method for the purpose of evaluation from the aspect of specific quality metrics of cost minimization and consistency preservation in linear evolution in service-oriented product lines.

Evaluation Questions (Q): Q1: Does the method minimize change costs?; Q2: Does the method preserve consistency of the SVM after applying the change items, in terms of avoiding logical conflicts?

Evaluation Metrics (M): To answer question Q1, we calculate change ratio which is the ratio of artifacts changed due to interface change and due to relationship change of the services (Metrics M1 and M2). Moreover, to answer question Q2, we introduce consistency degree metric (M3) which calculates a ratio of the number of consistent changed SVMs to the total number of changed SVMs that had gone through the change process. Table 5 represents more GQM details of evaluation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Evaluation Goal</th>
<th>Evaluation Question</th>
<th>Evaluation Metric</th>
<th>Metric Name</th>
<th>Metric Formula</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>G1</td>
<td>Q1</td>
<td>M1</td>
<td>Change Ratio for Interface Change (CRI)</td>
<td>[ \frac{AAI}{A} ]</td>
<td>AAF number of affected artifacts by interface change / A total number of artifacts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>M2</td>
<td>Change Ratio for Relationship Change (CRR)</td>
<td>[ \frac{AAR}{A} ]</td>
<td>AAF number of affected artifacts by relationship change / A total number of artifacts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Q2</td>
<td>M3</td>
<td>Consistency Degree (CD)</td>
<td>[ \frac{CS}{S} ]</td>
<td>C.S. number of consistent changed SVMs / S total number of changed SVMs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.1 Experimentation materials and procedure

Ten product lines (A to J) were selected for experimentation, for each of which a distinct BPFM was derived beforehand based on business processes existing in detergent manufacturing, sales and distribution, and food industries, by domain engineers and business experts. Input materials to the experimentation were the current versions of SVMs related to each case, along with their corresponding BPFM models. Other information such as the number of concrete services and the number of applications was also supplied.

Then, to design changes to the BPFM models, a set of random numbers were generated, to designate the number of changes to that BPFM (which we considered between 1 to 8) and the change scenarios for each change (random numbers between 1 and 22). If a change scenario was not applicable on the BPFM, then (rotationally) the next possible scenario was chosen. Moreover, we sometimes re-generated the random numbers for scenarios to make sure we had covered each change scenario at least once. All random numbers were generated in MS Excel.
Then, the changed BPFMs were designed in a way that the change requirements denoted by the numbers and scenarios of changes (random numbers) were met. Some details about the experimental materials are listed in Table 6.

The metrics were measured on the new SVMs generated by the method. Moreover, the consistency of the obtained outputs was then inspected using the SPLOT online consistency checking tool for variability models [22].

Table 6: Details on experimental cases for evaluating the method

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Exp. Case</th>
<th>Business process</th>
<th>Business domain</th>
<th>No. of changes in BPFM</th>
<th>Change scenarios</th>
<th>No. of total concrete services</th>
<th>Total No. of Configurations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>Purchase order processing</td>
<td>Procurement</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10,18,5,17,14</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>Order Processing</td>
<td>Sales</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2,19,13</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>Adding new asset</td>
<td>Asset management</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6,1,2,10,17,10,14</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>Repair order processing</td>
<td>Maintenance, operation and repair</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>19,23</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>Online sales</td>
<td>Sales</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11,17,6,21,1,14</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>Letter submission</td>
<td>Office automation</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16,20</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G</td>
<td>Issue warehouse note</td>
<td>Warehousing</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>11,9,22,4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H</td>
<td>Create new bill of materials</td>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7,12</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>Calculate wages and salaries</td>
<td>Payment</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J</td>
<td>Issue accounting notes</td>
<td>Accounting</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5,9,21,8,3,15</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.2 Experimentation Results

The summary of experimentation results to answer question Q1 is shown in Table 7. As it is obvious, average change ratios of 33.6% and 33% are resulted by the method for changes costs caused by interface changes and by relationship changes, respectively. Therefore, in response to question Q1, the method has managed to affect an average of only 33.3% (one third) of the artifacts in the product line.

Since the Pareto optimal set, which was obtained by the method is a set of optimal non-dominated solutions, it is obvious that these solutions are the least costly from the aspects of interface and relationships change costs, compared with the other solutions that are not a member of this set. Therefore, if the decision maker selects any of the members of the Pareto optimal set, he or she has chosen one of the least costly choices.

To answer question Q2, we measured metric M3, namely, the consistency degree, which shows a full (100%) consistency preservation. The reason is that the variability relationships between services must be re-determined by Algorithm 1 when a change occurs to the relationships; and the algorithm guarantees consistency. In other words, the automated process prevents formation of conflicting variability relationships between services, unless a human factor intervenes in the produced results. Hence, the answer to question Q2 would be that, in case there is no human intervention in the change results, the method guarantees 100% consistency preservation.
Table 7: A summary of experimentation results for Question Q1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Experimental Case</th>
<th>No. of Total Artifacts</th>
<th>ICost</th>
<th>RCost</th>
<th>CRI (%)</th>
<th>CRR (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>71.9</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>33.6</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5 Conclusion

In this paper, focusing on linear evolution scenario in service-oriented product lines, we dealt with the problem of propagating changes from domain requirements (the business process variability model) to the domain architecture (the service variability model) so that the costs of change in the concrete domain services and the configured applications are minimal; and simultaneously, the consistency of the target domain architecture model is preserved. This paper provides a method based on Pareto optimization to find an optimal solution, that is, the least costly changes in the target architecture model. The method consists of four main operations, namely, change identification, change impact analysis, change planning and change execution, interrelating with the evolution graph, which is used for version control. These operations along with the evolution graph form the whole evolution cycle to control and manage linear evolution. The evaluation results showed that the method manages to minimize change costs and can fully preserve consistency of the target model.

The future research includes proposing methods to cover other evolution scenarios, implementing model transformation to realize change execution as well as model-driven method to apply the deltas, along with extending the method to support runtime changes and dynamic reconfiguration of service-based applications in the service-oriented product line.

References

A Safe Stopping Protocol to Enable Reliable Reconfiguration for Component-based Distributed Systems

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Abstract. Despite the need for change, highly available software systems cannot be stopped to perform changes because disruption in their services may consequent irrecoverable losses. Current work on runtime evolution are either too disruptive, e.g., “blackouts” in unnecessary components in the quiescence criterion approach or presume restrictive assumptions such as the “black-box design” in the tranquility approach. In this paper, an architecture-based approach, called SAFER, is proposed which provides a better timeliness by relaxing any precondition required to start reconfiguration. We demonstrate the validity of the SAFER through model checking and a realization of the approach on a component model.

Keywords: Reconfiguration, Safe stopping, Consistency

1 Introduction

Many software-intensive systems are required to be reconfigured to maintain the key functions while they face changes in user requirements and/or domain assumptions. In some special category of software systems, it may not be possible to simply shut down the software from functioning and then apply the changes. In this regard, runtime evolution (interchangeably in this paper, dynamic reconfiguration) aims at adapting the system to changes without disrupting those parts of the system which are unaffected by the change [16]. The three most important issues which must be addressed in the runtime evolution are (i) reaching a safe application state, (ii) ensuring reliable reconfiguration, and (iii) transferring the internal state of entities which have to be replaced. Despite extensive research in component-based dynamic reconfiguration, and available component models which allow reconfiguration [4], safe reconfiguration is still an open problem, and existing approaches have made small steps in solving real world scenarios [1].
This paper focuses on the first two challenges of runtime evolution, i.e., reaching a safe application state and ensuring a reliable reconfiguration. It proposes an architecture-based reconfiguration approach, called SAFER\textsuperscript{1}, that provides a better timeliness by relaxing any preconditions required to start reconfiguration. The approach extends the notion of tranquility in a way that not only enjoys the low disruption of this proposal, but also works safely in both distributed and interleaved transactions. The paper presents the formalization of the proposed approach in Alloy [14] and the verification of its consistency by means of model checking in different architectural configurations and also for the most well known evolution scenarios. Implementation of a running example on top of the Fractal [2] shows the applicability of this approach.

This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives an overview of the challenges posed by runtime evolution. SAFER, an approach for ensuring safe dynamic reconfiguration, is articulated in Section 3. Related work are then discussed in Section 4, and Section 5 concludes the paper. The verification and evaluation reports are moved to the appendix due to space limitation.

2 PROBLEM SETTING

Existing approaches to safe dynamic reconfiguration try to put the elements of the running system that are subject to change at a specific state called safe state before performing the reconfiguration operations on them. Of most relevant work in this area, quiescence [16] causes a high disruption to the running system that is not acceptable in many critical systems [8]. To address this issue, Vandewoude et al. [12] proposed the concept of tranquility, as a low disruptive alternative to quiescence:

Definition 1 (Tranquility). A component is tranquil if: (i) it is not currently engaged in a transaction that it initiated; (ii) it will not initiate new transactions; (iii) it is not actively processing a request; and (iv) none of its adjacent components are engaged in a transaction in which both of them have already participated and might still participate in the future.

In [11], Ma et al. show that the tranquility criterion may not guarantee safe dynamic reconfiguration of distributed transactions. Moreover, when a component is used in an infinite sequence of concurrent interleaving transactions, it is not guaranteed that it will ever reach tranquility [12]. Also, tranquility criterion is not stable by itself. Once node N is in a tranquil state, all interactions between N and its environment should be blocked to assure that the tranquil state of that node is preserved [12]. In addition, tranquility does not guarantee consistency when deleting or detaching nodes [1]. Furthermore, both notions of quiescence and tranquility assume that a valid component substitution cannot be ensured if a transaction starts with an old version of a component and finishes with the new version [3]. These issues are thoroughly discussed in [8].

\textsuperscript{1} SAFe runtimE Reconfiguration
3 SAFE RECONFIGURATION

In many critical cases, changes should be applied as soon as the software violates a requirement, however, the consistency of changes is not guaranteed unless the affected components of the system are in a safe state. Such a precondition is not acceptable if changes in the running system are subject to very stringent time constraints to react. This section extends the notion of tranquility, and proposes SAFER, an approach to enable safe, low disruptive runtime evolution in distributed contexts.

3.1 The Concept of Tranquility

The notion of tranquility is a necessary criterion, but not sufficient to guarantee a safe reconfiguration [8]. In fact, the type of reconfiguration can also play an important role in the system’s consistency which has not been considered by existing approaches. Therefore, we extend tranquility to guarantee a more reliable reconfiguration. To clarify the concept, the definitions of consistent reconfiguration and dependency violation are provided first:

**Definition 2 (Consistent Reconfiguration).** A reconfiguration is consistent if it applies desired changes in a way that it transfers the system from a consistent configuration (before the evolution) to another consistent configuration (after the evolution). More specifically, a consistent configuration is a state of the system in which a component in a safe state can be changed without impacting both what has been already executed and what has still to be executed in active transactions.

**Definition 3 (Dependency Violation).** Modification of a component may have side effects on other components. Dependency violation is defined as the removal or modification of a certain component that leads to malfunction or failure in other component(s).

Having these definitions in place, we define $e$-tranquility, an extension to tranquility as follows:

**Definition 4 (E-Tranquility).** (i) node $N$ is in the tranquil state; (ii) the reconfiguration does not intend to delete or unlink the node; and (iii) the change does not impose any dependency violation among the components.

If one of these conditions is not satisfied, reaching e-tranquility delays until the transaction which $N$ belongs to, is accomplished completely (either committed or rolled back). In the following section, we show that despite whether or not e-tranquility is met, leveraging SAFER, relaxes any precondition to start the evolution process. In other words, e-tranquility is only to indicate the time in which an old component can be removed safely.

$^2$ extended tranquility
3.2 SAFER: An Approach to Safe Runtime Reconfiguration

The software architecture plays a central role in achieving a safe adaptation [10]. The behavioral and structural aspects of the architecture provide useful information like component dependencies. Here, we assume the availability of such information at runtime. This is not an infeasible assumption since reflective component models, e.g., Fractal [2], not only provide such an view by introspection but also allow changing them on-the-fly by intercession.

The concept of SAFER is established based on the idea that the transactions involving a component that will be updated should be separated from new transactions as soon as the update request is issued. This is operationalized as follows:

1. Whenever a component receives a change request, its new version is added to the system immediately. At this time, which is referred to as the *evolution time*, both the old and new versions of this component exist simultaneously.

2. As the second step, an event is published to dependent connectors (i.e., those which can initiate a transaction on the target component) to notify them about the start time of the evolution and the address of the new component.

3. When a connector receives a request, if the target is an evolved component $N$, the connector decides on the path to which the request should be routed, and the component which should serve the request (the old or the new version). In fact, the connector chooses the qualified component based on its knowledge about the undergoing evolution. The switching algorithm works based on the following rules: (i) if the request belongs to a transaction which has been initiated after the evolution time, it is directed to the new version of $N$; (ii) if the old version of $N$ has not been used in the ongoing transaction, and reconfiguration is not resulted in a node deletion/unlinking or dependency violation, the new version is responsible for processing the request. Otherwise, the old version serves the request.

4. The switching policy continues till the old component reaches the e-tranquility. Finally, the old component will be removed completely from the system, and the completion of the evolution is notified to its dependent connectors. Accordingly, all subsequent requests will be processed by the reconfigured version.

According to SAFER, to guarantee that the old system and its related transactions will still work and that all functionalities and qualities are preserved during the reconfiguration, multiple versions of a component exist in the system until the component reaches the e-tranquility. In fact, each connector contains the intelligence necessary to manage the requests and is enriched by the information about the dependencies that exist among the components so that it can route messages to the proper version of a component.

In order to clarify SAFER, imagine a Message Delivery system as illustrated in Figure 1(a), it includes four main components which are connected by specific connectors (Cnn-•). Each component invoking a request to another component initiates a transaction. Each transaction as a unit of work may also need to use or
collaborate with other neighboring components by initiating new transactions (sub-transactions). The completion of a transaction depends on its execution after the termination of its sub-transactions. We assume that transactions complete in a bounded time and that the initiator of a transaction is aware of its completion [16]. Respecting this definition, a behavioral scenario of the exemplary system specified in Figure 1(b) can be therefore described as follows:

“Whenever a client requests Sender to send a message, Sender as the root transaction invokes a request to the (De)Compression in order to compress the message. Next, the compressed message is sent to Packer to encapsulate the message with a header (including the time-stamp, message type, and decompression key) required to extract the message later. As soon as the message is prepared, it is sent to Receiver. On the other side, once the message is received by the Receiver, it asks (De)Compression to decompress the message to obtain the original message”.

To clarify SAFER, suppose a hypothetical situation where the (De)Compression component in the Message Delivery system needs to be replaced with a new version: Once an update request to (De)Compression is received, its new version will be added to the system. Thus, the dependent connectors of the (De)Compression (i.e., Cnn-S-C and Cnn-R-D) determine the component which should serve the incoming requests among a set of candidate components (the old or the new version). The coexistence of both of the versions of the (De)Compression continues until the old version finally reaches the e-tranquility. At this time, the old one can be removed safely from the system, and the new version of the (De)Compression is responsible for serving all corresponding requests. From the behavioral view of the system during the evolution, whenever Sender sends a request to use the compression service, since (De)Compression is under the evolution (two versions of this component coexist simultaneously), the request is mediated by Cnn-S-C to decide which version of (De)Compression should provide the service required.
by Sender. The target component is chosen based on considering both the initiation time of the transaction which the request belongs to and the history of using this component in the ongoing transaction.

Regarding the definition of tranquility and the behavior of the system depicted in Figure 1(b), although (De)Compression is tranquil at time T1, due to the dependency violation, changing this component leads the system toward a failure at time T2 where the compressed message needs to be decompressed. However, based on the e-tranquility, this component cannot be removed until the transactions involved with this component finish completely. As a result, when Receiver sends a decompression request at time T2, since the evolution is not completed yet, Cnn-R-D can still forward the request to the old version.

4 RELATED WORK

Several work on software reconfiguration have been reported in literature, all of which tackle the problem from different perspectives. However, the most related approaches to deal with safe reconfiguration are considered here. These approaches fall into two major categories.

The first category of approaches is those addressing consistency through recovery. In these approaches, components can deal with the failures of an operation and recover from inconsistencies introduced during the reconfiguration. However, these approaches bring certain drawbacks: in one hand, it cannot be used in systems which do not use atomic actions. On the other hand, atomic actions are not suited to all application domains since they often result in reduced levels of concurrency in the target application. Besides, aborting transactions prior to reconfiguration is an expensive process. In contrast to the recovery approach, the second category focuses on preventing inconsistencies from occurring in the first place [12] [16] [11]. They try to put the elements of the running system that are subject to change at a specific state before performing reconfiguration operations on them. This category is of particular interest in this paper and is discussed more in the following.

Among existing approaches, a highly cited paper co-authored by Kramer and Magee [16], introduced quiescence as a reliable criterion to guarantee system consistency during the evolution. It works properly in interleaving transactions, guarantees to achieve a safe state in bounded time, and also is the only criterion which supports component removals. However, due to deactivation of all potentially related components before the reconfiguration to ensure consistency, it imposes high disruption to the running system. In order to reduce the disruption imposed by quiescence, tranquility criterion is proposed by Vandewoude et al. [12] which avoids unnecessary disturbances. Nevertheless, this criterion does not work safely in distributed transactions because of its assumption about black-box design. Moreover, there is no guarantee to achieve tranquility in bounded time in interleaving transactions [8]. In a recent work, Ma et al. [11] proposed a version-consistent approach that benefits dynamic component dependency model of the system. While it guarantees a safe dynamic reconfiguration
in distributed contexts, the algorithm they propose seems to impose unnecessary processing time to maintain dynamic dependencies when the architecture model becomes large. The time is required to reach a safe state is bounded in most approaches, while it depends on a number of transactions for version-consistency. Both tranquility and version-consistent approaches assume that the interactions with the environment should remain blocked in order to remain stable. The more assumption a specific approach is based on, a narrower application area it would be applicable. Interested readers may consult with [8].

The idea of using multi-versioning is not a new concept. Cook et al. propose a framework, HERCULES, to improve the reliability of a system by keeping existing versions of the component running and only fully removing the old component when a determination is made that the new one fully satisfies its role [5]. The new version aims to correct deficiencies that have been detected in the old version and the old version offers an example of correct behavior outside of those deficiencies. Similarly, Miki-Rakic et al. [9] encapsulate the new and old components in a wrapper component named Multi-Versioning Connector. The wrapper serves as a connector between the encapsulated component versions and the rest of the system and is responsible for propagating the generated result(s).

5 CONCLUSIONS

In this paper, we promoted connectors for enabling a safe dynamic reconfiguration by addressing the shortcomings of tranquility in distributed contexts. We demonstrated that the proposed approach, called SAFER, not only impose low disruption, but also relaxes any preconditions required to start a reconfiguration that reduces the delay within which the system is being updated. To verify the consistency of SAFER, we specified it in Alloy and applied a model checking tool to examine SAFER in different architectural configurations and also possible evolution scenarios.

We implemented SAFER in a simple example and, we compared it with other approaches based on existing information. In order to objectively compare timeliness and the disruption introduced by this approach with existing approaches, different experiments with randomly generated system configurations, different levels of workloads, and even different component models are needed. This validation is beyond the scope of this paper and we leave it for future work.

Acknowledgments.

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Appendix

VERIFICATION REPORT

Dependability of runtime evolution is of major importance because any violations of consistency in running programs may lead to irreversible damages. To prevent this, reconfiguration safety should be ensured by performing appropriate (preferably formal) verification techniques. To achieve this goal, we have modeled our evolution procedure, i.e., SAFER, and its related definitions in Alloy [14] to verify whether a consistent system is evolved using the SAFER, it still remains consistent. Due to space limitations, interested readers can refer to [7] for obtaining further details, including complete specifications of the structural, behavioral, and evolitional aspects of SAFER in Alloy.

As stated earlier, a system is consistent if and only if all its transactions are consistent, and a transaction is consistent if and only if a specific version of each component is used during that transaction’s lifecycle. In other words, all requests belonging to that transaction and its sub-transactions must be served by non-equivalent components.

\[\text{pred consistent}[t : \text{Transaction}, tm : \text{Time}]\{
\text{let exe} = \{e : t.*\text{subTransactions}.\text{actions} | e \text{ in } \text{ExeRequest and lte[e.pre, tm]}\}\]
\[\text{all disj } e_1, e_2 : \text{exe} | \text{equivalent}[e_1.\text{to}, e_2.\text{to}] = \Rightarrow e_2.\text{to in } (e_1.\text{to}).\text{symmetric}\]

With respect to the above definition of consistent transactions, we executed the following assertion using the Alloy Analyzer to examine the reliability of SAFER for various configurations and the evolution scenarios in which we have corrective changes or node deletion/unlinkings.

\[\text{assert algorithmPreservesConsistency}\{
\text{all } t : \text{Transaction}, en : \text{EndNotify} | \text{consistent}[t, en.\text{cause.pre}] = \Rightarrow \text{consistent}[t, en.\text{post}]\}\]

More precisely, we let the Alloy Analyzer to consider all valid configurations of totally 12 components and connectors. The invariants which we have specified through the Alloy facts forced this tool to only instantiate valid configurations of our model. In addition, before analyzing the above assertion for generated configurations, we used more other assertions based on predicates some of which are given in [7] to show that our model was valid. After executing the assertion \text{algorithmPreservesConsistency} for all of the instantiated configurations, the tool reported no counterexamples, or in other words, it did not find any inconsistencies. Experience has shown that if a specification has a flaw, it can usually be demonstrated by a relatively small counterexample [15].
EVALUATION REPORT

We claim that the proposed reconfiguration approach is promising in the sense that it covers the limitations of tranquility in distributed contexts. To evaluate the applicability of SAFER in practice, it is implemented as a tool to facilitate the evolution of our running example on top of the Fractal component model [2]. After realizing the SAFER, we put its functionalities in the Fractal components membrane as controller methods to be utilized in enabling a safe reconfiguration. Interested readers are referred to [7] for details of implementation and experimental setup.

The result of this preliminary evaluation shows that in situations that a reconfiguration results in deletion of a tranquil node, the node still remains in the system to guarantee if it may, at some point in the future, participate in an ongoing transaction, even if it has not yet participated. Accordingly, the connectors could still route requests from old transactions to the deleted node. Secondly, the behavior of a component and its environmental dependencies during its execution within a transaction remains consistent. Consequently, even a temporary dependency violation does not impose any inconsistency in distributed transactions while an ongoing transaction still could use the same version of a component. In addition, the simultaneous operation of both the old and the evolved version of components enhances the availability of the system in long reconfiguration plans that include a lot of actions which will take more time to be executed and increases unavailability. Likewise, it guarantees achieving tranquility in bounded time even in the case of interleaved transactions. This is addressed by bringing a new version of the component on line to service the new top-level transactions, while the old component gradually transitions to an inactive state. Indeed, since those transactions initiated after evolution time will use new version of the component intended to be evolved, the old version would not be involved in new transactions anymore and old transactions are isolated from new interleaved ones. Furthermore, on demand possibility of using the evolved entities by new transactions increases the reliability of system in the case of critical changes like security breaches in banking services. In other words, there is no need to wait for a safe state since it is only a precondition to safely remove the old components, but not to perform the change, e.g., adding a new component.

Although the results are promising, there is still space for improvements. Having the exact component dependency model in an adaptive system is not trivial especially when the system often goes under the evolution. One way of sidestepping the overhead imposed by SAFER to keep track of transactions and their log is to collect dependencies with the mining transaction log [6]. Moreover, the overhead of performing the evolution and memory consumption of multi-version existence of the same component might impose limitations in resource-poor scenarios, especially in cases with high workloads. A remedy to this problem would be deploying changes temporary on idle resources [13].
Software Architecture Modeling and Evaluation Based on Stochastic Activity Networks

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Abstract. Quantitative and integrated evaluation of software quality attributes at the architectural design stage provides a sound basis for making objective decisions for design trade-offs and developing a high quality software. In this paper we introduce a formal method for modeling software architectures and evaluating their quality attributes quantitatively and in a unified manner. This method is based on stochastic activity networks (SANs) and the quality attributes considered include security, dependability and performance.

Keywords: Software architecture, quality attributes, quantitative evaluation, stochastic activity networks (SANs), reward structures.

1 Introduction

Dealing with quality attributes is one of the most difficult tasks in software engineering. To know whether a quality attribute is achieved, it has to be quantified by analysis or measured. However, not only quantification of each attribute has its own difficulties, but also they have complex dependencies.

In software systems, quality attributes are principally determined by the system’s architecture. Evaluating quality attributes at the architectural design stage not only helps in assuring that stakeholders expectations are met, but also aids in discovering flaws in a shorter time and with lower cost than latter stages.

According to an investigation on different types of quality attributes and their application domains [1], security, dependability and performance are among the top quality attributes important for software systems. The necessity of the integrated evaluation of security and performance has gained much attention in research communities. However, a few have contributed to the quantitative evaluation of security. Dependability is a quality attribute closely related to both security and performance [2]. The necessity of the integrated evaluation of dependability and performance led to the derivation of a new quality attribute called performability. On the other hand, many of the methods proposed for quantitative security evaluation are inspired from dependability evaluation techniques. Therefore, despite the significant differences between security and performance, their integrated and quantitative evaluation can be performed regarding their close relation to dependability.
The purpose of this paper is to take a small step in the direction of developing a unified approach for reasoning about multiple quality attributes. The attributes considered include security, dependability and performance (called the SDP attributes in this paper). In this approach hierarchical colored stochastic activity networks (HCSANs) \[5,6\] are used for architecture modeling and activity-marking oriented reward structures \[5\] are used for evaluation.

Stochastic activity networks (SANs) \[6\] are stochastic extensions of Petri Nets, which are more powerful and more flexible than other stochastic extensions such as GSPNs and have been effectively used for performance, dependability, performability and security evaluations. HCSANs are extensions of SANs, whose hierarchical nature facilitates top-down and bottom-up model construction and their support for colored tokens facilitates complex data manipulations.

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: in section 2 the related work is discussed. An introduction to HCSANs and activity-marking oriented reward structures is provided in section 3. Section 4 presents the proposed approach and finally section 5 provides the concluding remarks and outlines the future work.

2 Related Work

Discrete-time Markov chains (DTMCs) are used in \[7\] to model software architectures and evaluate their security, performance and reliability. In this approach each component is modeled as a simple state and the arcs between states model the control flow between components. Quality attributes are evaluated by assigning reward functions to the states of the model.

In \[8\] a framework is proposed for analyzing the performance degradation induced by different security solutions. In this approach UML is used for modeling both the architecture and different security solutions. These models are then composed and converted to GSPN models for performance evaluation.

A methodology is proposed in \[9\] for combined performance and security risk analysis for border management systems. These systems are good examples of the systems in which both security and performance are critical. On one hand travelers should not linger because of security checks and on the other hand impostors should be distinguished from genuine travelers. In this approach the UML models of systems architecture are annotated with performance requirements. From these models LQN models are extracted for performance analysis. Also, cost curves are used to estimate the risk of misclassifying travelers with different classifiers.

In comparison to the above methods, the approach presented in this paper has the following distinguishing features:

- all the three SDP attributes can be evaluated quantitatively,
- the internal behavior of components can be modeled and analyzed,
- error propagation between components can be modeled,
- in contrast to many evaluation methods, any distribution function can be used for estimating the time spent by each software activity and
the generality of the activity-marking oriented reward structures makes this approach extensible to other quality attributes.

3 HCSAN-based Reward Models

In addition to the five primitives of ordinary SANs (i.e. place, input gate, output gate, instantaneous activity and timed activity), Colored stochastic activity networks (CSANs) \[3,4\] have the following two primitives: (1) token type: a non-integer data type specifying the type of each token stored in a colored place and (2) colored place: a place maintaining a list of tokens with a specific token type. A selection policy (e.g. FIFO, LIFO, Priority) may be associated to each colored place specifying the order in which tokens are removed from that place.

HCSANs as an extension of CSANs, have one additional primitive, i.e. macro activity. A macro activity is a sub-model of an HCSAN model with a predefined interface. This interface includes a set of fusion places, which are virtual (colored) places that must be bound to concrete (colored) places in the encompassing model.

As a modification of the SAN-based reward structures, the reward structure of an HCSAN model can be defined formally as follows:

**Definition 1.** An activity-marking reward structure of an HCSAN model with places \( P = SP \cup CP \) and activities \( A = IA \cup TA \cup MA \) is a pair of functions:

\[- C : A \rightarrow \mathbb{R} \text{ where for } a \in A, C(a) \text{ is the reward obtained due to the completion of activity } a, \text{ and} \]
\[- R : \wp(P,M) \rightarrow \mathbb{R} \text{ where for } v \in \wp(P,M), R(v) \text{ is the rate of reward obtained when for each } (p,m) \in v \text{ the marking of place } p \text{ is } m, \]

where \( \mathbb{R} \) is the set of real numbers, and \( \wp(P,M) \) is the set of all partial functions between \( P \) and \( M \).

In order to quantify the total reward associated with an HCSAN model at an instant of time \( t \), variable \( V_t \) can be used, which is defined as follows:

\[ V_t = \sum_{v \in \wp(P,M)} R(v) I^v_t + \sum_{a \in A} C(a) I^a_t \quad (1) \]

where \( I^v_t \) is a random variable indicating that for each \( (p,m) \in v \), the marking of place \( p \) is \( m \) at time instant \( t \), and the random variable \( I^a_t \) indicates that activity \( a \) is the most recently completed activity with respect to time instant \( t \). If \( I^v_t \) and \( I^a_t \) converge in distribution for all \( v \) and \( a \) with non-zero rewards as \( t \) approaches \( \infty \), then steady-state reward evaluation is also possible:

\[ V_{t \rightarrow \infty} = \sum_{v \in \wp(P,M)} R(v) I^v_{t \rightarrow \infty} + \sum_{a \in A} C(a) I^a_{t \rightarrow \infty} \quad (2) \]

In order to evaluate the total reward accumulated in an interval \([t, t + \tau]\) variable \( Y_{[t,t+\tau]} \) can be used, which can be expressed as:
where $J^v_{t\tau}$ is a random variable indicating the total time the model is in a marking such that for each $(p, m) \in v$, the marking of place $p$ is $m$ during $[t, t + \tau]$, and the random variable $N^a_{t\tau}$ indicates the number of completions of activity $a$ during $[t, t + \tau]$. Variable $W_{t\tau} = \frac{Y_{t\tau}}{\tau}$ can be used to evaluate time-averaged measures.

4 The Proposed Approach

In this section we explain how to model software architectures and evaluate their SDP attributes with HCSAN-based reward models. We call this approach SAN-based architecture modeling (SANAM). In SANAM, HCSANs are used to define the behavior models of components and connectors and HCSAN-based reward structures are used to define and evaluate quality attributes.

A SANAM-based architecture model can be formally defined as a 4-tuple $SANAM = (CM, CN, HD, RS)$, where:

- $CM = \{cm_1, cm_2, \ldots, cm_n\}$ is a set of component models such that each component model $cm = (IBM, PS, RS)$ consists of: an internal behavior model $IBM$ specified with HCSANs, a set $PS$ of provided services such that each provided service is modeled by a concrete macro activity and a set $RS$ of required services, each modeled by a virtual macro activity which should be bound to a concrete macro activity providing the service.

- $CN = \{cn_1, cn_2, \ldots, cn_n\}$ is a set of connector models. Connectors are building blocks for modeling interactions among components.

- $HD = \{hd_1, hd_2, \ldots, hd_n\}$ is a set of hardware device models. Each software component or connector may be bound with a set of hardware devices such as processors, disks, links, etc. Speed, capacity, and failure behavior of these devices have significant impacts on the SDP attributes of software and

- $RS$ is a set of HCSAN-based reward structures which can be used for specifying and evaluating the quality measures of interest.

As an illustrative example, consider a Group Communication System (GCS) used to store a set of documents and give users access to them. Several use cases can be defined for a GCS (e.g. subscribe, unsubscribe, submit a document, retrieve a document, and update a document). In this paper we focus on document retrieval. The SANAM model of this system is depicted in Fig. 1. This model includes two software components (i.e. $CApp$ and $Serv$) representing the client application and the communication server respectively. $Serv$ provides one service (i.e. $rDoc$) which facilitates retrieving a document. This component is bound with two hardware resources i.e. the processor $SPrc$ and the disk $SDsk$, and its communication with $Serv$ is handled by the connector $CSPR$, which represents a client-server protocol. The behavior model of $CApp$ is depicted in Fig 2.
This component iteratively generates requests, sends them to Serv and displays the responses. In this model the timed activities genReq and display are bound with the processor CPrc. The activity genReq (display) is enabled whenever a token is put in the place resp (doc) and it has acquired an idle processor i.e. the ID of this activity is put in the place acID by CPrc. After completion, this activity releases the acquired processor. If display fails, an error message will be displayed. Otherwise, the response of the server will be displayed which may be either a valid document or a server-side error message. The virtual macro activity rDoc corresponds to the required service of CApp. The behavior model of the service Serv.rDoc is presented in Fig. 3. This activity first requests access to the local disk and processor. If it acquires these resources, it will seek for the
requested document. In case of success, the content of the found document is put in the place `doc`, and a token representing an error message otherwise.

The behavior model of `CSPr` includes two timed activities for transferring requests and documents between `Serv` and `CApp` (see Fig. 4). The activity `send` is enabled whenever a request is received from `CApp` and an idle processor is available. After completion, if this activity succeeds in sending the request, the activity `Serv.rDoc` will be enabled. Otherwise, the request token will be put back in `req` to try again. The behavior of `recv` is similar to `send`. The only difference is the type of token they process. The two activities `intercept` and `modify` are added to the behavior model of `CSPr` to represent Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) attacks. In MitM attacks, an attacker establishes independent connections with the communicating parties and relays messages between them such that they believe that they are communicating directly over a private connection. But in fact, the connection is controlled by the attacker. As such, attacker will be able to intercept and modify the messages transferred between them.

For simplicity, the HCSAN models of the hardware resources are considered identical. As depicted in Fig. 5, the incoming requests which include the ID of the requesting activity are put in a queue and if at least one idle resource exists, one of the requests is approved probabilistically and its ID is put in the place `resp`. If the resource fails, it will be repaired. The order of processing requests is determined by the selection policy associated with the place queue i.e. FIFO. Whenever a timed activity releases a resource or the repair process completes, a token will be put in the place `idle`.

Now, to evaluate reliability as a dependability measure, the notion of system failure should be defined first. The GCS system fails when a token is put in the

![Fig. 3. HCSAN model of Serv.rDoc](image-url)
place CApp.failure. Therefore, the reliability of this system can be specified as:

\[ C(a) = 0, \forall a \in A, \]

\[ R(v) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } v = \{(CApp.failure, 0)\} \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases} \quad (4) \]

Performance measures can be evaluated in a similar way. For example, if we define the throughput of the GCS system during some interval \([t, t + \tau]\) as the number of documents successfully displayed for users in this interval, then the following reward structure can be used to specify throughput:

\[ C(a) = \begin{cases} p & \text{if } a = \text{CApp.display} \text{ and } rdoc! = \text{error} \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases} \]

\[ R(v) = 0, \forall v \in \mathcal{P}(P, M) \quad (5) \]

where \(p\) is the success probability of the activity display and \(rdoc\) is the token that this activity has removed from the place CApp.doc (see Fig. 2).

To evaluate confidentiality as a security measure, we should determine in which states this attribute is compromised. The confidentiality of the GCS system is compromised whenever the content of a document is intercepted during transfer i.e. place CApp.doc is marked with a token whose value is idoc. Therefore, the confidentiality attribute can be specified using the reward structure

\[ C(a) = 0, \forall a \in A, \]

\[ R(v) = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } v = \{(CApp.doc, idoc)\} \\ 1 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases} \quad (6) \]
5 Conclusions and Future Work

Regarding the necessity of integrated and quantitative evaluation of software quality attributes, we proposed SANAM as a formal method for modeling software architectures and evaluating their quality attributes in a unified manner. As future work we intend to define transformation rules to extract SANAM models from software modeling notations (e.g. UML, PCM, etc.) and develop a software tool for automating the transformation and evaluation procedures.

References

High Performance Computing Applications
using Parallel Data Processing Units

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Abstract. Multicore processors are growing with respect to the number of cores on a chip. In a parallel computation context, multicore platforms have several important features such as exploiting multiple parallel processes, having access to a shared memory with noticeably lower cost than the distributed alternative and optimizing different levels of parallelism. In this paper, we introduce the Parallel Data Processing Unit (PDPU) which is a group of objects that benefits from the shared memory of the multicore configuration and that consists of two parts: a shared memory for maintaining data consistent, and a set of objects that are processing the data, then producing and aggregating the results concurrently. We then implement two examples in Java that illustrate PDPU behavior, and compare them with their actor based counterparts and show significant performance improvements. We also put forward the idea of integrating PDPU with the actor model which will result in an optimization for a specific spectrum of problems in actor based development.

Keywords: Multicore Processors, High Performance Computing, Actor Based Implementation, Shared Memory, Programming Construct, Data Management

1 Introduction

In computer science research and industry, hardware development has always been progressing at a very fast rate in terms of performance and costs compared to the software adapted to run on it. Ever since the notion of parallel programming was first introduced, the demand for algorithms and models to support this paradigm has drastically increased. Very important issues like synchronization, concurrency and fine-grained task parallelism have been raised in a wide spectrum of domains requiring significant computing power and speed-up. Currently, chip manufacturers are moving from single-processor chips to new architectures that utilize the same silicon real estate for a conglomerate of multiple independent processors known as multicores, which is also the focus of our ongoing research in the UPSCALE European Project [26].

Throughout all of the mainstream languages, several libraries have been proposed with the objective to efficiently and reliably map tasks to these cores providing a high degree of parallelism to applications while avoiding race conditions and data inconsistency. At a lower level, compilers have also been adapted
to ensure instruction-level parallelism on operations that do not depend on each other and these optimizations are completely transparent to the user. Our on-going research in this project focuses on how to "lift" this transparency to a higher level, offering an abstraction of task-level parallelism that allows the user to specify how and which tasks are executed in parallel without the complexity of monitoring data dependencies. We present this approach in one of the main programming languages, namely the Java language, while avoiding the need to learn specific instructions of particular Java libraries and packages or forcing the programmer to adopt a certain "pattern" to developing highly concurrent applications.

In a parallel computation context, multicore platforms provide some features like exploiting several parallel processes and having access to a shared memory that enables us to propose new higher level software abstractions containing both parallel processes and the memory which is shared among them, and encapsulating the before-mentioned low level coordination issues as one solid entity. In this direction, we introduce the Parallel Data Processing Unit (PDPU) as the elementary effort towards the elaboration of this category of software abstractions. In a nutshell, we may have multiple PDPU s in a software, each of which has its own memory which is shared among constituent processes running in parallel. In addition, the synchronization considerations caused by concurrent access to the shared memory are managed as internal features and are hidden from the programmers.

Through this solution we offer designers a reliable and efficient framework for avoiding race conditions, deadlocks and managing critical sections in their programs. We also allow them to analyze their code and identify the exact degree of parallelism and cost of their parallel sections, while making a clear separation between sequential and concurrent parts of their programs. Finally our solution focuses on how to optimize memory accesses by separate processes in a MIMD architecture [24, 25]. This is a crucial research question in the field of Computer Science as more and more computation intensive applications are moving to GRID environments or even further to CLOUD storage and resources. Therefore we formulate our main objective in this paper as follows: to introduce a new model for programming parallel data processing applications which encapsulates the multithreaded java programming model and its synchronization features. The model exposes an interface that is easy to use and transparent, while adding optimizations for efficient memory management and data consistency. In the rest of this paper, we first survey the related work in section 2. We then introduce the definition of PDPU in section 3. The implementation efforts and evaluation of PDPU will be addressed in section 4. In section 5, we put forward the idea of integrating PDPU with the actor model in order to take advantage of simplicity of higher level abstractions and better performance. Finally, we conclude the paper and present future works in section 6.
2 Related Work

In this section we look at several solutions proposed and developed in mainstream programming languages for adapting programs to run on multicores. We start from some of the basic concepts and examples that have been validated and used in research and industry for multicore programming. For each example we will look at what aspects are drawn into our solution, mainly the ease of use and readability of these solutions, as well as the drawbacks that we want to avoid in our approach. Furthermore, we look at some complex directions of research that are oriented towards memory management and mapping user-level threads to kernel-level threads and propose their integration into our model.

We first look into the kernel-level threads [23] which is a POSIX standard for programming in C, C++ and Fortran. The advantages of this standard are that, when implemented correctly, it is extremely efficient and fast, ensuring a high degree of parallelism that is specified by the user explicitly. The advantage of these threads is that they can be directly mapped to the kernel threads of an operating system making it very easy for the user to observe the load of each task and appropriately balance the computation amongst cores by correctly defining each thread’s functionality and adjusting it according to its profiling results. It has been validated in numerous applications and has yielded the best scaling results among parallel programming solutions [18, 22]. The drawbacks of this approach are centered around the fact that the user is responsible for synchronization, avoiding race conditions or deadlocks and managing critical sections and variables. The POSIX Library offers no warnings, compiler errors or exceptions when these issues occur. In our solution we use the thread mechanism due to its excellent performance and offer a certain degree of control to the user, however some of the basic synchronization issues are handled implicitly and due to our solution being specific to the Java language, it offers the user exceptions on these issues if they are violated.

Another contribution to our proposal is related to the OpenMP standard proposed in [21]. This solution is also specialized in shared-memory programming and parallelism is fully implicit. It comprises of a set of directives used to control repetitive instructions in particular and allow them to be scheduled on the available cores such that they can be executed in parallel. The directives offer limited control over scheduling options, the degree of parallelism and critical sections. What is the most important aspect that we draw from OpenMP is the transparency of the parallelism, as it does not have to be explicitly specified [17]. Basic instruction-level parallelism and, starting with the recently passed OpenMP 3.0 standard, task-level parallelism are achieved by adding the appropriate directive before a repetitive instruction or a code-block.

A significant research topic related to OpenMP is how to use this standard together with the well-known Message Passing Interface (MPI) standard for distributed programming [16]. This solution allows the user to explicitly model parallel processes at a much higher programming level than POSIX Threads while at the same time handling remote or local communication via messages. The communication is completely transparent to the user and avoids the im-
plementation of sockets or remote method invocation. Essentially, every node is considered a separate entity with its own address space, a model which disregards shared memory. From a software engineering standpoint this standard is the easiest to use in the FORTRAN, C and C++ languages as it does not present any difficult language constructs and offers high level methods to handle, spawn, finalize and synchronize processes either on the same machine or on several computing entities. Communication transparency is the key feature that we introduce in our model from the MPI standard, but without affecting the shared memory model that an application may or may not be running on. A study in [20] has shown that a hybrid approach between OpenMP and MPI depending on the programming model can yield the best performance results and our solution is based on this hybrid approach.

Nobakht et al. [3] proposed a modeling language for leveraging performance and scheduling concepts to application level. The proposal introduces the notion of concurrent object groups (COGs) that isolates multiple objects into separate entities and exposes a user-friendly solution to set scheduling policies at a higher-programming level. As stated in our main objective, we model our solution for the Java language, therefore we needed to carefully study the parallel programming concepts introduced by the Java Platform[15]. The solutions for this programming language are similar to POSIX threads in the sense that the user is responsible for every step in the concurrent application’s design. Although Java provides an abstraction for both Threads [14] and synchronization mechanisms [13] a programmer still has the difficult task of learning and using these new constructs being responsible for handling deadlocks, race conditions and data consistency. Our goal is to combine these solutions and their advantages to present a novel approach in multicore programming with a shared memory model. Our proposed setting is more general than coordination languages [32] in the sense that the data structures used for memory management can be customized and are not restricted to a specific tuple-space, with our aim being towards a more general data component.

3 The Definition of Parallel Data Processing Unit

Parallel Data Processing Unit (PDPU) is an abstract object (or unit) that puts together a group of objects so that they process the data in the shared memory concurrently. PDPU has two main constituents (Figure 1):

A group of processes: a frame that aggregates objects so that one can look at the group of objects as one solid entity. The group members and their corresponding details are abstracted away from the rest of the application (like a black box). Instead, PDPU provides one interface just like one coarse-grained object. There should be some reason that makes this frame meaningful e.g. conceptual coherence among active object classes. At least, all of them have one feature in common; they need a specific kind of data to process. From now on, we refer to the group members as processes since they process the data in shared memory,
though they can also behave the same as producers by pushing data in the input shared memory through the interface.

*Input and output shared memory*: PDPU, as an individual object, has one input shared memory for storing data received from outside. This memory is shared within the processes, and the group processes the data from it. There is also an output shared memory which is filled with the data produced by processes. The processes do not share any memory except the input for reading and the output for writing. Furthermore, the data elements are just added or removed and they are immutable. We refer to those objects which are responsible to fill in the input shared memory as data producers. Producers are not a part of the PDPU, instead they use its interface in order to put the data. The output shared memory is also accessed by the objects called consumers through PDPU interface. Inside the PDPU, the shared memory is responsible for thread safety and data consistency when processes work with data concurrently.

### 3.1 PDPU Interface Description

As shown in Figure 1, there are a group of processes inside the PDPU. Each process must follow the following template:

```
Start Process ()
Do
    data = retrieve()
    result = process(data)
    write(result)
Until (data meets ending condition)
End Process
```

This abstract template shows how proactively processes obtain the data from the input shared memory and then process it based on their own logic. They
Table 1. PDPU interface

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Method Name</th>
<th>Output Type</th>
<th>Method Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PDPU&lt;InputType, OutputType&gt;(Boolean, Runnable, int)</td>
<td>Object</td>
<td>PDPU Constructor which generates PDPU with individual processes from reproducible Runnable process and specified data retrieving policy (isAll). InputType is the input data type and OutputType is the output data type.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDPU&lt;InputType, OutputType&gt;(Boolean, List)</td>
<td>Object</td>
<td>PDPU Constructor which generates PDPU with individual Runnable processes from List and specified data retrieving policy (isAll). InputType is the input data type and OutputType is the output data type.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>retrieve()</td>
<td>InputType</td>
<td>Retrieve the data for process usage based on retrieving policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>add(InputType)</td>
<td>Boolean</td>
<td>Add the data to the shared memory and return True if it is successful</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>write(OutputType)</td>
<td>Boolean</td>
<td>Write the data to the output shared memory and return True if it is successful</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>read()</td>
<td>OutputType</td>
<td>Return the data from output shared memory</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

may, if necessary, generate a result and put it in the output shared memory. In the above mentioned code, there are two functions which are provided by PDPU interface: retrieve and write. A brief description of the PDPU interface is given in Table 1. The "retrieve()" method provides the process with the next data element from input shared memory. It encapsulates which is the next data element and how the synchronization issues are handled. The process may generate some explicit result for processing each data element. In this case it uses "write(data)" to record them in the output shared memory. This function also encapsulates the synchronization issues for writing in the output shared memory as well. The process’s result, however, may be produced implicitly through the "process()" method, as you will see in section 4. On the other hand, there has to be a data producer (or producers) which fills the input shared memory and consequently provides the processes with the data to be retrieved and processed. To this aim, the producer uses the interface method "add(data)" which adds the data to the shared memory. This function is propagated by PDPU interface.

In the definition of PDPU, there are two factors that impact the internal design of it and both should be specified based on user’s problem requirements.

- **Initialization phase:** initial state and logic of the processes.
- **Memory access:** the way that the data in shared memory will be retrieved.

The processes may be instances of the same class and their internal state may be the same after initialization. We refer to this type of processes as Reproducible (R) and otherwise as Non-Reproducible (NR). If the process is reproducible, it is enough to initiate one process and to send it to the PDPU object along with its number of replicas. Otherwise, the programmer is supposed to make a list
of processes with different initial states, and then to send the list to the PDPU object.

(1) PDPU(isAll, process, m) //for Reproducible processes
(2) PDPU(isAll, processList) // For Non-Reproducible processes

Furthermore, the data elements in the shared memory can have two different ways of being retrieved. The shared memory’s data is targeted either to all processes or to any of them. In the first instance, it means all the m processes will retrieve one specific data, and in the second case it means that it is enough for the data to be processed just by one of the processes. An example of how PDPU is used is given in Listing 1.1. The processes inside PDPU retrieve the next data element as soon as they become idle. The start-up sequence of the processes is also based on which one retrieves data from the input shared memory earlier.

**Listing 1.1. PDPU User Example**

```java
public class PDPUUser {
    Process[] process;
    PDPU<InputType, OutputType> pdpu;
    Input dataFlux = new input();
    // this can be a socketHandler
    // or anything which continuously receives Data

    public void Init(int m) {
        process = new process[m];
        pdpu = new PDPU<InputType, OutputType>("all", process);
        // the first parameter corresponds to how data is processed
        for (int i = 0; i < m; i++) {
            process[i] = new Process();
            process[i].setPDPU(pdpu);
        }

        while (dataFlux.hasData())
            pdpu.add(dataFlux.getNewData());
        // The producer rule in the model

        for (int i = 1; i <= m; i++)
            pdpu.add(dataFlux.endData());
        // ending condition
    }

    public class Process implements Runnable{
        PDPU<InputType, OutputType> pdpu;

        public void setPDPU(PDPU<InputType, OutputType> pdpu){
```
3.2 PDPU scientific impact

PDPUs bring about some advantages with respect to software engineering qualities, as they provide:

- **Ease of use**: some lower level implementation details are handled not by programmers, but by the PDPU; like allocating computation resources to the processes, allocating shared memory, and the thread-safety issues concerning access to the shared memory.
- **Understandability of system design and code**: PDPU as a coarse granular cohesive design component (or module) makes the design models of the system simpler and easier to understand.
- **Loose coupling**: the producer interacts only with PDPU interface instead of all processes.

Furthermore with respect to concurrent computation, PDPUs provide new abstract constructs for parallel programming languages and, more generally, they put forward a new paradigm of designing coarse grained objects which encapsulates both memory and multiple computation resources.

4 PDPU Implementation and Evaluation

In this section we present a technical explanation of the shared memory management. We illustrate the operation of PDPU through a case study with two examples in Java.

4.1 Memory management

As explained in section 3 the PDPU hides all of the elements concerning synchronization, thread-safety and data consistency from the user. The memory can
be customized to support retrieval of each data item by either a \textbf{single} process or \textbf{all} processes. In the first case, we implement the memory as a LinkedBlockingQueue\cite{13} which translates to a classic producer-consumer \cite{12} problem with the synchronization hidden from the user. The real issue appears in the second instance where the memory must take into account blocking all processes when new data is not available, releasing them for work when new data is added and cleaning up the input data when all processes have read it. This case maps to the classic readers/writers problem \cite{11} with a garbage collection issue. We use a ConcurrentHashMap with an index for a key and a counter/data pair for a value. A CyclicBarrier is assigned to a separate counter (the current number of items that were added up to a moment) which blocks all processes when no new data is available. After each process reads an item from the hash map it increments the item’s corresponding counter. The last process to read an item is responsible for eliminating the item based on the counter reaching the fixed number of processes. It is worth mentioning that because according to the definition of PDPU the data is immutable both in input and output shared memories, we use object cloning in order to have a copy of the data instead of reference to guarantee the immutability of the data.

\section*{4.2 Example 1: The Behavior of PDPU with Respect to Transferring Data}

We first compare a Java program in the domain of actor based applications with its PDPU-based counterpart. In this example, there is no computation and the only important factor is delivering data elements to the processes. Figure 2 presents the PDPU in Object Oriented model. For implementing above mentioned actor based Java programs, we use ABS-API\cite{7}, an actor-model library implemented in JAVA 8 using the newly introduced feature of lambda expressions. We also run all the programs on SaraSURF cluster on a 16 core processor 2.70 GHz (Intel Xeon CPU E5-4650 0) with 128GB of memory\cite{8} to have the same framework for comparison.

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=0.5\textwidth]{fig2.png}
\caption{The Object Oriented model containing PDPU}
\end{figure}
Let us assume a common actor based configuration in which there is a producer of data that provides multiple actors with a stream of data objects through message passing. The producer generates the data and sends it through asynchronous method invocation. Each data element will be processed by all of the actors. Therefore the producer composes and sends $m$ messages for each data, where $m$ is the number of actors receiving the message. Thus, for $n$ data elements, the producer sends $m \times n$ messages. However, instead of broadcasting each message to all actors, the PDPU alternative for this implementation involves having a PDPU which contains a fixed number of $m$ processes. The producer is supposed to add each data element to the shared memory of the PDPU instance just once through calling “add(data)” and processes retrieve and process the data. Therefore the producer adds the $n$ data elements to the PDPU which starts $m$ processes. It is clear that, in terms of transferring data to the processes, the computation complexities of producers are $O(nm)$ and $O(n + m)$ for the actor based and PDPU based implementations respectively. The difference is more clear, when we consider large $m$ because of the future of multicore platforms, namely manycores, with thousands or even millions of cores on a chip. Figure 3 illustrates the advantage of PDPU in terms of performance. The important point of this plot is the behavior of these two approaches, disregarding the elapsed times. As you can see, the line corresponding to actor based implementation grows exponentially, when $m$ is increased. The PDPU based implementation, however, grows at a linear rate. There are multiple factors other than computation complexity that impact on the elapsed time in the actor based configuration, namely, the resource consumption due to among others enqueueing and dequeueing the messages and generating the call stacks.

Fig. 3. The comparison between the behavior of Actor based and PDPU based Java programs. $10^6$ data items are sent to each process.
4.3 Example 2: The concurrent version of sieve of Eratosthenes

In mathematics, the sieve of Eratosthenes, one of a number of prime number sieves, is a simple algorithm for finding all prime numbers up to any given limit. It does so by iteratively marking as composite (i.e. not prime) the multiples of each prime, starting with the multiples of 2 [6]. To model the algorithm in two different versions using actors [5] and PDPU, we use the well-known parallel algorithm which partitions the sequence of candidate numbers [2,1]. In this algorithm, the numbers are partitioned into smaller sequences of numbers with almost the same size. The size of each partition must be equal or greater than \( \lceil \sqrt{n} \rceil \), and the number of partitions must be equal or less than \( \lceil n/\lceil \sqrt{n} \rceil \rceil \), where \( n \) is the target number such that the first partition contains all of the prime numbers that sieve composites throughout all partitions. Therefore the first actor in the model, namely producer, will send asynchronous messages to the others that will invoke the sieving process. To this aim, each prime number must be sent \( m \) times to the \( m \) actors. This is where the PDPU based model affects the performance of the program. If prime numbers are processed on the same machine they can exploit PDPU abstraction which reads and writes the numbers in a shared data structure, with message passing being required only between the producer and remote partitions. So each prime number is produced and written in shared memory just once. The comparison of actor based and PDPU based implementations of prime sieve is shown in Figure 4. While both algorithms scale, PDPU based implementation outperforms the actor based one. However it is not because of theoretical analysis we have mentioned in Section 4.2, but because of practical overheads in ABS-API for receiving the messages containing data. In other words, when the producer is not the bottleneck, in opposite to example 1, then both programs performances are limited to the computations done in actors and processes. In this example, they behave the same, though there is some constant difference in performance. In contrast, if we consider just producers overheads and disregard other parts of programs, the PDPU based implementation significantly outperforms since the same reason mentioned in Section 4.2.

5 Discussion: Integrating PDPU with Actor Model

In previous sections, we introduced PDPU as a high abstraction level object that is orthogonal to both Java Threads and the actor model. PDPU enhances the Java language to obtain parallelism in processing data via encapsulating synchronization. In other words, it is simpler to implement a parallel data processing algorithm using PDPU than using Java Threads, and the programmer does not need to face synchronization issues, race conditions and so forth. We have also shown how PDPU outperforms actor based implementations and what is the reason behind it through the examples in section 4. In this section, we explain how PDPU concept is integrated with actor model in such a way that the extended actor model exploits the strength points of both concepts.
Although it is achieved novel advantages in the area of actor model and asynchronous message passing, there are some downsides in practice e.g. the overhead of composing, sending and receiving messages and dealing with obtaining future results when their number is large. Sometimes the overhead is because of the nature of broadcasting mechanism — that is — broadcasting the same message to several actors which has both computation overhead, because of redundant repetitive actions for broadcasting message, and memory overhead, because of redundant queuing the same message by several actors. On the other hand, the actor model [7] provides the actor notion which is an entity with high abstraction level that leads to eliminating design and implementation complexities caused by the nature of parallel computation and programming. However, there can be higher abstract constructs or design patterns that still follow the actor concept and eliminate or lessen these cumbersome and confusing details in some specific circumstances.

This section puts forward the idea of a new abstract programming language construct, which is called Active Group in order to benefit from both actor based implementation and PDPU features. The general idea is that we have one actor-like component in a higher level abstraction. This component consists of one queue of runnable messages and one processing part which processes the messages. At lower abstraction level, similar to PDPU, the processing part contains multiple processes, i.e. actors, receiving messages. Instead of data elements in PDPU, here we will have runnable messages in the shared memory. You can see a simple scheme of Active Group in Figure 5. However we ignore some of its details, e.g. how actors have access to the shared queue. Here we briefly address some of these details as the main features of Active Groups. We use the same terminology as the definition of PDPU:
Fig. 5. Active Group (right side) and its extended actor based counterpart (left side)

Proactive or reactive actors: The actor can proactively fetch one message from shared memory or wait for the next element to be prepared. In contrast, it may passively receive the message through an independent scheduler in the group, and process it. Thus the values for this feature are Proactive and Reactive. In the former case, there is no need for each individual actor to have a message queue.

Different scheduling policies: One of the advantages of the active group is to apply different scheduling policies. Data is usually received in a particular order, but if the policy is not FIFO, the group may process them in other orders. To this aim, data can be reordered based on, say, Priority or Content. Furthermore, if actors are not proactive, they are supposed to be managed as computation resources by schedulers. They may be selected as the target actor based on different policies like Round Robin.

Different ways of using the shared memory: In some applications of active groups, each message in the shared memory will be fetched by one actor and processed by it. So, in that case, the message is removed from shared memory (e.g. a queue of HTTP requests, each of which will be enough to be processed by one server). This type of shared memory is technically a queue. However, in some other applications, the message is used by all actors. In that case, the data is read from the shared memory but it is not removed since it will be used by others (e.g. in section 4.3, the messages containing prime numbers that are used by actors in concurrent version of sieve of Eratosthenes).

There can be several distinct versions of active group, each of which have different feature values. If we refer to the above-mentioned issues as customizable features of active group, then the ideal active group definition provides the user with all these features to be customizable with existing values. To reach this aim, there can be different ways:
1. Parameterizing the active group construct so that the user can initialize appropriate feature values.
2. Using polymorphism to refine the abstract active group.
3. Having distinct types of active groups so that their definition illustrates their features values.

6 Conclusion and Future Works

In this paper we proposed a coarser granular object, i.e. Parallel Data Processing Unit, which contains both computation and memory, and encapsulates efforts for synchronization issues to make parallel programming easier for programmers. Through case studies and complexity analysis, we have shown how it overcomes one of the drawbacks of actor model and significantly improves performance.

Reasoning about multi-threaded Java programs is notoriously hard (see [9]) because of its fine-grained interleaving. In contrast PDPUs allow for a compositional proof method along the lines of the proof method for monitors as introduced in [10]. Given an appropriate assertion language for describing the internal data structures of a PDPU such a proof method is based on the specification of these data structures by means of an invariant. The external proof obligations for the invariant are specified in terms of the implementations of the "add" and the "read" operation, given a precondition of the caller specifying the input parameter in case of an "add" operation. The internal proof obligations of the invariant are specified in terms of the implementations of the processes which involves the implementations of the "retrieve" and "write" operations.

We then put forward the idea of integrating this novel approach with the actor model by bridging the gap between their conceptual differences. To this aim, we have generalized PDPU as a new concept, called Active Group, which is based on actor model. It will make it possible for a broader types of problems to be implemented in Active Groups. As future work, we aim to extend the syntax and the operational semantics of ABS language [4] to have the new construct, namely Active Group, and also extend the ABS-API so that it contains support for defining and using Active Groups.

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Modeling and Efficient Verification of Broadcasting Actors

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Abstract. Many distributed systems use broadcast communication for various reasons such as saving energy or increasing throughput. However, the actor model for concurrent and distributed systems does not directly support this kind of communication. In such cases, a broadcast must be modeled as multiple unicasts which leads to loss of modularity and state space explosion for any non-trivial system. In this paper, we extend Rebeca, an actor-based model language, to support asynchronous anonymous message broadcasting. Then, we apply counter abstraction for reducing the state space which efficiently bypasses the constructive orbit problem by considering the global state as a vector of counters, one per each local state. This makes the model checking of systems possible without further considerations of symmetry. This approach is efficient for fully symmetric system like broadcasting environments. We use a couple of case studies to illustrate the applicability of our method and the way their state spaces are reduced in size.

Keywords: state space reduction, broadcast, Rebeca, actor-based language, model checking, verification

1 Introduction

The actor model [2,13] is one of the pioneers in modeling of concurrent and distributed applications. It has been introduced as an agent-based language by Hewitt [13] and then extended by Agha as an object-based concurrent computation model [2]. An actor model consists of a set of actors that communicate through asynchronous message passing. Communication in actor models is based on unicast, i.e. in each message the receiver has to be specified. On the other hand, broadcast communication is a simple model of parallel computation [28] and a large number of algorithms in distributed networks use broadcast, such as consensus agreement [20,4,7,5,22], leader election [23,16,21], and max finding [9,17,27,18]. In addition, wireless channels have a broadcast nature as when a node sends a message, it can be received by any other node that lies within its communication range, which leads to power saving and throughput improvement [8]. Modeling these algorithms with actor model would cause some complexities both in modeling and analysis. In the modeling aspect, a broadcast has to be replaced with multiple unicasts, which leads to loss of modularity and cluttering of the model code. The (unnecessary) interleaving of these unicast messages
causes state space explosion during analysis, the main obstacle in model checking of nontrivial systems. Using broadcasts instead of multiple unicasts, enables efficient use of counter abstraction technique [3] to overcome this problem.

In this paper, we extend the actor-based modeling language Rebeca [31] with broadcast communication. Rebeca is an operational interpretation of the actor model with the aim of bridging the gap between formal verification techniques and the real world software engineering of concurrent and distributed applications. This is achieved by its simple Java-like syntax and extensive tool support [1,32], including a modeling environment and a model checker employing well known reduction techniques [14]. The resulting modeling language provides a suitable framework to model mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs). Having broadcast as the main communication mechanism in the broadcasting actor language, we have applied counter abstraction to efficiently reduce the size of the state space. To the best of our knowledge, there is no actor-based language with direct support for broadcast communication. In [29], Rebeca is extended with components to provide a higher level of abstraction and encapsulation and broadcast has been used for communication between the components of actors and not within a component.

In the original actor model, message delivery is guaranteed and each actor has a mailbox to maintain messages while it is busy processing another message. However, due to unpredictability of networks, the arrival order of messages are assumed to be arbitrary and unknown [2]. To prevent state space explosion, Rebeca makes use of FIFO queues as a means of message storage [30] so that messages will be processed based on the order that they have been received. In our extended model, queues are replaced by bags (unordered multi-sets of messages).

The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly introduces Rebeca and provides an overview on the counter abstraction technique. Section 3 presents our extension to Rebeca to support broadcast. In Section 4, we show how we have implemented counter abstraction to generate the state space compactly. To illustrate the applicability of our approach, we bring two case studies in Section 5. Finally, we review some related work in 6 before concluding the paper.

2 Preliminaries

2.1 Rebeca

Rebeca [31] is an actor-based modeling language which has been proposed for modeling and verification of concurrent and distributed systems. It aims to bring the formal verification techniques into the real world of software engineering by means of providing a Java-like syntax familiar to software developers and also providing tool support via an integrated modeling and verification environment [1]. A design principle behind Rebeca is to enable domain-specific extensions of the core language [30]. Examples of such extensions has been introduced in various domains such as probabilistic systems [33], real-time systems [25], and software product lines [26].
In Rebeca, actors are the units of computation, called rebecs (short for reactive objects) which are instances of the defined reactive classes in the model. Rebecs communicate with other rebecs only through message-passing which is fair and asynchronous. A rebec can send messages only to its known rebecs mentioned in its definition and also to itself using “self” keyword. The local state of a rebec is represented by its state variables as well as the contents of its message queue. The message servers, which indicate how received messages must be processed, are also other parts of a rebec definition. Each rebec has at least one message server called “initial” which acts as a constructor in object-oriented language and is responsible for initialization tasks, and it is always put in every rebec’s queue initially.

A rebec is enabled if and only if there is at least one message in its queue. The computation takes place by removing a message from the head of the queue and executing its corresponding message server atomically, after which the rebec proceeds to process the next message in the queue (if exists). Processing a message may have the following consequences:

- the value of the state variables of the executing rebec may be modified,
- new rebecs may be created,
- some messages may be sent to other rebecs or the executing rebec itself.

Besides the definition of the reactive classes, the main part of a Rebeca model specifies the instances of the reactive classes initially created along with their known-rebecs. The parameters of initial message server, if there is any, will also be specified.

As an example, Fig.1 illustrates a simple leader election algorithm modeled in Rebeca, aiming to select a node with the highest id as the leader. The nodes are organized in a (directed) ring. Each node sends its id to its neighbor and upon receiving a message compares the received id with its own id. If it is greater than its own id, it passes the number to its neighbor. So, when a number passes through the ring and is received by the node which its id is equal to the received id, it means that node has the greatest id and will be elected as the leader.

### 2.2 Counter Abstraction

When analyzing complex systems, their state space is prone to grow exponentially in space, known as the state space explosion problem, which is common in the realm of model checking. Counter abstraction is one of the proposed approaches to overcome this difficulty [24,3]. Its idea is to record the global state of a system as a vector of counters, one per local state, tracking how many of the n components currently reside in that local state. In our work, “components” refer to actors in the system. Let n and m be the number of components and local states respectively. This technique turns the n-component model of a size exponential in n, i.e., \( m^n \), into one of a size polynomial in n, i.e., \( \binom{n + m - 1}{m} \).

Counter abstraction can be seen as a form of symmetry reduction [10]. Two
Fig. 1: Simple leader election algorithm: an example of a Rebeca model

global states $S$ and $S'$ are identical up to permutation if for every local state $s$, the same number of components reside in $s$ is the same in the two states $S$ and $S'$, only the order of elements change through permutation. For example, consider a system which consists of 3 components each with only one variable $v_i$ of type Boolean. The global states of $(T, T, F)$, $(F, T, T)$ and $(T, F, T)$ are equivalent and can be represented as $(2T, F)$.

3 Broadcasting Rebeca

In this section, we present a modeling language based on Rebeca, by replacing the unicast communication mechanism by broadcast. We name the language bRebeca and will describe its syntax and formal semantics in the following subsections.

3.1 Syntax

In bRebeca, rebecs communicate with each other only through broadcasting: the sent message will be received by all rebecs of the model (as specified in the main part). After taking a message from its bag, the receiving rebea simply discards the message if no corresponding message server is defined in its reactive class. Since every message will be received by all existing rebecs, unlike Rebeca, there is no need for declaring the known rebecs in the reactive class definitions. Furthermore, there is no need to specify the receiver of a message in a send.
statement. Every initial message server at least have one parameter, named 
starter. The value of starter is only true for the rebec which initiates the 
algorithm by broadcasting the first message.

The grammar of bRebeca is presented in Fig. 2.

```
Model ::= ReactiveClass + Main
Main ::= main {RebecDecl + }
ReactiveClass ::= reactiveclass C { StateVars MsgServer* }
StateVars ::= statevars { VarDecl }
MsgServer ::= msgsrv M(< T V >*) { Statement* }
VarDecl ::= TV;
Statement ::= Assign | Broadcast | Conditional
Assign ::= V = Expr;
Broadcast ::= M(< V >*);
Conditional ::= if (Expr) { Statement* } else { Statement* }
RebecDecl ::= C R(< V >*)
```

Fig. 2: bRebeca language syntax: Angle brackets (< >) are used as meta-
parentheses. Superscript ? denotes that preceding part is optional, superscript
+ is used for more than once repetition, and * indicates the zero or more times
repetition. The symbols C, T, M, and V denote class, type, method and vari-
able names respectively. The symbol E denotes an expression, which can be an
arithmetic or Boolean expression.

3.2 Semantics

The formal semantics of bRebeca is expressed as a labeled transition system
(LTS), defined by the quadruple ⟨S, →, L, s0⟩, where S is a set of states, → a set
of transitions between states, L a set of labels, and s0 the initial state.

Let I denote the set of all existing rebec identifiers, ranged over 1..n, V a set
of all possible values for the state variables, and M the set of all message servers
identifiers in the model. All rebecs of the model which execute concurrently form
a closed model R = ||i∈IRi. Each rebec with identifier i, is described by a
tuple ri = ⟨Vi, Mi⟩, where Vi is the set of its state variables and Mi the set of
messages it can respond to. As said earlier, a rebec in bRebeca holds its received
messages in an unordered bag (unlike Rebeca, in which maintains such messages
in a FIFO queue).

**Definition 1.** (Local State) The local state of a rebec ri is an element of Si =
Vali × Bagi, where Vali is the set of all valuations for the state variables of ri.
Definition 2. (Global State) A global state $S$ is defined as the combination of all local states of rebecs in the model:

$$S = \prod_{i \in I} S_i$$

An initial state $s_0$ consists of all rebecs initial state, where all rebecs have executed their initial messages. In fact, an initial message server can be seen as a constructor in object-oriented languages.

To formally define the transitions between the states, we assume there are two sets of auxiliary functions defined as follows:

- $\text{Update}_i(v_i, m) : V_i \times M_i \rightarrow V_i$ receives a valuation $v_i$ for the state variables of $r_i$ and a message $m$, and returns the updated valuation for the state variables of $r_i$. This function abstracts the effect of processing $m$ by $r_i$ on its state variables.
- $\text{Sent}_i(m) : M_i \rightarrow M$ specifies the set of messages broadcasted by $r_i$ as a result of processing message $m$.

To keep our semantic description simple, we do not give the details of the above two functions, since the semantics of control statements and expressions are the same as those in Rebeca. We also ignore the parameters in the messages. For a detailed semantic description, the reader may refer to [31].

Definition 3. (Transition Relation) Let $L$ denote the set of all messages which can be passed between rebecs in the model $R$, $L = \bigcup_{i \in I} M_i$. Also assume $s = \langle s_1, s_2, \ldots, s_n \rangle$ and $s' = \langle s'_1, s'_2, \ldots, s'_n \rangle$ be two states in $S$ such that $s_i = \langle v_i, b_i \rangle$ and $s'_i = \langle v'_i, b'_i \rangle$. The transition relation $\rightarrow \subseteq S \times L \times S$ is defined such that $(s, m, s') \in \rightarrow$ (written as $s \xrightarrow{m} s'$) if and only if

$$\exists i \in I \cdot m \in b_i \land v'_i = \text{Update}_i(v_i, m) \land b'_i = b_i \cup \text{Sent}_i(m) - \{m\} \land (\forall j \in I, j \neq i \cdot v'_j = v_j \land b'_j = b_j \cup \text{Sent}_i(m)).$$

Note that in the definition above, the operators $\cup$ and $-$ are assumed to be applied to message bags, which are multi-sets. In other words, if $m$ is already in $b$, $\{m\} \cup b$ adds another copy of $m$ to $b$, and $b - \{m\}$ removes one instance of $m$ from $b$.

4 Implementing Counter Abstraction

To apply the counter abstraction technique on bRebeca, we consider each global state as a vector of counters, one per each distinct local state, and keep track of how many rebecs have that local state: the same state variable values and bag.
The reduction takes place on-the-fly while constructing the state space. Whenever a new global state is reached, we create a temporary global state by comparing the local states and counting how many are equal. Then the temporary global state is compared with existing temporary global states and if it is a new state, then it would be added to the set of the reached states. Fig. 3 shows an example of applying counter abstraction on a global state. The global state consists of three rebecs with only one state variable $i$ and one update message. The local states, i.e. the state variables and bags of rebecs $r_1$ and $r_2$ are equal and they can be considered the same while ignoring their identities.

$$i = 2, \text{bag: update}(3), \text{counter}=2$$

$$i = 3, \text{bag: update}(3), \text{counter}=1$$

Fig. 3: Example of applying counter abstraction on a global state

To implement the state space builder, we follow a model-driven approach implemented in C#. A reusable layer of abstract classes are defined to provide the basic entities and services needed to generate the state space, such as State and Message. Also, the basic mechanism of generating the state space using a Depth-First Search (DFS) is implemented in this layer (named StateSpaceBuilder). The DFS is implemented in a multi-threaded way to exploit multi-core processing power. This class takes the responsibility of handling nondeterminism in message scheduling: in each state, a separate task is created for scheduling each enabled rebec with distinct local state where rebecs are fairly run by keeping track of rebecs in each state.

The proposed model supports only broadcast communications, as rebecs have no ids to be distinguished from each other it would be impossible to add unicast to such a model. Though with some minor modifications of current model, as follows, very limited unicast would be feasible. A node can unicast a message only to itself or the sender of prepossessing message, otherwise it will jeopardize the soundness of counter abstraction technique by considering two states equal while they are not. In the other words, only relative addresses (i.e. the sender of a message) are allowed as ids have no absolute meaning.

We need to keep somehow the ids of rebecs instead of just counters in some level of state space exploration. While constructing the state space, by processing messages, we keep the ids of those rebecs together in a group which have the same local state, regardless of their ids. The resulting global state is called middle global state. To store reachable states, the final global states are computed from middle global states by counting the number of ids in each group.
To make unicast unconditionally possible we need to consider the permutation of ids and use the known-rebec concept like symmetry reduction[14].

For processing a bRebeca model, we use a bRebeca parser to generate a C# code from the source model. Each reactive class is translated into two basic classes: one subclass of \texttt{State} to represent the local states of the rebec of that class, and another class which holds the implementation of the message servers. A translated message server, when executed, generates all possible “next states”. Note that due to the existence of “non-deterministic assignment” in Rebeca, there may be more than one next state.

When generating a subclass of \texttt{State} for a rebec, the code generator is responsible for implementing an abstract \textit{hash function}, which is used to compare the local states. This is essential to implement an efficient comparison for global states which is encoded as a mapping from (the polymorphic) State into integers, implemented by a Dictionary class in C#.

5 Case Studies

To illustrate the applicability of the proposed modeling language, two algorithms are modeled and the amount of reduction in state space size is shown.

5.1 Max-algorithm

Consider a network where every node stores an integer value and they are going to find the maximum value in the network in a distributed manner. The bRebeca code for the model is illustrated in Fig.4 for a simple network of three nodes.

The nodes in the network are modeled by the reactive class \texttt{Node} with two state variables \texttt{my\_i} to store the node value and \texttt{done} which indicates whether the node has already sent its value or there is no need to send it, based on the values of the other nodes received so far. The goal is to find the maximum value of \texttt{my\_i} among nodes. One node initiates the algorithm by broadcasting its value to other nodes. Upon receiving a value from others, each node compares its value with the received one. If its value is less than the received one, it updates its value to the received one and waits for receiving the next messages while giving up on sending by setting its \texttt{done} to true. Otherwise, it broadcasts its value to other rebecs, if it has not already and then sets its \texttt{done} to true. The algorithm terminates when there is no further message to be processed. It means that everyone has either transmitted its value or given up. In this case, all state variables have been updated to the maximum value. This algorithm is referred to as “Max-Algorithm” [17].

For a network consists of three rebecs, if we start with rebec \texttt{rebec2} which has the maximum value (3), each node gives up transmitting after receiving the maximum and procedure has only one step. The reduced state space obtained from the execution of max-algorithm in this network is shown in Fig.5.
5.2 Leader Election

One way of electing leader in a distributed network is through flipping a coin \cite{11}. The algorithm consists of several rounds. In each round, all competitors, nodes with coin value of true, participate by flipping their coin and broadcasting the observed results to the others. A round is completed whenever all competitors have flipped their coin and received other nodes’ observation. At the end of each round:

– If there is only one node with coin value of true, then it is elected as the leader.
– If there is no node with coin value of true, it means that the round should be repeated. So all coin values of the previous competitors will be set to true.
– If the number of nodes with coin value of true is more than one, nodes with coin value of true will participate in the next round and flip the coin again.

Fig. 6 shows one execution scenario of the leader election algorithm in a network of five nodes.

The bRebeca code for this algorithm is represented in Fig. 7. There are two reactive classes, named Node and Barrier, in the model. We use Barrier to synchronize nodes before starting a new round, in order to prevent mixing up the messages between different rounds. The Barrier is to make sure that the current round is completed, and all nodes are aware of each other observation, and ready to start a new round. Reactive class Barrier has only one state variable which counts the number of nodes has completed their round. Whenever all nodes
Fig. 5: max-algorithm state space

Fig. 6: An execution scenario of leader election algorithm with five nodes

By completing their round, it would broadcast **start_next_round** to all nodes to start a new round.

In reactive class **Node**, two state variables **head** and **tail** are used to store the number of heads and tails have been observed in the current round. The state variable **comp** indicates whether the node was a competitor in the previous round. Therefore, if the number of competitors in the current round is equal to zero, no head observed in the previous round, we would be able to repeat the round by restoring the previous competitors (lines 32-35). In every round if currently there is more than one competitor and node is one them, its coin value is true, it flips its coin and after updating its counters accordingly broadcasts the result to the other nodes (lines 31-45). The number of previous and current competitors also need to be saved. Each node needs to keep the number of current competitors to decide when it has completed its round so it can inform the **Barrier** (line 46). The number of previous competitors is needed to specify when we can clean our counters and move to the next round (lines 25-30). Note
that as the delivery order of messages is not guaranteed, a node may process its rec_coin message before start_next_round message. Hence, both message servers must check whether the counter variables, such as head and tail, belong to the previous round and need to be reset before using them.

```java
tablevar int head;
4 tablevar boolean my_coin;
5 tablevar int tail;
6 tablevar int current_comp;
7 tablevar boolean prev_comp;
8 tablevar boolean is_leader;
9 }
10 }
12 msgsrv initial(boolean starter) {
13 if(starter==true)
14 start_next_round();
15 my_coin=true;
16 head=3;
17 tail=0;
18 current_comp=3;
19 prev_comp=3;
20 comp=true;
21 is_leader=false;
22 }
24 msgsrv start_next_round() {
25 if (head+tail == prev_comp) {
26 prev_comp = current_comp;
27 current_comp = head;
28 head = 0;
29 tail = 0;
30 }
31 if (current_comp != 1 && comp) {
32 if (current_comp == 0) {
33 my_coin = true;
34 current_comp = prev_comp;
35 }
36 if (my_coin) {
37 int ch=?(0,1);
38 if (ch == 0) {
39 my_coin = false;
40 tail = tail+1;
41 }
42 else {
43 my_coin=true;
44 head=head+1;
45 rec_coin(my_coin);
46 if (head+tail == current_comp)
47 rec_barrier();
48 } else
49 comp=false;
50 }
51 if (my_coin && current_comp == 1)
52 is_leader = true;
53 }
55 msgsrv rec_coin(boolean c) {
56 if (head + tail == prev_comp) {
57 prev_comp = current_comp;
58 current_comp = head;
59 head = 0;
60 tail = 0;
61 }
62 if (c)
63 head = head+1;
64 else
65 tail=tail+1;
66 if(head+tail == current_comp)
67 recBarrier();
68 }
71 reactiveclass Barrier {
72 statevars {
73 int barrier;
74 }
76 msgsrv initial(boolean starter) {
77 barrier=0;
78 }
80 msgsrv rec_barrier() {
81 barrier = barrier + 1;
82 if (barrier == 3) {
83 start_next_round();
84 barrier=0;
85 }
87 }
89 main {
90 Node rebec0(true);
91 Node rebec1(false);
92 Barrier bar(false);
93 }  
```

Table 1 compares the number of states resulted with and without applying counter abstraction. Note that with increasing the number of nodes, the opportunity of collapsing nodes together grows.

---

**Fig. 7: Leader election algorithm**
## Table 1: Comparing the state spaces size with and without applying counter abstraction

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>No. of nodes</th>
<th>No. of states</th>
<th>No. of states with reduction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Max-Algorithm</strong></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3216</td>
<td>1675</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>719,189</td>
<td>185,381</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Leader election</strong></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3792</td>
<td>752</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>308,553</td>
<td>15,905</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>&gt; 1,200,000</td>
<td>521,679</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 6 Related Work

In order to avoid state space explosion, different approaches have been proposed such as symbolic model checking [19], symmetry reduction [6], partial order reduction [12] and counter abstraction [3].

Counter abstraction has been studied in several other works (e.g., in [10,3,24]). The proposed approach in [24] aims to abstract an unbounded parameterized system into a finite-state system and then verify various liveness properties efficiently. The authors in [24] use limited abstracted variables to count for each local state of a process how many processes currently reside in. However, counters were saturated at a static value of \( c \), meaning that \( c \) or more processes are at local state \( s \). In [3], counter abstraction is used to achieve efficiency in BDD-based symbolic state space exploration of concurrent Boolean programs while unlike [24] it makes use of exact counters where in a global state only non-zero counters are stored. The idea of counting have also been used in [15] to record the local states of a biological system, in which each local state is represented as a vector of counters, each element denotes to the corresponding number of species.

In this paper counters are unbounded, similar to [3], to show the exact number of Rebecs having the specific local state, and abstracted local states are not limited either.

As mentioned before, there are several techniques for reducing the state space such as symmetry reduction which aims to reduce the state space by partitioning the state space into equivalence classes which are represented by one state [6] as their representative. Since finding the unique representative of state while exploring the state space, known as constructive orbit problem, is NP-Hard [6], some heuristics have been proposed to avoid this problem, which may result in multiple representatives. In [14], a polynomial-time heuristic solution is proposed to exploit symmetry in Rebeca, computing a representative state using the on-the-fly approach takes \( O(n^4) \) in the worst-case. The complexity of the proposed algorithm is due to the role of “known rebecs” that should be pre-
served during the permutation. Since in the broadcast environment there is no notion of “known rebecs” and the system is fully symmetric, we can skip paying such a price by applying counter abstraction which is suitable for such systems. The complexity of finding the equivalent of each state is linear in the number of states.

7 Conclusion

In this paper we extended the syntax and semantics of Rebeca to support broadcast efficiently. On one hand, it makes modeling easier, by replacing a set of unicast statements by a single broadcast statement, there is no need to define each rebec as a known-rebec to every other rebec to make the broadcast possible. On the other hand, as all rebecs instantiated from one reactive class are identical, their indexes are irrelevant and can be ignored while constructing the state space. This property makes counter abstraction applicable which is more efficient in fully symmetry systems as discussed in section 6.

The broadcasting actors model provides a suitable framework to model wireless sensor (WSNs) and mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs). In these networks, broadcast is restricted by locality of nodes, meaning that a node receives a message if it is located close enough to a sender, so called connected. Connectivity of nodes defines the topology concept which should be modeled as a part of semantics. Due to energy consumption of nodes and their mobility, the underlying topology changes arbitrary. Therefore, to address local broadcast and topology changes, bRebeca can be extended at the semantics level to allow verification of WSNs and MANETs. To this aim, we pair the global state with the topology of networks and generate the state space for permutations of a topology. We merge states with identical structures of topology while applying counting abstraction which makes automatic verification of such networks susceptible.

References

Painless support for static and runtime verification of component-based applications

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\textbf{Abstract} Architecture Description Languages (ADL) provide descriptions of a software system in terms of its structure. Such descriptions give a high-level overview and come from the need to cope with arbitrarily complex dependencies arising from software components. In this paper we present Painless, a novel ADL with a declarative trait supporting parametrized specifications and architectural reconfigurations. Moreover, we exhibit its reliable facet on its integration with ProActive — a middleware for distributed programming. This is achieved by building on top of Mefresa, a Coq framework for the reasoning on software architectures. We inherit its strong guarantees by extracting certified code, and subsequently integrating it in our toolchain.

\textbf{Keywords:} The Coq Proof Assistant, Component-based Engineering, Formal Methods, Architecture Description Language

1 Introduction

Typically, one uses an Architecture Description Language (ADL) as a means to specify the software architecture. This promotes separation of concerns and compels the software architect to accurately define structural requisites. Nevertheless, this task is seldom trivial as arbitrarily complex architectures may need to be defined. It is thus important to provide the means for expressive and intuitive, yet reliable, specifications.

In this paper we present Painless, a novel ADL for describing parametrized software architectures, and its related formal verification support. We discuss its integration with ProActive \cite{1}, a middleware for distributed programming, and the reference implementation for the Grid Component Model (GCM) \cite{2}.

The GCM ADL lacks support for architectural reconfigurations and parametrization. Further, it is XML-based: while it may be suitable for tools, it is

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a rather verbose and static description of the architecture. Painless supports both the definition of parametrized architectures and the specification of reconfigurations in a declarative style. This facilitates deployment tasks and gives a more comprehensive understanding of the application’s topology.

For instance, let us consider the motivating example depicted by Figure 1.

![Figure 1. Architecture of the Lights Control use case](image)

This architecture concerns a previous use case [3] on the saving of power consumption by adequately adding/removing Street Light and Brightness Info components. For such scenario an ADL solely describing the deployment topology and unable to handle parametrized specifications becomes cumbersome. In this paper, our main goal is to provide an ADL specifying at the same time the initial deployment and the possible reconfigurations, while providing support for describing parametrized topologies. We also want to rely on formal methods to guarantee a safe deployment and reconfiguration of the considered systems.

In [11], we presented Mefresa — a Coq [16] framework providing the means for the formal reasoning on software architectures. Here, we extend Mefresa with the ability to interpret Painless specifications, and provably correct functions computing their compliance with the GCM technical specification [10]. We take advantage of Coq’s strong guarantees by extracting certified code, and subsequently integrate it with the ProActive middleware. In our previous work we focused on the mechanization of the GCM, and facilities for developing arbitrarily complex proofs regarding its intricacies. In this paper, we focus on the pragmatical aspects of deployment and reconfiguration by providing an ADL, and all the toolchain that allows us to deploy and reconfigure GCM applications in ProActive while reusing the guarantees provided by our proven back-end.

We see our contribution as two-fold. Firstly, we propose Painless, a novel ADL supporting parametrized specifications and architectural reconfigurations. Its declarative nature promotes concise and modular specifications. Secondly, we describe the integration of its related tool support with ProActive. This provides a case study on the use of certified code, fostering the application of formal methods in a software engineering context.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 briefly discusses GCM and Mefresa. Section 3 overviews our approach for extending the Pro-Active middleware to cope with Painless specifications. Section 4 introduces the semantics of Painless. Section 5 shows the specification of the use case depicted by Figure 1 in Painless. Related work is discussed in Section 6. For last, Section 7 concludes this paper.

2 Background

Mefresa provides a mechanized specification of the GCM, a simple operation language for manipulating architectural specifications, and the means to prove arbitrary complex properties about instantiated or parametrized architectures. It is developed with the Coq proof assistant [16].

The GCM is constituted by three core elements: interfaces, components, and bindings.

An interface is defined by an id denoting its name, a signature corresponding to its classpath, and a path identifying its location in the component’s hierarchy (i.e. the component it belongs to). It is of internal or external visibility, has a client or server role, is of functional or non-functional functionality, has an optional or mandatory contingency, and its cardinality is singleton, multicast or gathercast.

A component has an id, a path, a class, subcomponents, interfaces, and bindings. This implicitly models GCM’s hierarchical nature. Further, components holding subcomponents are called composite.

Bindings act as the means to connect components together through their interfaces. They are composed by a path indicating the component holding the binding, and ids identifying the involved components and interfaces. Moreover, they can be of normal, import or export kind. A normal binding connects two components at the same hierarchical level, that is, they have the same enclosing component. The remaining kind of bindings are connecting together a component with a subcomponent. Whether of import and export kind depends on the client interface being from the subcomponent or from the enclosing one, respectively.

The GCM technical specification [10] dictates the constraints that a GCM application must comply with. They can be summed up into properties regarding the form of the architecture and its readiness to start execution. These requirements are encoded by the well-formed and well-typed predicates.

well-formed and well-typed architectures A component is well-formed if its subcomponents are well-formed and uniquely identifiable through their identifiers. Further, its interfaces, and bindings must also be well-formed.

Interfaces are well-formed if they are uniquely identifiable by their identifiers and visibility value: two interfaces may have the same identifier provided that they

\[1^\text{Mefresa is available online at } \text{http://mefresa.gaspar.link}\]
have a different visibility. bindings are well-formed if they are established between existing components/interfaces, from client to server interfaces, and unique.

A component may be well-formed but still unable to start execution. Further insurances are needed for the overall good functioning of the system in terms of its application dependencies. These are dictated by typing rules (see [10, p. 22]).

An interface possesses cardinality and contingency attributes. These determine its supported communication model and the guarantee of its functionality availability, respectively. For instance, for proper system execution we must ensure that client and singleton interfaces are bound at most once. For client interfaces only those of multicast cardinality are allowed to be bound more than once.

Analogously, similar constraints apply to the interfaces’ contingency attribute. An interface of mandatory contingency is guaranteed to be available at runtime. This is rather obvious for server interfaces as they implement one or more service methods, i.e., they do have a functionality of their own. Client interfaces however, are used by service methods that require other service methods to perform their task. It therefore follows that a client and mandatory interface must be bound to another mandatory interface of server role. As expected, interfaces of optional contingency are not guaranteed to be available.

MEFRESA captures these requirements by defining a well-typed predicate. Basically, it requires that both the contingency and cardinality concerns are met throughout the component hierarchy. Architectures not meeting these requirements are said to be ill-typed.

An operation language for manipulating GCM architectures Another important element of MEFRESA is an operation language that allows the manipulation of GCM architectures. It possesses seven constructors: Mk_component, Rm_component, Mk_interface, Mk_binding, Rm_binding, Seq, and Done. The meaning of each constructor should be intuitive from its name. The only doubt may arise from the Seq constructor: it stands for operation composition.

Its operational semantics is mechanized by the step predicate, and exhibit the following structure: \( op / \sigma \rightarrow op' / \sigma' \). States are denoted by \( \sigma \), and in our particular case these have the shape of a component, i.e., an empty state is an empty component, etc. Thus, \( \sigma \) represents the component hierarchy being built.

With Coq, one can use these semantic rules to interactively reduce an operation to its normal form done, at which point some final state \( \sigma \) is attained. Naturally, the ability to perform such reduction depends on the demonstration that all required premises for each individual reduction step are met. This lets us wonder about a more general property that one can expect about \( \sigma \) on an overall operation reduction. Let \( \rightarrow^* \) be the reflexive transitive closure of the step predicate. Then, the theorem depicted by Listing 1.1 should be intuitive.

```
1 Theorem validity :forall (s s':state) (op:operation),
2 well_formed s ->
3 op / s -->** Done / s' ->
4 well_formed s'.
```

Listing 1.1. validity statement
Informally, it expresses that if $s$ is a well-formed state, and if we are able to reduce $\text{op}$ to $\text{Done}$, then we know that the resulting state $s'$ is well-formed. Proving this theorem is achieved by induction on the operation language constructors.

3 Overview of our approach

Figure 2 gives an overview of our approach. In short, we obtain an extension to ProActive that is able to cope with PAINLESS architectures.

We extend MEFRESA with functions — $\text{build\_state}$ and $\text{well\_typed\_bool}$ — responsible for ensuring the compliance of a deployment/reconfiguration specification with the GCM requirements. We prove these functions correct w.r.t the GCM mechanized specification, and use Coq’s extraction mechanism to obtain certified OCaml code. Further, we also define a PAINLESS interpreter that translates PAINLESS expressions to MEFRESA’s operation language. This is directly programmed in OCaml. Finally, to ease the integration with ProActive, we use OCaml-Java [5] to produce Java byte code.

3.1 Painless hello world

PAINLESS provides the software architect with the ability to write parametrized architectures and its possible structural reconfigurations in a declarative style. An excerpt of its grammar is defined by Table 1.

Its elementary — or normal forms — expressions include natural numbers, booleans, lists, and strings. Naturally, one can also use variables. Making and removing elements from the component architecture is achieved by the polymorphic $\text{mk}$ and $\text{rm}$, respectively. As expected, $\text{skip}$ is idempotent. Components, interfaces and bindings are also first-class citizens — where $\text{bexp}$ is an expression.
\texttt{exp ::= n \mid true \mid false \mid \[] \mid str \mid x \mid mk \ exp \mid rm \ exp \mid skip}
\texttt{| Component exp_1 \ldots exp_6 \mid Interface exp_1 \ldots exp_7 \mid Binding bexp}
\texttt{| \ if \ exp \ then \ exp \ else \ exp \mid exp \ + \ exp \mid exp \ − \ exp}
\texttt{| match \ exp \ with \ pat_1 \ → \ exp_1 \ldots \ pat_k \ → \ exp_{k \geq 1} \ end}

\texttt{decl ::= let \ P = \ exp \mid let \ rec \ P = \ exp}

\texttt{rcfg ::= Reconfiguration \ str \ arg_0 \ldots \ arg_k \; \decl_0 \ldots \decl_k \ reconfigure \ exp}

\texttt{arch ::= Architecture \ str \; \decl_0 \ldots \decl_{k \geq 0} \ deploy \ exp \ rcfg_0 \ldots \rcfg_{h \geq 0}}

\textbf{Table 1.} \textsc{Painless} syntax (excerpt)

for the three types of bindings. Facilities for manipulating lists, comparison, and binary operators such as + and - are also built-in features. The standard if-then-else, function application, sequence ; and match constructors conclude the range of allowed expressions. \texttt{decl} acts as a declaration layer composed by the usual (potentially recursive) let definitions, indexed by a parameter \textit{P}.

An architecture \texttt{arch} is composed by a string \textit{str} representing its name, \textit{k \geq 0} declarations, and an expression describing the application deployment topology. Further, it may contain \textit{h \geq 0} similarly defined reconfigurations.

Listing 1.2 depicts a simple \textsc{Painless} specification.

1 \texttt{Architecture "Street Light component":}
2 \texttt{let itf\_class = "org.lightscontrol.GetLightInfo"}
3 \texttt{let impl\_class = "org.lightscontrol.StreetLight"}
4 \texttt{let itf = Interface "GetLightInfo", itf\_class ["Street Light"] External Server Functional Mandatory Singleton}
5 \texttt{let streetLight = Component "Street Light", [\] impl\_class [\] [itf] [\]}
6 \texttt{deploy mk streetLight}

Listing 1.2. A first \textsc{Painless} specification

Its meaning should be intuitive. We give a representative name to the specification (line 1), and define two definitions holding an interface and component class (lines 2-3). Then, we define an interface named "GetLightInto", using the previously defined class, with a path indicating the component it belongs, and followed by its attributes concerning its visibility, role, etc (line 5). Next, we define the component named "Street Light", with an empty path — i.e., at the root of the component hierarchy —, with \texttt{impl\_class} as its implementation class, without subcomponents, with \texttt{itf} as its only interface, and without bindings (line 6). Finally, we deploy the application (line 7).

3.2 Computing states from operations

\textsc{Painless} specifications are translated to \textsc{Mefresa}'s \texttt{operation} language. The details of this process are discussed in Section 4.

As discussed above, one can check the feasibility of reducing an \texttt{operation} by interactively applying its reduction rules and attempting to prove the required
premises. This ability is of great value when attempting to prove arbitrary complex properties about parametrized architectures. Yet, if we intend to build a state representing the result of an operation reduction, then we would be better with a function performing such task. This is the purpose of the function depicted by Listing 1.3.

```
Function build_state (op:operation) (s:state) : option state :=
match op with
  | Mk_component i p ic cl lc li lb =>
    if beq_bool (valid_component_path_bool p s & no_id_clash_bool i p s
                 & dec_component (Component i p ic cl lc li lb)) false then
      None
    else
      add_component s p i ic cl lc li lb
    ...
  | Seq op1 op2 =>
    match build_state op1 s with
      | None => None
      | Some s' => build_state op2 s'
    end
  | Done => Some s
end.
```

**Listing 1.3. Excerpt of the build_state function definition**

The above excerpt shows how we can use a function to compute the result of an arbitrary operation reduction. Basically, it pattern matches on the parameter `op` (line 2), and proceeds depending on the matched constructor. For instance, if it is a `Mk_component`, it performs the adequate checks w.r.t. to the creation of a component, and invokes the `add_component` function (lines 3-8). As expected, `valid_component_path_bool` is a boolean function checking if path `p` points to an existing component in the state `init`. `no_id_clash` checks that the identifier `i` is not already used by another component at the same hierarchical level. For last, `dec_component` computes whether the component to be added is well-formed.

Apart from the `Seq` and `Done` constructors, the remaining operation constructors are handled analogously. `Seq` is composed by two operations (line 11), the leftmost operation is fully evaluated, and the resulting state is used for evaluating the rightmost operation (lines 12-15). `Done` means that the end of the operation was reached, and it simply returns the current state (line 16).

Another important note regards the use of the `option` type as return type of this function. This is due to the fact that it only returns a state if it was able to fully evaluate the given operation, otherwise, if the operation is invalid, it simply returns `None`. As seen above, the validity theorem (see Listing 1.1) enunciates that reducing an operation to `Done` from a well-formed state yields a well-formed state. Naturally, the analogous behaviour is expected from the `build_state` function. Further, we also expect it to always be able to compute a resulting state from an operation `op`, whenever it is possible to fully evaluate `op`. Formally, listing 1.4 depicts the relevant theorem.

```
Theorem build_state_correctness:
forall op s s',
  well_formed s ->
  (op / s ------->* Done / s' <--> build_state op s = Some s').
```

**Listing 1.4. build_state correctness**
Proving build state correctness requires a case analysis on the operation constructors, and relating the boolean checks made in build state with the premises of the step predicate.

Considering the context of a component-based application life-cycle, one deploys its application by performing an operation op on an empty state — which is provably well-formed. Then, if op can indeed be reduced, we reach a well-formed state s (see Listing 1.1). Performing an architectural reconfiguration boils down to applying an operation op’ to s, leading to yet another well-formed state s’ — provided that op’ can indeed be reduced —, and this can be repeated indefinitely. Indeed, there is no need to explicitly compute the well-formedness of the attained states, as it is provably guaranteed. There is however such a need regarding their well-typedness. To this end, we define the well_typed_bool : component -> boolean function. Basically, it acts as a decision procedure w.r.t. the well-typedness of a component. It is proved as the computational counterpart of the well_typed predicate, that is, it is both sound and complete w.r.t. the well_typed predicate.

If an issue occurs — invalid operation or ill-typedness of the returned state — an exception is thrown and the deployment aborts. Otherwise, the operation is mapped to the adequate methods composing the ProActive API, and the actual deployment is performed by the middleware. Further, the object holding the state’s structure is kept for subsequent reconfiguration tasks.

4 Painless semantics

Table 2 gives an excerpt of the rules for translating expressions to Mefresa’s operation language. We use \( \Gamma \vdash e \Downarrow v \) for denoting the evaluation of \( e \) under the environment \( \Gamma \) being reduced to \( v \), and \( \vdash t \) stands for type inference.

Rule \( nf_{sem} \) dictates that a normal form yields immediately a semantic value. The rule \( skip_{sem} \) simply depicts that skip is translated to Mefresa’s done operation. Rules \( mk^c_{sem} \) and \( mk^i_{sem} \) illustrate the polymorphic constructor \( mk \) at work. It can be used to build components, interfaces and bindings — making bindings is omitted for the sake of space. These proceed by fully reducing the expression \( e \) into a component/interface/binding that can be used into Mefresa’s operations. Rule \( c_{sem} \) shows the reduction of a Component: all its elements (identifier, subcomponents, ...) need to be reduced and of adequate type. Analogous rules apply for Interfaces and Bindings. \( match_{sem} \) illustrates how pattern matching is performed. First, the expression \( exp \) to be matched is reduced to some value \( val \). Then, we reduce the expression \( exp_k \) with the corresponding pattern \( pat_{k\in\{1,n\}} \) matching with \( val \). As expected, this occurs in an environment \( \Gamma' \) enlarged with a mapping between \( pat_k \) and \( val \), and patterns are checked by order. \( var_{sem} \) shows that a variable is reduced by looking it up in the environment \( \Gamma' \). Finally, the rule \( seq_{sem} \) simple attests that a sequence of Painless expressions is translated to Mefresa’s operations.
The complete reduction of an expression should yield a (sequence of) MEFRESA’s operations, otherwise it is rejected. For instance, the rule archsem depicts how an architecture without reconfiguration strategies is evaluated.

\[
\forall i, 0 \leq i \leq k. \text{decl}_i = (P_i, \text{exp}_i) \quad \Gamma \vdash \text{exp}_i \Downarrow \beta_i \\
\Gamma, (P_0, \beta_0), ..., (P_k, \beta_k) \vdash \text{exp} \Downarrow \alpha \quad \Gamma \vdash \alpha : \text{operation} \\
\Gamma \vdash \text{Architecture str; decl}_0 \ ... \ \text{decl}_{k \geq 0} \ \text{deploy} \ \text{exp} \Downarrow \alpha \quad \text{archsem}
\]

Basically, the deployment expression exp is reduced to α, under an environment including all the declarations decli. Naturally, α must be of type operation.

Dealing with reconfigurations is performed analogously. The expression to be evaluated is reduced on a context including the deployment declarations, the ones defined locally, and its instantiated parameters.

4.1 Painless standard library

As discussed above, the GCM component model is hierarchical, that is, a component may possess subcomponents. A component communicates with the "outside" world through its external interface, whereas it relies on its internal interfaces to communicate with its subcomponents. Typically, composite component interfaces are symmetric, that is, for each external interface of server role there is an internal interface of client role, and vice-versa. Listing 1.5 and Listing 1.6 depict a convenient function to ease the specification of such scenarios — with the obvious definition of visibility/symmetry omitted for the sake of space.
An alternative scenario involves the necessity to transfer the location of a component. For this, we define the function shown in Listing 1.7.

Another common scenario is the requirement to change the location of a component. This necessitates the function depicted by Listing 1.7.

A component may contain subcomponents, interfaces, and bindings. As such, it is also necessary to adjust their paths. We define an inner function (lines 5-9) to handle nested recursion. The function suffix returns a path with the second parameter suffixed to the first one. Moreover, we use other library functions — change_interfaces_path and change_bindings_path — to adjust the interfaces and bindings paths (lines 13-14).

Another useful function concerns the creation of components in a specific path. Listing 1.8 provides such a function.

All the discussed functions are part of Painless standard library along with other facilities for dealing with common specification tasks. Further, the user can easily build its own libraries as specifications can be imported.

5 Specifying the Lights Control use case in Painless

In this section, we show how the specification of the Lights Control application discussed in Section 1 (see Figure 1) is achieved in Painless. We follow a modular approach by separately specifying the Switched On Lights, Sensed Brightness Info, and Lights Control components.

Listing 1.9 depicts the specification of the Switched On Lights component.
Architecture "Composite component: Switched On Lights":

let id = "Switched On Lights"

let p = [id]

let streetLight = Component "Street Light" p "org.lightscontrol.StreetLight"
  [ Interface "GetLightInfo" "org.lightscontrol.GetLightInfo"
    [ id; "Street Light" ] External Server Functional Mandatory Singleton ]

let collectLightInfo p = Interface "CollectLightInfo" "org.lightscontrol.CollectLightInfo"
  p External Server Functional Mandatory Singleton

let getLightInfo = Interface "GetLightInfo" "org.lightscontrol.GetLightInfo"
  [ id; "Light Collector" ] External Client Functional Mandatory Multicast

let lightCollector = Component "Light Collector" p "org.lightscontrol.LightCollector"
  [ ] [ collectLightInfo [ id; "Light Collector" ] ; getLightInfo ] []

let switchedOnLights nrOfStreetLights = Component id [ ] "null"
  [ ] [ collectLightInfo p ; symmetric (collectLightInfo p) ]
  (Export p "CollectLightInfo" "Light Collector" "CollectLightInfo"
    [ normal_bindings p "Light Collector" "GetLightInfo" "Street Light" "GetLightInfo"
      nrOfStreetLights ]
   "

Listing 1.9. Specification for the Switched On Lights component (from Figure 1)

We start by giving a descriptive name to this ADL (line 1). Then, we define the Street Light component (lines 6-11). It possesses a name, a path indicating where it is in the component hierarchy, a classpath, an empty list of subcomponents, one server interface and no bindings. This definition should be seen as a template, as its instances are the ones dynamically added/removed. Next, we define the Light Collector component (lines 21-23) and its two interfaces (lines 13-19). The first interface is parametrized by its path as we shall use it later when specifying the Lights Control component (see Listing 1.11). Last, we specify the Switched On Lights component parametrized by its number of Street Lights (lines 25-30). As expected, its subcomponents include the Light Collector component and a list of nrOfStreetLights Street Light components (line 27). The interfaces are symmetric and their specification is conveniently handled by the interface symmetry function. Further, the function normal_bindings is responsible for binding Light Collector’s multicast interface to the several Street Light instances.

It should be noted that this specification can be used on its own by adding a deployment expression. Listing 1.10 depicts an example of a deployment with one hundred Street Light components.

deploy mk (switchedOnLights 100)

Listing 1.10. Example of a deployment specification for Switched On Lights component

The ADL of the Sensed Brightness Info component follows the same rationale and is omitted for the sake of space. Listing 1.11 depicts the deployment spe-
cification of the overall Lights Control application. As an example, the Street Light and Sensed Brightness Info components are instantiated to ten each.

```
Require "org.lightscontrol.adl.SwitchedOnLights.painless"

Architecture "Lights Control Architecture":

let p = ["Lights Control"]

let lightsControl =
    Component "Lights Control" [] "null" []
    collectBrightnessInfo p; symmetric (collectBrightnessInfo p);
    collectLightInfo p; symmetric (collectLightInfo p) ] []

let n = 10 //number of sensor components to deploy
let m = 10 //number of light components to deploy

deploy
mk (add_subcomponents lightsControl [sensedBrightnessInfo n; switchedOnLights m]);

mk export p "CollectLightInfo" "Switched On Lights" "CollectLightInfo";

Listing 1.11. Specification for the Lights Control application

We start by importing the ADLs from the Switched On Lights and Sensed Brightness Info components (lines 1-2). This adds all their definitions to the current scope, namely the interfaces collectLightInfo and collectBrightnessInfo. Next, we define the Lights Control without including its subcomponents and bindings (lines 7-10). These are added directly in the deployment expression. The function add_subcomponents belongs to Painless standard library. It places the subcomponents into LightsControl while adequately adjusting their path field (line 16).

Finally, the two export bindings are established to the two added subcomponents (lines 17-18).

The last remaining ingredient concerns the structural reconfigurations. Listing 1.12 depicts two reconfiguration strategies regarding the addition and removal of the nth Street Light component.

```
Reconfiguration "add light" n:

let p = ["Lights Control"; "Switched On Lights"]

reconfigure

mk_in p (nth streetLight n);

mk normal p "Light Collector" "GetLightInfo" ("Street Light"+n) "GetLightInfo"

Listing 1.12. Reconfigurations specification for the Lights Control application

Their understanding should pose no doubt. The first adds a Street Light component by making it with the adequate path (line 25) and subsequently binding it to Light Collector’s multicast interface (line 26). As expected, the expression nth streetLight n returns a streetLight component with an identifier suffixed by n. The second reconfiguration is handled in a similar manner. We first need to
unbind the component to remove (line 31) — where normal is the constructor for normal bindings —, and then we proceed by removing it (line 32).

From a programming perspective, the reconfigurations are available through a simple method call indicating its name and parameters. Further, the evaluation of the deployment specification and subsequent applied reconfigurations is carried out by the machinery originating from MEFRESA. Moreover, it should be noted that checking that a reconfiguration leads to a well-formed and well-typed component architecture is achieved without stopping any component. Indeed, before reconfiguring the application, ProActive needs to stop the involved composite component. The inherent benefit is that only valid reconfigurations w.r.t the mechanized GCM specification are mapped to the ProActive API. For instance, attempting to add a Street Light component with the same identifier as another one already deployed is rejected, i.e., an exception is thrown.

Our ProActive extension is freely available online. The release contains the examples discussed here and several others. The reader is pointed to the following website for more details http://painless.gaspar.link.

6 Related Work

Let us mention the work around the ArchWare ADL [14]. They claim that “software that cannot change is condemned to atrophy” and introduce the concept of an active software architecture. Based on the higher-order $\pi$-calculus, it provides constructs for specifying control flow, communication and dynamic topology. Unlike PAINLESS, its syntax exhibits an imperative style and type inference is not supported, thus not promoting concise specifications. Nevertheless, it is sufficiently rich to provide executable specifications of active software architectures. Moreover, user-defined constraints are supported through the ArchWare Architecture Analysis Language. Yet, their focus is more aimed at the specification and analysis of the ADL, rather than actual application execution and deployment. In our work, the user solely defines the architecture of its application, structural constraints are implicit: they are within the mechanized GCM specification. Further, our tool support is tightly coupled with ProActive.

Also from the realm of process algebras, Archery [15] is a modelling language for software architectural patterns. It is composed by a core language and two extensions: Archery-Core, Archery-Script and Archery-Structural-Constraint. These permit the specification of structural and behavioural dimensions of architectures, the definition of scripts for reconfiguration, and the formulation of structural constraints, respectively. Moreover, a bigraphical semantics is defined for Archery specifications. This grants the reduction of the constraint satisfaction verification to a type-checking problem. However, this process is not guaranteed to be automatic, and type-checking decidability remains as future work.

Gerel [9] is a generic reconfiguration language including powerful query constructs based on first-order logic. Further, its reconfiguration procedures may contain preconditions à la Hoare Logic [12]. These are evaluated by brute force. It is unclear how they cope with the inherent undecidability of such task.
Di Cosmo et. al. defined the Aeolus component model [6]. Their focus is on the automation of cloud-based applications deployment scenarios. Their proposal is loosely inspired by the Fractal component model [4] whose most peculiar characteristics are its hierarchical composition nature and reconfiguration capabilities. However, while both approaches permit architectural reconfigurations at runtime, its specification is not supported by their ADL, it solely contemplates deployment related aspects. Moreover, support for parametrized specifications is also not covered, forcing the software architect to explicitly define the application’s structure.

Regarding Fractal, it is also worth noticing that it tries to overcome the lack of support for reconfiguration specification through Fscript [7]. Fscript embeds FPath — a DSL for navigation and querying of Fractal architectures — and acts as a scripting language for reconfiguration strategies. These are not evaluated for their validity. Nevertheless, system consistency is ensured by the use of transactions: a violating reconfiguration is rolled back.

Like the Fractal ADL, xMAML [13] is XML-based, yet it permits the specification of reconfigurations. An important difference is that their focus is on processor architectures and aim at producing synthesizable models.

In [8], Di Ruscio et. al. defend the concept of building your own ADL through the BYADL framework. Further, they claim that "it is not possible to define a general, optimal ADL once and forever", and propose the means to incrementally extend and customize existing ADLs by composing their metamodels. This approach offers an interesting perspective regarding the interoperability of Painless with other ADLs.

7 Final Remarks

In this paper we presented Painless and its related novel approach for the specification of software architectures. Its declarative trait allows for intuitive and concise specifications, liberating the software architect from highly verbose specifications such as the ones obtained via machine languages like XML. Moreover, its support for parametrized architectures eases deployment — it becomes a matter of instantiation —, and thus boosts productivity. Further, in ProActive, mapping components to physical resources is achieved through application/deployment descriptors. While this information is not an aspect of the architecture per se, extending Painless with such feature could be envisaged.

Another key ingredient is the treatment of structural reconfigurations as first-class citizens. Indeed, by supporting the specification of the topological changes that may occur at runtime, it yields a better understanding of the application. Moreover, it is worth noticing that the specified reconfigurations become easily accessible from a programming perspective: through a simple method call with the name of the desired reconfiguration. Furthermore, reconfiguration specifications are evaluated at runtime. The clear benefit is that one can be highly confident that the reconfiguration will not leave the application in a ill formed or ill typed state as the evaluation process is carried out by provably correct code
extracted from MEFRESA. Additionally, a further inherent advantage is that it all happens without stopping the application. Indeed, actually performing the reconfiguration requires it to be stopped at the composite level. By making a prior evaluation, the risk of reconfiguration failure is avoided.

References

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An Interval-Based Approach to Modelling Time in Event-B

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Abstract. Our work was inspired by our modelling and verification of a cardiac pacemaker, which includes concurrent aspects and a set of interdependent and cyclic timing constraints. To model timing constraints in such systems, we present an approach based on the concept of timing interval. We provide a template-based timing constraint modelling scheme that could potentially be applicable to a wide range of modelling scenarios. We give a notation and Event-B semantics for the interval. The Event-B coding of the interval is decoupled from the application logic of the model, therefore a generative design of the approach is possible. We demonstrate our interval approach and its refinement through a small example. The example is verified, model-checked and animated (manually validated) with the ProB animator.

1 Introduction

Control systems must interact with all possible events that the environment may present. A number of factors contribute to the complexity and challenge of these systems. Concurrent and communicating components tend to exhibit unpredictable interactions that may lead to incorrect behaviours. Moreover, timing constraints add real complexity to real-time control systems.

Formal methods are used for rigorous modelling and verification of safety-critical real-time systems. Mathematical models enable generation of verification conditions which then can be proved using theorem provers. Formalising complex real-time systems is demanding, thus suitable modelling abstractions are desirable.

This work emerges from our work on a cardiac pacemaker case study [1]. The pacemaker is a complex control system that interacts with a non-deterministic environment (the heart) via sensors and actuators, whose functionality depends on its internal model of a normal heart. The pacemaker identifies certain heart dysfunctions and intervenes when necessary in order to maintain a correct heart-beat rate. The normal behaviour of the heart is usually modelled [8] in terms of a set of interconnected time intervals, representing various requirements of the normal pacing cycle. The pacemaker intervenes when the heart is observed to violate these requirements. The pacemaker can be single- or dual-channel, being able to interact with one or both (atrium and ventricle) heart chambers respectively.
In this paper we present a timing interval approach that builds on the existing notion of delay, deadline and expiry [21]. We introduce the concept of the interval and reusable patterns that are potentially suitable for modelling systems. Their demands range from a single deadline timing constraint to systems with complex timing constraints that are cyclic, concurrent and interdependent.

A timing interval can have lower and upper boundary timing constraints defined in a number of ways. Typically, such timing constraints share many elements, such as trigger and response events. We present a notation for our timing interval approach that helps describe the timing requirements at a high level but hides the underlying implementation complexity from the modeller.

We demonstrate the interval approach through an example model. The example is modelled in the Event-B language [5] with the Rodin [6] tool. Our development process consists of two main stages. In the first stage, we express the system in UML diagrams using the UML-like modelling tool called iUML [3]. In the second stage, we add explicit timing using our interval approach. We leverage the power of abstraction and reuse via templates.

Section 2 introduces Event-B and the related formal approaches to modelling timing. Section 3 gives the Event-B semantics of the timing interval as a pattern-based collection of variables, invariants, event guards and actions. The approach allows the intervals to be specified in a manner that does not interfere with the logic of the model, and in a compositional fashion. This affords the opportunity to a generative description of the approach with a potential for automated support; in section 4 we give Event-B code templates for such potential automation. In section 5 we give an example of the interval refinement. Sections 6, 7 present verification and validation results of the approach and discuss related work on the pacemaker. Section 8 concludes.

2 Preliminaries

The Event-B [5] formalism is an evolution of the Classical B method [4]. Most of the formal concepts it uses were already proposed in Action Systems [7]. Event-B focuses on reactive systems and is aimed at modelling whereas the Classical B is just for software. We prefer Event-B for its simplicity of notations, extensibility and tool support.

An Event-B model is composed of contexts and machines. Contexts specify the static part of a model such as carrier sets $s$, constants $c$ and axioms $A(s, c)$. Machines represent the dynamic part of a model and contain variables $v$, invariants $I(s, c, v)$ and events. An event may accept a number of parameters $x$ and consists of at least two blocks: guards $G(x, s, c, v)$ that describe the conditions that need to hold for the occurrence of the event, and actions which determine how specific state variables change as a result of the occurrence of the event. Conceptually, events in Event-B are atomic and instantaneous. Contexts can be extended by other contexts and machines can be refined by other machines. Each machine may refer to one or more contexts.
Event-B employs a strong proof-based verification. The system’s safety property requirements are encoded as invariants from which Event-B verification conditions, called proof obligations (POs), are then generated. There are various kinds of POs concerned with different proof problems. For instance, an Invariant Preservation PO (INV) indicates that the invariant condition is preserved by an event with before-after predicate R:

\[ A(s, c) \land I(s, c, v) \land G(x, s, c, v) \land R(x, s, c, v, v') \vdash i(s, c, v') \]  

where \( i(s, c, v') \) is a modified specific invariant.

Systems are usually too complex to model all at once. Refinements help to deal with the complexity in a stepwise manner, by developing a system incrementally. There are two forms of refinement in Event-B. The feature augmentation refinement (horizontal refinement) introduces new features of the system. The data refinement (vertical refinement) enriches the structure of a model to bring it closer to an implementation structure. Refined variables are linked to the abstract layer state variables by means of gluing invariants that ensure the consistency of the system.

One of the key advantages of Event-B is its tooling support. Rodin [6] is an Eclipse based IDE for Event-B that provides effective support for modelling, refinement and proof. Rodin auto-generates POs for project machines. These are then discharged by automated theorem provers, such as AtelierB [2] or SMT [13], or manually via the interactive proving environment. Rodin provides a wide range of plug-ins, such as Camille text editor, statemachine-to-Event-B modelling tool iUML [3] and ProB [17] model checker, which were used in our case study.

2.1 Timing

The Event-B is a general purpose modelling language that lacks explicit support for expressing and verifying timing constraints. However, several concepts were proposed on how to model the time in Event-B. Event-B does not support real numbers natively, hence in this work we discuss only the discrete time related work.

Butler and Falampin [11] describe an approach to model discrete time in Classical B, which is the origin of Event-B. They express current time as a natural number and model the time flow with a tick operation. Deadline conditions are modelled as guards on the tick operation.

Cansell et al. [12] propose a scheme in Event-B. The authors model time as a variable \( time \in \mathbb{N} \). An event \( post\_time \) adds a new active time to a variable \( at \subseteq \mathbb{N} \). Active time elements are the future events' activation times (\( min(at) > time \)) that must be handled by the system. Event \( tick \) handles the time flow, where the time progress is limited to the least \( at - min(at) \). Event \( process\_time \) then handles the active time. The paper recommends to introduce timing not too early into the model, to avoid unnecessary complexity, especially in terms of proof obligation discharge.
Rehm [20] extends Cansell’s work on the active time approach. The author introduces an event-calendar $atCal$ that allows to keep a record of the active times for every process. Let $evts$ be the finite set of processes or names for one model. Event-calendar is a function that gives for every element of $evts$ a set of activation times in the future: $atCal \in evts \rightarrow P(N)$. In order to facilitate model-checking, [20] shows an approach to refine an infinite model with absolute timing to a finite model with relative timing and show the equivalence of the two models.

Bryans et al. [10], like Rehm, use the extended version of active times, that maps a set of events to future time and adds the support for bounded inconsistency. They remove the guard from the tick event to allow time to progress beyond the deadline. Instead, they split event process_time into two cases. One event then handles the case when the active time is handled within expected time boundaries. The other handles the case when the timing constraint is not correctly maintained by the system.

Sarshogh [21] categorises timing properties in terms of delay, expiry and deadline. He introduces notation to specify these timing properties and provides Event-B semantics for the notation. The notation hides the complexity of encoding timing properties in an Event-B model, thus making timing requirements easier to perceive for the modeller.

In this approach a typical constraint starts with a trigger event followed by a possible response event. A timing constraint relates a trigger event $T$ and a response event $R$ or a set of response events $R_1...R_n$:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Deadline}(T; R_1...R_n; t) \quad & (2a) \\
\text{Delay}(T; R; t) \quad & (2b) \\
\text{Expiry}(T; R; t) \quad & (2c)
\end{align*}
\]

$\text{Deadline}(T, R_1...R_n, t)$ means that one and only one of the response events $(R_1..R_n)$ must occur within time $t$ of trigger event $T$ occurring. In case of $\text{Delay}(T; R; t)$, the response event $R$ cannot occur before time $t$ of trigger event $T$ occurring. $\text{Expiry}(T; R; t)$ means that the response event cannot occur after time $t$ of trigger event occurring.

In general, Sarshogh’s timing properties correspond to timed automata delay, deadline and time-out modelling patterns [25]. However, two significant differences must be pointed out. Firstly, time in Event-B is modelled explicitly whereas in timed automata it is implicit and continuous ($\mathbb{R}$). Secondly, Sarshogh’s patterns can be used in a stepwise refinement modelling, whereas timed automata does not natively support such a feature. We build our approach on Sarshogh’s timing properties (2a - 2c) and use similarly structured Event-B semantics.

### 3 Timing Interval Approach

Our aim is to provide a generative, simple to apply approach to enrich an already existing Event-B model with timing interval constraints. The model can be of any
size, may include cyclic and concurrent behaviours and have multiple intervals and other timing constraints.

In the following paragraphs we emphasize the limitations that we solve in our contribution. The need for such timing requirements comes from the pacemaker case study [1] that we have performed [24].

In this paper we present a simple Event-B model [23] to illustrate various modelling needs for timing constraints. The model is abstracted from our pacemaker case study model. We choose a visual state representation for ease of discussion. The abstract model is represented in UML-like diagrams that are generated with the iUML tool as a statemachine SM with two concurrent regions (Fig. 1). A transition is enabled when all its source states are active. Therefore e3 is always enabled, e1 is enabled when the left hand side region is in state A. Transition e2 works as a synchronisation point – it is enabled only when the left hand side region is in state st_INT1 and the right hand side region is in state st_INT2. SM regions act independently unless the shared event e2 is executed.

At the abstract level, we express the timing interval as time spent in a state. In this example we define two intervals INT1 and INT2 as the time periods during which states st_INT1 and st_INT2 respectively are occupied.

In the left hand side region of the SM (Fig. 1), we define an interval INT1, triggered by the event e1 and responded by the event e2. We assume that this interval is an aggregate of delay and deadline timing properties, with lower and upper duration limits. We propose the interval as an abstraction over these properties that formally combine these boundaries. An interval is called active, when it has been triggered but not yet responded to.

We consider the notion of interrupt event, which can interrupt an already active timing interval. For instance, event e3, at any point in time, must be able to interrupt the left hand side region’s active timing interval INT1. Moreover, we require the enabledness of event e3 to be independent of whether INT1 is active or not. In contrast, e2 is enabled only if there is an active interval to respond to.

The right hand side region contains a timing interval INT2. The interval INT2 may be triggered by INIT or e2 event, hence it requires a multiple trigger support. Timing interval INT2 is responded by the event e2.

Note that both timing intervals are interdependent – they share the event e2, effectively forcing a single event to serve as a response for the INT1 and as

Fig. 1: Example iUML model.
both trigger and response for INT2. We call this phenomenon *event overloading*, when an event serves a number of roles in one or more timing intervals.

### 3.1 Modelling Notation

In order to model the given example, we introduce the timing interval approach. The interval is characterised by one or two *timing properties* TP and a set of events – optional ones denoted by [ ]. The system may have a number of timing intervals that are identified by a unique name – *Interval_name*. There may be multiple active instances of a given interval that occur independently from each other.

\[
Interval_{name}(T_1[;...;T_i]; R_1[;...;R_j]; [I_1;...;I_k]; TP_1(t_1); TP_2(t_2))
\]  

(3)

The interval is defined by three kinds of events. One of a set of trigger events \( T \in T_1;...;T_i \) always creates a new instance of the interval. One of a set of response events \( R \in R_1;...;R_j \) always terminates an interval instance under conditions specified by timing properties. If there is no active interval instance to terminate, the response event is disabled. In order to be well defined, the interval must have at least one trigger and response event. One of a set of optional interrupt events \( I \in I_1;...;I_k \) interrupts the interval. Unlike the response event, the interrupt event is not constrained by timing properties TP and does not block if there is no active interval instance to interrupt. The interrupt event always interrupts an active interval instance (if one exists).

The interval must have at least one timing property \( TP(t) \) of duration \( t \), where \( TP \) stands for *Deadline*, *Delay* or *Expiry*. Further, the interval can have one of five TP configurations: (i.) Deadline; (ii.) Delay; (iii.) Expiry; (iv.) Delay and Expiry; (v.) Delay and Deadline. If more than one timing property is associated with an interval, then there is a relation between the interval’s timing property durations (2a-2c): the delay duration must be less or equal to the deadline duration (\( t_{\text{Delay}} \leq t_{\text{Deadline}} \)) and the expiry duration (\( t_{\text{Delay}} \leq t_{\text{Expiry}} \)).

Having defined the notation, we can now use it to specify the left hand side region timing constraint INT1 ((4), Fig. 1), with trigger \( e_1 \), response \( e_2 \) and interrupt \( e_3 \). Upon event \( e_1 \) execution, a new interval INT1 instance is created. The occurrence of the response event \( e_2 \) then becomes constrained by the delay and deadline timing properties whose durations are \( INT1_t\_dly \) and \( INT1_t\_ddl \) respectively. The interrupt event \( e_3 \) can be executed at any given time regardless of the state the model is in. Upon event \( e_3 \) execution the active INT1 instance is interrupted (if one exists) and the left hand side region enters state \( A \).

\[
INT1(e_1; e_2; e_3; Delay(INT1_t\_dly), Deadline(INT1_t\_ddl))
\]  

(4)

According to the interval INT2 specification (5), the right hand side (Fig. 1) interval is triggered by INIT or \( e_2 \) events. Event INIT means that the interval is activated immediately upon the model initialisation. The overloaded \( e_2 \) event serves as the trigger and the response for the interval INT2. Therefore when
executed, event e2 responds to an already existing interval instance and initiates a new one. The deadline timing property means that event e2 must occur within time $\text{INT}_2.t_{\text{ddl}}$ of trigger event occurring. $\text{INT}_2$ has no interrupt and therefore can be responded to only by the response event e2.

$$\text{INT}_2(\text{INIT}, e_2; e_2; ; \text{Deadline}(\text{INT}_2.t_{\text{ddl}}))$$ (5)

As mentioned before, event e2 is an overloaded event – it is a response event for $\text{INT}_1$ and $\text{INT}_2$ intervals. Therefore e2 is constrained by both interval $\text{INT}_1$ and $\text{INT}_2$ timing properties.

### 3.2 Semantics of Example Intervals

We give semantics to our interval construct by translating it to Event-B variables, invariants, guards and actions. The interval timing notation serves as a blueprint, indicating the required Event-B code and its location in the model. In this section we provide semantics of the example interval $\text{INT}_1$.

**Interval.** We translate the interval $\text{INT}_1$ to a set of variables that store the information about interval instances (Fig. 2). Variable $\text{INT}_1._{\text{trig}}$ stores the indices of triggered interval $\text{INT}_1$ instances. When the interval instance is responded to, its index is copied to the $\text{INT}_1._{\text{resp}}$ variable. Trigger and response activities are timestamped and the timestamps are stored in $\text{INT}_1._{\text{trig\_ts}}$ and $\text{INT}_1._{\text{resp\_ts}}$ variables respectively. We model timestamp as a total function $X \rightarrow \mathbb{N}$, where the index set $X$ serves as a unique identification for the interval instance. In case the interval is interrupted, its index is copied to variable $\text{INT}_1._{\text{intr}}$. Interval $\text{INT}_1$-specific variables are prefixed with $\text{INT}_1._{\cdot}$.

Invariants $\text{INT}_1._{\text{consist}_1}$ and $\text{INT}_1._{\text{consist}_2}$ ensure the interval index consistency across the variables (Fig. 2). $\text{INT}_1._{\text{consist}_1}$ is the sequencing invariant ensuring that only the triggered indexes can be responded to or interrupted. $\text{INT}_1._{\text{consist}_2}$ states that interval instance can be either responded to or interrupted, but not both.

**Timing Properties.** In Event-B semantics, the timing property is expressed as a set of invariants (Fig. 7). According to $\text{INT}_1$ specification (4), the interval is constrained by two timing properties: the delay and the deadline. The deadline timing property consists of two invariants. The first invariant $\text{INT}_1._{\text{inv\_ddl}}$ expresses the requirement, that while the active interval instance has not yet been responded to or interrupted, it must not exceed the deadline duration $\text{INT}_1.t_{\text{ddl}}$. The second deadline invariant $\text{INT}_1._{\text{inv\_ddl2}}$ requires the active interval $\text{INT}_1$ instance to be responded to within $\text{INT}_1.t_{\text{ddl}}$ of the trigger event occurring. In order to preserve $\text{INT}_1$ deadline timing property invariants, a guard $\text{INT}_1._{\text{grd\_ddl1}}$ is needed in the $\text{tick}$ event to ensure that the time will not progress beyond active interval’s deadline boundaries (Fig. 6).

The delay timing property of $\text{INT}_1$ is expressed as one invariant $\text{INT}_1._{\text{inv\_dly1}}$ (Fig. 7). The guard $\text{INT}_1._{\text{grd\_dly1}}$ in event e2 ensures the invariant preservation (Fig. 4). Note that event $\text{tick}$ (Fig. 6) is not constrained by delay timing properties.
### Event $e_1 \triangleq$

any INT1_pTrig

where

Grds

INT1_pTrig-grd1 : INT1_pTrig \in X

INT1_pTrig-grd2 : INT1_pTrig \notin INT1_trig

INT1_pResp-grd1 : INT1_pResp \in INT1_trig \rightarrow N

INT1_pResp-grd2 : INT1_pResp \notin INT1_resp \rightarrow N

### Event $e_2 \triangleq$

any INT1_pResp INT2_pTrig INT2_pResp

where

Grds

INT1_pResp-grd1 : INT1_pResp \in INT1_trig

INT1_pResp-grd2 : INT1_pResp \notin INT1_resp \cup INT1_intr

INT1_pResp-grd3 : INT1_pResp \notin INT1_resp \cup INT1_intr

then

Acts

INT1_pResp-act1 : \text{INT1Resp} := \text{INT1Resp} \cup \{\text{INT1_pResp}\}

### Event $e_3 \triangleq$

INT1_pIntr

where

Grds

INT1_pIntr-grd1 : INT1_pIntr \subseteq INT1_trig \setminus (INT1_resp \cup INT1_intr)

INT1_pIntr-grd2 : \text{finite}(INT1_pIntr)

INT1_pIntr-grd3 : INT1_trig \setminus (INT1_resp \cup INT1_intr) \neq \varnothing \Rightarrow \text{card}(INT1_pIntr) = 1

then

Acts

INT1_pIntr-act1 : INT1_intr := INT1_intr \cup INT1_pIntr

### Event $tick \triangleq$

when

Grds

INT1-trig-grd11 : \forall \text{idx id} \in INT1_trig \wedge \text{idx id} \notin INT1_resp \cup INT1_intr

\Rightarrow \text{time} + 1 \leq \text{INT1_trig_ts(id)} + \text{INT1_t_dly}

INT1-trig-grd11 : \forall \text{idx id} \in INT1_trig \wedge id \notin INT1_resp \cup INT1_intr

\Rightarrow \text{time} + 1 \leq \text{INT1_trig_ts(id)} + \text{INT1_t_dly}

then

Acts

act1 : time := time + 1

### Event $tick$ event.

### Fig. 5: Event $e_3$.

### Fig. 6: $tick$ event.

### Fig. 7: Interval INT1 timing property invariants.
Invariant \( INT_1 \_rel \_dly \_ddl \) (Fig. 7) specifies the relation between delay and deadline timing property durations.

Events. According to the \( INV_1 \) specification (4), event \( e_1 \) serves as the trigger for \( INT_1 \) (Fig. 3). To trigger a new instance of the interval, event accepts a parameter \( INT_1 \_pTrig \) that must be an unused index (\( INT_1 \_trg \_grd1, INT_1 \_trg \_grd2 \)). If the conditions are met, the new index and the timestamp are added to \( INT_1 \) trigger and timestamp sets (\( INT_1 \_trg \_act1, INT_1 \_trg \_act2 \)).

Event \( e_2 \) serves as \( INT_1 \) response (Fig. 4). \( e_2 \) takes a parameter \( INT_1 \_pResp \) that must be an already existing interval \( INT_1 \) index and has not yet been responded to or interrupted (\( INT_1 \_rsp \_grd1, INT_1 \_rsp \_grd2 \)). Upon response, the selected index is recorded into the responded event set \( INT_1 \_resp \) with its timestamp (\( INT_1 \_resp \_act1, INT_1 \_resp \_act2 \)).

Grds represents the other guards and Acts represents the other actions of the corresponding event.

Event \( e_2 \) is an example of an overloaded event. It serves as the response for \( INT_1 \) and as both, trigger and response for \( INT_2 \) (Fig. 4). \( INT_2 \) trigger parameter \( INT_2 \_pTrig \) and labels \( INT_2 \_trg \_\ast \) correspond to those of \( INT_1 \); in an analogous manner, \( INT_2 \) response parameter \( INT_2 \_pResp \) and labels \( INT_2 \_rsp \_\ast \) match the ones of \( INT_1 \). As mentioned in subsection 3.1, the response event must always respond to an active interval instance. Hence \( e_2 \) can be executed only when there are active instances of intervals \( INT_1 \) and \( INT_2 \) to respond to, otherwise the event is disabled. There is no interference between these three roles, as they operate on different variables.

Event \( e_3 \) serves as an interrupt for \( INT_1 \) (Fig. 5). Parameter \( INT_1 \_pIntr \) is modelled as a subset of active but non-responded \( INT_1 \) instance indexes (\( INT_1 \_grd1 \)). If, upon event execution, there is no active \( INT_1 \) instance, the parameter becomes equal to \( \emptyset \) and interval’s variable is not affected (\( INT_1 \_act1 \)). On the other hand, if there is at least one active interval instance available, the parameter is forced to contain one index (\( INT_1 \_grd3 \)). The guard \( INT_1 \_grd2 \) is required for well-definedness, since cardinality function can accept only finite parameters. We limit \( INT_1 \_pIntr \) size to 1 to ensure a consistent behaviour with trigger and response parameters that always accept strictly one element.

4 Interval Templates

We provide a generative approach for translating interval specification to Event-B code. Our approach defines a number of generic Event-B code templates that represent elements of the interval notation (3). The templates can potentially be specialised, and thus simplified, to handle, e.g., strictly a single instance interval.

The interval timing approach consists of the interval base template, event templates and timing property templates. Our process comprises three steps. Firstly, we pick relevant templates according to the interval specification. Then, we instantiate the templates by adding the interval name as a prefix to each template variable (as for \( INT_1 \_\) and \( INT_2 \_\) prefixes in the previous sections). Finally, we inject instantiated templates into the model locations, specified by the interval specification.
**Interval Base Template.** The interval base template is a set of variables and invariants that describe all interval instance states and ensures their consistency (Fig. 8). Prefix $P$ is a place holder for the interval name that gets instantiated in the template code. @ indicates the target Event-B block to be injected with the instantiated template code.

![Interval Base Template](image)

**Timing Property Templates.** We define timing property templates for deadline and delay; expiry can be defined similarly. The timing property template is a collection of invariants and guards appropriate for the timing property.

The deadline timing property template consists of two invariants and a guard in $\text{Tick}$ event (Fig. 9). Invariants $P\text{\_inv\_ddl1}$ and $P\text{\_inv\_ddl2}$ expresses the deadline timing property requirement. Guard $P\text{\_grd\_ddl1}$ is for $\text{Tick}$ event.\(^1\)

![Deadline template](image)

The delay timing property template consists of a single invariant $P\text{\_inv\_dly1}$ and a guard $P\text{\_grd\_dly1}$ on a response event (Fig. 10).

![Delay template](image)

In case interval has delay and deadline (Fig. 11) or delay and expiry (Fig. 12) timing properties, their duration relation is specified as an invariant.

\(^1\)We assume, that the time variable $\text{time}$ and the time flow event $\text{Tick}$ are present in the model.
Interval Event Templates. We define Event-B code templates for trigger $T$ (Fig. 13), response $R$ (Fig. 14) and interrupt $I$ (Fig. 15) interval event types. Templates consist of parameters, guards and actions that are needed for a specific interval role. The templates are analogous to INT1 trigger (Fig. 3), response (Fig. 4) and interrupt (Fig. 5).

![Fig. 11: Delay-deadline TP rel. tl.](image)

![Fig. 12: Delay-expiry TP rel. tl.](image)

![Fig. 13: Trigger event template.](image)

![Fig. 14: Response event template.](image)

![Fig. 15: Interrupt event template.](image)

![Fig. 16: Ref. of PM example.](image)

### 5 Example Interval Refinement to Sequential Sub-Intervals

We chose one interval refinement pattern out of a number of possible ones [21]. In this section we demonstrate in our example model how the abstract timing interval INT1 (4) can be refined into two sub-intervals INT1_1 (6) and INT1_2 (7). We visually express sub-intervals as sub-states $st_{INT1_1}$ and $st_{INT1_2}$ of the parent state $st_{INT1}$ (Fig. 16). Sub-states are connected with a new transition $e4$.

Sub-intervals are modelled in the same way as the abstract interval INT1 unless stated otherwise. Concrete sub-intervals INT1_1 and INT1_2 have their own trigger, response and interrupt variables, and at least the same number and type of timing properties. Concrete sub-intervals proceed sequentially, where preceding interval’s response serves as succeeding interval’s trigger. Thus the
INT1_1 response e4 serves as the trigger for INT1_2.

\[ \text{INT1}_1(e1; e4; e3; \text{Delay}(\text{INT1}_1.t_{dly}), \text{Deadline}(\text{INT1}_1.t_{ddl})) \]  \hspace{0.5cm} (6)

\[ \text{INT1}_2(e4; e2; e3; \text{Delay}(\text{INT1}_2.t_{dly}), \text{Deadline}(\text{INT1}_2.t_{ddl})) \]  \hspace{0.5cm} (7)

This interval refinement is encoded by a set of gluing invariants that map abstract interval variables to concrete sub-interval variables.

Firstly, the concrete sub-interval INT1_1 must data refine all abstract interval INT1 trigger variables. Interval INT1 trigger index and trigger timestamp variables must map to interval INT1_1 trigger index and timestamp (8). Secondly, abstract interval INT1’s response index variables must be refined (9).

\[ \text{INT1}_{\text{trig}} = \text{INT1}_1\text{trig} \land \text{INT1}_{\text{trig}} \text{ts} = \text{INT1}_1\text{trig}_{\text{ts}} \]  \hspace{0.5cm} (8)

\[ \text{INT1}_{\text{resp}} = \text{INT1}_2\text{resp} \land \text{INT1}_{\text{resp}} \text{ts} = \text{INT1}_2\text{resp}_{\text{ts}} \]  \hspace{0.5cm} (9)

Thirdly, INT1’s interrupt indexes must be refined (10). The concrete interrupt indices must be unique to each sub-interval.

\[ \text{INT1}_{\text{intr}} = \text{INT1}_1\text{intr} \cup \text{INT1}_2\text{intr} \land \text{INT1}_1\text{intr} \cap \text{INT1}_2\text{intr} = \emptyset \]  \hspace{0.5cm} (10)

Note that in the refined model of subsection 3.2, event e3 acts as interrupt for both INT1_1 and INT1_2 intervals (Fig. 17). We reuse the interrupt event pattern. In case there are no active interval instances, both interrupt index parameters become empty sets. Otherwise, guards INT1_1\_intr_grd3 and INT1_2\_intr_grd3 force strictly one of the parameters to be a non empty set with the cardinality of 1. The with Event-B keyword (witness) defines the relation between the abstract parameter that has been refined away and concrete parameters. In event e3 witness INT1\_pIntr specifies that the indexes of interrupted abstract and concrete intervals must match.

Fig. 17: m1: refined interrupt event e3.

Finally, interval INT1_1 response indexes and timestamps must map to interval INT1_2 indexes and timestamps (11). This ensures the continuity of concrete
To make sure that concrete sub-intervals do not violate abstract interval durations, the relation between timing property durations is specified as invariants. The sum of sub-interval deadline property durations must be less or equal to the abstract interval’s deadline property duration (12). The sum of sub-interval delay property durations must be higher or equal to abstract interval’s delay property duration (13).

\[
\begin{align*}
INT1_1_{\text{resp}} &= INT1_2_{\text{trig}} \land INT1_1_{\text{resp-ts}} = INT1_2_{\text{trig-ts}} \\
INT1_1_{t_{\text{ddl}}} + INT1_2_{t_{\text{ddl}}} &\leq INT1_{t_{\text{ddl}}} \\
INT1_1_{t_{\text{dly}}} + INT1_2_{t_{\text{dly}}} &\geq INT1_{t_{\text{dly}}}
\end{align*}
\]  

6 Verification and Validation

We have evaluated our timing interval approach in terms of applicability, verification and validation. The refinement model has 3 timing intervals (INT1, INT1_2 and INT2) and 47 time-related invariants. All 132 generated timing-related POs were automatically discharged. Verification for deadlock freeness is not well integrated into Event-B framework [26], hence we favour model-checking for this task. To further verify our approach, we have model-checked our model with a limited state-space coverage and did not find any deadlocks of invariant violations. Since we model time as an absolute value of \(\mathbb{N}\), the infinite state space prevents us from a full state-space coverage. Finally, the model has been manually animated in the ProB and there were no invariant violations or deadlocks found.

A fuller evaluation of our approach is the pacemaker case study [24]. The pacemaker model resulted in three refinements with the final refinement having 10 timing intervals. No customisations were needed to our approach in order to model the timing requirements. Overall, the model has 177 timing related invariants. There are 652 time-related proof obligations, all of which were automatically discharged. A limited coverage model checking has been performed using ProB model-checker. No deadlocks or invariant violations were found, so our approach appears to scale.

We have written a number of test case scenarios for manual validation with the ProB animator in order to test various aspects of the model and the timing interval approach.

Finally, we have developed a heart model in Groovy language for ProB model checker [9]. The heart model has been written as a Java plug-in. It is a simplistic system with two methods \textit{isVentricleContracted}() and \textit{isAtriumContracted}() that return a random boolean value. The simulation engine performs actions in a sequential loop fashion: (i.) invokes the methods to update the heart model state (ii.) if appropriate, executes pacemaker model \textit{sense} events (iii.) arbitrarily executes any non-\textit{sense} pacemaker model event. The simulation did not return any negative results.
7 Related Work

A number of authors have modelled the pacemaker system. Each case study differs in the covered scope of requirements and the modelling challenges that authors have perceived and tackled. For timing, we note some modelling improvement our approach offers over other work.

[19] have developed a single electrode pacemaker system using Event-B. The authors used the activation times pattern [12] to model timing constraints. They did not treat timing constraints as a separate element but rather integrated them tightly into the model. Timing constraint implementation is tightly coupled with the model structure, thus does not take advantage of reusability and requires more modelling effort. [16] used timed automata to model a closed loop system of the two-channel pacemaker and the heart. Since UPPAAL lacks a notion of refinement, the complexity of the system is put all at once in a component oriented fashion. The authors modelled pacemaker timing intervals as separate automata that correspond to time counters. The automata communicate via broadcast channels. This is a more complex bottom-up approach than ours. Other works include [18], [14] and [15]. None of the reviewed case studies uses notation specific to timing requirements.

We have chosen to model a dual-channel pacemaker. The support of refinement in Event-B allowed us to use a top-down approach, dealing with the system complexity incrementally. We have expressed the pacemaker system as two interdependent statemachines, representing atrium and ventricle channels. Interdependency and concurrent behaviour are the main factors for the complexity of our the model. To specify the requirements, we used the timing interval notation. We then generated explicit time constraints using our approach, that required no customisations.

8 Conclusions and Future Work

In the simple example model we have highlighted some timing aspects of a complex critical system and demonstrated how to overcome them using our approach. From the case study results we have concluded that the introduced notation gives a sufficient degree of flexibility in terms of timing requirement specification. The example model shows how the interrupt event facilitates event interruption by non-deterministic events and helps to avoid event replication to tackle different cases. As demonstrated in the example model, the event can be overloaded, that is, serve many event roles (trigger, response or interrupt) for multiple intervals. Our approach decouples intervals from other model structure. This affords a template-driven generative approach to modelling timing.

We plan to formalise the interval refinement of section 5 and provide templates for generative modelling. Further, we plan to present more refinement patterns [21].

Two factors prevent the full state-space coverage model-checking. Firstly, we model time as absolute value \( \mathbb{N} \). Secondly, the interval instance indexes are not
discarded after the use and accumulate. To overcome the infinite state-space problem we consider introducing a relative countdown timer for modelling cyclic intervals [20] and an index reset method for our approach that clears used interval instance indices.

More complex pacemaker systems support variable timing intervals, therefore in future we plan to implement a variable duration $t$ for timing properties. We intend to use a co-simulation plug-in [22] to validate our model against more sophisticated heart models.

Finally, our plan is to develop a plug-in for Event-B code generation, add visualisation support for timing interval representation in iUML diagrams and ProB animations.

Bibliography


From Event-B Models to Dafny Code Contracts

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Abstract. The constructive approach to software correctness aims at formal modelling and verification of the structure and behaviour of a system in different levels of abstraction. In contrast, the analytical approach to software verification focuses on code level correctness and its verification. Therefore it would seem that the constructive and analytical approaches should complement each other well. To demonstrate this idea we present a case for linking two existing verification methods, Event-B (constructive) and Dafny (analytical). This approach combines the power of Event-B abstraction and its stepwise refinement with the verification capabilities of Dafny. We presented a small case study to demonstrate this approach and outline of the rules for transforming Event-B events to Dafny contracts. Finally, a tool for automatic generation of Dafny contracts from Event-B formal models is presented.

Keywords: Event-B, Dafny, Formal Methods, Program Verification, Methodologies

1 Introduction

The constructive approach to software correctness focuses on early stages of the development and aims at formal modelling of the intended behaviour and structure of a system in different levels of abstraction and verifying the formal specification of it. In contrast, the analytical approach focuses on code level and its target is to verify the properties of the code level. In other words, the constructive approach is concerned with the derivation of an algorithm from the specifications of the desired dynamic behaviour of that, in a way that the algorithm satisfies its specification [5] while the analytical approach is concerned with verifying that a given algorithm satisfies its given specifications. Both approaches are supported through a range of verification tools from groups worldwide. At a high level it would seem that the constructive and analytical approaches should complement each other well. However there is little understanding or experience of how these approaches can be combined at a large scale and very little tool support for transitioning from constructive formal models to annotated code that is amenable to analytical verification. This represents a wasted opportunity, as deployments of the approaches are not benefiting from each other effectively.

This paper presents work in progress on a tool-supported development approach by linking two existing verification tools, Rodin [2] and Dafny [4]. The
Rodin platform supports the creation and verification of Event-B formal models. The Dafny tool is an extension to Microsoft Visual Studio for writing and verifying programs written in the Dafny programming language. Event-B in its original form does not have any support for the final phase of the development (implementation phase). On the other hand, Dafny has a very little support for abstraction and refinement. Our combined methodology is beneficial for both Event-B and Dafny users. It makes the abstraction and refinement of Event-B available for generating Dafny specifications which are correct with regards to a higher level of abstract specification in Event-B and allows Event-B models to be implemented and verified in a programming language. We discuss our approach for transforming Event-B formal models to annotated Dafny method declarations. Our focus here is only on generating code contracts (pre- and post-conditions) from Event-B models rather than implementations. Generated method contracts with this approach can be seen as an interface that can be implemented and verified later against the high level abstract specification. We also present a tool for automatic generation of Dafny annotations from Event-B models. We have validated our transformation rules by applying our tool to an Event-B model of a map abstract datatype which is presented in this paper.

The organisation of the rest of the paper is as follows: in section 2, background information on Event-B and Dafny is given. Section 3 contains an example of transformation of an Event-B model of a map abstract datatype to Dafny contracts. Transformation rules for transforming an Event-B machine to an annotated Dafny class are described in section 4. In section 5 related and future work are presented and finally section 6 contains conclusions.

2 Background

2.1 Event-B

Event-B is a formal modelling language for system level modelling based on set theory and predicate logic for specifying, modelling and reasoning about systems, introduced by Abrial [1]. Modelling in Event-B is facilitated by a platform called Rodin [2]. Rodin is an extensible open source software which is built on top of the Eclipse IDE. A model in Event-B consists of two main parts: contexts and machines. The static part (types and constants) of a model is specified in a context and the dynamic part (variables and events) is specified in a machine. To describe the static part of a model there are four elements in the structure of a context: carrier sets, constants, axioms, and theorems. Carrier sets are represented by their name and they are distinct from each other. Constants are defined using axioms. Axioms are predicates that express properties of sets and constants. Theorems in contexts can be proved from axioms. A machine in Event-B consists of three main elements: (1) a set of variables, which defines the states of a model (2) a set of invariants, which is a set of conditions on state variables that must hold permanently by all events and (3) a number of events which model the state change in the system. Each event may have a number of assignments called actions and also may have a number of guards. Guards are
predicates that describe the necessary conditions which should be true before an event can occur. An event may have a number of parameters. Event parameters are considered to be local to the event. Figure 1 illustrates machine m0 with two events Add and Remove.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Machine m0 Sees c0</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Variables map</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Invariants map≠KEYS⇒VALUES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initialisation map := Ø</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Event Add any k,v</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>where</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>grd1: k∈KEYS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>grd2: v∈VALUES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>then</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>act1: map(k) := v</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Event Remove any k |
| where              |
| grd1: k∈dom(map) |
| then               |
| act1: map := {k} ∈ map |

Fig. 1. Machine m0: the Most Abstract Level of Map ADT Model

Modelling a complex system in Event-B can benefit from refinement. Refinement is a stepwise process of building a large system starting from an abstract level towards a concrete level [1]. This is done by a series of successive steps in which, new details of functionality are added to the model in each step. The abstract level represents key features and the main purpose of the system. Refining an Event-B machine may involve adding new events or new variables(concrete variables). Concrete variables are connected to abstract variables through gluing invariants. A gluing invariant associates the state of the concrete machine with that of its abstraction. All invariants of a concrete model including gluing invariants should preserve by all events. The built-in mathematical language of the Rodin platform is limited to basic types and constructs like integers, boolean, relations and so on. The Theory Plug-in [3] has been developed to make the core language extension possible. A theory, which is a new kind of Event-B component, can be defined independently from a particular model and it is the mean by which the mathematical language and mechanical provers may be extended.

2.2 Dafny

Dafny [4] is an imperative sequential programming language which supports generic classes, dynamic allocation and inductive datatypes and has its own specification constructs. A Dafny program may contain both specification and implementation details. Specifications are omitted by the compiler and are used just during the verification process. Programs written and specified in Dafny can be verified using the Dafny verifier which is based on an SMT-solver. Standard pre- and post-conditions, framing construct and termination metrics are included in the specifications. The language offers updatable ghost variables,
recursive functions, sets, sequences and some other features to support specification. The verification power of Dafny originates from its annotations (contracts). A program behaviour can be annotated in Dafny using specification constructs such as methods’ pre- and post-conditions. The verifier then tries to prove that the code behaviour satisfies its annotations. This approach leads to producing correct programs not only in terms of syntax but also in terms of behaviour. A basic program in Dafny consists of a number of methods. A method in Dafny is a piece of imperative, executable code. Dafny also supports functions. A function in Dafny is different from a method and has very similar concept to mathematical functions. A Dafny function cannot write to memory and consists of just one expression. A special form of functions which returns a boolean value is called predicate. Dafny uses the ensures keyword for post-condition declaration. A post-condition is always a boolean expression. Each method can have more than one post-condition which can either be joined with boolean and (&& operator or be defined separately using the ensures keyword. To declare a pre-condition the requires keyword is used. Like post-conditions, adding multiple pre-conditions is allowed in the same style. Pre- and post-conditions are placed after method declarations and before method bodies. Dafny does not have any specific construct for specifying class invariants. Class invariants are specified in a predicate named Valid() and this predicate is incorporated in all methods pre- and post-conditions so the verifier checks if each method preserve all invariants or not.

3 Case Study: A Map Abstract Data Type

In this section we present a map abstract datatype as a case study and show the Event-B formal model and its transformation to Dafny contracts that is performed by our tool. A map (also called associated array) is an abstract data type which associates a collection of unique keys to a collection of values. This case study is originally taken from [6] where the map ADT is specified, implemented and verified in Dafny. The most abstract model of the map in Event-B (machine m0) is illustrated in Figure 1. The map is simply modelled using a partial function from KEYS to VALUES. KEYS and VALUES are generic types which are defined in a context (not shown here) as carrier sets. There is only one invariant in this model which says that the variable map is a partial function. The model contains two events for add and removing keys and values to the map. By proving that these events preserve the invariant of the model, the uniqueness of the map’s keys is verified.

Dafny does not support relations (and functions) as data structures so we cannot directly transform machine m0 to Dafny annotations. Machine m0 should be refined in order to reduce the abstraction and syntax gap between the Event-B model and Dafny specification. In the refined machine two new variables keys and values are introduced to model. Variable keys is a sequence of type KEYS and variable values is a sequence of type VALUES. Sequences are built-in data structures in Dafny but they are not part of the built-in mathematical language
Fig. 2. Event *Add* is refined to two events *Add1* and *Add2* of Rodin. However sequences are available through the standard library of the Rodin theory plug-in. As the name suggests sequence *keys* stores keys and the other sequence stores values where a value in position *i* of sequence *values* is associated with the key that is stored in position *i* of sequence *keys*. An invariant is needed in this refinement to state that both sequences have the same size. A gluing invariant is also needed to prove the consistency between refinements.

Figure 2 shows that the event *Add* from machine *m0* is refined to two events *Add1* (for adding new keys to the map) and *Add2* (for updating an associated value to an existing key). Refinement of event *Remove* and other elements of the refined machine are omitted here because of the space limitation. Listing 1.1 shows the transformation of events of the refined machine to an annotated Dafny method called *Add*.

```
method Add(k:KEYS, v:VALUES)
  requires Valid();
  ensures (k !in old(keys) && keys==[k] + old(keys) &&
  values==[v] + old(values))
  ||
  (exists i :: i in (set k0| 0<=k0 && k0<|old(keys)|) &&
  old(keys)[i]==k && values==old(values)[i:= v] &&
  keys == old(keys));
```

Listing 1.1. Transformation of Machine *m1* to a Dafny Contract

Post-conditions of the *Add* method are directly derived from those events that form the method and they specify the behaviour of the method. Method *Add* is specified by two events in Event-B therefore two *ensures* clauses are generated (beside *ensures Valid()*). The reason for specifying a method with two Event-B events is that each event represents a separate case of the method and each case in a Dafny method is represented with a separate post-condition in the method contract. The keyword *old* which is used in the post-conditions of methods represents the value of the variable on entry to the method. Internal variables of each event are defined using existential quantifier with regards to the event’s guards. The class declaration, predicate *Valid()* and other details of the generated class are not shown here. The transformation of Event-B events to annotated Dafny methods is discussed in the next section.
4 Transforming Event-B Models to Dafny Contracts

In this section we describe how we generate Dafny contracts from Event-B events. In order to be able to merge different Event-B events together to form a single method from them in Dafny, we have introduced a new element to Event-B machines called constructor statement. A constructor statement has the following form:

\[
\text{method } \text{mtd\_name}(\text{pi\_1, pi\_2},...) \text{ returns}(\text{po\_1, po\_2},...) \{ \text{evt\_1, evt\_2},... \}
\]

In the above statement, \text{mtd\_name} is the name of the target method in Dafny, \((\text{pi\_1, pi\_2},...)\) represents the list of input parameters, \((\text{po\_1, po\_2},...)\) represents the list of output parameters, and \text{evt\_1, evt\_2},... represents the list of Event-B events that must be merged together to form the target method.

A method may or may not have input/output parameters. Input parameters which are stated in the constructor statement must exist in all events which are listed in the the statement and also the type of the parameters must be explicitly declared in Event-B events as guards of the event. If a method in a constructor statement has a parameter which is not listed as a method’s input/output parameter, it should be treated as an internal parameter. An internal parameter is a local variable to the method and will be specified using an existential quantifier. A number of post-conditions can be generated from before-after predicates of the actions of the events together with their guards. A before-after predicate denotes the relation that exists between the value of a variable just before and just after the execution of an action. In the example shown in the previous section, the method \textit{Add} was generated as a result of the following constructor statement:

\[
\text{method } \text{Add}(k,v) \text{ returns}() \{ \text{Add1, Add2} \}
\]

Consider \textit{act1} of event \textit{Add1} from Figure 2. The before-after predicate associated with this action is \(\text{keyst} = \text{seqPrepend}(\text{keys}, k)\) where the primed variable denotes the value of the variable just after the execution and the unprimed variables denote the value of the variables before the execution. The following expression can be derived from event \textit{Add1} by conjunction of all non-typing guards of the event before-after predicates of all actions of the event. The result would be for event \textit{Add1}:

\[
k \notin \text{ran}(\text{keys}) \land \text{keyst} = \text{seqPrepend}(\text{keys}, k) \land \text{values} = \text{seqPrepend}(\text{values}, v)
\]

(1)

The same should be done for event \textit{Add2}. As it is obvious from the action of event \textit{Add2}, variable \textit{keys} is not changed by this event therefore the value of this variable after the execution of the event is equal to its value before the execution. The following expression is derived from this event:

\[
i \in 1..\text{seqSize}(\text{keys}) \land \text{keys}(i) = k \land \text{values}(i) = v \land \text{keyst} == \text{keys}
\]

(2)
Note that event Add2 has a third parameter $i$ which is not listed as Add method parameter in constructor statement so it is an internal parameter and should be specified using an existential quantifier:

$$
\exists i \in 1..\text{seqSize}(\text{keys}) \land \text{keys}(i) = k \land \text{valuest}(i) = v \land \text{keyst} == \text{keys}
$$

(3)

The disjunction of (1) and (3) becomes the post-condition for method Add and specifies the desirable behaviour of the method. In addition to the generated contracts from events of the Event-B model, predicate Valid() (which contains the conjunction of machines invariants) must be a pre-condition for all method declarations. This is necessary as the verifier needs this information to be able to verify the post-conditions.

4.1 Tool Support for Automatic Transformation

We have developed a Rodin plug-in for automatic transformation of Event-B machines to annotated Dafny classes. The plug-in builds an abstract syntax tree (AST) with regards to the Event-B machine and contexts that it sees and constructor statements that are provided by the user. The AST then is translated to Dafny code by a number of translation rules that are encoded in the plug-in source code. The tool only supports the translation of those Event-B mathematical constructs that have a counterpart in Dafny and ignores the rest. So it is important that the model should be refined to a level that only has those constructs that have a Dafny counterpart.

5 Related and Future Work

To the best of our knowledge, no research has been carried out in order to generate annotated Dafny programs from Event-B models and there is very little research on generating verifiable code from Event-B models. EventB2Dafny [7] is a Rodin plug-in for translating Event-B proof obligations to Dafny code to use Dafny verifier as an external theorem prover for proving Event-B proof obligations. Another research has been carried out in order to translate Event-B models to JML-specified JAVA code. A Rodin plug-in called EventB2JML [8] has been developed to automate the translation from Event-B models to Java specified code. Tasking Event-B [9] is a code generator that generates code from Event-B models to a target language but it does not support verification of the generated code.

Our current transformation rules allow us to generate Dafny contracts for abstract data types. We plan to extend our rules and the tool to be able to generate code contracts from Event-B model of complex algorithms. We have already done another case study for transforming an Event-B model of a model checking algorithm to Dafny contracts.
6 Conclusion

We have presented an approach for generating Dafny code contracts from Event-B models. This approach allows us to start the development with a very high level specification of the program in Event-B and use the Rodin platform facilities to prove the correctness and consistency of specification and refine the specification to a level that is suitable for transformation to Dafny. The implementation can be done later manually and verified against the abstract specification. The abstraction level that can be achieved in a modelling language like Event-B is not achievable at Dafny level therefore using the stepwise manner of Event-B for building specification will help to tackle the complexity that is associated with this task.

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References

Tooled Process for Early Validation of SysML Models using Modelica Simulation

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Abstract. The increasing complexity and heterogeneity of systems require engineers to consider the verification and validation aspects in the earliest stages of the system development life cycle. To meet these expectations, Model-Based Systems Engineering (MBSE) is identified as a key practice for efficient system development while simulation is still widely used by engineers to evaluate the performance and conformance of complex systems regarding requirements. To bridge the gap between high-level modeling (from requirements) and simulation, the present paper proposes a Model-Driven Engineering (MDE) tooled approach to automate the system requirements validation using SysML models and Modelica simulation. The implementation of the related toolchain has been officially adopted by the OMG SysML-Modelica working group.

Keywords: Requirements Validation, SysML Models, Modelica Simulation, Model Transformation, Code Generation, OMG Standard.

1 Introduction

Over the last years, the complexity of physical and hybrid systems has considerably grown since these systems integrate an increasing number of heterogeneous components (electrical, mechanical, software, etc). At the same time, system engineers always have to achieve the following objectives: building the right system correctly, reducing costs and ensuring delivery date. Designing the right system is still a challenge for engineers. Bad design choices or bugs, which are not discovered during early design stages, may indeed be very expensive. Therefore, it is today crucial to be able to validate a system design as soon as possible, even before the development has started and a single line of code has been written. Moreover, despite the increasing complexity of the system requirements, a consistent understanding of the project scopes between all the involved engineer teams is required to ensure the conformity to requirements, and to provide adapted guidance for their production and development choices. Hence, it entails the necessity of adopting and sharing an overall view of system development, especially during the early design stages (in particular during conceptual design, system design and rapid prototyping).
In the last decade, to overcome these challenges, Model-Based System Engineering (MBSE) methodologies have emerged on the sharing and standardization of embedded software technologies [1]. MBSE deals with the definition of system models that could be exploited during all the system development life cycle, such as the System Modeling Language (SysML) [2]. This approach puts a strong emphasis on the use of models at the different steps of the system specification. As reported by the International Council on Systems Engineering (INCOSE), validation of system requirements using modeling and simulation is today a common method for system analysis and evaluation. Replacing the traditional document centric approach by MBSE approaches entails to use models as the core of the requirements definition, design, analysis, verification and validation activities. In this MBSE context, the communication and cooperation between all the project stakeholders are necessary, and it is thus stimulating to design a first overall system model from requirements. A model may describe expected requirements, behaviours and structure of the designed system. It may be used to validate some parts or the whole designed system regarding functional as well as non-functional requirements. To achieve that, different kinds of analysis can be performed: this can be abstract formal analysis methods (e.g., using analytic techniques) as well as simulation-based analysis (e.g., using SystemC hardware models). Formal analysis allows to cover and guarantee corner cases of the system behaviours while the simulation computation time is in general much smaller. Nevertheless, some components may be too complex for economical formal verification. In these cases, formal analysis may be done on an abstract functional level whereas the implementation or detailed internal behaviours have to be checked via accurate simulation models. However, in some cases, simulation models are the only possibility to estimate timed behaviours of software-hardware interactions.

To address mechatronic systems and embedded systems modeling, high-level design using SysML is on the rise. SysML allows to graphically specify all aspects of physical systems (mixing software and hardware parts) including requirements, structural and behavioural aspects. Moreover, using SysML improves the communication since it eases the interaction between different teams of multi-domain engineers. But SysML is not executable: there is neither an action language nor a simulation framework to evaluate SysML models containing equations. To overcome this issue, we propose a tooled approach to automatically generate Modelica\textsuperscript{1} simulation code from SysML models.

The contributions of this paper are threefold. First, it relies on the SysML-Modelica Transformation specification [3], provided by the Object Management Group (OMG), to integrate Modelica concepts in SysML models. Second, we propose a Model-Driven Engineering (MDE) approach to automatically translate such high-level SysML models into executable Modelica code. The obtained simulation results are then compared with the initial system requirements to assess them. Thirdly, to evaluate this whole process, experiments have been conducted within the Smart Blocks project in the mechatronic domain.

\textsuperscript{1} http://www.modelica.org/ [Last visited: Jan. 2015]
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the integration of Modelica constructs into SysML models and describes the process of Modelica code generation from such models. Section 3 discusses the relevance of the tooled approach. Finally, after surveying related work in Sect. 4, we conclude and outline the future work in Sect. 5.

2 From SysML Models to Modelica Code

SysML and Modelica are two complementary languages: their joint use enables the integration of Modelica simulation constructs to complete architectural SysML models. This integration, based on existing recommendations provided by the OMG, has been implemented as the SysML4Modelica profile, which defines the practical contribution of the present paper. Then, we describe the process of Modelica code generation from SysML models using model-driven engineering techniques. The implementation of this whole process is available to the community² (demos, examples and source code).

2.1 The Gap between SysML and Modelica

To support MBSE principles, OMG has developed and promotes the System Modeling Language (SysML) that enables systems engineers to specify all aspects of a complex system using graphical constructs. SysML is built on the well-known Unified Modeling Language (UML) by bringing adapted semantics to the system engineering field: SysML is implemented as a UML profile. Using SysML enables the adoption of a Model-Based approach to represent, specify and manage knowledge at the early stage of the design. However, SysML is a semi-formal language and it lacks of structures for requirements and model validation. To tackle this issue, the Modelica language is a convincing candidate: it is a non-proprietary, object-oriented and equation-based language for complex physical systems simulation. Moreover, OMG promotes a dedicated standard (SysML-Modelica Transformation standard) to integrate Modelica semantics into SysML.

The objectives of the SysML-Modelica Transformation specification are to enable a bi-directional transformation between the both modeling languages. The specification defines an extension to SysML, called SysML4Modelica, which proposes matching semantics between the SysML4Modelica constructs and the Modelica language. The integration of Modelica concepts into SysML is based on a profiling approach. Basically, the SysML4Modelica constructs enable to stereotype elements that are part of the Block Definition Diagram (BDD) and the Internal Block Diagram (IBD) of SysML (the BDD is analogous to the UML class diagram whereas the IBD permits to represent physical or logical interactions between component instances via input and output FlowPorts). Thus, BDD and IBD (and optionally the requirements diagram) are the SysML diagrams that are addressed by the approach.

This SysML4Modelica profile is therefore used to bridge the gap between the two modeling language: SysML, which is a non executable graphical high-level modeling language, and Modelica, which is used as simulation language for complex and heterogeneous systems. The next step of the proposed process is to perform Modelica code generation from SysML models profiled with SysML4Modelica. Thus, the next subsections describe this process and its implementation using Model Driven Architecture (MDA) approach.

2.2 Model to Model Transformation

Model transformation and code generation are the backbone of the Model Driven Architecture approach [4]. In the context of MBSE, this approach helps to bring the analysis of specifications and the rapid prototyping closer. Considering that SysML enables system modeling from specifications, MDA offers techniques to obtain executable Modelica prototypes from SysML models. The next paragraphs give details of this process, which is depicted in Fig. 1.

![Fig. 1: Modelica Generation Process](image)

The starting point of this translation process consists of manually giving Modelica semantics to SysML models using SysML4Modelica constructs. After verifying that the SysML model contains the correct Modelica constructs, using the automated SysML2Problem verification, a model transformation, based on the ATLAS Transformation Language (ATL) framework, is performed from the SysML4Modelica metamodel to the Modelica metamodel. ATL [5] is a model transformation language inspired by the OMG standard QVT. It makes it possible to implement model transformation rules and to run transformation process. ATL matched rules are the heart of the transformation process as they describe how output elements (that conform to the output metamodel) are produced from input elements (that conform to the input metamodel). For instance, Fig. 2 shows an example of such ATL matched rule.

Within this approach, ATL is used to automatically verify the correctness of SysML4Modelica constructs (SysML2Problem) and to translate SysML models into Modelica models (SysML2Modelica). The Modelica metamodel is built with Eclipse Modeling Framework (EMF) as an ecore file. The generated Modelica model defines the entry point of Modelica code generation, which is described in the next subsection.

2.3 From Modelica Model to Modelica Code

To perform the generation of the Modelica code from the generated Modelica models, the approach is based on the Acceleo technology. Acceleo\(^4\), developed by the company Obeo, is an open source code generator from the Eclipse foundation. It implements the MDA approach to develop application from EMF based models. The Acceleo language is an implementation of the MOF Models to Text Transformation (MOFM2T) standard.

The implementation of the OMG SysML-Modelica Transformation specification is available for the Topcased and Papyrus environments as an Eclipse plugin. It is adopted and promoted by the OMG SysML-Modelica working group. The next section discusses experiments feedback of the proposed process on a concrete case study about the Smart Blocks system.

3 Discussion and lessons learned from experiments

The following discussion is based on the obtained results and lessons learned from the experiments of our prototype for carrying out the Smart Blocks\(^5\) case study (results are presented in [6]). Basically, the goal of this project consists to empirically evaluate the reliability and the scalability of our approach, and finally to answer the following questions regarding the proposed tooled process:

(A) How appropriate and convenient is the SysML4Modelica profile?
(B) Is our prototype efficient enough to support large systems modeling and simulation?
(C) Does it fit the need to validate a high-level SysML design and requirements at the soonest?

\(^4\) [http://www.eclipse.org/acceleo/][Last visited: Jan. 2015]
3.1 Using SysML4Modelica

At the first sight, the relevance of the proposed approach to early validate system design using SysML models to perform Modelica simulation, instead of writing directly Modelica code for simulation, is debatable. SysML is indeed a high-level modeling language, traditionally used to specify all aspects of a complex system at the earliest stage of the development, whereas Modelica is used later in the development life cycle for rapid prototyping. However, the integration of the both notations enables to fulfill validation challenges and offers new perspectives.

On the one hand, software developers as well as software architects are experienced in using modeling methodology, but they usually lack knowledge to perform hardware related coding and setup of variables to support compilers and simulation platform. The proposed approach allows them to initiate the simulation validation process (in collaboration with engineers) and therefore guarantees the continuous validation of the modeled expected requirements. On the other hand, from robotics engineers point of view and feedback, the advantages of using SysML over using Modelica directly are also significant since the proposed approach attempts to bring closer system modeling from requirements using SysML and allows rapid prototyping using Modelica simulation.

Nevertheless, the gap between SysML and Modelica being quite important at business-level, the cost to perform simulation from SysML model can be also important since design teams have to learn two languages. One important key for the adoption success of this approach by the industry would be to provide reverse-engineering tools that enable to automate the generation of SysML models from existing simulation code. It should also be underlined that the SysML4Modelica profile can be applied to existing SysML models without changing the structure of the model. Incomplete model can also be handled: we could generate the structure of Modelica code without considering all the behavioural rules (e.g., equations, algorithms).

3.2 Scalability of the approach

The Smart Blocks case study is not very large. To evaluate the scalability of the proposed approach, we have applied it on a large and complex energy manager of a new generation of helicopter type. Basically, this system is composed of an energy source that emulates a permanent power source (alternator coupled with a turbine or a fuel cell system), an accumulators battery and a battery of super-capacitors. Each source is connected with a controller that gives managing strategies. The SysML model of this energy manager system contains 20 blocks, 30 properties, 37 constraints, 30 instances, 109 flow ports and 62 connectors. This case study allows to assess the scalability of the proposed approach regarding modeling effort and automatic Modelica code derivation (the transformation process takes less than one second to generate 23 Modelica files). For confidentiality reasons, experiments results and report about this case study are not presented in this paper.
3.3 Validation of a design at the soonest

High-level SysML model validation over requirements was the main motivation of the proposed approach. The Smart Blocks case study is managed by strong requirements concerning the velocity and the acceleration of different kind of tiny objects. Therefore, the SysML model of the system had to meet these requirements. The results obtained with several simulations with different initial conditions gave some clues on future design choices. Moreover, structural modeling error are immediately detected and reported by the SysML2Problem checking.

4 Related Work

This section discusses related work investigating the integration of Modelica into UML and SysML models in the context of MBSE.

In [7, 8], the authors propose techniques to apply the ModelicaML profile on UML models to generate Modelica code. An Eclipse plugin for the Papyrus modeller has been developed, but it is not based on the OMG SysML-Modelica specification and it does not take into account SysML models. Schramm et al. [9] introduce the MDRE4BR profile (Model Driven Requirement Engineering for Bosch Rexroth), which aims to perform verification of the design against the requirements using an executable model. This profile extends the current SysML requirements constructs and is linked with ModelicaML to translate analytical models into executable Modelica models. However, this work focuses on the SysML requirements diagram only. Nytsch-Geusen [10] also proposes to use a special format of UML, named UMLH, for the modeling of hybrid systems. Modelica code can be produced automatically from UMLH models. However, the generated code has to be manually completed with the physical equations of the system to allow simulations.

A representation of Modelica models in SysML is introduced by Johnson et al. in [11]. This work explores the definition of continuous dynamics models in SysML and the use of triple graph grammar to maintain a bidirectional mapping between SysML and Modelica constructs. A mapping between SysML and Modelica considering a smaller subset of the Modelica language has been proposed by Vasaiely [12]. This work does not use the OMG specification, but uses its own mapping between SysML parametric diagrams and Modelica equations.

5 Conclusion and Future Work

The present paper proposes a tooled MDE approach to validate requirements of complex systems at the earliest stages of design process. This approach consists to generate Modelica simulation code from SysML models. To address this issue, the OMG SysML-Modelica Transformation specification has been implemented as a UML profile for SysML called SysML4Modelica. The model transformations are based on ATL and Acceleo rules, and use a dedicated Modelica metamodel that verifies Modelica syntax. The constraints defined in the OMG specification are thus verified and ensure the SysML model consistency. The approach has been experimented and validated within several industrial case studies.

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We are now investigating a novel SysML modeling approach that could allow both to generate test cases and to simulate the system under test from a unique SysML model. This innovative approach could be used within Hardware-In-the-Loop process since the simulation could play two key roles: simulating a system component and providing test cases and oracles for its concrete product. Finally, depending on the OMG standards evolution, we will update the proposed prototype, which is officially promoted by the OMG SysML-Modelica group.

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References

Improved Iterative Methods for Verifying Markov Decision Processes

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Abstract. Value and policy iteration are powerful methods for verifying quantitative properties of Markov Decision Processes (MDPs). In order to accelerate these methods many approaches have been proposed. The performance of these methods depends on the graphical structure of MDPs. Experimental results show that they don’t work much better than normal value/policy iteration when the graph of MDP is dense. In this paper we present an algorithm which tries to reduce the number of updates in dense MDPs. In our algorithm instead of saving unnecessary updates we use graph partitioning method to have more important updates.

Keywords: Markov decision processes, probabilistic model checking, value iteration, policy iteration, graph partitioning, variable ordering

1 Introduction

Markov Decision Processes (MDPs) are transition systems that can be used for modeling both nondeterministic and stochastic behaviors of reactive systems. In this paper we mainly focus on the quantitative verification of MDPs and consider reachability probabilities, i.e., calculating the maximum (or minimum) probability of reaching some goal states.

In general there are three main classic methods to solve MDPs: value iteration [1], policy iteration, and linear programming approach [6]. Many researchers have tried to improve the performance of Value Iteration (VI) and Policy Iteration (PI) by reducing the number of updates of states [2, 4, 7–9]. Although the main focus of so-called papers is on dealing with some problems in learning, one can use those techniques for quantitative verification of MDPs [3,5].

Experimental results show that when the graph of MDP is dense or in the situation where all states belong to only one Strongly Connected Component (SCC), VI (or modified PI) works better than other advanced methods. In addition finding the optimal variable reordering for cyclic MDPs is an NP-complete problem [9].

In this paper we concentrate on these types of MDPs and consider maximum reachability probability problems (as defined in [1]) present an algorithm that
works faster than VI (and also faster than other methods). The main contribution is to present a prioritized algorithm for accelerating verification of dense MDPs.

The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 formally defines MDPs and reviews PI algorithms. In Section 3 we present heuristics for variable reordering in both sparse and dense MDPs and then present a prioritized algorithm for dense MDPs. Section 4 presents the experimental results on several case studies. Section 5 presents conclusions and ideas for future research.

2 Preliminaries

In this section, we provide an overview of MDP and policy iteration method. Detailed definitions and topics are available in [1,5].

2.1 Markov Decision Process (MDP)

An MDP is a tuple $M = (S, Act, P, AP, L)$, where $S$ is a countable set of states, $Act$ is a finite set of actions, $P : S \times Act \times S \rightarrow [0, 1]$ is the transition probability function such that for each state $s \in S$ and each action $\alpha \in Act : \sum_{s' \in S} P(s, \alpha, s') \in \{0, 1\}$, $AP$ is a nonempty set of atomic propositions, and $L : S \rightarrow 2^{AP}$ is a labeling function.

For the sake of simplicity, we suppose that $AP = \{goal, non-goal\}$ and there is a unique start state $s_0$. For a state $s \in S$ and an enabled action $\alpha \in Act$, set of successors are defined as

$$Post(s, \alpha) = \{s' \in S | P(s, \alpha, s') > 0\}$$

and $Post(s) = \cup_{\alpha \in Act} Post(s, \alpha)$.

A path in an MDP is a non-empty (finite or infinite) sequence of the form:

$$s_0 \stackrel{\alpha_0}{\rightarrow} s_1 \stackrel{\alpha_1}{\rightarrow} s_2 \stackrel{\alpha_2}{\rightarrow} \cdots$$

where $s_i \in S$ and $s_{i+1} \in Post(s_i, \alpha_i)$ for each $i > 0$. We define $Paths_s$ as the set of infinite paths that start in $s$. To resolve nondeterministic choices in an MDP we require the notion of policy. A policy selects an enabled action in each state based on the history of choices made so far (or simply the last state in memory-less policies). One can define a probability space $Prob^*_\pi$ over the paths $Paths_s^\pi$ [1]. For an MDP $M$ we use $H_M$ to denote the set of all policies of $M$.

MDPs can be used in the verification of systems (probabilistic verification). In this area, properties that should be verified against MDPs can be expressed using temporal logics such as PCTL [5]. In this paper, we concentrate on a limited yet important class of problems: maximum reachability probabilities, i.e. the maximum probability that a path through the MDP which starts from $s_0$ eventually reaches a goal state.

2.2 Quantitative Verification of MDPs

Model checking of PCTL formulas can be reduced to some important questions against MDPs. The maximum (or minimum) reachability probability is one of the most important questions against them. Given a set of goal states $G \subset S$, the maximum and minimum reachability probability can be defined as:
\[ p_s^{\text{min}}(G) = \inf_{\pi \in \Pi_M} p_s^\pi(G) \text{ and } p_s^{\text{max}}(G) = \sup_{\pi \in \Pi_M} p_s^\pi(G), \]

where \( p_s^\pi(G) = \text{Prob}^\pi_\omega(\{\omega \in \text{Path}^\pi_\omega | \exists i. \omega_i \in G\}) \). As we have mentioned, there are three main methods to compute reachability probability in MDPs but we only consider PI, (because PI has better performance for dense MDPs) and in algorithm 1 presents the main idea of this method.

### 2.3 Policy Iteration

Algorithm 1 describes the policy iteration method to calculate the values of \( p_s^{\text{max}} \). This algorithm uses an array \( P \) to save the value \( p_s^{\text{max}} \) for each state \( s_i \). It first estimates a good policy (Line 9) and computes the value of states iteratively according to this policy (Lines 17-28). After reaching the threshold if the estimated policy is not optimal it will be improved and the iterative method continues. In the following algorithm, \( \text{Act}[s_i] \) is an array that determines the best estimated action for each state \( s_i \).

**Algorithm 1: Policy Iteration**

1. Remove states \( \{s \in R_1\} \) and related transitions from \( M \)
2. Set initial values: \( P[s_i] = 1 \) if \( \{s_i \in R_2\} \) and o.w. \( P[s_i] = 0 \).
3. \( \text{diff1} := 1; \text{diff2} := 1; \)
4. while \( \text{diff1} > \text{epsilon} \) do
5. \( \text{diff1} := 0; \text{temp} := 0; \)
6. for \( i := 1 \) to the number of states do
7. if \( P[s_i] < 1 \) then
8. \( \text{temp} := \max_{\alpha \in \text{enabled}(s_i)} \sum_{s' \in S} p(s_i, \alpha, s') \times P[s'] \)
9. \( \text{Act}[s_i] := \arg \max_{\alpha \in \text{enabled}(s_i)} \sum_{s' \in S} p(s_i, \alpha, s') \times P[s'] \)
10. if \( \text{temp} - P[s_i] > \text{diff1} \) then
11. \( \text{diff1} := \text{temp} - P[s_i] \) end if
12. end if
13. end for
14. if \( \text{diff1} < \text{epsilon} \) then
15. return \( P[s_i] \) end if
16. while \( \text{diff2} > \text{epsilon} \) do
17. \( \text{diff2} := 0; \text{temp} := 0 \)
18. for \( i := 1 \) to number of states do
19. if \( P[s_i] < 1 \) then
20. \( \text{temp} := \sum_{s' \in S} p(s_i, \text{Act}[s_i], s') \times P[s'] \)
21. if \( \text{temp} - P[s_i] > \text{diff2} \) then
22. \( \text{diff2} := \text{temp} - P[s_i] \) end if
23. end if
24. end for
25. end while
3 Accelerating VI and PI algorithms

One of the main drawbacks of VI (and also PI) is that in every iteration it updates the values of all (nontrivial) states. Researchers proposed a range of methods to avoid unnecessary backups and speed up this algorithm. Some of these methods [4,9] try to split the MDP to some SCCs and in every iteration only compute the new value for states in some SCCs. Another approach for accelerating iterative methods is to consider a better variable ordering [4,5,9].

In this section we review the idea of variable reordering and propose a heuristic algorithm for variable reordering in dense MDPs.

3.1 Variable ordering

The PI algorithm in Section 2 is in fact Gauss-Seidel algorithms that tries to use the update of states as soon as possible. In this case the order of updated states can influence the performance of algorithm. Let StatesOrder[$s_i$] be the array that determines the (static) order of states for update. When the value of a state is updated the new value can be propagated to next computation if the values of next states depend on the value of current state. There are some heuristics for variable ordering in previous works [3–5,9], but none of them are useful for dense MDPs.

Here we propose an algorithm for variable reordering whose time complexity is linear in the size of the MDP. The idea of this algorithm is to select a state $s$ for update where the most of states of Post($s$) have been updated before. The for loop in line 5 is used to guarantee the selection of all states.

Algorithm2: VariableReordering

1. for $i := 0$ to $n - 1$
2.     Selected[$i$] := false;
3. end for
4. left := right := 0;
5. for $i := 0$ to $n - 1$
6. if Selected[$i$] = false then
7.     Selected[$i$] := true; StateOrder[left] := i;
8.     while left <= right and left < n
9.         j := StateOrder[left++];
10. for each $s_k \in Post(s_j)$
11.        if Selected[$k$] = false then
12.            Selected[$k$] := true;
13.            StateOrder[right++] = k;
14. end if
15. end for

2. end while
Policy iteration algorithm should call this function in the beginning of inner while loop (Line 17 of Algorithm 2). In this case the VariableReordering function uses Post($s_j$, Act[$s_j$]) in line 8 where Act[$s_i$] has been calculated in the inner loop of Algorithm 2. In addition, the for loop of line 19 should be in reverse order and the state $s_i$ could be selected according to the StateOrder array:

\[
\text{for } i := \text{number of states down to 1} \\
\quad s_i = \text{StateOrder}[i];
\]

This algorithm is useful for sparse MDPs but in order to deal with dense MDPs we modify the Post set in Line 7. Given $t < 1$ as a threshold we define $Post(s_i, \alpha, t) = \{s_j | P(s_i, \alpha, s_j) \geq t\}$. The experimental results show that the good value for $t$ is between 0.3 and 0.5.

### 3.2 prioritized algorithm for PI

Prioritized algorithms [9] in general try to focus on regions of the problem space that are more important and have the maximum effect on the whole problem. In this section we propose an algorithm that uses a simple graph partitioning method for prioritizing state updates.

Inspiring from the idea of SCC-based methods [5] we propose an algorithm which uses a good heuristic it attempts to split the state space to 3 partitions and updates these states according to this partitioning. Let $B$ be a partition. Define $AverageTrans(s_i, B) = \frac{\sum_{j \in B} P(s_i, \text{Act}(s_i), s_j)}{\text{size}(B)}$. Our algorithm tries to make partitions where for each state $s_i$ and each partition $B$ the value of $AverageTrans(s_i, B)$ is high if $s_i \in B$ and this value is low otherwise. In this case the partition that contains goal states is the most important and the frequency of updates for states of this partition should be more than the other two. We use this partitioning algorithm in the PI because for dense MDPs the performance of PI is usually better than the performance of VI.

Note that we use an $O(n^2)$ heuristic for graph partitioning of the MDP because its overhead in the case of dense MDPs is negligible for most case studies. There are some options for the size of partitions. In this paper we suppose that the size of the first partition is 0.25% and the second partition is 0.35% of all state space. Algorithm 3 describes this partitioning method.

**Algorithm 3:** Graph Partitioning

1. for $i := 1$ to number of states
2. \hspace{1cm} Distance[$i$] := 0;
3. for $i := 1$ to number of states
4. \hspace{1cm} if $s_i$ is a goal state then
5. \hspace{2cm} Selected[$i$] := true;
for j := 1 to number of states
    if Selected[j] = false then
        Distance[j] += $P(s_j, Act[s_j], s_i)$;
    else
        Selected[i] := false;
    endif
end for

for i := 1 to 0.25 × number of states
    k := the index of non-selected state for which Distance[k] is maximum;
    Selected[k] := true;
    for j := 1 to number of states
        if Selected[j] = false then
            Selected[j] := true;
            Distance[j] += $P(s_k, Act[s_k], s_j) + P(s_j, Act[s_j], s_k)$;
        endif
    end for
end for

This algorithm should be called before the second while loop (Line 16) in Algorithm 1. In order to use the result of this algorithm we modify Algorithm 1 and add the following statements after Line 18:

if i % 7 = 0
    update states of partition #3
else if i % 7 = 2 or i % 7 = 5
    update states of partition #2
else
    update states of partition #1
endif

4 Experiments

We implemented the proposed and original iterative algorithms in C++ using MS Visual Studio 2010 and ran it on an Intel Core i3 processor with 4GB memory. In the sections that follow we first consider the proposed algorithm of Section 3.1 and then consider the algorithm of Section 3.2.

4.1 Results for the Variable Ordering Algorithm

We tested our modified ordering algorithm on some dense MDPs. These models are randomly generated problems with 100 states and 3 actions per state. We created these MDPs such that the average value of $P(s_i, \alpha, s_{i+1})$ for each non-absorbing state $s_i$ is $\lambda$ with standard deviation of 0.1. Each model has one goal
state and 3 absorbing states. Table 1 shows results of running Value Iteration with best and worst variable ordering and also a random variable ordering. For simplicity we only present number of iterations for the execution of VI with $\epsilon = 10^{-6}$.

Table 1. Results of Variable Ordering for Some Dense MDPs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$\lambda$</th>
<th>0.9</th>
<th>0.7</th>
<th>0.5</th>
<th>0.3</th>
<th>0.2</th>
<th>0.1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Random ordering</td>
<td>116K</td>
<td>55K</td>
<td>37K</td>
<td>29K</td>
<td>26K</td>
<td>25K</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Best ordering</td>
<td>17K</td>
<td>19K</td>
<td>20K</td>
<td>21K</td>
<td>22K</td>
<td>22K</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worst ordering</td>
<td>205K</td>
<td>92K</td>
<td>56K</td>
<td>38K</td>
<td>32K</td>
<td>29K</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Best/random</td>
<td>0.147</td>
<td>0.364</td>
<td>0.568</td>
<td>0.758</td>
<td>0.846</td>
<td>0.88</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The impact of variable ordering for these case studies is considerable where the $\lambda$ parameter is more than 50%.

4.2 Results for partitioning-based algorithms

SysAdmin problem [9] is a good example of real problems that have dense MDPs. Because of relatively high number of actions per state, the performance of PI algorithm is better than VI. We used an implementation for the MDP of this problem that is developed by the authors of [9]. The only change is that we randomly set some states as absorbing.

In addition, we defined one other MDP: M1 is a model that the probability of reaching to 20% of its states is about 8 times more than the probability of reaching other 80% of states. This model has 400 states where 3 of them are absorbing and average number of actions per state is 3.

It has been shown that the performance of SCC-based methods is lower than standard iterative method for dense MDPs [9]. Hence, we dont compare our algorithm with SCC-based methods. To compare our algorithm with learning based ones, we use the implementation of learning algorithms that the authors of [3] proposed.

Table 2 shows the results of running normal VI and PI methods and, our prioritized algorithm (PI with algorithm 3). We called our algorithm Prioritized PI (PPI). Because of high average number of actions per state, the running time of PI is less than VI. The results show that our prioritized algorithm reduces the running time for all models. While prioritized methods of [9] could not improve the performance of iterative methods for SysAdmin, our algorithm accelerates these models.

The main reason that the performance of learning based algorithms for dense MDPs is so low is that these methods doesnt usually propose good variable ordering for this class of MDPs.
5 Conclusions and Future Research

The main contribution of this paper is that we present a prioritized algorithm for dense MDPs and show that it can reduce the running time of iterative methods for solving probabilistic reachability problems of this class of MDPs.

An approach for future works is to use a good variable ordering in each partition in our prioritized algorithm. In addition, one can propose a better prioritized algorithm that outperforms other prioritized ones in both dense and sparse models.

While many of previous works focus on VI, we believe that variable reordering can improve the performance when it is used in PI. One can also improve the performance of PI for both dense and sparse MDPs and outperform the VI approach by using advanced methods for selection of good policies (like action elimination.)

References

A Pre-congruence Format for $XY$-simulation

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Abstract. $XY$-simulation is a generalization of bisimulation that is parameterized with two subsets of actions. $XY$-simulation is known in the literature under different names such as modal refinement, partial bisimulation, and alternating simulation. In this paper, we propose a pre-congruence rule format for $XY$-simulation. The format allows for checking compositionality of $XY$-simulation for an arbitrary language with structural operational semantics, by performing very simple checks on the syntactic shape of the rules. We apply our format to derive concrete compositionality results for different notions of behavioral pre-order with respect to different process calculi in the literature.

1 Introduction

$XY$-simulation is a generalization of bisimulation that is parameterized by two subsets of actions: $X$ and $Y$ [1]. The idea is to weaken the transfer property of a bisimulation relation in the following way: the actions in $X$ are simulated from left to right, while the actions in $Y$ are simulated from right to left. $XY$-simulation is well-known in the literature, albeit under different names, such as modal refinement [16], partial bisimulation [6], and alternating simulation [4].

An essential property for any notion of behavioral pre-order and hence, also for $XY$-simulation, is the so-called pre-congruence property. This property allows for compositional verification and reasoning about processes under arbitrary contexts. The pre-congruence property has been studied in the literature for some instances of $XY$-simulation and for a fixed set of well-known operators from the field of process algebras (see [6,16] for instance). In this paper, we generalize these results by providing generic sufficient conditions for compositionality of $XY$-simulation with respect to any arbitrary set of operators with a Structural Operational Semantics (SOS) [21]. We do so by restricting the syntactic shape of the SOS rules to ensure pre-congruence. The result of this paper provides a unified account of existing results and is instantiated to generate new results. Furthermore, the proposed rule format can serve as a yardstick for language designers to check the compositionality of their operators while defining their semantics.

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To develop our rule format, we employ the modal decomposition approach proposed in [9, 13] in combination with an existing modal characterization of \( XY \)-simulation, due to [11]. We devise a modal decomposition that specifies when an open term satisfies a modal formula in terms of the modal formulae that are to be satisfied by its variables. This modal decomposition is then directly employed in generating a pre-congruence rule format for \( XY \)-simulation. The obtained format is an elegant and simple one; the only specific checks required are simple checks on the labels of the transition formulae, with respect to their inclusion in \( X \) or \( Y \). As we demonstrate by some examples in this paper, the format is applicable to various notions of behavioral pre-order and to various process calculi in the literature.

The rest of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we recall the basic definitions that will be used throughout the paper. Then, in Section 3, we first formulate and prove the modal decomposition theorem and using that, derive our pre-congruence rule format. In Section 4, we apply the obtained rule format to various examples from the literature. In Section 5, we show that the syntactic conditions on the rule format cannot be trivially relaxed. Finally, in Section 6, we conclude the paper and present the direction of our ongoing research.

2 Preliminaries

In this section, we first quote the basic definition of labeled transition systems and \( XY \)-simulation and some of their properties. Subsequently, we recall a formalization of SOS, and building upon this formalization, we define the basic rule formats that will form the foundations of our results in this paper.

2.1 Transition Systems and \( XY \)-simulation

We start by recalling below the well-known notion of labeled transition systems.

**Definition 1 (Labeled Transition Systems).** A labeled transition system (LTS) is a triple \((P, A, \rightarrow)\), where \( P \) is the set of processes, \( A \) is the set of actions, and \( \rightarrow \subseteq P \times A \times P \) is the transition relation. We denote \( (p, a, q) \in \rightarrow \) by \( p \xrightarrow{a} q \).

The following definition formalizes the notion of \( XY \)-simulation, originally due to [1].

**Definition 2 (\( XY \)-simulation).** Let \( X, Y \subseteq A \). A binary relation \( R \subseteq P \times P \) is an \( XY \)-simulation relation iff the following transfer conditions are satisfied:

1. \( \forall p, a, q, p' : (p \xrightarrow{a} p' \land p R q \land a \in X) \Rightarrow \exists q' : q \xrightarrow{a} q' \land p' R q' \).
2. \( \forall p, a, q, q' : (q \xrightarrow{a} q' \land p R q \land a \in Y) \Rightarrow \exists p' : p \xrightarrow{a} p' \land p' R q' \).

Two processes \( p, q \in P \) are \( XY \)-similar, denoted by \( p \preceq_{X,Y} q \), iff there is an \( XY \)-simulation relation \( R \) such that \( p R q \).
It is worth noting that in [2], $XY$-simulation relations are called covariant-contravariant simulation relations.

The following lemma lists some of the intuitive properties of $XY$-similarity.

**Lemma 1.** Consider an arbitrary LTS $(P, A, \rightarrow)$ and assume that $X, Y, X', Y' \subseteq A$; the following statements hold.

1. Relation $\preceq_{X,Y}$ is a pre-order.
2. If $X \subseteq X'$, then $\preceq_{X',Y} \subseteq \preceq_{X,Y}$.
3. If $Y \subseteq Y'$, then $\preceq_{X,Y'} \subseteq \preceq_{X,Y}$.
4. $\preceq_Y = \preceq_X^{-1}$.

**Proof.** 1. It is straightforward to verify that the identity relation is an $XY$-simulation relation. To prove transitivity, let $p \preceq_{X,Y} p'$ and $p' \preceq_{X,Y} p''$ with $R$ and $R'$ their witnessing $XY$-simulation relations, respectively. It remains to show that $R \circ R' = \{(p, p'') \mid \exists p' pRp' \land p'R'p''\}$ is an $XY$-simulation relation. We distinguish the following cases:

- Let $p \xrightarrow{a} q$, for some $a \in X$, and $pR \circ R'p''$. By the definition of relation composition, there exists some $p'$ such that $pRp'$ and $p'R'p''$. Since $R$ and $R'$ are $XY$-simulation relations, we have $p' \xrightarrow{a'} q'$, $p'' \xrightarrow{a''} q''$, and $qR \circ R'q''$, for some $q'$, $q''$.

- Let $p'' \xrightarrow{a''} q''$, for some $a \in Y$, and $pR \circ R'p''$. Similar to the previous case.

The proof of Items 2., 3., and 4. are straightforward from Definition 2. \qed

**Definition 3 (Modal Characterization of $XY$-simulation).** Let $\Phi_{X,Y}$ be the set of modal formulas generated by the following grammar:

$$\Phi_{X,Y} ::= \bigwedge_{i \in I} \varphi_i \mid \bigvee_{i \in I} \varphi_i \mid (a)\varphi \mid [b]\varphi \quad (a \in X, b \in Y).$$

The semantics of a formula $\varphi \in \Phi_{X,Y}$ is inductively defined in the standard way, i.e.,

$$p \models \bigwedge_{i \in I} \varphi_i \iff \forall_{i \in I} p \models \varphi_i \quad p \models \bigvee_{i \in I} \varphi_i \iff \exists_{i \in I} p \models \varphi_i$$

$$p \models (a)\varphi \iff \exists q p \xrightarrow{a} q \land q \models \varphi \quad p \models [a]\varphi \iff \forall q p \xrightarrow{a} q \Rightarrow q \models \varphi.$$ 

Note that $\top = \bigwedge_{\emptyset}$ and $\bot = \bigvee_{\emptyset}$. Furthermore, we let $\Phi = \Phi_{A,A}$ and $\varphi_1 \lor \varphi_2 = \bigvee_{i \in \{1,2\}} \varphi_i$. For any two formulas $\varphi, \varphi' \in \Phi$, we define $\varphi \Rightarrow \varphi' = neg(\varphi) \lor \varphi'$, where $neg : \Phi \rightarrow \Phi$ is a function that encodes negation in the logic, by pushing negation through conjunction, disjunction, and the modalities in the standard way.

**Theorem 1.** $p \preceq_{X,Y} q \iff \forall_{\varphi \in \Phi_{X,Y}} p \models \varphi \Rightarrow q \models \varphi$.

**Proof.** Standard (see [11]). \qed
2.2 Transition System Specifications

In this section, we recall some basic concepts that are used in the meta-theory of SOS. Regarding the notions treated in this section and the next one, we refer to [3, 19] for more details, examples and results.

Definition 4 (Terms and Signatures). Let $\mathcal{V}$ be an infinite set of variables with $|\mathcal{V}| \geq |\mathcal{A}|$. A signature is a collection $\Sigma$ of function symbols $f \notin \mathcal{V}$ equipped with a function $\text{ar} : \Sigma \rightarrow \mathbb{N}$ denoting their arity. The set $T(\Sigma)$ of terms over signature $\Sigma$ is defined as follows:

- $\mathcal{V} \subseteq T(\Sigma)$,
- if $f \in \Sigma$ and $t_1, \cdots, t_{\text{ar}(f)} \in T(\Sigma)$ then $f(t_1, \cdots, t_{\text{ar}(f)}) \in T(\Sigma)$.

A constant term $c()$ is denoted by $c$. Let $\text{var}(t)$ denote the set of variables that occur in term $t$. Let $T(\Sigma) = \{ t \mid \text{var}(t) = \emptyset \}$ denote the set of closed terms. A (closed) $\Sigma$-substitution $\sigma$ is a total function from the set of variables $\mathcal{V}$ to (closed) terms ($T(\Sigma)$).

Definition 5 (Transition System Specifications). Let $\Sigma$ be a signature. A positive $\Sigma$-literal is an expression of the form $t \xrightarrow{a} t'$ with $t, t' \in T(\Sigma)$ and $a \in \mathcal{A}$. A negative $\Sigma$-literal is an expression of the form $t \xrightarrow{a}$ with $t \in T(\Sigma)$ and $a \in \mathcal{A}$. A transition rule (or simply a rule) over $\Sigma$ is an expression of the form $H \xrightarrow{\alpha}$ with $H$ a set of $\Sigma$-literals (whose elements are called the premises of the rule) and $\alpha$ a $\Sigma$-literal (called the conclusion of the rule). Furthermore, the left- and the right-hand side (if any) of the conclusion of a rule are called the source and the target of the rule, respectively. A transition system specification (TSS) over $\Sigma$ is a collection of rules over $\Sigma$. A TSS is standard if all its rules have positive conclusions and positive if moreover all premises of its rules are also positive.

For each literal $\alpha$ of the form $t \xrightarrow{a} t'$, the action label of $\alpha$, denoted by $\text{action}(\alpha)$, is defined to be $a$. For each two terms $t, t'$, literals $t \xrightarrow{a} t'$ and $t \xrightarrow{a}$ deny each other.

A TSS is meant to define an LTS; however, in the presence of negative literals, this is not straightforward. To start with, we first recall the definition of irredundant proof, by Bloom et al. [9], which corresponds to the intuitive notion of proof from a given set of hypotheses.

Definition 6 (Irredundant Proof). Let $P$ be a TSS over a signature $\Sigma$. An irredundant proof of a transition rule $H \xrightarrow{\alpha}$ from $P$ is a well-founded, upwardly branching tree with the nodes labeled by $\Sigma$-literals, and some of the leaves marked as “hypotheses”, such that:

- the root is labeled by $\alpha$,
- $H$ is the set of labels of the hypotheses, and
- if $\beta$ is the label of a node $\star$ which is not a hypothesis and $K$ is the set of labels of the nodes directly above $\star$, then there is a transition rule $K \xrightarrow{\beta'}$ in $P$ and substitution $\sigma$ such that $\sigma(K') = K$ and $\sigma(\beta') = \beta$.
A proof of \( K \alpha \) from \( P \) is an irredundant proof of \( H \alpha \) from \( P \) with \( H \subseteq K \).

Note that the term “irredundant” highlights that the set of literals marked as hypotheses in the proof corresponds exactly to the set of premises of the proven rule. In other words, irredundantly provable rules contain no junk literals (i.e., literals not used in the proof tree) among their premises.

Next, we use the notion of irredundant proof to define the LTS associated with a TSS. This is achieved through the following notion of well-supported proof [23].

**Definition 7.** Let \( P \) be a standard TSS over a signature \( \Sigma \). A well-supported proof of a closed literal \( \alpha \) from \( P \) is a well-founded, upwardly branching tree with the nodes labeled by closed \( \Sigma \)-literals, such that the root is labeled by \( \alpha \) and if \( \beta \) is the label of a node \( * \) and \( K \) is the set of labels of the nodes directly above \( * \), then

- either there is a rule \( K' \beta \) from \( P \) and closed substitution \( \sigma \) such that \( \sigma(K') = K \land \sigma(\beta') = \beta \),
- or \( \beta \) is negative and for every set \( N \) of closed negative literals such that \( \gamma \)
  is irredundantly provable from \( P \) for \( \gamma \) a closed literal denying \( \beta \), a literal in \( K \) denies one in \( N \).

A well-supported proof of \( \alpha \) from \( P \) (if it exists) is denoted by \( P \vdash_{ws} \alpha \).

In order to unequivocally define an LTS, a TSS has to be complete, as defined below.

**Definition 8 (Complete TSSs).** A standard TSS is complete if and only if for any closed literal \( t \), either \( P \vdash_{ws} t \Rightarrow t' \) for some closed term \( t' \), or \( P \vdash_{ws} t \Rightarrow t \).

It is often possible to establish completeness by using a syntactic measure on rules, called stratification [10]. All practical examples of TSSs are standard and complete and hence, almost all SOS meta-theorems are formed around complete TSSs. In this paper, we also follow this tradition and formulate our results for complete TSSs.

### 2.3 Rule Formats

The goal of a rule format is to establish a semantic property via syntactic constraints on rules. One of the most important semantic properties addressed by rule formats is compositionality or (pre-)congruence, defined below.

**Definition 9 (Pre-congruence).** Let \( P \) be a TSS over signature \( \Sigma \). A preorder \( \sqsubseteq \subseteq T(\Sigma) \times T(\Sigma) \) on closed terms is a pre-congruence if and only if for all operators \( f \in \Sigma \) and closed terms \( t_1, t'_1, \ldots, t_{ar(f)}, t'_{ar(f)} \in T(\Sigma) \), we have that \( t_i \sqsubseteq t'_i \) (for \( i \in [1, ar(f)] \)) implies \( f(t_1, \ldots, t_{ar(f)}) \sqsubseteq f(t'_1, \ldots, t'_{ar(f)}) \).
A rule format that establishes pre-congruence for simulation (and congruence for bisimulation) is the following ntyft/ntyxt format [14].

**Definition 10 (ntyft/ntyxt format).** An ntytt rule is a transition rule in which the right-hand sides of positive premises are variables that are all distinct and do not occur in the source of the conclusion. An ntytt rule is an ntyxt rule if the source of its conclusion is a variable and an ntyft rule if the source of its conclusion contains exactly one function symbol applied to distinct variables. An ntytt rule (resp. an ntyft rule) is an nxytt rule (resp. an nxyft rule) if the left-hand sides of its premises are variables. A TSS is in the ntyft/ntyxt format if it contains only ntyft and ntyxt rules.

The ready simulation format, defined below, guarantees pre-congruence for ready simulation. Moreover, it is the basis of the modal decomposition technique presented in [9,13] and hence, also serves as the basis of our approach.

**Definition 11 (Ready simulation format).** A transition rule has no lookahead if the variables occurring in the right-hand sides of its positive premises do not occur in the left-hand sides of its premises. A TSS is in the ready simulation format if it is in the ntyft/ntyxt format and its transition rules have no lookahead.

SOS rules are meant to define a flow of variable valuations from the source of the conclusion to the premises and eventually to the target of the conclusion. However, some rules may feature free variables whose valuations do not depend on the source of the conclusion. Rules without free variables and lookahead are called decent [9].

**Definition 12 (Decent rule).** A variable occurring in a transition rule is free iff it does not occur in the source of the conclusion nor in the right-hand sides of the positive premises of the rule. A transition rule is decent if it has no lookahead and does not contain free variables.

Rules with free variables can always be replaced with infinitely many decent rules, by replacing the free variables with all their possible closed valuations. The following lemma captures this intuition. According to the following lemma, focusing on decent rules in the proofs does not impose any extra theoretical constraint.

**Lemma 2 ([9]).** Let $P$ be a standard TSS in the ready simulation format. Then there is a TSS $P^+$ in the decent ntyft format such that any closed literal $\alpha$ is provable from $P^+$ if and only if $P \vdash_{\text{ws}} \alpha$.

**Definition 13.** A $P$-ruloid is a decent nxytt rule that is irredundantly provable from $P^+$. Lastly, the set of all $P$-ruloids of a given TSS $P$ is denoted by $\bar{P}$.

For the results to come, we need the following lemma. Intuitively, it states that for any TSS $P$ in the ready simulation format, there is a well-supported proof of a positive closed literal $\alpha$ if and only if there is an irredundant proof of a $P$-ruloid such that the closed literal $\alpha$ is a closed substitution instance of the ruloid.

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Lemma 3 ([9]). Let be a TSS in the ready simulation format. For any term \( t \in T(\Sigma) \), closed term \( t' \), and a closed substitution \( \sigma \), we have \( P \vdash_{us} \sigma(t) \xrightarrow{\alpha} t' \) if and only if there are a \( P \)-rule \( \frac{H}{t \xrightarrow{\alpha} t'} \) and a closed substitution \( \sigma' \) such that \( P \vdash_{us} \sigma'(\alpha) \) (for every \( \alpha \in H \)), \( \sigma'(t) = \sigma(t) \), and \( \sigma'(u) = t' \).

3 Deriving a Pre-congruence Format

The basic machinery developed in [9] to derive a pre-congruence format works in two steps. First, a modal formula \( \varphi \in \Phi \) for an open term \( t \) is decomposed into a choice of modal formulas \( \psi(x) \) for variables \( x \) such that \( \sigma(t) \) satisfies \( \varphi \) if and only if for one of those \( \psi \)'s and all the variables \( x \) in \( t \), \( \sigma(x) \) satisfies \( \psi(x) \) (Theorem 2). This is achieved by considering the provable transition rules for term \( t \) (given that such rules are in a given rule format.) Secondly a pre-congruence format for a pre-order is devised such that if a modal formula belongs to characterizing logic of the pre-order, then the resulting decomposed modal formulas also belong to the same characterizing logic (Theorem 3).

3.1 Modal Decomposition

Definition 14. Let be a standard TSS over \( \Sigma \) in the ready simulation format. The decomposition function \( t^{-1} : T(\Sigma) \to (\Phi \to 2^{V^\Phi}) \) for a term is defined in the following way:

1. \( \psi \in t^{-1}(a,x) \) iff
   \[
   \psi(x) = \bigvee_{\frac{H}{t \xrightarrow{\alpha} t'}} P \chi \in u^{-1}(\varphi) \left( \chi(x) \land \bigwedge_{(x \xrightarrow{\beta} x') \in H} [c] \land \bigwedge_{(x \xrightarrow{\beta} y) \in H} \langle b \rangle \chi(y) \right),
   \]
   whenever \( x \in \text{var}(t) \). For \( x \notin \text{var}(t) \), we let \( \psi(x) = \top \).

2. \( \psi \in t^{-1}(a) \) iff \( \psi(t) \) (for \( x \in \text{var}(t) \)) is defined to be
   \[
   \bigwedge_{\frac{H}{t \xrightarrow{\alpha} t'}} \left( \bigwedge_{(x \xrightarrow{\beta} x') \in H} [c] \land \bigwedge_{(x \xrightarrow{\beta} y) \in H} \langle b \rangle \top \right) \Rightarrow
   \left( \bigvee_{\chi \in u^{-1}(\varphi)} \chi(x) \land \bigwedge_{(x \xrightarrow{\beta} y) \in H} [b] \bigvee_{\chi \in u^{-1}(\varphi)} \chi(y) \right).
   \]
   As in the previous case, we let \( \psi(x) = \top \) for \( x \notin \text{var}(t) \).

3. \( \psi \in t^{-1}(\bigvee_{i \in I} \varphi_i) \) iff \( \psi(x) = \bigvee_{i \in I} \psi_i(x) \), where \( \psi_i \in t^{-1}(\varphi_i) \) for \( i \in I \).

4. \( \psi \in t^{-1}(\bigwedge_{i \in I} \varphi_i) \) iff \( \psi(x) = \bigwedge_{i \in I} \psi_i(x) \), where \( \psi_i \in t^{-1}(\varphi_i) \) for \( i \in I \).

Note that item 2. has not been treated in the past decomposition approaches [9, 13]. It concerns the semantic clause of the box modality \( [a] \varphi \), i.e., for any closed terms \( t, t' \), if there is a transition \( t \xrightarrow{\alpha} t' \), then \( t' \) must satisfy \( \varphi \).
Theorem 2. Let $P$ be a complete TSS in the ready simulation format over the signature $\Sigma$. Then, for any term $t \in T(\Sigma)$, closed substitution $\sigma$, and a formula $\varphi \in \Phi$, we have $\sigma(t) \models \varphi$ $\iff \exists \psi \in t^{-1}(\sigma) \forall x \in \text{var}(t) \sigma(x) \models \psi(x)$.

Proof. By structural induction on $\varphi$. In the remainder, we only consider the case when $\varphi = [a]\varphi'$. The proof of the remaining cases is the same as the proof given in [13, Theorem 2].

$(\iff)$ Let $\sigma(t) \xrightarrow{a} t'$ for some closed term $t'$. We need to show that $t' \models \varphi'$.

We begin by using Lemma 3 to find a $P$-ruloid of the form:

$$\{x \xrightarrow{b_i} y_i \mid i \in I_x \land x \in \text{var}(t)\} \cup \{x \xrightarrow{\ell} j \mid j \in J_x \land x \in \text{var}(t)\} \xrightarrow{a} u$$

and a closed substitution $\sigma'$ such that $\sigma(t) = \sigma'(t)$, $P \vdash_{ws} \sigma'(H)$, and $\sigma'(u) = t'$. Since $\exists \psi \in t^{-1}(\sigma) \forall x \in \text{var}(t)$, by Definition 14, we have (for every $x \in \text{var}(t)$):

$$\sigma(x) \models \left( \bigwedge_{j \in J_x} [c_j] \land \bigwedge_{i \in I_x} (b_i)^{T} \right) \Rightarrow \left( \bigvee_{\chi \in u^{-1}(\sigma')} \chi(x) \land \bigwedge_{i \in I_x} [b_i] \bigwedge_{\chi \in u^{-1}(\sigma')} \chi(y_i) \right).$$

We claim that $\forall z \in \text{var}(u) \sigma'(z) \models \bigvee_{\chi \in u^{-1}(\sigma')} \chi(z)$. Let $z \in \text{var}(u)$. We distinguish the following cases depending on the position of $z$ in the decent $P$-ruloid:

- Let $z = x$ for some $x \in \text{var}(t)$. Using $\sigma(x) = \sigma'(x)$ and $P \vdash_{ws} \sigma'(H)$ in (2) we get $\sigma'(x) \models \bigvee_{\chi \in u^{-1}(\sigma')} \chi(x)$.

- Let $z = y_i$ for some $i \in I_x$ and $x \in \text{var}(t)$. Then, using $\sigma(x) = \sigma'(x)$ and $P \vdash_{ws} \sigma'(H)$ in (2) we have $\sigma'(x) \models [b_i] \bigvee_{\chi \in u^{-1}(\sigma')} \chi(y_i)$ and $P \vdash_{ws} \sigma'(x) \xrightarrow{b_i} \sigma'(y_i)$. Therefore, from the semantics of box modality we obtain $\sigma'(y_i) \models \bigvee_{\chi \in u^{-1}(\sigma')} \chi(y_i)$.

This proves the claim. Fix $\tilde{\chi}(z) = \bigvee_{\chi \in u^{-1}(\sigma')} \chi(z)$ for every $z \in \text{var}(u)$. Since Definition 14 is closed under arbitrary disjunctions, we know that $\tilde{\chi} \in u^{-1}(\sigma')$. Moreover, we have $\sigma'(z) \models \tilde{\chi}(z)$ (for every $z \in \text{var}(u)$). Thus, by the induction hypothesis we obtain $\sigma'(u) \models \varphi'$.

$(\Rightarrow)$ Let $\sigma(t) \models [a]\varphi'$. Suppose there are no $P$-ruloids of the form $\frac{u}{t \xrightarrow{a} u}$.

Then, by Definition 14 we have $\psi(x) = \bigwedge_{i \in I_x} [c_i] \land \bigwedge_{i \in I_x} (b_i)^{T}$. Since every closed term satisfies $T$, we have $\sigma(x) \models \psi(x)$ for every $x \in \text{var}(t)$ as required.

Now, suppose there is a $P$-ruloid of the form given in (1). It suffices to show that the condition in (2) holds. Assume that $\sigma(x) \models \bigwedge_{j \in J_x} [c_j] \land \bigwedge_{j \in J_x} (b_j)^{T}$. Then, the completeness of $P$ together with the semantics of box modality guarantee that $P \vdash_{ws} \sigma(x) \xrightarrow{\ell} (for every $j \in I_x$). Furthermore, from the semantics of diamond modality, for every $i \in I_x$, we find some closed term $t_i$ such that $P \vdash_{ws} \sigma(x) \xrightarrow{b_i} t_i$. Thus, we can define a closed substitution $\sigma'$ such that $\sigma(x) = \sigma'(x)$ (for $x \in \text{var}(t)$), $\sigma'(y_i) = t_i$ (for $i \in I_x$). Note that $\sigma'$ is well-defined because the $P$-ruloids have no lookahead and all $y_i$'s are distinct.
(i.e., \( \forall_i, i' \in I_x \; i \neq i' \Rightarrow y_i \neq y_{i'} \)). By Lemma 3, we obtain \( \sigma(t) \vdash_a \sigma'(u) \). Thus, \( \sigma'(u) \models \varphi' \) because \( \sigma(t) \models [a] \varphi' \). From the induction hypothesis we obtain

\[
\exists \chi, \varphi \, \forall z \in \var{u} \; \sigma'(z) \models \chi(z).
\]

(3)

From (3) we have, for every \( x \in \var{t} \), \( \sigma(x) \models \bigwedge_{i \in I_x} [b_i] \bigwedge_{i \in I_x} \chi(y_i) \).

Let \( \sigma(x) \xrightarrow{b} t'' \) for some \( i \in I_x \). Then, we define a closed substitution \( \sigma'' \) such that \( \sigma(t) = \sigma''(t) \), \( \sigma''(y_i) = t'' \), and \( \sigma''(y_{i'}) = \sigma'(y_{i'}) \) (for \( i' \in I_x \) such that \( i \neq i' \)). By repeating the same arguments (from above) to derive \( P \vdash_{ws} \sigma(t) \xrightarrow{a} \sigma'(u) \), we can find \( P \vdash_{ws} \sigma(t) \xrightarrow{a} \sigma''(u) \). Thus, \( \sigma''(u) \models \varphi' \) because \( \sigma(t) \models [a] \varphi' \).

We can again instantiate the induction hypothesis to find a \( \chi'' \in u^{-1}(\varphi') \) such that \( \forall z \in \var{u} \; \sigma''(z) = \chi''(z) \). Therefore, \( \sigma''(y_i) \models \bigwedge_{i \in I_x} \chi(y_i) \) and we can conclude that \( \sigma(x) \models [b_i] \bigwedge_{i \in I_x} \chi(y_i) \).

We have shown for every \( P \)-ruloid \( \xrightarrow{H} \) and for every \( x \in \var{t} \), if \( \sigma(x) \models \bigwedge_{(x \xrightarrow{a} y) \in H} [c] \bot \) and \( \sigma(x) \models \bigwedge_{(x \xrightarrow{a} y) \in H} [b] \top \) then \( \sigma(x) \models \bigwedge_{i \in I_x} \chi(y_i) \) and \( \sigma(x) \models \bigwedge_{i \in I_x} \chi(y_i) \).

Therefore, the formula \( \psi(x) \) as defined in Definition 14(2) is satisfied by \( \sigma(x) \).

\[\square\]

3.2 \textbf{XY-simulation Format}

\textbf{Definition 15.} Given a set \( H \) of premises, we write \( H^+ \) and \( H^- \) to denote the set of all positive and negative literals in \( H \), respectively. A \( \xrightarrow{H} \) is in the \( XY \)-simulation format iff it is in the ready simulation format and the following conditions hold:

1. If \( a \in X \) then
   \( (a) \; \forall_a (a \in H^+ \Rightarrow \text{action}(a) \in X) \)
   \( (b) \; \forall_a (a \in H^- \Rightarrow \text{action}(a) \in Y) \)

2. If \( a \in Y \) then
   \( (a) \; \forall_a (a \in H^+ \Rightarrow \text{action}(a) \in Y) \)
   \( (b) \; \forall_a (a \in H^- \Rightarrow \text{action}(a) \in X) \)

A TSS is in the \( XY \)-simulation format iff all its rules are in the \( XY \)-simulation format.

\textbf{Lemma 4.} If a TSS is in the \( XY \)-simulation format, then all its \( P \)-ruloids are.

Due to space limitations, we do not present the complete proof of Lemma 4. It goes by an induction on the depth of the irredundant proof for the \( P \)-ruloid at hand.

\textbf{Theorem 3.} Let \( P \) be a standard TSS in the \( XY \)-simulation format and \( \Sigma \) be its signature. If \( t \in \Phi(\Sigma) \), \( \varphi \in \Phi_{X,Y} \), and \( \psi \in t^{-1}(\varphi) \) then \( \forall z \in \var{t} \; \psi(x) \in \Phi_{X,Y} \).
Proof. We prove this theorem by structural induction on $\varphi$ and consider the cases when $\varphi = \langle a \rangle \varphi'$ and $\varphi = [a] \varphi'$. In the following, due to Lemma 4, we use the fact that every derived $P$-ruloid is in the $XY$-simulation format, whenever $P$ is in the $XY$-simulation format.

(1) Let $\varphi = \langle a \rangle \varphi'$ for some $a \in X$. By Definition 14, we have

$$\psi(x) = \left( \chi(x) \land \bigwedge_{(x \xrightarrow{\varphi'}) \in H} [c] \land \bigwedge_{(x \xrightarrow{\varphi'} y) \in H} (b) \chi(y) \right),$$

for some $P$-ruloid $\frac{H}{(\cdot \xrightarrow{\varphi'})}$ and a decomposition function $\chi \in u^{-1}(\varphi')$. Hence, by the induction hypothesis $\chi(z) \in \Phi_{X,Y}$ (for $z \in \text{var}(u)$). It suffices to show that $\forall (x \xrightarrow{\varphi'}) \in H \exists c \in Y$ and $\forall x \xrightarrow{b} y \in H b \in X$.

- Let $(x \xrightarrow{\varphi'}) \in H$. Then, Definition 15(1b) ensures that $c \in Y$.
- Let $x \rightarrow y \in H$. Then, Definition 15(1a) ensures that $b \in X$.

(2) Let $\varphi = [a] \varphi'$ for some $a \in Y$. By Definition 14, we have (for $x \in \text{var}(t)$):

$$\psi(x) = \bigwedge_{\frac{H}{(\cdot \xrightarrow{\varphi'})} \in P} \left( \bigvee_{(x \xrightarrow{\varphi'}) \in H} (c) \top \lor \bigvee_{(x \xrightarrow{\varphi'} y) \in H} [b] \bot \lor \left( \chi(x) \land \bigwedge_{(x \xrightarrow{\varphi'} y) \in H} \left( b \lor \bigvee_{x \xrightarrow{\varphi'} y \in H} (\chi(y)) \right) \right) \right).$$

By the induction hypothesis we have, for every $\chi \in u^{-1}(\varphi')$, $z \in \text{var}(u)$, that $\chi(z)$ is a formula in $\Phi_{X,Y}$; therefore $\forall y \in u^{-1}(\varphi'), \chi(z)$ is a formula in $\Phi_{X,Y}$. Thus, it suffices to show that $\forall x \xrightarrow{b} y \in H \forall b \in Y \Rightarrow b \in Y \Rightarrow c \in X$, which follow directly from conditions (2a) and (2b) of Definition 15, respectively.

\[ \square \]

**Corollary 1 (Main Result).** Let $P$ be a complete TSS in the $XY$-simulation format over the signature $\Sigma$. Then, for any term $t \in T(\Sigma)$ and closed substitutions $\sigma, \sigma'$ we have: $\forall x \in \text{var}(t) \sigma(x) \lesssim_{X,Y} \sigma'(x) \implies \sigma(t) \lesssim_{X,Y} \sigma'(t)$.

**Proof.** It suffices to show that if $\sigma(t) \models \varphi$ then $\sigma'(t) \models \varphi$, for all $\varphi \in \Phi_{X,Y}$.

$$\sigma(t) \models \varphi \implies \exists \varphi \in t^{-1}(\varphi) \cap \Phi_{X,Y} \forall x \in \text{var}(t) \sigma(x) \models \psi(x) \quad \text{(Theorem 2 and 3)}$$

$$\implies \exists \varphi \in t^{-1}(\varphi) \cap \Phi_{X,Y} \forall x \in \text{var}(t) \sigma'(x) \models \psi(x) \quad \text{(: \forall x \in \text{var}(t) \sigma(x) \lesssim_{X,Y} \sigma'(x))}$$

$$\implies \sigma'(t) \models \varphi \quad \text{(Theorem 2)}.$$

## 4 Applications

In this section, we review the different incarnations of $XY$-simulation relation present in the literature and assert their pre-congruence property with respect to some well-known operators from the field of process algebra. To start with, through the following proposition, we establish a link between $XY$-similarity and some other notions of behavioral pre-order and equivalence.
Proposition 1. Let \((\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{A}, \rightarrow)\) be an arbitrary LTS. Then, the following statements hold:

1. Relation \(\preceq_{\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{A}}\) is the bisimilarity relation in the sense of [20].
2. Relation \(\preceq_{\mathcal{A}, \emptyset}\) is the similarity relation in the sense of [18].
3. If \(X \subseteq \mathcal{A}\), then the relation \(\preceq_{\mathcal{A}, X}\) is the partial bisimilarity relation in the sense of [6].
4. If the set of actions are partitioned into two sets of may actions \(\mathcal{A}_\Diamond\) and must actions \(\mathcal{A}_{\Box}\), then the relation \(\preceq_{\mathcal{A}_\Diamond, \mathcal{A}_{\Box}}\) is the modal refinement relation in the sense of [16].
5. If the set of actions are partitioned into two sets of input actions \(\mathcal{I}\) and output actions \(\mathcal{O}\), then the relation \(\preceq_{\mathcal{O}, \mathcal{I}}\) is the alternating similarity relation in the sense of [4].

In the following subsection, we show how our rule format can be applied to obtain compositionality results for various process calculi.

4.1 Partial Bisimulation

In [6], Baeten et al. used the partial bisimulation pre-order to define controllability of nondeterministic processes. (Controllability is a central notion in the supervisory control theory.) To this end, they defined a basic sequential process algebra \(\text{BSP}_{\downarrow}(\mathcal{A}_\downarrow, B)\) (for some fixed subset \(B \subseteq \mathcal{A}\) and \(\mathcal{A}_\downarrow = \mathcal{A} \cup \{\downarrow\}\)) and provided a ground-complete axiomatization of partial bisimulation pre-order. The signature of process terms \(\Sigma\) in \(\text{BSP}_{\downarrow}(\mathcal{A}_\downarrow, B)\) is given below:

\[
\Sigma = \{ (0, 0), (1, 0), (a, 1)_{a \in \mathcal{A}}, (+, 2), (|, 2) \}.
\]

Constant 0, called inaction, denotes that no actions can be performed and can only deadlock, whereas constant 1 denotes successful termination. The family of unary operators \(a._\) (for \(a \in \mathcal{A}\)), called action prefix operator, expresses that a process can initially perform \(a\) and then the argument process takes over. Binary operator \(\_ + \_\), known as the alternative composition operator, specifies the choice between two process terms. Lastly, the synchronization parallel composition is denoted by \(\_ | \_\) and specifies that the two arguments synchronize on common actions. The formal semantics for each operator in \(\Sigma\) is given in Table 1 by means of a standard TSS that is in the ready simulation format.

By a quick inspection of the labels, we note that all rules in Table 1 are in the \(\mathcal{A}_\downarrow\)\(-\)simulation format, the \(\mathcal{A}_\downarrow\emptyset\)-simulation format, and the \(\mathcal{A}_\downarrow\mathcal{A}_\downarrow\)-simulation format. Therefore, we obtain the following (pre-)congruence results for free.

Corollary 2. Partial bisimilarity pre-order \(\preceq_{\mathcal{A}_\downarrow, B} \subseteq T(\Sigma) \times T(\Sigma)\) is a pre-congruence relation for all closed terms in process algebra \(\text{BSP}_{\downarrow}(\mathcal{A}_\downarrow, B)\). Moreover, similarity pre-order \(\preceq_{\mathcal{A}_\downarrow, \emptyset}\) and bisimilarity equivalence \(\preceq_{\mathcal{A}_\downarrow, \mathcal{A}_\downarrow}\) are also pre-congruence and congruence relations, respectively, for all constructs of process algebra \(\text{BSP}_{\downarrow}(\mathcal{A}_\downarrow, B)\).

\(^1\) We employ \(\downarrow\) (by a coding proposed by Baeten and Verhoef in [7]) as a special action label modeling successful termination.
4.2 Modal Refinement

Next, we consider the framework of modal specifications [15, 16]. Let \( \text{Act} \) be the set of action labels ranged over by \( a, b, \ldots \). Construct the set of may and must actions as: \( A♦ = \text{Act} \times \{ ♦ \} \) and \( A□ = \text{Act} \times \{ □ \} \). We write \( a♦ \) and \( a□ \) to denote the elements \( (a, ♦) \in A♦ \) and \( (a, □) \in A□ \), respectively. Let \( A = A♦ \cup A□ \) and consider the following signature:

\[
\Sigma_m = \{(0, 0), (a, 1)_{a \in \text{Act}}, (+, 2), (\lor, 2), (\land, 2)\}
\]

The formal semantics of the operators in \( \Sigma \cap \Sigma_m \) remains the same in this new setting, whereas the semantics of conjunction and disjunction is given by the rules in Table 2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 2. Operational rules for ( \lor ) and ( \land ), taken from [15]</th>
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| \[
\begin{align*}
\frac{x^{a♦} \to x'}{x \lor y^{a♦} \to x'} & \quad (6) \\
\frac{y^{a♦} \to y'}{x \lor y^{a♦} \to y'} & \quad (7) \\
\frac{x^{a□} \to x'}{x \lor y^{a□} \to x'} & \quad (8) \\
\frac{y^{a□} \to y'}{x \lor y^{a□} \to y'} & \quad (9) \\
\frac{x^{a□} \to x'}{x \land y^{a□} \to x'} & \quad (10) \\
\frac{y^{a□} \to y'}{x \land y^{a□} \to y'} & \quad (11)
\end{align*}
\]

Note that the process terms induced by our operational rules are not admissible (consistent) in the sense of [16], i.e., the set of must transitions are not necessary included in the set of may transitions. In essence, the transition system induced by our algebra corresponds to the mixed transition system, where the consistency assumption is dropped.

By inspection we note that all the rules in Table 1 and Table 2 are in \( A♦A□ \)-simulation format. Therefore, we obtain the following pre-congruence result for free.

**Corollary 3.** The modal refinement pre-order \( \preceq_{A♦, A□} \subseteq T(\Sigma_m) \times T(\Sigma_m) \) is a pre-congruence relation. Moreover, the \( A♦A□ \)-simulation format subsumes the static constructor format given by Larsen and Thomsen [16, Section 4].
Next consider the following modified operational rules of conjunction $\wedge'$ taken from [17]. Note that, in [17], the conjunction is defined between any two arbitrary interface automata [12] and we interpret the input actions as must actions and the output actions as may actions.

\[
\begin{align*}
\frac{x \xrightarrow{a} x', y \xrightarrow{a} y'}{x \wedge' y \xrightarrow{a} x'} & \quad (9') \quad \frac{y \xrightarrow{a} y', x \xrightarrow{a} y}{x \wedge' y \xrightarrow{a} y'} & \quad (10')
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
\frac{x \xrightarrow{a} x', y \xrightarrow{a} y'}{x \wedge' y \xrightarrow{a} x' \wedge' y'} & \quad (11') \quad \frac{y \xrightarrow{a} y', x \xrightarrow{a} y}{x \wedge' y \xrightarrow{a} x' \wedge' y'} & \quad (11'')
\end{align*}
\]

Clearly, rules (9') and (10') are not in the $A_0A_0$-simulation format because they violate condition (2b) of Definition 15. Next, by a counterexample, we show that the modal refinement pre-order is not a pre-congruence for the modified conjunction operator $\wedge'$.

**Example 1.** Consider the following process terms: $t = a_0, b_0, 0$, $t' = a_0, c_0, 0$, and $\bar{t} = t + t'$. Clearly, $\bar{t} \preceq_{A_0A_0} t$ and $\bar{t} \preceq_{A_0A_0} t'$. However, $\bar{t} \wedge' t' \not\preceq_{A_0A_0} t'$.\[<br>5 Adequacy of XY-simulation Format\]

In this section, with the help of the following counterexamples, we motivate why the conditions of XY-simulation format are essential for the pre-congruence result. In particular, we show how dropping each of the conditions is sufficient for breaking pre-congruence.

**Example 2.** Consider the synchronous parallel composition parameterized with a partial function $\gamma : A \times A \rightarrow A$ (called as communication function [5]) such that rule 5 is substituted by the following rules:

\[
\begin{align*}
\frac{x \xrightarrow{a} x', y \xrightarrow{b} y'}{x|\gamma y \xrightarrow{\gamma(a,b)} x'|\gamma y'} & \quad (5') & \frac{x \xrightarrow{a} x', y \xrightarrow{b} y'}{x|\gamma y \xrightarrow{\gamma(b,a)} x'|\gamma y'} & \quad (5'').
\end{align*}
\]

Let $A = \{a, b\}$ and the communication function $\gamma$ be defined as: $\gamma(b, b) = a$ and undefined otherwise. Clearly, the inequation $b.0 \preceq_{\{a\},\{b\}} a.0$ holds; however, $b.0|_\gamma b.0 \not\preceq_{\{a\},\{b\}} a.0|_\gamma a.0$. We note that rule 5 of $|_\gamma$ violates Definition 15(1a). Similarly, by defining a communication function $\gamma'$ as $\gamma(a, a) = b$ and undefined otherwise, we can see that $b.0|_{\gamma'} b.0 \not\preceq_{\{a\},\{b\}} a.0|_{\gamma'} a.0$. Furthermore, we now note that rule 5 of $|_{\gamma'}$ violates Definition 15(2a).

**Example 3.** This example concerns negative premises. Consider the unary operator $\theta$ (called the priority operator) from TCP [5], which also comes with a partial ordering $\prec$ on the set of actions $A$. Intuitively, the priority operator can execute an $a$-transition if the operand can execute an $a$-transition and no action with priority over $a$ can be executed.
$x \xrightarrow{a} x'$ for all $b$ with $a < b$

(12)

$\theta(x) \xrightarrow{a} \theta(x')$

Clearly, the above rule is in the ready simulation format. Let $A = \{a, b\}$ with $a < b$ and consider the process terms $a.0, a.0 + b.0$. It holds that $a.0 \preceq_{A,0} a.0 + b.0$; however, $\theta(a.0) \npreceq_{A,0} \theta(a.0 + b.0)$. We note that rule 12 of $\theta$ violates Definition 15(1b). Furthermore, since $\preceq_{\emptyset,X} = \preceq_{X,\emptyset}^{-1}$, the above counterexample also highlights the violation of Definition 15(2b).

6 Conclusions

In this paper, we proposed a pre-congruence rule format for $XY$-simulation. The rule format guarantees that once the SOS rules of a given language satisfy certain syntactic conditions, then $XY$-simulation is pre-congruence for the constructs of the language. We showed that the format is applicable to obtain compositionality results for different behavioral pre-orders and for different process calculi. We also showed that dropping each of the syntactic conditions imposed by the rule format can jeopardize compositionality.

We intend to exploit the results of this paper in order to obtain a rule format for input-output conformance (ioco) testing [22], which is a behavioral pre-order widely used as a basis for model-based testing. This will generalize the earlier compositionality results reported in [8], which only address a particular synchronization operator and the hiding (abstraction) operator.

References

Applicative Bisimulation
and Quantum λ-Calculi*

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Abstract. Applicative bisimulation is a coinductive technique to check program equivalence in higher-order functional languages. It is known to be sound — and sometimes complete — with respect to context equivalence. In this paper we show that applicative bisimulation also works when the underlying language of programs takes the form of a linear λ-calculus extended with features such as probabilistic binary choice, but also quantum data, the latter being a setting in which linearity plays a role. The main results are proofs of soundness for the obtained notions of bisimilarity.

1 Introduction

Program equivalence is one of the fundamental notions in the theory of programming languages. Studying the nature of program equivalence is not only interesting from a purely foundational point of view, but can also be the first step towards defining (semi)automatic techniques for program verification, or for validating compiler optimizations. As an example, conformance of a program to a specification often corresponds to the equivalence between the program and the specification, once the latter is written in the same formalism as the program.

If the language at hand is an higher-order functional language, equivalence is traditionally formalized as Morris’ context equivalence: two programs are considered equivalent if and only if they have the same behavior in every possible context [15]. This makes it relatively easy to prove two programs to be not equivalent, since this merely amounts to finding one context which separates them. On the other hand, proving two terms to be equivalent requires one to examine their behaviour in every possible context.

Various ways to alleviate the burden of proving context equivalence have been proposed in the literature, from CIU theorems (in which the class of contexts is restricted without altering the underlying relation [14]) to adequate denotational semantics, to logical relations [16]. We are here interested in coinductive techniques akin to bisimulation. Indeed, they have been shown to be very powerful, to the point of not only being sound, but even complete as ways to prove terms to be context equivalent [17]. Among the various notions of bisimulation which are known to be amenable to higher-order programs, the simplest one is

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certainly Abramsky’s applicative bisimulation [1], in which terms are seen as interactive objects and the interaction with their environment consists in taking input arguments or outputting observable results.

Applicative bisimulation is indeed well-known to be fully-abstract w.r.t. context equivalence when instantiated on plain, untyped, deterministic \(\lambda\)-calculi [1]. When the calculus at hand also includes a choice operator, the situation is more complicated: while applicative bisimilarity is invariably a congruence, thus sound for context equivalence, completeness generally fails [17, 13], even if some unexpected positive results have recently been obtained by Crubillé and the first author [4] in a probabilistic setting. An orthogonal issue is the one of linearity: does applicative bisimulation work well when the underlying calculus has linear types? The question has been answered positively, but only for deterministic \(\lambda\)-calculi [3, 2]. Finally, soundness does not hold in general if the programming language at hand has references [11].

In this paper, we define and study applicative bisimulation when instantiated on linear \(\lambda\)-calculi, starting with a purely deterministic language, and progressively extending it with probabilistic choice and quantum data, a setting in which linearity is an essential ingredient [19, 20]. The newly added features in the language are shown to correspond to mild variations in the underlying transition system, which in presence of probabilistic choice becomes a labelled Markov chain. The main contributions of this paper are congruence results for applicative bisimilarity in probabilistic and quantum \(\lambda\)-calculi, with soundness with respect to context equivalence as an easy corollary. In all the considered calculi, Howe’s technique plays a key role [9, 17].

This is the first successful attempt to apply coinductive techniques to quantum, higher-order, calculi. The literature offers some ideas and results about bisimulation and simulation in the context of quantum process algebras [8, 7, 6]. Deep relations between quantum computation and coalgebras have recently been discovered [10]. None of the cited works, however, deals with higher-order functions.

This paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, a simple linear \(\lambda\)-calculus, called \(\ell ST\) will be introduced, together with its operational semantics. This is a purely deterministic calculus, on top of which our extensions will be defined. Section 3 presents the basics of applicative bisimulation, instantiated on \(\ell ST\). A probabilistic variation on \(\ell ST\), called \(\ell PST\), is the subject of Section 4, which also discusses the impact of probabilities to equivalences and bisimilarity. Section 5 is about a quantum variation on \(\ell ST\), dubbed \(\ell QST\), together with a study of bimilarity for it. Section 6 concludes the paper with a discussion about full-abstraction. An extended version of this paper with more details is available [5].

2 Linear \(\lambda\)-Calculi: A Minimal Core

In this section, a simple linear \(\lambda\)-calculus called \(\ell ST\) will be introduced, together with the basics of its operational semantics. Terms and values are generated by
the following grammar:

\[
e, f ::= v \mid ee \mid \text{if } e \text{ then } e \text{ else } e \mid \text{let } e \text{ be } \langle x, x \rangle \text{ in } e \mid \Omega; \\
v, w ::= x \mid \texttt{tt} \mid \texttt{ff} \mid \lambda x.e \mid \langle v, v \rangle.
\]

Observe the presence not only of abstractions and applications, but also of value pairs, and of basic constructions for booleans. Pairs of arbitrary terms can be formed as follows, as syntactic sugar:

\[
\langle e, f \rangle = (\lambda x.\lambda y.\langle x, y \rangle) ef.
\]

Finally, terms include a constant \(\Omega\) for divergence. \(b\) is a metavariable for truth values, i.e. \(b\) stands for either \(\texttt{tt}\) or \(\texttt{ff}\). We need a way to enforce linearity, i.e., the fact that functions use their arguments \textit{exactly} once. This can take the form of a linear type system whose language of types is the following:

\[
A, B ::= \texttt{bool} \mid A \to A \mid A \otimes A.
\]

The set \(\mathcal{Y}\) includes all types. Typing judgments are in the form \(\Gamma \vdash e : A\), where \(\Gamma\) is a set of assignments of types to variables. Typing rules are standard, and can be found in Figure 1. The set \(\mathcal{T}_{\ell ST_A}\) contains all terms \(e\) such that \(\Gamma \vdash e : A\).

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{llll}
\hline
\(x : A \vdash x : A\) & \(b : \texttt{bool}\) & \(\Gamma \vdash e : A \to B\) & \(\Delta \vdash f : A\) \\
\hline
\(\Gamma, \Delta \vdash \langle v, w \rangle : v \otimes w\) & \(\Gamma, \Delta \vdash f : X \otimes Y\) & \(\Gamma \vdash \text{let } f \text{ be } \langle x, y \rangle \text{ in } e : A\) & \\
\hline
\(\Gamma, x : A \vdash e : B\) & \(\Gamma \vdash e : \texttt{bool}\) & \(\Delta \vdash f : A\) & \(\Delta \vdash g : A\) \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{center}

\textbf{Fig. 1. Typing Rules}

\(\Gamma \vdash e : A, \mathcal{T}_{\ell ST_A}\) is usually written as \(\mathcal{T}_{A, \ell ST}\). Notations like \(\mathcal{V}_{\ell ST_A}\) or \(\mathcal{V}_{A, \ell ST}\) are the analogues for values of the corresponding notations for terms.

Endowing \(\ell ST_A\) with call-by-value small-step or big-step semantics poses no significant problem. In the first case, one defines a binary relation \(\to\) between closed terms of any type by the usual rule for \(\beta\)-reduction, the natural rule for the conditional operator, and the following rule: \(\text{let } \langle v, w \rangle \text{ be } \langle x, y \rangle \text{ in } e \to e\{v, w/x, y\}\). Similarly, one can define a big-step evaluation relation \(\downarrow\) between closed terms and values by a completely standard set of rules (see [5] for more details). The expression \(e \downarrow\), as usual, indicates the existence of a value \(v\) with
Subject reduction holds in the following sense: if $\emptyset \vdash e : A$, $e \rightarrow f$, and $e \Downarrow v$, then both $\emptyset \vdash f : A$ and $\emptyset \vdash v : A$.

The expressive power of the just-introduced calculus is rather poor. Nonetheless, it can be proved to be complete for first-order computation over booleans, in the following sense: for every function $F : \{\text{tt, ff}\}^n \rightarrow \{\text{tt, ff}\}$, there is a term which computes $F$, i.e., a term $c_F$ such that $e_F(b_1, \ldots, b_n) \Downarrow F(b_1, \ldots, b_n)$ for every $b_1, \ldots, b_n \in \{\text{tt, ff}\}^n$. Indeed, even if copying and erasing bits is not in principle allowed, one could anyway encode, e.g., duplication as the following combinator of type $\text{bool} \rightarrow \text{bool} \otimes \text{bool} : \lambda x. \text{if } x \text{ then } (\text{tt, tt) else } (\text{ff, ff})$.

Similarly, if $\Gamma \vdash e : A$ and $x$ is a fresh variable, one can easily find a term $\text{weak } x \text{ in } e$ such that $\Gamma, x : \text{bool} \vdash \text{weak } x \text{ in } e : A$ and $\text{weak } b \text{ in } e$ behaves like $e$ for every $b \in \{\text{ff, tt}\}$.

But how could one capture program equivalence in an higher-order setting like the one we are examining? The canonical answer goes back to Morris [15], who proposed context equivalence (also known as observational equivalence) as the right way to compare terms. Roughly, two terms are context equivalent iff they behave the same when observed in any possible context, i.e., when tested against any possible observer. Formally, a context is nothing more than a term with a single occurrence of a special marker called the hole and denoted as $\cdot$ (see [5]). Given a context $C$ and a term $e$, $C[e]$ is the term obtained by filling the single occurrence of $\cdot$ in $C$ with $e$. For contexts to make sense in a typed setting, one needs to extend typing rules to contexts, introducing a set of rules deriving judgments in the form $\Gamma \vdash C[\Delta] : A : B$, which can be read informally as saying that whenever $\Delta \vdash e : A$, it holds that $\Gamma \vdash C[e] : B$.

We are now in a position to define the context preorder: given two terms $e$ and $f$ such that $\Gamma \vdash e, f : A$, we write $e \leq_{\Gamma, A} f$ iff for every context $C$ such that $\emptyset \vdash C[\Gamma] : B$, if $C[e] \Downarrow$ then $C[f] \Downarrow$. If $e \leq_{\Gamma, A} f$ and $f \leq_{\Gamma, A} e$, then $e$ and $f$ are said to be context equivalent, and we write $e \equiv_{\Gamma, A} f$. What we have just defined, in fact, are two typed relations $\leq$ and $\equiv$, that is to say two families of relations indexed by contexts and types, i.e., $\leq$ is the family $\{\leq_{\Gamma, A}\}_{\Gamma, A}$, while $\equiv$ is $\{\equiv_{\Gamma, A}\}_{\Gamma, A}$. If in the scheme above the type $B$ is restricted so as to be $\text{bool}$, then the obtained relations are the ground context preorder and ground context equivalence, respectively. Context equivalence is, almost by construction, a congruence. Similarly, the context preorder is easily seen to be a precongruence.

### 3 Applicative Bisimilarity and its Properties

Context equivalence is universally accepted as the canonical notion of equivalence of higher-order programs, being robust, and only relying on the underlying operational semantics. Proving terms not context equivalent is relatively easy: ending up with a single context separating the two terms suffices. On the other hand, the universal quantification over all contexts makes proofs of equivalence hard.
A variety of techniques have been proposed to overcome this problem, among them logical relations, adequate denotational models and context lemmas. As first proposed by Abramsky [1], coinductive methodologies (and the bisimulation proof method in particular) can be fruitfully employed. Abramsky’s applicative bisimulation is based on taking argument passing as the basic interaction mechanism: what the environment can do with a λ-term is either evaluating it or passing it an argument.

In this section, we will briefly delineate how to define applicative bisimilarity for the linear λ-calculus $\ell ST_\lambda$. We will do that in an unnecessarily pedantic way, defining a labelled transition system, and then playing the usual bisimulation game on top of it. This has the advantage of extending to probabilistic and quantum calculi much easier.

A labelled transition system (LTS in the following) is a triple $L = (S, \mathcal{L}, \mathcal{F})$, where $S$ is a set of states, $\mathcal{L}$ is a set of labels, and $\mathcal{F}$ is a subset of $S \times \mathcal{L} \times S$. If for every $s \in S$ and for every $\ell \in \mathcal{L}$ there is at most one state $t \in S$ with $(s, \ell, t) \in \mathcal{F}$, then $L$ is said to be deterministic. The theory of bisimulation for LTSs is very well-studied [18] and forms one of the cornerstones of concurrency theory.

An applicative bisimulation relation is nothing more than a bisimulation on an LTS $L_{\ell ST_\lambda}$ defined on top of the λ-calculus $\ell ST_\lambda$. More specifically, the LTS $L_{\ell ST_\lambda}$ is defined as the triple

$$(\overline{T}_{\ell ST_\lambda} \sqcup \overline{V}_{\ell ST_\lambda}, \overline{E}_{\ell ST_\lambda} \sqcup \overline{V}_{\ell ST_\lambda} \sqcup \{\text{eval, tt, ff}\} \cup (Y \sqcup Y), \mathcal{R}_{\ell ST_\lambda}),$$

where:

- $\overline{T}_{\ell ST_\lambda}$ is the set $\sqcup_{A \in Y}(T^{{\ell ST_\lambda}}_A \times \{A\})$, similarly for $\overline{V}_{\ell ST_\lambda}$. On the other hand, $\overline{E}_{\ell ST_\lambda}$ is $\sqcup_{A,B,E \in Y}(T^{L_{\ell ST_\lambda}}_A \times A \times \{A, B, E\})$. Observe how any pair $(v, A)$ appears twice as a state, once as an element of $\overline{T}_{\ell ST_\lambda}$ and again as an element of $\overline{V}_{\ell ST_\lambda}$. Whenever necessary to avoid ambiguity, the second instance will be denoted as $(\hat{v}, A)$. Similarly for the two copies of any type $A$ one finds as labels.

- The label eval models evaluation of terms, while the labels tt, ff are the way a boolean constant declares its own value.

- The relation $\mathcal{R}_{\ell ST_\lambda}$ contains all triples in the following forms:

$$(\lambda x.e, A \rightarrow B), (v, A), (e\{v/x\}, B)); \quad ((\text{bool}, \text{tt}, (\text{bool}, (\text{eval}, (v, A))));

(((v, w), A \otimes B), (e, (A, B, E)), (e\{v/x, w/y\}, E));

((e, A), (e, A)); \quad ((\hat{v}, A), (\hat{v}, A)); \quad ((e, A), \text{eval}, (\hat{v}, A));$$

where, in the last item, we of course assume that $e \downarrow v$.

Basically, values interact with their environment based on their types: abstractions take an input argument, pairs give their two components to a term which can handle them, and booleans constants simply expose their value. The only way to interact with terms is by evaluating them. Both terms and values exposes their type. As one can easily verify, the labelled transition system $L_{\ell ST_\lambda}$ is deterministic. Simulation and bisimulation relations for $L_{\ell ST_\lambda}$ are defined as for
any other LTS. Notice, however, that both are binary relations on states, i.e., on elements of $\text{T}^{\ell}\text{S}^\lambda \cup V^{\ell}\text{S}^\lambda$. Let us observe that:

- Two pairs $(e, A)$ and $(f, B)$ can be put in relation only if $A = B$, because each state makes its type public through a label. For similar reasons, states in the form $(v, A)$ and $(\bar{w}, B)$ cannot be in relation, not even if $A = B$.
- If $(v, A)$ and $(w, A)$ are in relation, then also $(\bar{v}, A)$ and $(\bar{w}, A)$ are in relation. Conversely, if $(\bar{v}, A)$ and $(\bar{w}, A)$ are in a (bi)simulation relation $R$, then $R \cup \{(v, A), (w, A)\}$ is itself a (bi)simulation.

As a consequence, (bi)similarity can be seen as a relation on terms, indexed by types. Similarity is denoted as $\preceq$, and its restriction to (closed) terms of type $A$ is indicated with $\preceq_A$. For bisimilarity, symbols are $\sim_A$, respectively.

(Bi)similarity can be generalized to a typed relation by the usual open extension.

Example 1. An example of two distinct programs which can be proved bisimilar are the following:

$$e = \lambda x.\lambda y.\lambda z. \text{and}(xy) \ (\text{or} \ z \ \text{tt}); \quad f = \lambda x.\lambda y.\lambda z. x(\text{or} \ (\text{and} \ z \ \text{ff}) \ y);$$

where $\text{and}$ and $\text{or}$ are combinators computing the eponymous boolean functions. Both $e$ and $f$ can be given the type $(\text{bool} \rightarrow \text{bool}) \rightarrow \text{bool} \rightarrow \text{bool} \rightarrow \text{bool}$ in the empty context. They can be proved bisimilar by just giving an relation $R_{e,f}$ which contains the pair $(e, f)$ and which can be proved to be an applicative bisimulation. Another interesting example of terms which can be proved bisimilar are the term $e = \text{if} \ f \ \text{then} \ g \ \text{else} \ h$ and the term $s$ obtained from $e$ by $\lambda$-abstracting all variables which occur free in $g$ (and, equivalently, in $h$), then applying the same variables to the obtained term. For more details, see [5].

Is bisimilarity sound for (i.e., included in) context equivalence? And how about the reverse inclusion? For a linear, deterministic $\lambda$-calculus like the one we are describing, both questions have already been given a positive answer [7]. In the next two sections, we will briefly sketch how the correspondence can be proved.

3.1 (Bi)similarity is a (Pre)congruence.

A natural way to prove that similarity is included in the context preorder, (and thus that bisimilarity is included in context equivalence) consists in first showing that similarity is a preorder relation which is compatible with all the operators of the language.

While proving that $\preceq$ is a preorder is relatively easy, the naive proof of compatibility (i.e. the obvious induction) fails, due to application. A nice way out is due to Howe [9], who proposed a powerful and reasonably robust proof based on so-called precongruence candidates. Intuitively, the structure of Howe’s method is the following:

1. First of all, one defines an operator $(\cdot)^H$ on typed relations, in such a way that whenever a typed relation $R$ is a preorder, $R^H$ is a precongruence.
2. One then proves, again under the condition that $R$ is an equivalence relation, that $R$ is included into $R^H$, and that $R^H$ is substitutive.

3. Finally, one proves that $\preceq^H$ is itself an applicative simulation. This is the so-called Key Lemma [17], definitely the most difficult of the three steps. Points 2 and 3 together imply that $\preceq^H$ and $\preceq^H$ coincide. But by point 1, $\preceq^H$, thus also $\preceq$, are precongruences. Points 1 and 2 do not depend on the underlying operational semantics, but on only on the language’s construct.

In Figure 2, one can find the full set of rules defining $(\cdot)^H$ when the underlying terms are those of $\ell ST_\lambda$.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$\emptyset \vdash cRt : A$</th>
<th>$x : A \vdash xRt : A$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\emptyset \vdash cR^Ht : A$</td>
<td>$\emptyset \vdash xR^Ht : A$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Gamma, x : B \vdash eR^H h : A$</td>
<td>$\Gamma \vdash (\lambda x.h)Rt : B \rightarrow A$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Gamma \vdash (\lambda x.e)R^H t : B \rightarrow A$</td>
<td>$\Gamma, \Delta \vdash (hs)Rt : A$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Gamma \vdash eR^H h : B \rightarrow A$</td>
<td>$\Delta \vdash fR^H s : B$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Gamma, \Delta \vdash (ef)R^H t : A$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Gamma \vdash eR^H h : \text{bool}$</td>
<td>$\Delta \vdash fR^H s : A$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Gamma, \Delta \vdash (\text{if } h \text{ then } s \text{ else } r)Rt : A$</td>
<td>$\Delta, x : X, y : Y \vdash fR^H s : A$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Gamma, \Delta \vdash (\text{let } h \text{ be } \langle x, y \rangle \text{ in } s)Rt : A$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Gamma \vdash vR^H u : A$</td>
<td>$\Delta \vdash wR^H z : B$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Gamma, \Delta \vdash \langle u, z \rangle R e : A \otimes B$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Gamma, \Delta \vdash \langle v, w \rangle R^H e : A \otimes B$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Fig. 2. The Howe’s Rules for $\ell ST_\lambda$.

**Theorem 1.** In $\ell ST_\lambda$, $\preceq$ is included in $\leq$, thus $\sim$ is included in $\equiv$.

## 4 Injecting Probabilistic Choice

The expressive power of $\ell ST_\lambda$ is rather limited, due to the presence of linearity. Nevertheless, the calculus is complete for first-order computations over the finite domain of boolean values, as discussed previously. Rather than relaxing linearity, we now modify $\ell ST_\lambda$ by endowing it with a form of probabilistic choice, thus obtaining a new linear $\lambda$-calculus, called $\ell PST_\lambda$, which is complete for probabilistic circuits. We see $\ell PST_\lambda$ as an intermediate step towards $\ell QST_\lambda$, a quantum $\lambda$-calculus we will analyze in the following section.

The language of terms of $\ell PST_\lambda$ is the one of $\ell ST_\lambda$ where, however, there is one additional binary construct $\oplus$, to be interpreted as probabilistic choice: $e ::= e \oplus e$. The set $\mathcal{Y}$ of types is the same as the one of $\ell ST_\lambda$. An evaluation operation
is introduced as a relation $\Downarrow \subseteq \mathcal{T}_{\ell \text{PST}A} \times \mathcal{D}_{\ell \text{PST}A}$ between the sets of closed terms of type $A$ belonging to $\ell \text{PST}_A$ and the one of subdistributions of values of type $A$ in $\ell \text{PST}_A$. The elements of $\mathcal{D}_{\ell \text{PST}A}$ are actually subdistributions whose support is some finite subset of the set of values $V_{\ell \text{PST}A}$, i.e., for each such $\mathcal{E}$, we have $\mathcal{E} : V_{\ell \text{PST}A} \rightarrow [0,1]$ and $\sum_{v \in V_{\ell \text{PST}A}} \mathcal{E}(v) \leq 1$. Whenever this does cause ambiguity, subdistributions will be referred to simply as distributions. In Figure 3 a selection of the rules for big-step semantics in $\ell \text{PST}_A$ are given. Expressions in the form $\{v_i\}_{i \in I}$ have the obvious meaning, namely the distribution with support $\{v_i\}_{i \in I}$ which attributes probability $p_i$ to each $v_i$.

As for the terms $e \in \mathcal{T}_{\ell \text{PST}A}$, the following lemma holds:

**Lemma 1.** If $\emptyset \vdash e : A$, there is a unique distribution $\mathcal{E}$ such that $e \Downarrow \mathcal{E}$.

Lemma 1 only holds because the $\lambda$-calculus we are working with is linear, and as a consequence strongly normalizing. If $\emptyset \vdash e \Downarrow \mathcal{E} : A$, then the unique $\mathcal{E}$ from Lemma 1 is called the **semantics** of term $e$ and is denoted simply as $\llbracket e \rrbracket$.

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Fig. 3. Big-step Semantics of } \ell \text{PST}_A & - \text{Selection} \\
\end{align*}
\]

Context equivalence and the context preorder are defined very similarly to $\ell \text{ST}_\lambda$, the only difference being the underlying notion of observation, which in $\ell \text{ST}_\lambda$ takes the form of convergence, and in $\ell \text{PST}_\lambda$ becomes the probability of convergence.

### 4.1 Applicative Bisimilarity

Would it be possible to define applicative bisimilarity for $\ell \text{PST}_\lambda$ similarly to what we have done for $\ell \text{ST}_\lambda$? The first obstacle towards this goal is the dynamics of $\ell \text{PST}_\lambda$, which is not deterministic but rather probabilistic, and thus cannot fit into an LTS. In the literature, however, various notions of probabilistic bisimulation have been introduced, and it turns out that the earliest and simplest one, due to Larsen and Skou [12], is sufficient for our purposes.

A **labelled Markov chain** (LMC in the following) is a triple $(\mathcal{S}, \mathcal{L}, \mathcal{T})$, where $\mathcal{S}$ and $\mathcal{L}$ are as in the definition of a LTS, while $\mathcal{T}$ is a **transition probability matrix**, i.e., a function from $\mathcal{S} \times \mathcal{L} \times \mathcal{S}$ to $[0,1]$ such that for every $s$ and for every $\ell$, it holds that $\mathcal{T}(s, \ell, S) \leq 1$ (where the expression $\mathcal{T}(s, \ell, X)$ stands for $\sum_{t \in X} \mathcal{T}(s, \ell, t)$ whenever $X \subseteq \mathcal{S}$). Given such a LMC $\mathcal{M}$, an equivalence relation
$R$ on $S$ is said to be a **bisimulation** on $M$ iff whenever $(s, t) \in R$, it holds that $T(s, \ell, E) = T(t, \ell, E)$ for every equivalence class $E$ of $S$ modulo $R$. A preorder $R$ on $S$ is said to be a **simulation** iff for every subset $X$ of $S$, it holds that $T(s, \ell, X) \leq T(t, \ell, R(X))$. With some efforts (see [5] for some more details) one can prove that there exist largest bisimulation and simulation, that we continue to call **similarity** and **bisimilarity**, respectively.

Probabilistic (bi)simulation, despite the endeavor required to define it, preserves all fundamental properties of its deterministic sibling. As an example, a symmetric probabilistic simulation is a bisimulation. Moreover, bisimilarity is the intersection of similarity and co-similarity.

Labelled Markov chains are exactly the objects we need when generalizing the construction $\mathcal{L}_{\lambda}$ to $\lambda$. The LMC $\mathcal{M}_{\lambda}$, indeed, is defined as the triple

$$(\mathcal{T}_{\lambda}, \mathcal{V}_{\lambda}, \mathcal{E}_{\lambda})$$

where $\mathcal{T}_{\lambda}$ is the function assuming the following values:

- $\mathcal{T}_{\lambda}(\lambda x.e, A \rightarrow B, (v, A), (e[v/x], B)) = 1$;
- $\mathcal{T}_{\lambda}(e, A, \text{eval}, (v, A)) = [e(v)]$;
- $\mathcal{T}_{\lambda}((v, w), A \oplus B, (e, (A, B, E)), (e[v/x,w/y], E)) = 1$;
- $\mathcal{T}_{\lambda}(\text{tt}, \text{bool}, \text{tt}, (\text{tt}, \text{bool})) = 1$;
- $\mathcal{T}_{\lambda}(\lambda e.A, (e, A)) = 1$;
- $\mathcal{T}_{\lambda}(\lambda v.A, (v, A)) = 1$;

and having value 0 in all the other cases. It is easy to realize that $\mathcal{T}_{\lambda}$ can indeed be seen as the natural generalization of $\mathcal{T}_{\lambda}$: on states in the form $(\lambda v.A, (v, A))$, the function either returns 0 or 1, while in correspondence to states like $(e, A)$ and the label $\text{eval}$, it behaves in a genuinely probabilistic way.

As for $\lambda$, simulation and bisimulation relations, and the largest such relations, namely similarity and bisimilarity, can be given by just instantiating the general scheme described above to the specific LMC modeling terms of $\lambda$ and their dynamics. All these turn out to be relations on closed terms, but as for $\lambda$, they can be turned into proper typed relations just by using the usual open extension.

The question now is: are the just introduced coinductive methodologies sound with respect to context equivalence? And is it that the proof of precongruence for similarity from Section 3.1 can be applied here? The answer is positive, but some effort is needed. More specifically, one can proceed as in [4], generalizing Howe’s method to a probabilistic setting, which makes the Key Lemma harder to prove. By the way, the set of Howe’s rules are the same as in $\lambda$, except for a new one, namely

$$\Gamma \vdash e R h : A \quad \Delta \vdash f R s : A \quad \Gamma, \Delta \vdash (h \oplus s) R t : A$$

Thus:

**Theorem 2.** In $\lambda$, $\preceq$ is included in $\leq$, thus $\sim$ is included in $\equiv$.
5 On Quantum Data

Linear $\lambda$-calculi with classical control and quantum data have been introduced and studied both from an operational and from a semantical point of view [20, 7]. Definitionally, they can be thought of as $\lambda$-calculi in which ordinary, classic, terms have access to a so-called quantum register, which models quantum data.

A quantum register $\categories$ on a finite set of quantum variables $Q$ is mathematically described by an element of a finite-dimensional Hilbert space whose computational basis is the set $\mathcal{SB}(Q)$ of all maps from $Q$ to $\{\text{tt, ff}\}$ (of which there are $2^{|Q|}$). Any element of this basis takes the form $|r_1 \leftarrow b_1, r_2 \leftarrow b_2, \ldots, r_n \leftarrow b_n⟩$, where $Q = \{r_1, \ldots, r_n\}$ and $b_1, \ldots, b_n \in \{\text{tt, ff}\}$. Elements of this Hilbert space, called $H(Q)$, are in the form

$$\sum_{\eta \in \mathcal{SB}(Q)} \alpha_{\eta} |\eta⟩,$$

where the complex numbers $\alpha_{\eta} \in \mathbb{C}$ are the so-called amplitudes, and must satisfy the normalisation condition $\sum_{\eta \in \mathcal{SB}(Q)} |\alpha_{\eta}|^2 = 1$. If $\eta \in \mathcal{SB}(Q)$ and $r$ is a variable not necessarily in $Q$, then $\eta\{r \leftarrow b\}$ stands for the substitution which coincides with $\eta$ except on $r$ where it equals $b$.

The interaction of a quantum register with the outer environment can create or destroy quantum bits increasing or decreasing the dimension of $Q$. This shaping of the quantum register is mathematically described making use of the following operators:

- The probability operator $\mathbf{PR}_b^r : H(Q) \rightarrow \mathbb{R}_{[0,1]}$ gives the probability to obtain $b \in \{\text{tt, ff}\}$ as a result of the measurement of $r \in Q$ in the input register:
  $$\mathbf{PR}_b^r(\categories) = \sum_{\eta(r) = b} |\alpha_{\eta}|^2$$

- If $r \not\in Q$, then the projection operator $\mathbf{MS}_b^r : H(Q \cup \{r\}) \rightarrow H(Q)$ measures the variable $r$, stored in the input register, destroying the corresponding qubit. More precisely $\mathbf{MS}_{tt}^r(\categories)$ and $\mathbf{MS}_{ff}^r(\categories)$ give as a result the quantum register configuration corresponding to a measure of the variable $r$, when the result of the variable measurement is tt or ff respectively:
  $$\mathbf{MS}_b^r(\categories) = [\mathbf{PR}_b^r(\categories)]^{-\frac{1}{2}} \sum_{\eta} \alpha_{\eta(r \leftarrow b)} |\eta⟩,$$

where $\categories$ is as in (1).

- If $r \not\in Q$, then the operator $\mathbf{NW}_b^r : H(Q) \rightarrow H(Q \cup \{r\})$ creates a new qubit, accessible through the fresh variable name $r$, and increases by one the dimension of the quantum register.

Qubits can not only be created and measured, but their value can also be modified by applying unitary operators to them. Given any such $n$-ary operator $U$, and any sequence of distinct variables $r_1, \ldots, r_n$ (where $r_i \in Q$ for every $1 \leq i \leq n$), one can build a unitary operator $U_{r_1,\ldots,r_n}$ on $H(Q)$. 208
5.1 The Language

We can obtain the quantum language $\ell QST_\lambda$ as an extension of basic $\ell ST_\lambda$. The grammar of $\ell ST_\lambda$ is enhanced by adding the following values:

$$v ::= \cdots \mid r \mid U \mid \text{meas} \mid \text{new},$$

where $r$ ranges over an infinite set of quantum variables, and $U$ ranges over a finite set of unitary transformations. Functions $\text{new}$ and $\text{meas}$ are constants of the language. $\text{new}$ takes as argument a boolean constant and returns (a quantum variable pointing to) a qubit of the same value, increasing this way the dimension of the quantum register. The measurement operator $\text{meas}$ measures a qubit, therefore it decreases the dimension of the quantum register.

Typing terms in $\ell QST_\lambda$ does not require any particular efforts. The class of types needs to be slightly extended with a new base type for qubits, called $\text{qbit}$, while contexts now give types not only to classical variables, but also to quantum variables. The new typing rules are in Table 4.

| $\emptyset \vdash \text{meas} : \text{qbit} \rightarrow \text{bool}$ | $\emptyset \vdash \text{new} : \text{bool} \rightarrow \text{qbit}$ |
|---------------------------------------------------------------|
| $\emptyset \vdash U : \text{qbit}^\otimes n \rightarrow \text{qbit}^\otimes n$ | $r : \text{qbit} \vdash r : \text{qbit}$ |

Fig. 4. Typing rules in $\ell QST_\lambda$.

The semantics of $\ell QST_\lambda$, on the other hand, cannot be specified merely as a relation between terms, since terms only make sense computationally if coupled with a quantum register, namely in a pair in the form $[Q,e]$, which is called a quantum closure. Analogously to what has been made for $\ell PST_\lambda$, small step reduction operator $\rightarrow$ and the big step evaluation operator $\Downarrow$ are given as relations between the set of quantum closures and of quantum closures distributions. In figures 5 and 6 the small-step semantics and big-step semantics for $\ell QST_\lambda$ are given. Quantum closures, however, are not what we want to compare, since what we want to be able to compare are terms. Context equivalence, in other words, continues to be a relation on terms, and can be specified similarly to the probabilistic case, following, e.g. [20].

5.2 Applicative Bisimilarity in $\ell QST_\lambda$

Would it be possible to have a notion of bisimilarity for $\ell QST_\lambda$? What is the underlying “Markov Chain”? It turns out that LMCs as introduced in Section 4.1 are sufficient, but we need to be careful. In particular, states of the LMC are not terms, but quantum closures, of which there are in principle nondenumerably many. However, since we are only interested in quantum closures which can be
Fig. 5. Small-step Semantics of ℓQSTₜ.

Fig. 6. Big-step Semantics of ℓQSTₜ.
obtained (in a finite number of evaluation steps) from closures having an empty quantum register, this is not a problem: we simply take states as those closures, which we dub constructible. \( \mathcal{M}_{QST} \), can be built similarly to \( \mathcal{M}_{PST} \), where (constructible) quantum closures take the place of terms. The non zero elements of the function \( T_{QST} \) are defined as follows:

\[
\begin{align*}
T_{QST}(\langle \tt, \text{bool} \rangle, \text{bool}, (\tt, \text{bool})) &= 1; \\
T_{QST}(\langle \ff, \text{bool} \rangle, \text{bool}, (\ff, \text{bool})) &= 1; \\
T_{QST}(\left[ \begin{array}{c} \lambda x. e \\ \alpha \rightarrow e \end{array} \right], A) &\rightarrow A, (\left[ \begin{array}{c} \mathcal{W} \\ v \end{array} \right], A, (\left[ \begin{array}{c} \mathcal{W} \otimes \mathcal{W}, e(x) \end{array} \right], B)) = 1; \\
T_{QST}(\left[ \begin{array}{c} \lambda x. e \\ \alpha \rightarrow e \end{array} \right], \text{bool}) &\rightarrow \text{bool}, (\left[ \begin{array}{c} \mathcal{W} \\ v \end{array} \right], \text{bool}, (\left[ \begin{array}{c} \mathcal{W} \otimes \mathcal{W}, \text{meas} r \end{array} \right], \text{bool})) = 1; \\
T_{QST}(\left[ \begin{array}{c} \lambda x. e \\ \alpha \rightarrow e \end{array} \right], \text{bool}) &\rightarrow \text{bool}, (\left[ \begin{array}{c} \mathcal{W} \\ v \end{array} \right], \text{bool}, (\left[ \begin{array}{c} \mathcal{W} \otimes \mathcal{W}, \text{new} b \end{array} \right], \text{qbit})) = 1; \\
T_{QST}(\left[ \begin{array}{c} \lambda x. e \\ \alpha \rightarrow e \end{array} \right], \text{qbit}) &\rightarrow \text{qbit}, (\left[ \begin{array}{c} \mathcal{W} \\ v \end{array} \right], \text{qbit}, (\left[ \begin{array}{c} \mathcal{W} \otimes \mathcal{W}, \text{meas} r \end{array} \right], \text{bool})) = \text{PR}(\mathcal{Q}) \\
T_{QST}(\left[ \begin{array}{c} \lambda x. e \\ \alpha \rightarrow e \end{array} \right], A) &\rightarrow A, (\left[ \begin{array}{c} \mathcal{W} \\ v \end{array} \right], A, (\left[ \begin{array}{c} \mathcal{W} \otimes \mathcal{W}, e \{v/x, w/y\} \end{array} \right], E)) = 1; \\
T_{QST}(\left[ \begin{array}{c} \lambda x. e \\ \alpha \rightarrow e \end{array} \right], A) &\rightarrow A, (\left[ \begin{array}{c} \mathcal{W} \\ v \end{array} \right], A, (\left[ \begin{array}{c} \mathcal{W} \otimes \mathcal{W}, \text{new} b \end{array} \right], \text{qbit})) = 1; \\
T_{QST}(\left[ \begin{array}{c} \lambda x. e \\ \alpha \rightarrow e \end{array} \right], A) &\rightarrow A, (\left[ \begin{array}{c} \mathcal{W} \\ v \end{array} \right], A, (\left[ \begin{array}{c} \mathcal{W} \otimes \mathcal{W}, \text{meas} r \end{array} \right], \text{bool})) = \text{PR}(\mathcal{Q}) \\
T_{QST}(\left[ \begin{array}{c} \lambda x. e \\ \alpha \rightarrow e \end{array} \right], A) &\rightarrow A, (\left[ \begin{array}{c} \mathcal{W} \\ v \end{array} \right], A, (\left[ \begin{array}{c} \mathcal{W} \\ v \end{array} \right], A)) = 1.
\end{align*}
\]

Please notice the presence of a new label, called \text{meas}, which models the action of measuring a qubit. This has the same effect as the eponymous term, but is easy to apply the same definitional scheme we have seen for \( \ell_{PST} \), and obtain a notion of applicative (bi)similarity. Howe’s method, in turn, can be adapted to the calculus here, resulting in a proof of precongruence and ultimately in the following:

**Theorem 3.** In \( \ell_{QST} \), \( \preceq \) is included in \( \preceq \), thus \( \sim \) is included in \( \equiv \).

More details on the proof of this can be found in [5].

**Example 2.** An interesting pair of terms which can be proved bisimilar are the following two:

\[
e = \lambda x. \text{if } (\text{meas } x) \text{ then ff else tt}; \quad f = \lambda x. \text{meas}(X x);
\]

where \( X \) is the unitary operator which flips the value of a qubit. This is remarkable given, e.g. the “non-local” effects entanglement could cause.

### 6 On Full-Abstraction

In the deterministic calculus \( \ell_{ST} \), bisimilarity not only is included into context equivalence, but coincides with it (and, analogously, similarity coincides with the context preorder). This can be proved by observing that in \( \mathcal{Z}_{IST} \), bisimilarity coincides with trace equivalence, and each linear test, i.e., each trace, can be implemented by a context. This result is not surprising, and has already been obtained in similar settings elsewhere [2].

But how about \( \ell_{PST} \) and \( \ell_{QST} \)? Actually, there is little hope to prove full-abstraction between context equivalence and bisimilarity in a linear setting.
if probabilistic choice is present. Indeed, as shown by van Breugel et al. [21], probabilistic bisimilarity can be characterized by a notion of test equivalence where tests can be \textit{conjunctive}, i.e., they can be in the form $t = (s, p)$, and $t$ succeeds if both $s$ and $p$ succeeds. Implementing conjunctive tests, thus, requires \textit{copying} the tested term, which is impossible in a linear setting. Indeed, it is easy to find a counterexample to full-abstraction already in $ℓPΣT_λ$. Consider the following two terms, both of which can be given type $\text{bool} → \text{bool}$ in $ℓPΣT_λ$:

$$
e = \lambda x. \text{weak} \ x \ \text{in} \ tt \oplus \ ff; \quad f = (\lambda x. \text{weak} \ x \ \text{in} \ tt) \oplus (\lambda x. \text{weak} \ x \ \text{in} \ ff).$$

The two terms are not bisimilar, simply because $tt$ and $ff$ are not bisimilar, and thus also $\lambda x. \text{weak} \ x \ \text{in} \ tt$ and $\lambda x. \text{weak} \ x \ \text{in} \ ff$ cannot be bisimilar. However, $e$ and $f$ can be proved to be context equivalent: there is simply no way to discriminate between them by way of a linear context (see [5] for more details).

What one may hope to get is full-abstraction for extensions of the considered calculi in which duplication is reintroduced, although in a controlled way. This has been recently done in a probabilistic setting by Crubillé and the first author [4], and is the topic of current investigations by the authors for a non-strictly-linear extension of $ℓQΣT_λ$.

7 Conclusions

We show that Abramsky’s applicative bisimulation can be adapted to linear $λ$-calculi endowed with probabilistic choice and quantum data. The main result is that in both cases, the obtained bisimilarity relation is a congruence, thus included in context equivalence.

For the sake of simplicity, we have deliberately kept the considered calculi as simple as possible. We believe, however, that many extensions would be harmless. This includes, as an example, generalizing types to recursive types which, although infinitary in nature, can be dealt with very easily in a coinductive setting. Adding a form of controlled duplication requires more care, e.g. in presence of quantum data (which cannot be duplicated).

References

A behavioural theory
for a π-calculus with preorders

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Abstract. We study the behavioural theory of πP, a π-calculus in the tradition of Fusions and Chi calculi. In contrast with such calculi, reduction in πP generates a preorder on names rather than an equivalence relation. We present two characterisations of barbed congruence in πP: the first is based on a compositional LTS, and the second is an axiomatisation. The results in this paper bring out basic properties of πP, mostly related to the interplay between the restriction operator and the preorder on names.
Consequently, πP is a calculus in the tradition of Fusion calculi, in which both types and behavioural equivalences can be exploited in order to reason rigorously about concurrent and mobile systems.

1 Introduction

The π-calculus expresses mobility via name passing, and has two binders: the input prefix binds the value to be received, and restriction is used to delimit the scope of a private name. The study of Fusions [16], Chi [8], Explicit Fusions [20] and Solos [13] has shown that using restriction as the only binder is enough to express name passing. In such calculi (which, reusing a terminology from [10], we shall refer to as fusion calculi), the bound input prefix, c(x).P, is dropped in favour of free input, cb.P, and communication involving two prefixes cb and ca generates the fusion of names a and b. This yields a pleasing symmetry between input and output prefixes; moreover, one can encode bound input in terms of free input as (νx)cx.P. Fusion calculi therefore promote minimality (keep only restriction as a binder) and symmetry (input and output prefixes play similar roles). Moreover, and most importantly, fusions act on restricted names, in contrast with the π-calculus, where restricted names can only replace names bound by input (and are thus treated like constants).

The behavioural theory of existing fusion calculi is generally simpler than in the π-calculus (in particular, bisimilarity is a congruence). Fusion calculi have notably been used to analyse concurrent constraints [19], to study distributed implementations of programming languages [9,5] and to establish connections with proof theory [7].

Symmetry comes however at a price. It has indeed been shown in [10] that i/o-types (input/output types, [17]) cannot be adapted to a fusion calculus. Such
types go beyond the simple discipline of sorting, and can be useful, in particular, to reason using typed behavioural equivalences [17,18].

The intuitive reason of the incompatibility of i/o-types with fusions can be explained by considering the following structural congruence law in Explicit Fusions (but the point is essentially the same for other fusion calculi):

\[ a(x).P \mid a\equiv b(x).P \mid a\equiv b . \]

Process \(a\equiv b\) is an explicit fusion. The law says that in presence of \(a\equiv b\), an input on \(a\) can be viewed as the same input on \(b\), and vice-versa (fusion processes are somehow akin to equators, in an asynchronous setting [12]). This shows that fusions define a symmetric relation on names; this is incompatible with a nontrivial (i.e., asymmetric) subtyping relation, which is necessary for i/o-types to make sense.

This observation has led in [10] to the introduction of \(\pi P\), a \(\pi\)-calculus with name preorders. The most important difference between \(\pi P\) and existing name-passing calculi is that interaction does not have the effect of equating (or fusing) two names, but instead generates an arc process, as follows:

\[ \tau a.P \mid cb.Q \rightarrow a/b \mid P \mid Q . \]

The arc \(a/b\) expresses the fact that anything that can be done using name \(b\) can be done using \(a\) as well (but not the opposite): we say that \(a\) is above \(b\). Arcs induce a preorder relation on names, which can evolve along reductions.

Arcs can modify interaction possibilities: in presence of \(a/b\), \(a\) is above \(b\), hence a process emitting on \(b\) can also make an output transition along channel \(a\). In general, an output on channel \(c\) can interact with an input on \(d\) provided \(c\) and \(d\) are joinable, written \(c \bowtie d\), which means that there is some name that is above both \(c\) and \(d\) according to the preorder relation. To formalise these observations, the operational semantics exploits conditions involving names, which are either of the form \(b \prec a\) (\(a\) is above \(b\)), or \(a \bowtie b\) (\(a\) and \(b\) are joinable).

\(\pi P\) can be described as a variant of Explicit Fusions, in which arcs replace fusion processes. Beyond the possibility to define i/o-types and subtyping for \(\pi P\) [10], we would like to analyse the consequences of the novel aspects of \(\pi P\), whose behaviour does not seem to be reducible to existing calculi.

In particular, name preorders have an impact on how processes express behaviours. Barbed congruence for \(\pi P\), written \(\simeq\), is defined in [10]. Some laws for \(\simeq\) suggest that the behavioural theory of \(\pi P\) differs w.r.t. existing fusion calculus. As an illustration, consider the following interleaving law, which is valid in \(\pi P\) (and in \(\pi\)):

\[ \overline{\pi(x)\overline{b}(y) \cdot (\overline{\pi} \mid \overline{y})} \simeq \overline{\pi(x)\overline{b}(y) \cdot (\pi \cdot y \cdot \pi + \pi \cdot x)} . \]

\(\overline{\pi(x)}\) is the emission of a fresh name \(x\) on \(a\), and \(\overline{\pi}\) (resp. \(\overline{y}\)) stands for an output (resp. input) where the value being transmitted is irrelevant. In Fusions, unlike in the \(\pi\)-calculus, the process that creates successively two fresh names \(x\) and \(y\) cannot prevent the context from equating (“fusing”) \(x\) and \(y\). Hence, in order for the equivalence to hold, it is necessary to add a third summand on the right, \([x = y]\tau\). This example suggests that \(\pi P\) gives a better control on restricted
names than existing fusion calculi. This issue also motivated the study of two variants of fusion calculi that have a refined notion of restriction [3,4].

The main purpose of the present work is to deepen the study of the behavioural theory of $\pi P$, in an untyped setting. We define a Labelled Transition System (LTS) for $\pi P$, and show that the induced notion of bisimilarity, written $\sim$, characterises $\simeq$ (Section 3). It can be noted that [10] presents a characterisation of barbed congruence, using an LTS that is rather ad hoc, because it is based on the definition of the reduction relation. Unlike the latter, the LTS we present here is structural.

The LTS reveals interesting aspects of interaction in $\pi P$. An important observation is related to the interplay between arcs and the restriction operator. It is for instance possible for a process to react to an input offer on some channel, say $c$, without being actually able to perform an output on $c$. This is the case for process $P_0 \triangleq (\nu a)(\pi(x).0 | a/c)$. Because $a$ is above $c$ in the preorder, $P_0$ cannot do an output on $c$, although $c$ is occurs free in $P_0$ (it could if the arc $a/c$ was replaced with $c/a$). However, $P_0 | c(y).0$ can perform a reduction: intuitively, by extending the scope of $(\nu a)$, the input at $c$ can be moved to $a$, so that the communication takes place.

This phenomenon leads to the addition of a new type of labels in the LTS, corresponding to what we call protected actions: in the example $P_0$ can do a protected output at $c$, meaning that it can react to an input offer at $c$. Accordingly, we introduce protected names, which correspond to (usages of) names where a protected action occurs: intuitively, in $P_0$, name $c$ is protected. As expected, protected actions correspond to observables in the reduction-based semantics supporting the definition of $\simeq$.

Arc processes do not have transitions, but they induce relations between names, which in turn influence the behaviour of processes. Accordingly, strong bisimilarity, $\sim$, not only tests transitions, but also has a clause to guarantee that related processes entail the same conditions.

Finally, the LTS also includes a label $[\varphi]\tau$, expressing "conditional synchronisation". Intuitively, process $\pi | b$ is not able to perform a $\tau$ transition by itself, but it should be when the environment entails $a \upharpoonright b$. Hence, in order for our LTS to be compositional, we include labels of the form $[\varphi]\tau$, interpreted as "$\tau$ under the condition $\varphi$".

In Section 4, we provide a second characterisation of barbed congruence, by presenting a set of laws that define an axiomatisation of $\sim$. Algebraic laws help analysing the behaviour of the constructs of the calculus and their interplay. We present a sample of behavioural equalities, and explain how they can be derived equationally, in Section 4.1.

The axiomatisation we give is less simple than, say, the one for Fusions in [16], for two reasons: first, we manipulate preorders between names rather than equivalences. Second, the preorder is explicitly represented in processes, so that some equational laws must describe the interplay between processes and the preorder relation. On the contrary, such aspects are dealt with implicitly in Fusions—we sketch how our ideas can be adapted to Explicit Fusions in Section 4.3.
The axiomatisation exploits the idea that πP processes have a state component, corresponding to the preorder induced by arcs. Several laws in the axiomatisation express persistence of the state component (the state can only be extended along computation). Moreover, the restriction operator prevents the state from being globally shared in general: for instance, in process $P_0$ above, name $a$ can be used instead of $c$, but is only known inside the scope of $(\nu a)$. All in all, the handling of restriction in our axiomatisation requires more care than is usually the case, due to the necessity to express the “view” that subprocesses have on the preorder of names.

To present the axiomatisation, we renounce minimality. The syntax of the calculus in this paper differs from the one in [10]: we include bound prefixes and sums with conditions, as it is customary for axiomatisations for the π-calculus [15,18]. We compare the calculus from [10] with ours in Remark 3 and Proposition 11. We show that the differences are unimportant: the calculus from [10] can be encoded into ours and the behavioural equivalence is unaffected.

We focus in this paper on a finite calculus. This is sufficient to enlighten the main aspects of the behavioural theory of processes. We do not expect any unpredicted difficulty to arise, in the definition of labelled transitions and bisimilarity, from the extension of πP with a replication operator.

The paper describes our results and sketches the most important proofs. We refer to [11] for a more detailed presentation of the technical details. Related work is discussed along the paper, where it is relevant.

2 πP: Reduction-Based Semantics

The Calculus: Preorders and Processes. We consider a countable set of names $a, b, c, \ldots, x, y, \ldots$, and define conditions ($\varphi$), extended names ($\alpha, \beta$), prefixes ($\pi$) and processes ($P, Q$) as follows:

- $\varphi ::= a \prec b \mid a \bowtie b \quad \alpha, \beta ::= a \mid \{a\} \quad \pi ::= \alpha(x) \mid \overline{\alpha}(x) \mid [\varphi]\tau$
- $P, Q ::= P \mid Q \mid (\nu a)P \mid a/b \mid \sum_{i \in I} \pi_i . P_i$

There are two forms of conditions, ranged over with $\varphi$: $\varphi = a \prec b$ is read “$b$ is above $a$” and $\varphi = a \bowtie b$ is read “$a$ and $b$ are joinable”. In both cases, we have $n(\varphi) = \{a, b\}$. We explain below how we extend relations $\prec$ and $\bowtie$ to extended names. When $n(\varphi) = \{a\}$, we say that $\varphi$ is reflexive, and abbreviate in this case prefix $[\varphi]\tau$ as $\tau$. Condition $b \prec a$ is ensured by the arc process $a/b$.

In a prefix $\alpha(x)$ or $\overline{\alpha}(x)$, we say that extended name $\alpha$ is in subject position, while $x$ is in object position. As discussed in Section 1, extended names include protected names, of the form $\{a\}$, which can be used in subject position only. We call protected prefix a prefix where the subject is a protected name. A prefix of the form $[\varphi]\tau$ is called a conditional $\tau$, while other prefixes are called visible. Bound and free names for prefixes are given by: $\text{bn}([\varphi]\tau) = \emptyset$ and $\text{bn}(\alpha(x)) = \text{bn}(\overline{\alpha}(x)) = \{x\}$, $\text{fn}([\varphi]\tau) = n(\varphi)$, $\text{fn}(\alpha(x)) = \text{fn}(\overline{\alpha}(x)) = n(\alpha)$ with $n(a) = n(\{a\}) = \{a\}$.

In a sum process, we let $I$ range over a finite set of integers. 0 is the inactive process, defined as the empty sum. We use $S$ to range over sum processes of the
form $\sum_{i \in I} \pi_i.P_i$, and write $\pi.P \in S$ if $\pi.P$ is a summand of $S$. We sometimes decompose sum processes using the binary sum operator, writing, e.g., $S_1 + S_2$ (in particular, $S + 0 = S$). We abbreviate $\pi.0$ as $\pi$, and write $\alpha(x).P$ simply as $\alpha.P$ when the transmitted name is not relevant, and similarly for $\bar{\pi}$. In $(\nu a)P$, $(\nu a)$ binds $a$ in $P$, and prefixes $\alpha(x)$ and $\bar{\pi}(x)$ bind $x$ in the continuation process. The set of free names of $P$, $\text{fn}(P)$, is defined in the usual way, and we work up to $\alpha$-conversion of processes. $P\{b/a\}$ is the process obtained by substituting $a$ with $b$ in $P$, in a capture-avoiding way.

We use an overloaded notation, and define processes representing conditions:

\[ a \parallel b \triangleq (\nu u)(u/a | u/b) \quad a \ntriangleq b \triangleq b/a . \]

Below, $\Gamma$ ranges over sets of conditions. We define $\Gamma \vdash \phi$, meaning that $\Gamma$ implies $\phi$, and $P \triangleright \phi$ (we write $P \triangleright \Gamma$ to express that $P$ entails $\phi$ for all $\phi \in \Gamma$):

\[
\begin{array}{c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c}
\hline
\phi & \Gamma \vdash \phi & \Gamma \vdash b \parallel a & \Gamma \vdash b \ntriangleq c & \Gamma \vdash c \ntriangleq b & \Gamma \vdash b \parallel c \\
\hline
\parallel a & \vdash a < a & \vdash a < b & \vdash a < b & \vdash a < b & \vdash a \parallel c \\
\mid a & \vdash a \parallel \phi & \vdash a \parallel \phi & \vdash a \parallel \phi & \vdash a \parallel \phi & \vdash a \parallel \phi \\
\equiv & P \triangleright \phi & P \triangleright \phi & P \triangleright \phi & P \triangleright \phi & (\nu a)P \triangleright \phi \\
\hline
\end{array}
\]

As an example, the reader might check that $(\nu u)(u/a | u/b) | b/c \triangleright a \ntriangleq c$.

**Reduction Semantics and Barbed Congruence.** The definition of structural congruence, $\equiv$, is standard. In particular, we have

\[ \Sigma_{i \in I} \pi_i.P_i \equiv \Sigma_{i \in I} \pi_{\sigma(i)}.P_{\sigma(i)} \quad \text{if } \sigma \text{ is a permutation of } I . \]

Relations $\equiv$ and $\triangleright$ are used to define the reduction of processes. We rely on $\triangleright$ to infer that two processes interact on joinable (extended) names. This allows us to introduce reduction-closed barbed congruence, along the lines of [10].

**Definition 1 (Reduction).** Relation $\Rightarrow$ is defined by the following rules:

\[
\begin{array}{c|c}
\pi(x).P \in S_1 & \beta(y).Q \in S_2 \quad R \triangleright \alpha \parallel \beta \quad x \neq y \\
\hline
R \mid S_1 \mid S_2 \rightarrow R | (\nu xy)(\alpha/y | P | Q) \quad \text{where:} \quad a \parallel \{b\} = \{b\} \quad a = a \ntriangleq b \\
\hline
\end{array}
\]

\[
\begin{array}{c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c}
\hline
[\varphi] \pi.P \in S & R \triangleright \varphi & P \rightarrow P' & (\nu a)P \rightarrow (\nu a)P' & P \equiv \Rightarrow \equiv P' \\
\hline
R \mid S \rightarrow R \mid P & R \mid S \rightarrow R \mid P & P \mid R \rightarrow P' \mid R & (\nu a)P \rightarrow (\nu a)P' & P \equiv \Rightarrow \equiv P' \\
\hline
\end{array}
\]

**Definition 2 (Barbs, barbed congruence).** We write $P \downarrow_{\pi}$ if $P \mid a(x).\omega \rightarrow P'$, where $P'$ is a process in which $\omega$ is unguarded, and $\omega$ is a special name that does not appear in $P$. We define similarly the barb $\downarrow_{\alpha}$, using the tester $\pi(x).\omega$.

Barbed congruence, $\equiv$, is the largest congruence that satisfies:

- if $P \downarrow_{\alpha}$ and $P \equiv Q$ then $Q \downarrow_{\alpha}$, and similarly for $\downarrow_{\pi}$, and
- if $P \rightarrow P'$ and $P \equiv Q$ then for some $Q'$, $Q \rightarrow Q'$ and $P' \equiv Q'$.

We can remark that $P_0 \downarrow_{\pi}$, where $P_0$ is the process defined in Section 1. 218
The remainder of the paper is devoted to the presentation of two character-
isations of ≃. We first comment on the definition of πP given above.

One could consider an alternative version of reduction, called “eager”, whereby arcs can rewrite prefixes in one step of computation, yielding, e.g., \( d/c | c(x).P \mapsto d/c | d(x).P \). It appears in [10] that the present semantics is more compelling (for instance \( a(x).a(y) \) would not be equivalent to \( a(x) | a(y) \) in the eager version).

Remark 3 (Encodability of free and protected prefixes).

In πP, arcs act like “instantaneous forwarders”. This allows us to define an encoding \([·]_f\) from a calculus with free prefixes to a calculus with bound prefixes as follows (\(x\) is chosen fresh):

\[
[ab.P]_f \triangleq a(x).([P]_f | x/b) \\
[πb.P]_f \triangleq π(x).([P]_f | b/x)
\]

where \([·]_f\) preserves other operators of the calculi. We return to this encoding below (Proposition 11), and show that it allows us to reflect behavioural equivalence in [10] into our calculus.

We can also encode protected prefixes as follows (\(u\) is chosen fresh):

\[
[(a)(x).P]_p \triangleq (νu)(u/a | u(x).[P]_p) \\
[(\overline{a})(x).P]_p \triangleq (νu)(u/a | π(x).[P]_p)
\]

Although protected prefixes are in some sense redundant, we do not treat them as derived operators, to simplify the presentation (in particular in Section 4).

The results of this paper (Sections 3 and 4) can be adapted to a calculus featuring only free prefixes, and restriction as the only binder, like the calculus of [10]. This yields more complex definitions to handle bound prefixes and protected actions, in particular when defining sum processes. We discuss in [11] a presentation of transitions and bisimilarity based on free prefixes. It can be noted that the axiomatisation of Fusions given in [16] relies only on free input and output, and treats bound prefixes as derived operators. We think that, for πP, handling prefixes for bound and protected actions as derived operators would introduce further technical complications that would make the axiomatisation more obscure.

### 3 A Labelled Transition System for πP

#### 3.1 LTS and Bisimilarity

The LTS defines transitions \( P \xrightarrow{\mu} P' \), where the grammar for the labels, \( \mu \), is the same as the one for prefixes \( π \). We comment on the rules, given in Figure 1.

The first two rules correspond to the firing of visible prefixes. The transition involves a fresh name \(x\), upon which the participants in a communication “agree”. Name \(y\) remains local, via the installation of an arc, according to the directionality of the prefix. (Adopting a rule with no arc installation would yield a more complex definition of \(≈\)). The rule for the \([\varphi]τ\) prefix is self explanatory. The rule describing communication follows the lines of the corresponding rule for \(⇒\); no arc is installed (but arcs are introduced in the prefix rules).

The three rules mentioning \(▷\) are called preorder rules. The two preorder rules for visible actions exploit \(≺\), which is defined for extended names (as we...
did for \( \gamma \) above). Note that the condition involving \( \triangleright \) is the same in these two rules. To understand these rules, and the role of protected actions, we recall the basic intuition about arcs: an arc \( \triangleright a \) can transform an interaction at \( a \) into an interaction at \( d \). For instance, from \( P \xrightarrow{\alpha(x)} P' \) and \( P \triangleright a \prec d \), we can derive \( P \xrightarrow{\alpha(x)} P' \). As a consequence, an input at \( a \) can synchronise with an output at \( b \) if both \( a \) and \( b \) can be “pulled upwards in the preorder”, using arcs, to some name, say \( u \), which is above \( a \) and \( b \). Observe also that if, like in \( P \) above, the input at \( a \) is transformed into an input at \( d \), then a name \( u' \) standing above \( d \) and \( b \) can be used to let the synchronisation happen (because \( u' \) would be above \( a \) and \( b \)).

If, on the contrary, we want to replace, in the input, name \( a \) with a name that sits below \( a \), say \( c \) (like in process \( P_0 \) from Section 1), we are moving \textit{downwards} in the preorder. Because of this, the action becomes protected, and we can derive for instance \( P_0 \xrightarrow{\pi(y)} \), because \( \pi(x).0 \triangleright a/c \triangleright c' \prec a \) (and hence \( a \prec \{c\} \)). By going downwards, we have somehow fixed the channel where the communication occurs (e.g., at \( a \) in \( Pf_x.a.0 \)). Indeed, it is no longer the case that an output at \( b \) can synchronise with the protected input at \( c \) whenever some \( u \) is above \( b \) and \( c \), because such \( u \) would not necessarily be above \( a \) (where the original input takes place) and \( b \) in the preorder. For this reason, we can only move further downwards in the preorder, and for instance deduce, from \( P_0 \xrightarrow{\pi(y)} \), that \( P_1 \xrightarrow{\pi(y)} \), that \( P_1 \xrightarrow{\pi(y)} \) as soon as \( c_1 \prec c \) (which implies \( \{c\} \prec \{c_1\} \)).

The other preorder rule can be used to modify conditional \( \tau \)'s involved in a transition. As an example, let \( P_1 \triangleq (\pi(x).Q \mid n/a) \mid (u(y).R \mid n/a) \). Process \( P_1 \) can perform a \( \tau \) transition: the two arcs can, intuitively, let the output at \( a \) and the input at \( u \) interact at name \( n \). Technically, this can be derived by inferring a \( \frac{[u \equiv \gamma u]}{\pi(y)} \) transition (from the output on the left and the input on the right), which can then be turned into a \( \tau \) transition, exploiting the fact that the whole process entails \( a \equiv u \). Finally, the congruence rules are as expected.

**Definition 4 (\( \sim \)).** A symmetric relation \( R \) is a bisimulation if \( P \mathcal{R} Q \) implies:

- If \( P \triangleright \varphi \) then \( Q \triangleright \varphi \).
- If \( P \xrightarrow{\alpha(x)} P' \), with \( x \notin \text{fn}(Q) \), then there is \( Q' \) such that \( Q \xrightarrow{\alpha(x)} Q' \) and \( P' \mathcal{R} Q' \); we impose the same condition with \( \pi \) instead of \( \alpha \).
- If \( P \xrightarrow{\varphi \tau} P' \) then there is \( Q' \) such that \( Q \xrightarrow{\varphi \tau} Q' \) and \( P' \parallel \varphi \mathcal{R} Q' \parallel \varphi \).

**Bisimilarity, written \( \sim \), is the greatest bisimulation.**

This definition can be related to the efficient bisimulation from [20]. In the last clause, we add \( \varphi \) in parallel, since the transition is fired only if \( \varphi \) is satisfied.

**Remark 5.** Our LTS does not have rules for opening and closing the scope of a restriction. Instead, we rely on arcs in \( \pi P \) to handle scope extrusion. To illustrate this, consider the following \( \pi P \) transition where a a private name \( c \) is emitted:

\[
\pi(c).P \xrightarrow{\pi(x)} (\nu c)(c/x \mid P)
\]

Name \( x \) is visible in the label, and arc \( c/x \) is installed. Through \( x \), the environment can affect \( c \), so that \( \pi P \) actually \textit{implements} scope extrusion via arcs,
\[ x \notin n(\alpha) \cup \{y\} \cup fn(P) \quad \frac{\alpha(y).P \xrightarrow{\alpha(x)} (\nu y)(x/y|P)}{\alpha(x) \xrightarrow{(\nu y)|P}} \]

\[ x \notin n(\alpha) \cup \{y\} \cup fn(P) \quad \frac{\alpha(y).P \xrightarrow{\alpha(x)} (\nu y)(y/x|P)}{\alpha(x) \xrightarrow{(\nu y)|P}} \]

\[ \forall y. P \xrightarrow{\alpha} y \quad \frac{\alpha(y).P \xrightarrow{\alpha(x)} (\nu y)(y/x|P)}{\alpha(x) \xrightarrow{(\nu y)|P}} \]

\[ \forall y. P \xrightarrow{\alpha} y \quad \frac{\alpha(y).P \xrightarrow{\alpha(x)} (\nu y)(y/x|P)}{\alpha(x) \xrightarrow{(\nu y)|P}} \]

\[ \vdash \phi \Rightarrow \exists \Gamma, \varphi_{1} \vdash \varphi_{2} \]

\[ P \xrightarrow{\alpha} P' \quad P \ni \alpha \prec \beta \quad \frac{P \xrightarrow{\beta} P'}{P \xrightarrow{\alpha} P'} \]

\[ P \xrightarrow{\alpha} P' \quad P \ni \alpha \prec \beta \quad \frac{P \xrightarrow{\beta} P'}{P \xrightarrow{\alpha} P'} \]

\[ P \xrightarrow{\mu} P' \quad a \notin fn(\mu) \cup bn(\mu) \quad \frac{(\nu a)P \xrightarrow{\pi(\nu)} (\nu a)P'}{P \mid Q \xrightarrow{\mu} P' \mid Q} \]

\[ P \xrightarrow{\mu} P' \quad \frac{bn(\mu) \cap fn(Q) = \emptyset}{P \mid Q \xrightarrow{\mu} P' \mid Q} \]

\[ \Sigma_{i=1}^{n} \pi_{i} P \xrightarrow{\mu} P' \]

\[ \frac{\pi(c).P \mid a(y).Q \xrightarrow{\pi(x)} (\nu x)((\nu c)(c/x|P) \mid (\nu y)(x/y|Q))}{\simeq (\nu c)(\nu y)(P \mid c/y|Q)} \]

\[ \text{Fig. 1. LTS for } \pi P. \text{ Symmetric versions of the two rules involving } | \text{ are omitted.} \]

3.2 The Characterisation Theorem

Lemma 6. If \( P \equiv Q \) and \( P \ni \varphi \) then \( Q \ni \varphi \).

Definition 7. We define a relation \( \sqsubset^\varphi \) between labels as follows: (i) \( \alpha_{1}(x) \sqsubset^\varphi \alpha_{2}(x) \) and \( \pi_{1}(x) \sqsubset^\varphi \pi_{2}(x) \) when \( \varphi = \alpha_{2} \prec \alpha_{1} \), and (ii) \( [\varphi_{1}]_{\tau} \sqsubset^\varphi [\varphi_{2}]_{\tau} \) when \( \varphi_{1} \nvdash \varphi_{2} \). We write \( \preceq_{P} \) for the smallest preorder containing all \( \sqsubset^\varphi \) when \( P \ni \varphi \).

Intuitively, \( \eta \sqsubset_{P} \mu \) means that label \( \mu \) is less general than \( \eta \), given some condition \( \varphi \) above) entailed by \( P \). For instance, we have \( [a](x) \sqsubset_{0} a(x) \). This notion is used in the following lemma to reason about transitions of processes.

Lemma 8. If \( P \xrightarrow{\mu} P' \) and \( \eta \sqsubset_{P} \mu \) then \( P \xrightarrow{\eta} P' \). Conversely, whenever \( P \xrightarrow{\eta} P' \), there exists \( \mu \) such that \( \eta \sqsubset_{P} \mu \) and \( P \xrightarrow{\mu} P' \), of which there is a proof, not bigger than the one for \( P \xrightarrow{\eta} P' \), that does not end with a preorder rule.

Congruence for parallel composition is proved using Lemma 8, which gives:

Lemma 9. Relation \( \sim \) is a congruence.

Theorem 10 (Characterisation). \( P \simeq Q \) iff \( P \sim Q \).

Proof (Sketch). The proof follows a standard pattern: soundness is a consequence of Lemma 9. For completeness, we have to show that contexts can express the conditions in the three clauses of Definition 4, and we define accordingly tester.
processes. The first clause about $\varphi$ is handled using process $\alpha.w_1 | \beta.w_2$ where $\alpha$ and $\beta$ are such that $\varphi = \alpha \bowtie \beta$. For transitions (second clause), the counterpart of, e.g., $(a(x), \exists y \mid \exists w).w_1 | \exists y | \exists w).w_2$, is given by tester process $(\exists y \mid \exists w).w_1 | \exists y | \exists w).w_2$. We use process $\varphi$ for the third clause, since $P[\varphi] \tau \xrightarrow{} Q$ iff $P | \varphi \tau \xrightarrow{} Q | \varphi$.

As mentioned above, the calculus in [10] is a version of $\pi\mathcal{P}$ with prefixes for free input and output, and without the corresponding bound prefixes. Let us call that calculus $\pi\mathcal{P}_1$. The encoding $[\cdot]_f$, which we introduced in Remark 3, allows us to embed $\pi\mathcal{P}_1$ into $\pi\mathcal{P}$ in a faithful way:

**Proposition 11.** $P \simeq_{\pi\mathcal{P}_1} Q$ (in $\pi\mathcal{P}_1$) iff $[P]_f \simeq [Q]_f$ (in $\pi\mathcal{P}$).

The proof of the above result exploits in a crucial way the fact that, although $\pi\mathcal{P}_1$ does not feature sums and the $[\varphi]\tau$ prefix, those are not needed to prove the completeness of $\sim$.

### 4 Axiomatisation

#### 4.1 Equational Laws for Strong Bisimilarity

**Notations and Terminology.** We use $A$ to range over processes that consist of compositions of $\varphi$ processes only, which we call **preorder processes**. We often view such processes as multisets of conditions. We use notation $A : P$ to denote a process that can be written, using the monoid laws for parallel composition, as $A | P$, where $P$ does not contain toplevel arcs. Note that $A$ may contain restrictions, but only those corresponding to the definition of join processes (given in Section 2).

We write $\vdash P = Q$ whenever $P$ and $Q$ can be related by equational reasoning using the laws of Figure 2. We omit the standard laws expressing that $|$ and $+$ obey the laws of commutative monoids, and that $+$ is idempotent. We also omit the laws for equational reasoning (equivalence, substitutivity). We will reason up to these laws in the remainder.

**Comments on the laws.** Before presenting the properties of the axiomatisation, we comment on the laws of Figure 2 and illustrate them on some examples.

As usual, expansion (L1) allows us to rewrite the parallel composition of two sum processes into a sum, the third summand describing synchronisation in $\pi\mathcal{P}$.

**Preorders.** Laws L2-L5 express basic properties of relations $\prec$ and $\bowtie$, and actually provide an axiomatisation of $\sim$ for preorder processes.

**Prefixes.** Law L6 propagates $\varphi$s in depth, expressing the persistence of condition processes ($\varphi$). Law L7 is the counterpart of the third clause of Definition 4, and describes the outcome of a $[\varphi]\tau$ transition. Similarly, laws L18-L19 correspond to the firing of visible transitions in the LTS (regarding these rules, see also the comments after Proposition 16).
Expansion law (we can suppose $x \neq y$, $bn(\pi_i) \notin fn(T)$, $bn(\rho_j) \notin fn(S)$.)

$$L_1 \sum_{i}^{\pi_i} P_i \mid \sum_{j}^{\rho_j} R_j = \sum_{i}^{\pi_i} (P_i \mid T) + \sum_{j}^{\rho_j} (S \mid R_j)$$
when $\alpha \gamma \beta$ is defined, and $\\{\pi_i, \rho_j\} = \{\pi(x), \beta(y)\}$

Laws for preorder processes

$L_2 \ a \prec b \mid b \prec c = a \prec b \mid b \prec c \ a \prec c \ L_3 \ a \prec b \mid c \prec b = a \prec b \mid c \prec b \ a \gamma c \ L_4 \ a \prec b \mid b \gamma c = a \prec b \mid b \gamma c \ a \gamma c \ L_5 \ a \prec a = 0$

Laws for prefixes  
(the counterparts of laws L11-L13 for output are omitted)

$L_6 \ \varphi, S + \pi.P = \varphi, S + \pi.(\varphi \mid P) \ L_7 \ [\varphi] \tau.P = [\varphi.]\tau.(\varphi \mid P)$

$L_8 \ [a \prec a] \pi.P = [b \gamma b] \pi.P \ L_9 \ [a \gamma b] \pi.P = [a \gamma b] \pi.P + [a \prec b] \pi.P \ L_{10} \ [a \gamma b] \pi.P = [a \gamma b] \pi.P + [b \gamma a] \pi.P \ L_{11} \ a(x).P = a(x).P + \{a\}(x).P \ L_{12} \ b/a, S + a(x).P = b/a, S + a(x).P + b(x).P \ L_{13} \ a/b, S + \{a\}(x).P = a/b, S + \{a\}(x).P + b(x).P \ L_{14} \ b/a, S + [a \prec c] \pi.P = b/a, S + [a \prec c] \pi.P + b \prec c] \pi.P \ L_{15} \ a/b, S + [c \prec a] \pi.P = a/b, S + [c \prec a] \pi.P + [c \prec b] \pi.P \ L_{16} \ b/a, S + [a \gamma c] \pi.P = b/a, S + [a \gamma c] \pi.P + b \gamma c] \pi.P \ L_{17} \ b/a, S + [a \gamma c] \pi.P = b/a, S + [a \gamma c] \pi.P + [c \prec b] \pi.P \ L_{18} \ a(x).P = a(x).\nu(y)(xy) | P \text{ if } x \notin fn(P) \ L_{19} \ a(x).P = a(x).\nu(y)(xy) | P \text{ if } x \notin fn(P)$

Laws for restriction  
(the counterparts of laws L26 and L27 for output are omitted; $a \prec b \in A^+$ stands for $a \prec b \in A$ and $a \neq b$, and similarly for $a \gamma b$.)

$L_{20} \ (b/a).P = (a/b).P(a/b) \text{ if } a \neq fn(P) \ L_{21} \ (\nu d)(\nu d).P = (\nu d)(\nu d).P \ L_{22} \ P | (\nu a).P = (\nu a).P | Q \text{ if } a \neq fn(P) \ L_{23} \ (\nu a)0 = 0 \ L_{24} \ (\nu a).A = \{b \prec c \mid b \prec a, a \prec c \in A^+\} \uplus \{b \gamma c \mid b \prec a, c \prec a \in A^+\} \uplus \{b \gamma c \mid a \prec c, a \prec b \in A^+\} \uplus \{\varphi \in A \mid a \neq n(\varphi)\}$

$L_{25} \ (\nu a).A, S + \pi.P = (\nu a).A, S + \pi.(\nu a)(A \mid P) \text{ if } a \neq n(\pi) \ L_{26} \ (\nu a).A, S + a(x).P = (\nu a).A, S + \sum_{b \prec a \in A^+} b(x).A, S + \sum_{b \gamma a \in A^+} b(x).A, S + \sum_{b \gamma a \in A^+} b(x).A \text{ if } a \neq n(\pi)$

$L_{27} \ (\nu a).A, S + \{a\}(x).P = (\nu a).A, S + \sum_{b \prec a \in A^+} b(x).A, S + \sum_{b \gamma a \in A^+} b(x).A \text{ if } a \neq n(\pi)$

$L_{28} \ (\nu a).A, S + \{a \prec c\} \pi.P = (\nu a).A, S + \sum_{b \prec a \in A^+} b \prec c \pi.(\nu a)(A \mid P) \text{ if } a \neq n(\pi)$

$L_{29} \ (\nu a).A, S + [a \prec c] \pi.P = (\nu a).A, S + \sum_{b \prec a \in A^+} b \prec c \pi.(\nu a)(A \mid P) \text{ if } a \neq n(\pi)$

$L_{30} \ (\nu a).A, S + [a \gamma c] \pi.P = (\nu a).A, S + \sum_{b \gamma a \in A^+} b \gamma c \pi.(\nu a)(A \mid P) \text{ if } a \neq n(\pi)$

Fig. 2. An axiomatisation of $\sim$
\(\alpha\)-conversion for input prefixes follows from laws L20 and L18, by deriving the following equalities (and similarly for the other visible prefixes):
\[
a(y).P \overset{L18}{=} a(x).(\nu y)(x/y \mid P) \overset{L20}{=} a(x).(\nu y')(x/y' \mid P[y'/y]) \overset{L18}{=} a(y').P[y'/y].
\]

Laws \(L11-L17\) can be used to expand process behaviours using the preorder: arcs can modify the subject of visible prefixes (\(L11-L13\)) and the condition in \(\phi\tau\) prefixes (\(L14-L17\)). Laws \(L9, L10\) and \(L14-L17\) rely on the defining properties of relations \(\prec\) and \(\bowtie\). Finally, law \(L8\) is used to equate all reflexive \(\tau\) prefixes.

Restriction. Laws \(L20-L23\) are standard. The other laws are used to “push” restrictions inside processes. Due to the necessity to handle the preorder component \((A)\), they are rather complex.

Law \(L24\) is used to eliminate a restriction on a name \(a\) in a preorder process, by propagating the information expressed by all \(\psi\)s that mention \(a\).

Law \(L25\) is rather self-explanatory, and shows how the \(A\) component prevents us from simply pushing the restriction downwards (under prefixes).

Laws \(L26-L30\) describe a kind of “synchronous application” of the prefix laws seen above. For instance, the two summands in law \(L26\) correspond to applications of laws \(L12-L13\): as we push the restriction on \(a\) downwards, we make sure that all possible applications of these laws are taken into account.

Intuitively, \(L24\) is applied after laws \(L25-L30\) have been used to erase all prefixes mentioning the restricted name \(a\), pushing the restriction on \(a\) inwards.

All in all, the set of laws in Figure 2 is rather lengthy. We make two comments on this. First, it can be remarked that axiomatisations often treat restriction separately, by first focusing on a restriction-free calculus. In \(\pi P\), because of preorder processes, we cannot in general push restrictions on top of sum processes, so the situation is more complex (see also the discussion about \([14]\) in Section 5).

Second, we could have presented the laws in a more compact way, by writing schemas. A uniform presentation for laws \(L8-L17\) and \(L26-L30\) is as follows:

\[
\eta \in A \mu \mu.P \in S \quad a \in \text{fn}(\mu) \quad \forall \eta \in A \mu \quad a \in \text{fn}(\eta) \lor \exists \rho \eta \in A \rho \wedge \rho.P \in S
\]

\[
A, S = A, S + \eta.P
\]

\[
(\nu a)(A, \mu.P + S) = (\nu a)(A, S)
\]

(To remove \(\mu.P\) from \(\mu.P + S\), the second rule requires that some \(\rho.P\) are in \(S\). The second rule can be used to add those summands to \(S\).) We prefer nevertheless to write all rules explicitly, since this is how they are handled in proofs.

Examples of derivable equalities. In the following examples, we sometimes switch silently to notation \(A, P\) to ease readability. We also allow ourselves to simplify some reasonings involving prefixes where the object is not important. We explain how the following derivable between \(\pi P\) processes can be derived:

\[
(\nu a)(b/a \mid a/c) = b/c \quad (\nu a)(S+a(x).P) = (\nu a)S
\]

\[
(\nu a)(a\beta \mid a(x).P) = (b\beta \mid (\nu a)P) \quad (\sigma x.x = \sigma x.(x) \quad a(x).\{x\} = a(x).0
\]

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The first equality above is established using law L24: before getting rid of the restriction on \( a \), we compute all conditions not involving \( a \) that can be deduced from \( b/a \mid a/c \). In this case, this is only \( b/c \).

The second equality is a direct consequence of law L26. Law L26 is also used for the third equality: only the second sum in the law is not empty, which gives \((\nu a)(a/b,a(x).P) = (\nu a)(a/b,(b)(x).P)\). Then, L22 allows us to restrict the scope of \( \nu a \), and we can get rid of \( (\nu a)a/b \) using law 24, which yields the result.

Another way to see the third equality is to observe that we can derive \( a/b,a(x).P = a/b,a(x).P + \{a\}(x}.P + \{b\}(x).P \) using laws L11 and L13. In the latter process, the sum is intuitively expanded, in the sense that all derivable toplevel summands have been made explicit. When considering the restricted version of both processes, it is sound to push the restriction on \( a \) downwards in the expanded process, to obtain the expected equality. In this sense, law L26 implements a “synchronous version” of this reasoning, so as to insure that when pushing a restriction downwards, the behaviour of the process is fully expanded.

The next two equalities illustrate the meaning of protected names. We reason as follows:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{We then obtain the expected equality by getting rid of } (\nu x)x/x' & = (\nu x)x/x' \mid 0) \\
\text{(we have explained above how } a(x').0 & = a(x).0 \text{ can be derived).}
\end{align*}
\]

We leave it to the reader to check that the law for interleaving, presented in Section 1, can be derived using the expansion law, followed by the rules for prefixes and restriction to get rid of the summand \([x \land y]_\tau.(\nu t,u)(t\mid u)\).

4.2 Soundness and Completeness of the Axioms

Lemma 12 (Soundness). The laws of Figure 2 relate bisimilar processes.

Proof (Sketch). For laws 24-30, we establish a “saturation property”, expressing the fact that when erasing a preorder process \( \varphi \) or a prefix \( \pi \) that mentions \( a \), we generate all processes \( \varphi \) or \( \pi \) could induce. The other laws are easy. \(\Box\)

Auxiliary Results: Preorder Processes, Prefixes, Restriction.

In order to establish completeness, we first need some technical results, given by Propositions 13, 16 and 17.

First, laws L2-L5 can be used to saturate preorder processes:
Proposition 13. If $A_1, S_1 \sim A_2, S_2$, then there exists $A^\star$ such that $\vdash A_i, S_i = A^\star, S_i$ $(i = 1, 2)$, and $A^\star = \prod\{\varphi \mid \varphi$ not reflexive and $A_1 \triangleright \varphi\}$.

(Note that we could have picked $A_2$ instead of $A_1$ above.) We say that $A$ is a saturated preorder process whenever $A^\star \equiv A$. We use $A^\star$ to range over such processes. We can remark that even if $A$ contains only arcs, $A^\star$ may contain restrictions, because of induced conditions involving $\gamma$.

The next lemma relates transitions of sum processes and the laws for prefixes.

Lemma 14. If $A, S \xrightarrow{\mu} A, P$ then $\vdash A, S = A, S + \pi.Q$ for some $\pi$ and $Q$ such that $\mu$ and $\pi$ only differ in their bound names and $\pi.Q \xrightarrow{\mu} P$.

Laws L9-L17 can be used to “saturate” the topmost prefixes in sums. We express this using the equivalence below, and rely on Lemma 14 to prove Prop. 16:

Definition 15 (Head sum normal form, $\simeq_h$). Given two sum processes $S$ and $T$, we write $S \simeq_h T$ whenever for any summand $\pi.P$ of $S$, there exists a summand $\pi.Q$ of $T$ with $\pi.P \sim \pi.Q$. We let $S \simeq_h T$ stand for $S \simeq_h T \wedge T \simeq_h S$.

Proposition 16. Whenever $A^\star, S_1 \sim A^\star, S_2$, where $S_1, S_2$ are two sum processes, there are $S'_1, S'_2$ s.t. $\vdash A^\star, S_i = A^\star, S'_i$ (for $i = 1, 2$) and $S'_1 \simeq_h S'_2$.

In the definition of $\simeq_h$, we impose $\pi.P \sim \pi.Q$, and not simply $P \sim Q$. The equivalence induced by the choice of the latter condition would indeed be too discriminating. To see why, consider $Q_1 = a(x).c/x$ and $Q_2 = a(x).0$. Obviously, $c/x \not\sim 0$. On the other hand, we have $Q_1 \sim Q_2$: after a $a(y)$ transition on both sides, we must compare $(\nu x)(c/x \mid y/x)$ and $(\nu x)(y/x)$, and both are bisimilar to 0. In order to derive $\vdash Q_1 = Q_2$, we rely on the following property, which explains the shape of laws L18, L19: $a(y).P \sim a(y).Q$ iff $(\nu y)(x/y \mid P) \sim (\nu y)(x/y \mid Q)$.

Proposition 17 expresses that restrictions can be pushed inwards in processes. It introduces a notion of measure on processes that is useful to reason by induction on processes in the completeness proof:

Proposition 17. We define $|P|$ as follows: $|\Sigma_i \pi_i.P_i| = \max_i (1 + |P_i|) \quad |(\nu a)P| = |P|, \quad |P \mid Q| = |P| + |Q|$, and $|a|b| = 0$.

For any $A, S, a$, there exist $A'$ and $S'$ such that $\vdash (\nu a)(A, S) = A', S'$ and $|(\nu a)(A, S)| \geq |A', S'|$.

Establishing Completeness. The grammar $P ::= A, \Sigma_i \pi_i.P_i \mid (\nu a)P$ defines what we call $|-\text{free processes}$: only arcs are composed, and the non-preorder part of processes is a sum.

Proposition 18. For all $|-\text{free processes}$ $P$ and $Q$, $P \sim Q$ iff $\vdash P = Q$.

Proof (Sketch). The “if” part follows from Lemmas 9 and 12. Suppose now $P \sim Q$; we reason by induction on $|P| + |Q|$. By Propositions 17, 13 and 16, we obtain $\vdash P = A^\star, S_1$ and $\vdash Q = A^\star, S_2$, for some $A, S_1, S_2$ such that $S_1 \simeq_h S_2$. 226
We then consider \(a(x).T_1 \in S_1\) and \(a(x).T_2 \in S_2\) s.t. \(a(x).T_1 \sim a(x).T_2\). The latter yields, by triggering the input transition, \((\nu x)(y/x \mid T_1) \sim (\nu x)(y/x \mid T_2)\). By induction we derive \(\vdash (\nu x)(y/x \mid T_1) = (\nu x)(y/x \mid T_2)\) from which we get \(\vdash a(x).T_1 = a(x).T_2\) by law L18.

The other kinds of prefixes are handled similarly. This reasoning allows us to prove \(\vdash S_1 = S_2\) and hence \(\vdash P = Q\). □

The expansion law yields the following result, which then gives Theorem 20.

**Lemma 19.** For any \(P\), there exists a \(\tau\)-free process \(Q\) s.t. \(\vdash P = Q\).

**Theorem 20 (Axiomatisation of \(\sim\)).** For all \(P\) and \(Q\), \(P \sim Q\) iff \(\vdash P = Q\).

**Remark 21 (Normal forms).** The proofs of the results in this section suggest that we can define a strategy to apply the rules of Figure 2, in order to rewrite a \(\pi P\) process \(P\) to its normal form, \(nf(P)\), so that \(P \sim Q\) iff \(nf(P) = nf(Q)\). We leave the rigorous description of this normalisation procedure for future work.

### 4.3 Adapting our Axiomatisation to Explicit Fusions

We can reuse the ideas presented above to describe an axiomatisation for barbed congruence in Explicit Fusions (EF, [20]). EF feature fusion processes, of the form \(a=\bar{b}\), which can equate names via \(\equiv\): we have \(a=\bar{b}\mid P \equiv a=\bar{b}\mid P\{b/a\}\).

Like in \(\pi P\), we work with three kinds of prefixes, \(\pi(x)\), \(a(x)\) and \([a=\bar{b}]\tau\), the latter being the counterpart of \([\phi]\tau\) in \(\pi P\) (it appears, e.g., in [20]).

The “state component” of processes is simpler in EF than in \(\pi P\), notably through the interplay between arcs and restrictions. The preorder relation is represented explicitly in \(\pi P\) processes, using arcs. We do not see any natural “implicit version” of \(\pi P\), mimicking the relation between Explicit Fusions and Fusions, whereby the extension of the preorder along a communication would not generate an arc process.

5 Conclusions and Future Work

Working with a preorder on names has an influence on the behavioural theory of \(\pi P\), notably through the interplay between arcs and restrictions. The preorder relation is represented explicitly in \(\pi P\) processes, using arcs. We do not see any natural “implicit version” of \(\pi P\), mimicking the relation between Explicit Fusions and Fusions, whereby the extension of the preorder along a communication would not generate an arc process.
The stateful nature of the preorder component of \( \pi \) processes can be related to frames in the applied \( \pi \)-calculus \([1]\) and Psi-calculi \([2]\). Arcs in \( \pi \) can be seen in some sense as substitutions, but they differ from the active substitutions of applied \( \pi \). The latter map variables to terms, while, in the tradition of fusion calculi, we only have (channel) names in \( \pi \). Moreover, several arcs acting on the same name are allowed in \( \pi \), while a substitution acts on at most one variable in applied \( \pi \). For these reasons, the behavioural theories of \( \pi \) and applied \( \pi \) are rather different. Liu and Lin’s proof system for applied \( \pi \) \([14]\) departs from our axiomatisation for \( \pi \), but has in common the stateful component of processes.

Psi-calculi can represent the active substitutions of applied \( \pi \). It would be interesting to study whether arcs, and the preorder between names, can be represented in the setting of Psi-calculi. An important technical point to address in this perspective is whether transitivity of (generalised) channel equivalence in Psi-calculi would conflict with the fact that name joinability is not transitive in \( \pi \). Another important feature of Psi-calculi is that they come with a fully mechanised metatheory: this is clearly something that \( \pi \) is lacking at the moment.

The behavioural theory of \( \pi \) is based on an operational account. An intriguing question is the construction of a denotational model for \( \pi \), and the comparison with known models for \( \pi \) and Fusions. We would also like to study the weak version of behavioural equivalence.

The results of this work provide foundations for the behavioural theory of the \( \pi \) calculus, which also has i/o-types (cf. \([10]\)). As already mentioned, typed behavioural equivalence \([17,6]\) can be used to establish fine behavioural properties of concurrent systems. We would like to find out whether it can be helpful to refine untyped analyses of systems where Fusions have been used.

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References

Can High Throughput Atone for High Latency in Compiler-Generated Protocol Code?

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Abstract. High-level concurrency constructs and abstractions have several well-known software engineering advantages when it comes to programming concurrency protocols among threads in multicore applications. To also explore their complementary performance advantages, in ongoing work, we are developing compilation technology for a high-level coordination language, Reo, based on this language’s formal automaton semantics. By now, as shown in our previous work, our tools are capable of generating code that can compete with carefully hand-crafted code, at least for some protocols. An important prerequisite to further advance this promising technology, now, is to gain a better understanding of how the significantly different compilation approaches that we developed so far, which vary in the amount of parallelism in their generated code, compare against each other. For instance, to better and more reliably tune our compilers, we must learn under which circumstances parallel protocol code, with high throughput but also high latency, outperforms sequential protocol code, with low latency but also low throughput.

In this paper, we report on an extensive performance comparison between these approaches for a substantial number of protocols, expressed in Reo. Because we have always formulated our compilation technology in terms of a general kind of communicating automaton (i.e., constraint automata), our findings apply not only to Reo but, in principle, to any language whose semantics can be defined in terms of such automata.

1 Introduction

Context. A promising application domain for coordination languages is programming protocols among threads in multicore applications. One reason for this is a classical software engineering advantage: coordination languages typically provide high-level constructs and abstractions that more easily compose into correct—with respect to programmers’ intentions—protocol specifications than do conventional lower-level synchronization mechanisms (e.g., locks or semaphores). However, not only do coordination languages simplify programming protocols, but their high-level constructs and abstractions also leave more room for compilers to perform optimizations that conventional language compilers cannot apply. Eventually, sufficiently smart compilers for coordination languages should be capable of generating code (e.g., in Java or in C) that can compete with carefully hand-crafted code. Preliminary evidence for feasibility of this goal
appears elsewhere [13]. A crucial step toward adoption of coordination languages for multicore programming, then, is the development of such compilers.

To study the performance advantages of using coordination languages for multicore programming, in ongoing work, we are developing compilation technology for the coordination language Reo [1,2]. Reo facilitates compositional construction of protocol specifications manifested as connectors: channel-based mediums through which threads can communicate with each other. Figure 1 shows a number of example connectors in their usual graphical syntax. Briefly, a connector consists of one or more channels, through which data items flow, and a number of nodes, on which channel ends coincide. Reo features an open-ended set of channels, which means that programmers can define their own channels with custom semantics. Figure 1, for instance, includes standard synchronous channels (normal arrows) and asynchronous channels with a 1-capacity buffer (rectangle-decorated arrows), among others. Nodes, in contrast, have fixed semantics. Threads can perform blocking i/o operations—put and get—on the named public nodes of a connector, while a connector uses its anonymous private nodes only for internal routing. Section 2 provides a more detailed overview of Reo; Section 4 explains the behavior of the connectors in Figure 1.
Figure 2 shows one of our most promising achievements in developing compilation technology so far [13]. It shows the performance of three k-producer-single-consumer protocol implementations in C, for $k \in \{2^i \mid 2 \leq i \leq 9\}$: one naive hand-written implementation (continuous line), one optimized hand-written implementation (dashed line), and one implementation compiled from a Reo connector (dotted line). In every round of this protocol, every producer sends one data item to the consumer. Once the consumer has received a data item from every producer, in any order, it sends an acknowledgement to the producers, thereby signaling that the consumer is ready for the next round. (The Reo connector for this protocol, for $k = 2$, resembles EarlyAsyncBarrierMerger in Figure 1c.) This example shows that already our current compilation technology is capable of generating code that can compete with—and in this case even outperform—carefully hand-crafted code. Surely, our technology is not yet mature enough to achieve similarly positive results in every multicore application, for every connector. Nevertheless, this example offers preliminary evidence that programming protocols among threads using high-level constructs and abstractions can result in equally good—or better—performance as compared to conventional low-level, manual techniques.

**Problem.** Despite our encouraging first results, a long road still lies ahead of us before we reach the point at which our tools can compile every connector into high-performance code, the following step of which we try to take in this paper.

In the Reo literature, three different approaches for compiling Reo connectors exist [11]. In the distributed approach, a compiler implements the behavior of each of the k constituents of a connector (i.e., its nodes and its channels) and runs these k implementations in parallel as a distributed system; in the centralized approach, a compiler computes the behavior of a connector as a whole, implements this behavior, and runs this implementation sequentially as a centralized system. The distributed approach has maximal parallelism, and it has the advantage of fast compilation at build-time and high throughput at run-time. However, this comes at the cost of higher latency at run-time (because of a necessary distributed consensus algorithm). In contrast, the centralized approach has maximal sequentiality, and it has the advantage of low latency at run-time. However, this comes at the cost of slower compilation and lower throughput. Moreover, centralized-approach compilers may generate an amount of code exponential in k, which may make their output prohibitively large and the time to produce it prohibitively long. Proença et al. observe that a partially-distributed, partially-centralized hybrid approach, where a compiler splits a connector into parts, implements those parts according to the centralized approach, and runs those implementations according to the distributed approach, is generally ideal [16,17]: a hybrid approach strikes a middle ground between latency and throughput at
run-time while achieving reasonably fast compilation at build-time.

We started developing a centralized-approach compiler and gradually moved to a hybrid-approach version, mainly motivated by the latter’s advantages at build-time. Before this paper, however, we had only little understanding of the implications with respect to run-time performance. Moreover, in recent work [11], we found a case where hybrid-approach compilation actually took much longer than centralized-approach compilation. This made us realize that we must improve our understanding of the differences between the centralized approach and the hybrid approach to advance our compilation technology.

Contribution & Organization. In this paper, we compare centralized-approach compilation and execution with hybrid-approach compilation and execution. For this, we use nine different connector “families” (i.e., connectors parametric in the number of the coordinated threads), “members” of which Figure 1 shows. Our comparison reveals previously unknown strengths and weaknesses of the approaches under investigation. These new insights are imperative for the future development of our compilation technology and, consequently, for evidencing the performance merits of high-level constructs and abstractions for multicore programming, complementary to their classical software engineering advantages.

Although framed in the context of Reo, our technology works at the level of Reo’s formal automaton semantics. This means that we have formulated and implemented our compilers in terms of a general kind of communicating automaton. Therefore, our findings apply to compilation technology not only for Reo but for any high-level model or language whose semantics one can define in terms of such automata (e.g., some process calculi). We expect this generality to make our work interesting to a larger audience, beyond the Reo community.

In Section 2, we discuss preliminaries on Reo and its automaton semantics. In Section 3, we present a centralized-approach and a hybrid-approach compiler for Reo, which we implemented from scratch (though conceptually based on earlier implementations). In Section 4, we explain our experimental setup. In Sections 5 and 6, we discuss our experimental results: in Section 5, we discuss results related to the compilation of our experimental connectors, while in Section 6, we discuss results related to their execution. Section 7 concludes this paper.

2 Preliminaries

Reo is a language for compositional construction of concurrency protocols, manifested as connectors [1,2]. Connectors consist of channels and nodes, organized in a graph-like structure. Every channel consists of two ends and a constraint that relates the timing and the content of the data-flows at those ends. A channel end has one of two types: source ends accept data (i.e., a source end of a channel connects to that channel’s data source/producer), while sink ends dispense data (i.e., a sink end of a channel connects to that channel’s data sink/consumer). Reo makes no other assumptions about channels and allows, for instance, channels with two source ends. Table 1 shows four common channels.
Table 1: Graphical syntax and informal semantics of common channels

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Syntax</th>
<th>Semantics</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><img src="syntax_semantics.png" alt="Diagram" /></td>
<td>Synchronously takes a data item (d) from its source end (e_1) and writes (d) to its sink end (e_2).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><img src="syntax_semantics.png" alt="Diagram" /></td>
<td>Synchronously takes a data item (d) from its source end (e_1) and nondeterministically either writes (d) to its sink end (e_2) or loses (d).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><img src="syntax_semantics.png" alt="Diagram" /></td>
<td>Synchronously takes data items from both its source ends and loses them.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><img src="syntax_semantics.png" alt="Diagram" /></td>
<td>Asynchronously ([\text{takes a data item } d \text{ from its source end } e_1 \text{ and stores } d \text{ in a buffer } x], \text{ then } [\text{writes } d \text{ to its sink end } e_2 \text{ and clears } x]).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Channel ends coincide on nodes. Contrasting channels, every node behaves in the same way: repeatedly, it nondeterministically selects an available data item out of one of its coincident sink ends and replicates this data item into each of its coincident source ends. A node’s nondeterministic selection and its subsequent replication constitute one atomic execution step; nodes cannot temporarily store, generate, or lose data items. Threads can perform blocking I/O operations on the public nodes of a connector: put operations enable threads to send data, while get operations enable threads to receive data. In Figure 1, we distinguish the white, named public nodes of a connector from its shaded, anonymous private nodes. Before a connector makes a global execution step, usually instigated by pending I/O operations, its channels and its nodes must have reached consensus about their behavior to guarantee mutual consistency of their local execution steps (e.g., a node should not replicate a data item into a channel with an already full buffer). Afterward, connector-wide data-flow emerges.

Through composition, programmers can construct arbitrarily complex connectors out of simpler ones. As Reo supports both synchronous and asynchronous channels, connector composition enables mixing synchronous and asynchronous communication within the same protocol.

Our compilers generate code for Reo connectors based on their constraint automaton (CA) semantics [4]. Constraint automata are a general formalism for modeling concurrent systems, better suited for modeling Reo connectors—and their composition in particular—than classical automata or traditional process calculi. For Reo, a CA specifies when during execution of a connector which data items flow where (i.e., through which channel ends). Structurally, every CA consists of finite sets of states and transitions, which model a connector’s internal configurations and atomic execution steps. Every transition has a label that consists of two elements: (i) a set with the names of those channel ends that have synchronous data-flow (ii) and a logical formula that specifies which particular data items may flow through which of those ends. In such formulas, \(d(e_1) = d(e_2)\) means that the same data item flows through \(e_1\) and \(e_2\). In practice, we associate every node and every channel with an elementary CA for its behavior. Figure 3
Fig. 3: Constraint automata for the channels in Table 1 (first three from the left), for a private node with two incoming and one outgoing channel (fourth from the left), and for two public nodes, each with either one incoming or one outgoing channel (fifth from the left). The latter CA is defined not only over the names of its coincident channel ends but also over its own name. (Threads use node names—not channel end names—to perform I/O operations on, and therefore, public node names must explicitly occur in their CA semantics.)

Fig. 4: Composition and abstraction of \( \textit{LateAsyncMerger}_2 \) in Figure 1g shows exampleCAS. A product operator on CAS subsequently models connector composition: to obtain the “big” CA for a whole connector, one can incrementally form the product of the “small” CAS for its constituent nodes and channels. Afterward, one can abstract away private nodes’ coincident channel ends with a hide operator on CAS [4], which also eliminates internal transitions involving only such ends. Figure 4 shows the composite CA of \( \textit{LateAsyncMerger}_2 \).

3 Compilers

Our compilers operate fully at the level of Reo’s CA semantics. Our focus on Reo so far in this paper is therefore misleading: we use Reo’s graphical, channel-based abstractions, just as a—not the—programmer-friendly syntax for exposing CA-based protocol programming. Different syntax alternatives for CAS may
work equally well or yield perhaps even more user-friendly languages. For instance, we know how to translate UML sequence/activity diagrams and BPMN to CAS [3,7,15]. Algebras of Bliudze and Sifakis [6], originally developed for BIP [5], also have a straightforward interpretation in terms of CAS, thereby offering an interesting alternative possible syntax. Due to their generality, CAS can thus serve as an intermediate format for compiling specifications in many different languages and models of concurrency, by reusing the core of our compilers. This makes the development of our compilation technology relevant beyond Reo.

For our performance comparison, based on earlier implementations [10,14], we developed two Reo/CAs-to-Java compilers as mentioned already in Section 1: a centralized-approach one, henceforth referred to as Compiler_centr, and a hybrid-approach one, henceforth referred to as Compiler_hybr. (Both compilers are available on request.) Both compilers generate shared-memory Java code, geared toward multicore execution. On input of a connector, Compiler_centr (i) first finds a small CA for every channel and every node that this connector consists of, (ii) then forms the product of all those CAs to get a big CA for the whole connector, abstracting away all internal details in the process, and (iii) finally generates one piece of sequential code for that big CA. At run-time, this piece of code logically has its own thread. (Physically, however, we can optimize this “protocol thread” away by letting “computation threads” perform its work.) Essentially, the construction of a big CA in this way corresponds to parallel expansion in process algebra [8]. Compiler_hybr also first finds a set of small CAs, but in contrast to Compiler_centr, it does not form their product to get a big CA. Instead, it computes an \( m \)-size partition of this set. By doing so, Compiler_hybr effectively splits a connector into a number of “regions” (i.e., connected subconnectors), each of which has a corresponding subset in the partition. After computing a partition, Compiler_hybr forms products on a per-region basis, which results in \( m \) “medium” CAs, and generates a piece of sequential code for each of them. At run-time, every such piece of code has its own thread. These threads use shared-memory (plus concurrency protection) to synchronize their actions whenever necessary.

Compiler_hybr’s partitioning algorithm iterates over the set of small CAs and incrementally extends its computed partition (starting from an empty one) [9,14]. For every small CA \( \alpha \), the algorithm decides either to add \( \{ \alpha \} \) to the partition (as a new singleton subset) or to add \( \alpha \) to one or more existing parts. (In the latter case, the algorithm subsequently merges all extended subsets into one new subset.) Jongmans et al. formulated the condition based on which the algorithm makes this decision generally, in terms of CAs and their transitions. In the context of Reo, however, this partitioning algorithm precisely coincides with the identification of synchronous/asynchronous regions of a connector [17] (each of which gets a corresponding subset in the partition). The asynchronous regions of a connector are its smallest connected subconnectors that have only asynchronous data-flow (e.g., the fourth channel in Table 1). By removing the asynchronous regions from a connector, its pairwise disconnected synchronous regions remain: connected subconnectors with synchronous data-flow. Intuitively, asynchronous regions decouple synchronous regions. Such decoupling enables synchronous re-
gions to run independently of each other: communication between synchronous regions always proceeds in an asynchronous fashion, through a shared asynchronous region. Figure 5 shows the medium CASs that result from applying the previous partitioning algorithm to LateAsyncMerger, composing CASs on a per-subset basis, and abstracting away private nodes (see also Figure 4). Note that a connector without asynchronous regions consists of one comprehensive synchronous region. For such connectors, Compilerhybr reduces to Compilercentr.

Notably, a connector represents the logic behind—not the architecture of—the data-flow in a protocol. For instance, even though Lock in Figure 1j, which represents a classical lock, consists of a mix of synchronous, asynchronous, and lossy channels, its compiler-generated code uses neither physical hardware channels nor virtual software channels to realize its desired behavior.

4 Experimental Setup

Practical details. To study under which circumstances code generated by Compilerhybr outperforms code generated by Compilercentr, we performed a number of experiments. In every experiment, we compared the performance of centralized and hybrid implementations of a k-parametric connector family, for $k \in \{2, 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14, 16, 32, 48, 64\}$. Figure 1 shows the $k = 2$ members of the nine connector families that we investigated. (One can extend these $k = 2$ members to their $k > 2$ versions in a similar way as how we extended Figure 1a to Figure 1b.) We selected these particular families because each of them exhibits different behavior in terms of (a)synchrony, exclusion, nondeterminism, polarity, sequentiality, and parallelism, thereby aiming for a balanced comparison. In total, thus, we investigated 99 different connectors and twice as many Java implementations. We ran every implementation nine times on a machine with sixteen cores (two Intel E5-26520V2 processors with eight physical cores at 2.6
GHz in two sockets, hyperthreading disabled) and averaged our measurements. In every run, we warmed up the JVM for thirty seconds before starting to measure the number of “rounds” that an implementation could finish in the subsequent four minutes. What constitutes one round differs per connector; see below.

Primarily, we wanted to study and measure the overhead of the synchronization algorithm between the protocol threads in the hybrid implementations (which increases their latency) relative to those implementations’ increased parallelism (which increases their throughput). To focus our measurements on only that particular aspect, we needed to eliminate as much as possible all other, orthogonal sources of computation inside compiler-generated code. One notable such source is data processing: although both our compilers support compilation of data-sensitive connectors, whose behavior may depend on the particular data items that pass through them, we nevertheless compiled all connectors in a data-insensitive fashion. This ensured that no data processing occurred at run-time during our experiments, which would have constituted a substantial source of sequential, unoptimized computation, even though we already know of ways to significantly improve this. If we would have enabled data processing, its irrelevant—at least to this comparison—overhead would have polluted our measurements. Perhaps even worse, our results would become obsolete the moment we implement our upcoming data processing optimizations.

For convenience, we divided the connector families under study—except Lock—over two categories: k-producer-single-consumer and single-producer-k-consumer. Both of these categories consist of four families. The k-producer-single-consumer category contains LateAsyncMerger (cf. Figure 1g), EarlyAsyncMerger (cf. Figure 1d), EarlyAsyncBarrierMerger (cf. Figure 1c), and Alternator (cf. Figures 1a and 1b); the single-producer-k-consumer category contains LateAsyncReplicator (cf. Figure 1h), EarlyAsyncReplicator (cf. Figure 1f), LateAsyncRouter (cf. Figure 1i), and EarlyAsyncOutSequencer (cf., Figure 1e).

Connectors. Next, we explain the behavior of the connectors in Figure 1. We start with explaining the k-producer-single-consumer connector families. With LateAsyncMerger, (cf. Figure 1g), whenever producer \( i \) puts a data item on its local node \( \text{In}_i \), the connector stores this data item in its only buffer (unless this buffer is already filled by another producer, in which case the put suspends until the buffer becomes empty). The relieved producer can immediately continue, possibly before the consumer has completed a get for its data item (i.e., communication between a producer and the consumer transpires asynchronously). Whenever the consumer gets a data item from its local node Out, the connector empties the previously full buffer. The consumer gets data items in the order in which producers put them (i.e., communication between a producer and the consumer transpires transactionally, i.e., undisrupted by other producers). Every round consists of a put by a producer and a get by the consumer; in every round, two transitions fire.

With EarlyAsyncMerger (cf. Figure 1d), whenever a producer \( i \) puts a data item on its local node \( \text{In}_i \), the connector stores this data item in its corresponding buffer. The relieved producer can immediately continue, possibly before the
consumer has completed a **get** for its data item (i.e., communication between a producer and the consumer transpires asynchronously). Whenever the consumer **gets** a data item from its local node Out, the connector empties one of the previously full buffers, selected nondeterministically. The consumer does not necessarily **get** data items in the order in which producers **put** them (i.e., communication between a producer and the consumer transpires not necessarily transactionally). Every round consists of a **put** by a producer and a **get** by the consumer; in every round, two transitions fire.

Connectors in the **EarlyAsyncBarrierMerger** family work in largely the same way as those in the **EarlyAsyncMerger** family, except that the former enforce a barrier on the producers: no producer can **put** its $n$-th data item until all other producers have **put** their $(n-1)$-th data items. The consumer may still **get** data items in an order different from the order in which the producers **put** them. Every round consists of a **put** by every producer and $k$ **gets** by the consumer, one for every producer; in every round, $2k$ transitions fire.

With **Alternator**$_k$ (cf. Figures 1a and 1b), whenever a producer $i$ attempts to **put** a data item on its local node In, this operation suspends until both (1) the consumer attempts to **get** a data item from its local node Out, and (2) every other producer $j$ attempts to **put** a data item on its local node In$_j$ (i.e., the producers can **put** only synchronously). Once each of the producers and the consumer attempt to **put/get**, the consumer **gets** the data item sent by the top producer (i.e., communication between the top producer and the consumer transpires synchronously), while the connector stores the data items of the other producers in their corresponding buffers (i.e., communication between the other producers and the consumer transpires asynchronously). Afterward, the consumer **gets** the remaining buffered data items in the spatial top-to-bottom order of the producers. Every round consists of a **put** by every producer and $k$ **gets** by the consumer, one for every producer; in every round, $k$ transitions fire.

We proceed with explaining the single-producer-$k$-consumer connector families. With **EarlyAsyncReplicator**$_k$ (cf. Figure 1f), whenever the producer puts a data item on its local node In, the connector stores this data item in its only buffer. The relieved producer can immediately continue, possibly before the consumers have completed **gets** for its data item (i.e., communication between the producers and a consumer transpires asynchronously). Whenever a consumer $i$ attempts to **get** a data item from its local node Out$_i$, this operation suspends until both (1) the buffer has become full, and (2) every other consumer attempts to **get** a data item (i.e., the consumers can **get** only synchronously). Once the buffer has become full and each of the consumers attempts to **get**, every consumer **gets** the data item in the buffer, while the connector empties that buffer. Every round consists of a **put** by the producer and a **get** by every consumer; in every round, $k + 1$ transitions fire.

With **LateAsyncReplicator**$_k$ (cf. Figure 1h), whenever the producer puts a data item on its local node In, the connector stores a copy of this data item in each of its buffers. The relieved producer can immediately continue, possibly before the consumers have completed **gets** for its data item (i.e., communication
between the producers and a consumer transpires asynchronously). Whenever a consumer \( i \) gets a data item from its local node \( \text{Out}_i \), the connector empties its corresponding full buffer. Every round consists of a put by the producer and a get by every consumer; in every round, \( k + 1 \) transitions fire.

With \textit{LateAsyncRouter}_k (cf. Figure 1i), whenever the producer puts a data item on its local node \( \text{In} \), the connector stores this data item in exactly one of its buffers (instead of a copy in each of its buffers as \textit{LateAsyncReplicator}_k does), selected nondeterministically. The relieved producer can immediately continue, possibly before the consumer of the selected buffer has completed a get for its data item (i.e., communication between the producer and a consumer transpires asynchronously). Whenever a consumer \( i \) gets a data item from its local node \( \text{Out}_i \), the connector empties its corresponding full buffer. The consumers do not necessarily get data items in the order in which the connector stored those data items in its buffers. Every round consists of a put by the producer and a get by a consumer; in every round, two transitions fire.

With \textit{EarlyAsyncOutSequencer}_k (cf. Figure 1e), whenever the producer puts a data item on its local node \( \text{In} \), the connector stores this data item in its leftmost buffer. The relieved producer can immediately continue, possibly before a consumer has completed a get for its data item (i.e., communication between a producer and the consumers transpires asynchronously). The connector ensures that the consumers can get only in the top-to-bottom sequence. Whenever a consumer \( i \) gets a data item from its local node \( \text{Out}_i \), the connector empties its corresponding full buffer. Every round consists of a put by the producer and a get by every consumer; in every round, \( 2k \) transitions fire.

Finally, \textit{Lock}_k represents a classical lock (cf. Figure 1j). To acquire the lock, a computation thread \( i \) puts an arbitrary data item (i.e., a signal) on its local node \( \text{Acq}_i \); to release the lock, this thread puts an arbitrary data item on its local node \( \text{Rel}_i \). A put on \( \text{Acq}_i \) suspends until every computation thread \( j \) that previously performed a put on \( \text{Acq}_j \) has performed its complementary put on \( \text{Rel}_j \) (i.e., the connector guarantees mutual exclusion). Every round consists of two puts by one of the \( k \) producers; in every round, two transitions fire.

5 Experimental Results: Compilation

\textit{Measurements}. We used \texttt{Compiler\textsubscript{hybr}} and \texttt{Compiler\textsubscript{centr}} to compile the connector families in Figure 1 for the aforementioned values of \( k \) with a transition limit of 8096 and a timeout after five minutes. We imposed a transition limit, because the Java compiler cannot conveniently handle Java code generated for \texttt{cas} with so many transitions; we imposed a compilation timeout, because waiting for longer than five minutes to compile a single connector in practice seems unacceptable to us. Figure 6 shows the measured compilation times; see also [12].

For most connector families, \texttt{Compiler\textsubscript{hybr}} required substantially less time than \texttt{Compiler\textsubscript{centr}}. In fact, for six of our nine connector families, \texttt{Compiler\textsubscript{centr}} failed to run to completion beyond certain (relatively low) values of \( k \), as witnessed also by their very steep curves in Figure 6.
For EarlyAsyncMerger \(k > 7\), LateAsyncReplicator \(k > 8\) and LateAsyncRouter \(k > 7\), the transition number of their “big” CAS exceeded the limit (e.g., EarlyAsyncMerger_8 has 23801 transitions, LateAsyncReplicator_9 has 19172 transitions, and LateAsyncRouter_8 has 23801 transitions) or the compiler timed out.

For EarlyAsyncBarrierMerger \(k > 4\), EarlyAsyncOutputSequencer \(k > 14\), and Lock \(k > 12\), the compiler timed out.

In contrast, Compiler\textsubscript{hybr} had no problems compiling these connector families.
for all values of $k$ under investigation. For $\text{LateAsyncMerger}_k$ and $\text{EarlyAsyncReplicator}_k$, our two compilers required a comparable amount of time for all values of $k$ under investigation. Finally, only for $\text{Alternator}_k$, $\text{Compiler}_{\text{hybr}}$ required substantially more time than $\text{Compiler}_{\text{centr}}$ does. In this case, $\text{Compiler}_{\text{hybr}}$ timed out for $k > 12$, while $\text{Compiler}_{\text{centr}}$ had no problems.

Discussion. In Section 1, we stated that hybrid-approach compilers have the advantage of “reasonably fast compilation at build-time” compared to centralized-approach compilers. The idea behind this statement is that the formation of a big CA in the centralized approach requires much computational resource, notably when state spaces or transition relations of such big CAs grow exponentially in $k$; hybrid-approach compilers usually avoid this, because hybrid-approach compilers do not compute big CAs. Intuitively, the medium CAs computed for a connector by hybrid-approach compilers are typically much smaller than its big CA. After all, each of those medium CAs consists of fewer small CAs than does this big CA. (The big CA consists of every small CA that also constitutes a medium CA.)

Thus, in cases of exponential growth, medium CAs typically have a much smaller exponent than their corresponding big CA. A quick look at our measurements in Figure 6a seems to confirm this intuition: all six connector families for which $\text{Compiler}_{\text{centr}}$ eventually failed require exponentially more time as $k$ increases. Beyond this quick look, however, there are peculiarities that need clarification.

A first, obvious peculiarity are the measurements for $\text{Alternator}$, which $\text{Compiler}_{\text{hybr}}$—instead of $\text{Compiler}_{\text{centr}}$—eventually fails for. Actually, we already made a preliminary qualitative analysis of this phenomenon in a recent workshop contribution [11]; our current quantitative results fully support the anecdotal analysis in that extended abstract. To save space—an in-depth explanation requires significantly more details of the partitioning algorithm used in hybrid-approach compilation—we only briefly summarize the cause of this phenomenon. Essentially, a hybrid-approach compiler cannot treat every private node of a connector as truly private: $\text{Compiler}_{\text{hybr}}$ cannot use the hide operator to abstract away those private nodes that mark the boundaries between a connector’s regions. After all, protocol threads for neighboring regions synchronize their transitions through those nodes, which makes explicitly representing them in compiler-generated code essential. But because those private nodes must remain, also many internal transitions remain, potentially to the extent that they cause the transition relation of “medium” CAs formed for certain problematic regions to explode. This happens with $\text{Alternator}$. $\text{Compiler}_{\text{centr}}$, in contrast, can incrementally hide all private nodes to neutralize this source of explosion.

The second peculiarity concerns centralized-approach compilation. First, by analyzing the big CAs of the $k$-parametric connector families $\text{EarlyAsyncBarrierMerger}$, $\text{EarlyAsyncMerger}$, $\text{EarlyAsyncOutSequencer}$, $\text{LateAsyncReplicator}$, and $\text{LateAsyncRouter}$, we found that those CAs grow exponentially as $k$ increases (due to the many ways in which their $k$ independent transition can concurrently fire). This explains why $\text{Compiler}_{\text{centr}}$ requires exponentially more time as $k$ increases to compile members of those families, as shown in Figure 6. Now, it seems not unreasonable to assume also the inverse: for $k$-parametric connector
families whose big cas grow only linearly in $k$, Compiler$_{centr}$ should scale fine. Alternator, EarlyAsyncReplicator, and LateAsyncMerger, which satisfy its premise, seem to validate this assumption. Indeed, Figure 6 shows that Compiler$_{centr}$ has no problems with compiling members of those families. (The big cas of the EarlyAsyncReplicator family even have a constant number of transitions.) However, this still leaves us with two families whose compilation behavior we have not yet accounted for: EarlyAsyncOutSequencer and Lock. Although the big cas of both these $k$-parametric families grow only linearly in $k$, Figure 6 shows that Compiler$_{centr}$ nevertheless requires exponentially more time as $k$ increases.

It turns out that even if big cas grow only linearly in $k$, the “intermediate products” during their formation may “temporarily” grow exponentially. For instance, if we have three cas $\alpha_1$, $\alpha_2$ and $\alpha_3$, the intermediate product of $\alpha_1$ and $\alpha_2$ may grow exponentially in $k$, while the full product of $\alpha_1$, $\alpha_2$, and $\alpha_3$ grows only linearly. This is easiest to explain for EarlyAsyncOutSequencer$_k$ (cf. Figure 1e), in terms of its number of states. EarlyAsyncOutSequencer$_k$ consists of a subconnector that, in turn, consists of a cycle of $k$ buffered channels (of capacity 1). The first buffered channel initially contains a dummy data item ■ (i.e., its actual value does not matter); the other buffered channels initially contain nothing. As in the literature [1,2], we call this subconnector Sequencer$_k$. Because no new data items can flow into Sequencer$_k$, only ■ cycles through the buffers—ad infinitum—such that only one buffer holds a data item at any time. Consequently, the ca for Sequencer$_k$ has only $k$ states, each of which represents the presence of ■ in a different one of the $k$ buffers. However, when Compiler$_{centr}$ compositionally computes this ca out of a number of smaller cas by forming their product, it closes the cycle only with the very last application of the product operator: until that moment, the “cycle” still looks to the compiler as an open-ended chain of buffered channels. Because new data items can freely flow into it, such an open-ended chain can have a data item in any buffer at any time. Consequently, the ca for the largest chain (i.e., the chain of $k−1$ buffered channels, just before it becomes closed) has $2^{k−1}$ states. Only when Compiler$_{centr}$ forms the product of [the ca of the $k$-th buffered channel] and [the previously formed ca for the chain of $k−1$ buffered channels], the state space of $2^{k−1}$ states collapses into $k$ states, as the compiler “finds out” that the open-ended chain is actually an input-closed cycle with exactly one data item. Clearly, because Sequencer$_k$ constitutes EarlyAsyncOutSequencer$_k$, also EarlyAsyncOutSequencer$_k$ itself suffers from this problem. A similar argument applies to Lock$_k$.

Thus, even for $k$-parametric connector families whose big cas grow only linearly in $k$, Compiler$_{centr}$ can have scalability issues because of exponential growth in intermediate products. Compiler$_{hybr}$ has no problems with the kind of cycle-based exponential growth discussed above because of how it deals with such cycles in its partitioning algorithm. Generally, however, we can imagine also Compiler$_{hybr}$ to have this problem for other sources of exponential growth.

Conclusion. For the four $k$-parametric connector families whose big cas grow exponentially in $k$ (i.e., EarlyAsyncBarrierMerger, EarlyAsyncMerger, LateAsyncReplicator, and LateAsyncRouter), hybrid compilation has clear advantages over
centralized compilation, as we already expected. For the two $k$-parametric connector families whose big CAs and intermediate products grow only linearly in $k$ (i.e., $\text{LateAsyncMerger}$ and $\text{EarlyAsyncReplicator}$), centralized-approach compilation and hybrid-approach compilation do not make much of a difference; here, run-time performance—investigated in the next section—becomes the key factor in deciding which approach to apply. For $\text{Alternator}$, centralized compilation has clear advantages over hybrid compilation. Finally, for the two $k$-parametric connector families whose intermediate products grow exponentially in $k$ (i.e., $\text{EarlyAsyncOutSequencer}$ and $\text{Lock}$), hybrid compilation seems to have clear advantages over centralized compilation as suggested by Figure 6b.

We find the latter conclusion slightly rash, though. After all, our previous analysis showed that the big CAs—the only CAs that we actually care about—for both $\text{EarlyAsyncOutSequencer}$ and $\text{Lock}$ grow only linearly in $k$. If we can develop technology that enables $\text{Compiler}_{\text{centr}}$ to avoid temporary exponential growth of intermediate products, $\text{Compiler}_{\text{centr}}$ should perform similar to $\text{Compiler}_{\text{hybr}}$.

One option is to equip $\text{Compiler}_{\text{centr}}$ with a novel static analysis technique to infer, before forming the full product, which states will have become unreachable after forming the full product. For instance, in the case of $\text{EarlyAsyncOutSequencer}_k$ (or its subconnector $\text{Sequencer}_{k}$), every state where two or more buffers contain a data item will have become unreachable in the full product but not so yet in the intermediate products. If $\text{Compiler}_{\text{centr}}$ can determine such “eventually unreachable states” from the start, it can already remove those states while forming the full product to keep the intermediate products as small as possible. This optimization requires significant theoretical work: not only must we formulate the analysis technique itself, but we must also prove that it preserves certain behavioral properties. It seems an interesting form of on-the-fly state space reduction, though, which may have applications also in model checking.

Another option is not really a solution to our problem but a way to avoid it. We observed that the $\text{Sequencer}_k$ subconnector of $\text{EarlyAsyncOutSequencer}_k$ causes its intermediate products to grow exponentially in $k$. For simplicity, let us therefore focus on this problematic $\text{Sequencer}_k$. The obvious way to construct a connector with the behavior of $\text{Sequencer}_k$ is by putting $k$ buffered channels in a cycle, as we did before. An alternative way to construct such a connector, however, is by connecting a $\text{Sequencer}_{0.5k}$ to another $\text{Sequencer}_{0.5k}$ with a “glue subconnector”. The details of this glue subconnector do not matter here: what matters is that in this alternative construction, $\text{Compiler}_{\text{centr}}$ can first form the products of the $\text{Sequencer}_{0.5k}$ subconnectors to get two CAs with $0.5k$ states, and then form the products of those CAs and the two-state CA of the glue subconnector. The largest intermediate CA encountered by the compiler during this process has at most $\max(2^{0.5k}, 0.5k \cdot 0.5k \cdot 2)$ states. In contrast, the largest intermediate CA for the obviously constructed $\text{Sequencer}_k$—the one with the cycle—has $2^{k-1}$ states. This analysis shows that hierarchically constructing $\text{Sequencer}_k$ out of $\text{Sequencer}_{l<k}$ subconnectors reduces its centralized-approach compilation complexity compared to its flat design. Generally, we should therefore encourage programmers to design connectors as hierarchically as possible.
6 Experimental Results: Execution

Measurements. We ran every successfully compiled connector with “empty” computation threads: in every iteration of their infinite loop, a producer/consumer had no work and immediately performed a put/get on its own public node. As a result, we measured the performance of only the compiler-generated code. Figure 7 shows our measurements, in completed protocol rounds per four minutes. By dividing this number of rounds by 240, one gets the round-throughput, in rounds per second. By further dividing this number by the number of transitions per round, one gets the (transition-)throughput.

Figures 7a, 7b, 7c, and 7f show the performances in the \(k\)-producers-single-consumer category. For LateAsyncMerger, EarlyAsyncMerger, and EarlyAsyncBarrierMerger, their centralized implementations outperform their hybrid implementations in cases involving only few producers (six in the case of LateAsyncMerger and EarlyAsyncMerger; four in the case of EarlyAsyncBarrierMerger). In cases involving more producers, either the hybrid implementations outperform the centralized implementations, or Compiler\(_\text{centr}\) failed to compile such that we cannot make a direct comparison. In those latter cases, however, it seems reasonable to assert, by extrapolation, that if compilation had succeeded, these generated centralized implementations would have performed significantly worse than their corresponding hybrid counterparts. For Alternator, in contrast, its centralized implementations evidently outperform its hybrid implementations.

Figures 7d, 7e, 7g, and 7h show the performances in the single-producer-\(k\)-consumers category. The figures for LateAsyncReplicator and LateAsyncRouter are similar to those of LateAsyncMerger, EarlyAsyncMerger, and EarlyAsyncBarrierMerger that we saw before: with only few consumers, their centralized implementations outperform their hybrid implementations, while with more consumers, their hybrid implementations outperform their centralized implementations. For EarlyAsyncReplicator, the performance of its centralized and hybrid implementations is nearly the same. For EarlyAsyncOutSequencer, because Compiler\(_\text{centr}\) failed to generate code for \(k > 14\), the comparison remains inconclusive.

Discussion. For six of the nine connector families, the obtained results look as expected. For those families, we observe that with low values of \(k\) (i.e., little parallelism), their centralized implementations outperform their hybrid implementations. In those cases, the increased throughput of hybrid implementations as compared to their centralized counterparts cannot yet compensate for their increased latency. As \(k\) increases and more parallelism becomes available, however, hybrid implementations start to outperform centralized implementations. In those cases, increased throughput does seem to compensate for increased latency. This, however, is not the only reason why hybrid implementations outperform centralized implementations for larger values of \(k\). More importantly, we found that the latency of not only hybrid implementations but also centralized implementations increases with \(k\). In fact, the latency of centralized implementations increases much more dramatically. By analyzing the “big” CAS formed by Compiler\(_\text{centr}\) for the families currently under discussion, we found that their
Fig. 7: Performance, in completed protocol rounds per four minutes of execution time (continuous/dotted lines for centralized/hybrid implementations)
exponential growth (cf. Section 5) causes this steep increase in latency: the more transitions a CA has per state, the more time it takes for a thread to select and check any one of them at run-time. (A EarlyAsyncReplicator constitutes a special case, where increased throughput and increased latency exactly balance out.)

Contrasting the families discussed in the previous paragraph, the results obtained for Alternator, EarlyAsyncOutSequencer, and Lock are more peculiar. In Section 5, we already briefly explained why Compiler$_{c}$ succeeded in generating code for Alternator$_{k>12}$, while Compiler$_{h}$ failed. This, however, does not yet explain why centralized implementations of Alternator connectors outperform their hybrid implementations also at run-time. The reason becomes clear when we realize that Alternator$_{k}$ essentially behaves sequentially: in every round, the producers start by synchronously putting their data items (and the consumer synchronously gets the first data item), after which the consumer asynchronously gets the remaining $k-1$ data items in sequence. The centralized implementation of Alternator$_{k}$ at run-time sequentially simulates one CA, which consists of $k$ transitions between $k$ states, that represents exactly this sequentiality. Its hybrid implementation, in contrast, at run-time has $k$ parallel protocol threads and, as such, suffers from overparallelization: it uses parallelism—and incurs the overhead that parallelism involves—to implement intrinsically sequential behavior. Because also EarlyAsyncOutSequencer and Lock essentially behave sequentially, they suffer from the same problem. For these two families, however, this observation is even more important than for Alternator. After all, hybrid-approach compilation fails for Alternator$_{k>12}$, so for larger $k$, we must use centralized-approach compilation anyway. For EarlyAsyncOutSequencer$_{k>14}$ and Lock$_{k>12}$, in contrast, centralized-approach compilation fails, even though centralized implementations of those connectors are, by extrapolation, likely to perform better than their hybrid counterparts.

Centralized implementations consist of only one protocol thread, which can do only one thing at a time. If many computation threads each perform an I/O operation roughly simultaneously, depending on the connector, this may result in contention (i.e., every computation thread must wait until the protocol thread has time to process its I/O operation). To further study the effect of contention, we repeated our experiments with $z$-parametric producers/consumers that wait a random amount of time between 0 and $z$ times the previously measured round-latency before they perform their put/get, for $z \in \{1, 10, 100\}$. [12] contains our measurements. The short conclusion is that as $z$ increases, the performance of centralized implementations and hybrid implementations becomes more similar. We doubt whether this can be ascribed to less contention, though. Instead, we consider it more likely that the producers'/consumers' waiting times now dominate our measurements. Although perhaps not too surprising, we nevertheless consider this something that one should be aware of: the more work threads perform, the less important the choice between centralized/hybrid implementation becomes (with respect to run-time performance).

Conclusion. For six of the nine connector families, the obtained results are as we expected: their centralized implementations outperform their hybrid implemen-
tations for smaller values of \( k \), while their hybrid implementations outperform their centralized implementations for larger values of \( k \). As \( k \) increases and more parallelism becomes available, the higher throughput of hybrid implementations as compared to their centralized counterparts compensates for their higher latency, while the latency of centralized implementations dramatically increases.

Because Alternator, EarlyAsyncOutSequencer, and Lock essentially behave sequentially, their centralized implementations in fact outperform their hybrid implementations for all \( k \). This is a strong incentive to improve our centralized-approach compilation technology (e.g., the optimization at the end of Section 5).

### 7 Conclusion

Better understanding the differences between centralized-approach compilation and hybrid-approach compilation is crucial to further advance our compilation technology, one of whose promising applications is programming protocols among threads in multicore applications. Initially, we wanted to investigate under which circumstances parallel protocol code generated by a hybrid-approach compiler, with high throughput but also high latency, outperforms sequential protocol code generated by a centralized-approach compiler, with low latency but also low throughput. Based on our comparison, the answer to this question is this:

- Except for cases with overparallelization, hybrid implementations of connectors with more than a few (e.g., at least ten to twelve) parallel computation threads perform at least as good as their centralized counterparts.

Our comparison taught us much more about centralized/hybrid-approach compilation, though. To summarize our other findings:

- Hybrid-approach compilation may suffer from exponentially sized CAS in cases where centralized-approach compilation works fine.
- Centralized-approach compilation may suffer from exponentially sized intermediate products in cases where hybrid-approach compilation works fine.
- Programmers should prefer hierarchically constructed connectors over flat constructed connectors to reduce compilation complexity.
- Hybrid implementations may overparallelize inherently sequential connectors, which leads to poor run-time performance.
- Centralized implementations may in fact have even higher latency than hybrid implementations.
- The more work threads perform, the less important the choice between centralized/hybrid approach becomes (with respect to run-time performance).

In future work, we want to follow up on these findings by developing new optimization techniques (such as the one sketched in Section 5). In particular, we should identify when hybrid-approach compilation should reduce to centralized-approach compilation and improve our partitioning algorithm accordingly.

Although we heavily used Reo/connector terminology in this paper as a narrative mechanism, we really have been talking about and investigating different
kinds of implementations of a general kind of communicating automaton (i.e.,\nCAS). Because also other languages can have semantics in terms of such automata
(e.g., Rebeca [18] and Bip [5]), our findings have applications beyond Reo.

References

Benchmarks for Parity Games

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Abstract We propose a benchmark suite for parity games that includes the benchmarks that have been used in the literature, and make it available online. We give an overview of the parity games, including a description of how they have been generated. We also describe structural properties of parity games, and using these properties we show that our benchmarks are representative. With this work we provide a starting point for further experimentation with parity games.

1 Introduction

Parity games (see, e.g., [24,55,78]) play an important role in model checking research. The $\mu$-calculus model checking problem is polynomial time reducible to the problem of deciding the winner in parity games [73]. Other problems that are expressible in parity games are equivalence checking of labelled transition systems [73], as well as synthesis, satisfiability and validity of temporal logics [66].

Besides their practical interest for verification, solving (deciding the winner of) parity games is known to be in the complexity class $\text{NP} \cap \text{co-NP}$, and more specifically in $\text{UP} \cap \text{co-UP}$ [42]. Parity game solving is one of the few problems in this complexity class that is not known to be in $\text{P}$, yet there is hope that a polynomial time algorithm exists. In recent years this has led to the development of (1) a large number of algorithms for solving parity games, such as [44,67,68], all of which were recently shown to be exponential, and (2) the study of (polynomial time) reduction techniques for parity games [30,47,21,22].

So far, practical evaluation of parity game algorithms has been based on ad-hoc benchmarks, mainly consisting of random games or synthetic benchmarks. Friedmann and Lange observed in 2009 [30] that no standard benchmark set for parity games was available. They introduced a small benchmark set in the context of their comprehensive comparison of parity game solving algorithms and their related heuristics [30]. The set of benchmarks was extended in [47,21,22] using model checking and equivalence checking cases. To the best of our knowledge, the situation has not improved since then, and the benchmarks in these papers still are the most comprehensive benchmarks included in a single paper. The number of games and the diversity of parity games in each set in isolation are however limited. The lack of standard benchmarks makes it hard to compare the different tools and algorithms presented in the literature.
To improve the current situation, in this paper we propose a set of parity games for benchmarking purposes that (1) is diverse, (2) contains games that originate from different verification problems, and (3) includes those games that have been used to experimentally evaluate algorithms in the literature.

In general, parity game examples in the literature can be classified as follows (we indicate their origins):

1. Encodings of problems such as model checking, equivalence checking and complementation of Büchi automata to parity games [53,54,75,47,21,22,30].
2. Synthetic parity games for which a certain solving algorithm requires exponential time [53,43,58,26,31,29,35].
3. Random games [6,49,68,69,30,31].

Our benchmarks include games from each of these categories.

Additionally, inspired by the properties for explicit state spaces in [60] we introduce a set of structural properties for parity games, and in the spirit of [61,62] we analyse our benchmarks. Among others, we introduce a novel notion of alternation depth for parity games.

The structure of the paper is as follows. We first introduce parity games and their structural properties in Section 2. Next we describe the benchmarks (Section 3) and the way in which they have been generated (Section 4). Finally we illustrate diversity of our benchmarks with respect to the structural properties in Section 5. This paper is based on the PhD thesis of the author [45, Chapter 5]; an extended version of this paper, including more detailed descriptions and analyses is available as [46]. We plan to keep [46] up-to-date when new benchmarks are added, and we invite the community to contribute benchmarks.

2 Parity Games and Their Structural Properties

A parity game is a two-player game played on a finite, directed graph by two players, even and odd, denoted □ and ○, respectively. We use ○ ∈ {□, □} to denote an arbitrary player. Formally, a parity game is a structure (V□, V□, →, Ω), where V□ and V□ are disjoint sets of vertices. We say that ○ owns v if v ∈ V○, we write V for V□ ∪ V□; → ⊆ V × V provides the total edge relation—hence each vertex has a successor—and Ω: V → N assigns a non-negative integer priority to every vertex. The parity game is played by placing a token on some initial vertex, and then the players take turns moving the token: if the token is on a vertex v ∈ V○ then ○ plays the token to one of the successors of v. This way, an infinite play through the game is constructed. If the largest priority that occurs infinitely often on this play is even (resp. odd) then ○ (resp. □) wins the play.

The time required for parity game solving and reduction algorithms depends on the structure of the game. Typically the algorithmic complexity of parity game algorithms are expressed in terms of the size of the game graph, i.e. the number of vertices and edges, and the number of priorities in the game. Although other structural properties may not affect the asymptotic running times of the
algorithms, in general they do affect the actual running time. We therefore describe a number structural properties that could be used for the further study of parity games.

**Sizes.** As basic parity game properties, we consider the numbers of vertices $|V|$, $|V□|$ and $|V [][]|$, and the number of edges $→$. We write $Ω(V)$ for the set of priorities $\{Ω(v) \mid v ∈ V\}$, and denote the number of priorities in the game by $|Ω(V)|$. The number of vertices with priority $k$ is represented by $|Ω−1(k)|$. The complexity of most parity game algorithms is expressed in these quantities. For parity games in which either $|V□| = 0$ or $|V [][]| = 0$, special polynomial time solving algorithms are available, see [30].

**Degrees.** Typical structural properties in the graph are the in- and out-degrees of vertices, i.e., the number of incoming and outgoing edges of vertices. Formally, for vertex $v ∈ V$, $\text{indeg}(v) = |\{u ∈ V \mid u → v\}|$, $\text{outdeg}(v) = |\{w ∈ V \mid v → w\}|$, and $\deg(v) = |\{w ∈ V \mid v → w ∨ w → v\}|$ are the in-degree, out-degree and degree of $v$. We consider the minimum, maximum and average of these values.

The degrees of vertices might have an effect on, e.g., algorithms that use lifting strategies to propagate information between vertices. Examples of such algorithms are small progress measures [43] and the strategy improvement algorithm [68].

**Strongly Connected Components.** The strongly connected components (SCCs) of a graph are the maximal strongly connected subgraphs. More formally, a strongly connected component is a maximal set $C ⊆ V$ for which, for all $u, v ∈ C$, $u →^* v$, i.e., each vertex in $C$ can reach every other vertex in $C$.

The strongly connected components in a graph induce a quotient graph. Let $\text{sccs}(G)$ denote the strongly connected components of the graph. The quotient graph is the graph $(\text{sccs}(G), →')$ and for $C_1, C_2 ∈ \text{sccs}(G)$, there is an edge $C_1 →' C_2$ if and only if $C_1 ≠ C_2$ and there exist $u ∈ C_1$ and $v ∈ C_2$ such that $u → v$. Observe that the quotient graph is a directed acyclic graph.

We say that an SCC $C$ is **trivial** if $|C| = 1$ and $C ∉ C$, i.e., it only contains one vertex and no edges, and we say that $C$ is **terminal** if $C ∉ C'$, i.e., its outdegree in the quotient graph is 0. The **SCC quotient height** of a graph is the length of the longest path in the quotient graph.

Parity game algorithms and heuristics can benefit from a decomposition into strongly connected components (SCCs). One prominent example of this is the global parity game solving algorithm presented by Friedmann and Lange [30], for which it was shown that SCC decomposition generally works well in practice.

**Properties of Search Strategies.** Given some initial vertex $v_0 ∈ V$, breadth-first search (BFS) and depth-first search (DFS) are search strategies that can be used to systematically explore all vertices in the graph. The fundamental difference between BFS and DFS is that the BFS maintains a queue of vertices that still need to be processed, whereas the DFS maintains a stack of vertices. We record the queue and stack sizes during the search.
Breadth-first search induces a natural notion of levels, where a vertex is at level $k$ if it has least distance $k$ to $v_0$. The **BFS height** of a graph is $k$ if $k$ is the maximal non-empty level of the BFS. For each level the number of vertices at that level is recorded. During a BFS, three kinds of edges can be detected, viz. edges that go to a vertex that was not yet seen, edges that go to a vertex that was seen, but has not yet been processed (i.e., vertices in the queue) and edges that go back to a vertex on a previous level. This last type of edges is also referred to as a **back-level edge**. Formally it is an edge $u \rightarrow v$ where the level of $u$, say $k_u$, is larger than the level of $v$, say $k_v$. The length of a back-level edge $u \rightarrow v$ is $k_u - k_v$.

Graph algorithms are typically based on a search strategy like BFS or DFS, given some initial vertex $v_0 \in V$. The characteristics of these search strategies are therefore likely to affect the performance of such graph algorithms.

**Width-measures on Graphs.** Width-measures of graphs are based on cops-and-robbers games [56,63], where different measures are obtained by varying the rules of the game. For various measures, specialised algorithms are known that can solve games polynomially if their width is bounded. Most of the measures have an alternative characterisation using graph decompositions.

The classical width notion for undirected graphs is **treewidth** [64,11]. Intuitively, the treewidth of a graph expresses how tree-like the graph is—the treewidth of a tree is 1. This corresponds to the idea that some problems are easier to solve for trees, or graphs that are almost trees, than for arbitrary graphs. For directed graphs, the treewidth is defined as the treewidth of the graph obtained by forgetting the direction of the edges. The complexity for solving parity games is bounded in the treewidth [57]; this means that, for parity games with a small, constant treewidth, parity game solving is polynomial.

Treewidth has been lifted to directed graphs in a number of different ways. For instance, **Directed treewidth** [41] is bounded by the treewidth [1]. **DAG-width** [7] describes how much a graph is like a directed acyclic graph. DAG-width bounds the directed tree width of a graph from above, and is at most the treewidth. The **Kelly-width** [40] is yet another generalization of treewidth to directed graphs. If the Kelly-width of a graph is bounded, then also a bound on its directed treewidth can be given, however, classes of directed graphs with bounded directed treewidth and unbounded Kelly-width exist. **Entanglement** [9,10] is a graph measure that aims to express how much the cycles in a graph are intertwined. If an undirected graph has bounded treewidth or bounded DAG-width, then it also has bounded entanglement. Finally, **clique-width** [19] measures how close a graph is to a complete bipartite graph. For every directed graph with bounded treewidth an exponential upper bound on its clique-width can be given. Unlike the other width measures that we discussed clique-width does not have a characterisation in terms of cops-and-robbers games.

If a parity game is bounded to a constant in any of the measures introduced above, it can be solved in polynomial time.
Alternation Depth. Typically, the complexity of parity game algorithms is expressed in the number of vertices, the number of edges, and the number of priorities in the game. If we look at other verification problems, such as μ-calculus model checking, or solving Boolean equation systems, the complexity is typically expressed in terms of the *alternation depth*. Different versions of alternation depth (with varying precision) have been coined, see [14]. Intuitively, the alternation depth of a formula captures the number of alternations between different fixed point symbols.

Analogous to the definition of alternation depth for modal equation systems by Cleaveland *et al.* [18], our definition consists of two parts. First we define the nesting depth of a strongly connected component within a parity game, next we define the alternation depth of the parity game as the maximum of the nesting depths of its strongly connected components.

**Definition 1.** Let $G = (V_\square, V_\Diamond, \to, \Omega)$ be a parity game, and let $\text{sccs}(G)$ be the set of strongly connected components of $G$. Let $\mathcal{C} \in \text{sccs}(G)$ be a strongly connected component. The nesting depth of $v_i$ in $\mathcal{C}$ is given by

\[
\text{nd}(v_i, \mathcal{C}) \triangleq \max\{1, \max\{\text{nd}(v_j, \mathcal{C}) \mid v_j \to^*_{\mathcal{C}, \Omega(v_i)} v_i, v_j \neq v_i \text{ and } \Omega(v_i) \equiv_2 \Omega(v_j)\}, \\
\max\{\text{nd}(v_j, \mathcal{C}) + 1 \mid v_j \to^*_{\mathcal{C}, \Omega(v_i)} v_i \text{ and } \Omega(v_i) \not\equiv_2 \Omega(v_j)\}\}
\]

where $v_j \to^*_{\mathcal{C}, k} v_i$ if $v_j \to v_i$ is an edge in the SCC $\mathcal{C}$ with $\Omega(v_j) \leq k$ and $\Omega(v_i) \leq k$. Intuitively, the nesting depth of a vertex $v$ counts the number of alternations between even and odd priorities on paths of descending priorities in the SCC of $v$. Note that this is well-defined since we forbid paths between identical nodes.

The nesting depth of an SCC $\mathcal{C} \in \text{sccs}(G)$ is defined as the maximum nesting depth of any vertices in $\mathcal{C}$, i.e., $\text{nd}(\mathcal{C}) \triangleq \max\{\text{nd}(v, \mathcal{C}) \mid v \in \mathcal{C}\}$. The *alternation depth* of a parity game is defined as the maximal nesting depth of its SCCs.

**Definition 2.** Let $G = (V_\square, V_\Diamond, \to, \Omega)$ be a parity game, and let $\text{sccs}(G)$ be the set of strongly connected components of $G$. Then the alternation depth of $G$ is defined as $\text{ad}(G) \triangleq \max\{\text{nd}(\mathcal{C}) \mid \mathcal{C} \in \text{sccs}(G)\}$.

There are reasonable translations of the μ-calculus model checking problem into parity games, such that the alternation depth of the resulting parity game is at most the fixed point alternation depth of the μ-calculus formula as described by Emerson and Lei [25], see [45, Proposition 5.4]. Note that the alternation depth of a game can be smaller than the number of priorities in the game, and could provide an interesting alternative to the number of priorities in computing the complexity of parity game algorithms.

Other measures. When studying structural properties for labelled transition systems, other global measures such as diameter and girth have been considered.
The diameter is the maximal length of a shortest path between any pair of vertices. The girth is the length of the shortest cycle in the graph. Also, local properties such as the number of diamonds and the k-neighbourhood were studied. These measures could be considered for parity games as well, but currently there is no clear indication that they are related to the performance of parity game algorithms. These measures and their analysis with respect to the games presented in the next section have been described in more detail in the extended version [46].

3 Benchmarks

For benchmarking parity game algorithms, it makes sense to distinguish three classes of parity games, (1) the games that are the result of encoding a problem into parity games, (2) games that represent hard cases for certain algorithms, and (3) random games. All three classes of games occur in the literature, and our benchmark set contains games from each of these classes. In the rest of this section we discuss our benchmarks. In the next section we briefly discuss these games with respect to the properties described in Section 2.

3.1 Encodings

A broad range of verification problems can be encoded as a parity game. The most prominent examples of these are the $\mu$-calculus model checking problem—does a model satisfy a given property?—, equivalence checking problems—are two models equivalent?—, decision procedures—is a formula valid or satisfiable?— and synthesis—given a property, give a model that satisfies the property.

Model Checking. The model checking problems we consider are mainly selected from the literature. All of the systems are encodings that, given a model $L$ of a system, and a property $\varphi$, encode the model checking problem $L \models \varphi$, i.e., does $L$ satisfy property $\varphi$. Most sensible encodings of model checking problems typically lead to a low number of priorities, corresponding to the low alternation depths of these properties. We verify fairness, liveness and safety properties. This set includes, but is not limited to, the model checking problems described in [54,75,30,21,22].

We take a number of communication protocols from the literature, see, e.g., [4,15,48,38]: two variations of the Alternating Bit Protocol (ABP), the Concurrent Alternating Bit Protocol (CABP), the Positive Acknowledgement with Retransmission Protocol (PAR), the Bounded Retransmission Protocol (BRP), the Onebit sliding window protocol, and the Sliding Window Protocol (SWP). All protocols are parameterised with the number of messages that can be sent, and the sliding window protocol is parameterised by the window size. For these protocols a number of properties of varying complexity was considered, ranging from alternation free properties, e.g. deadlock freedom, to fairness properties.
A Cache Coherence Protocol (CCP) [76] and a wait-free handshake register (Hesselink) [39] are considered. For the cache coherence protocol we consider a number of properties from [59] and for the register we consider properties from [39]. Additionally we consider a leader election protocol for which we verify whether it eventually stabilises.

To obtain parity games with a high degree of alternation between vertices owned by different players we also consider a number of two-player board games, viz. Clobber [2], Domineering [34], Hex, see e.g. [5,52], Othello, also known as reversi, see e.g. [65], and Snake. For these games we check for each of the players whether the player has a winning strategy starting from the initial configuration of the game. The games are parameterised by their board size.

Additionally, we consider a number of industrial model checking problems. The first is a system for lifting trucks (Lift) [37], of which we consider both a correct and an incorrect version. We verify the liveness and safety properties described in [37]. For the IEEE 1394 Link Layer Protocol (1394) we verify the properties from [51]. We translated the ACTL properties from [71] to the $\mu$-calculus.

Finally, we check the Elevator described by Friedmann and Lange, in a version in which requests are treated on a first-in-first-out basis (FIFO), and on a last-in-first-out basis (LIFO). We then check whether, globally, if the lift is requested on the top floor, then it is eventually served. This holds for the FIFO version, but does not hold for the LIFO version of the model. The elevator model is parameterised by the strategy and the number of floors. Furthermore we consider the parity games generated using an encoding of an LTS with a $\mu$-calculus formula, as well as the direct encoding presented in [30]. In a similar way we consider the Hanoi towers from [30] as well as our own version of this problem.

**Equivalence Checking.** Given two processes $L_1, L_2$, the problem whether $L_1 \equiv L_2$, for relations $\equiv$, denoting that $L_1$ and $L_2$ are equivalent under some process equivalence, can be encoded as a parity game [50,77]. We consider strong bisimulation, weak bisimulation, branching bisimulation and branching simulation equivalence in our benchmarks, using the approach described in [17]. The number of different priorities in these parity games is limited to 2, but they do include alternations between vertices owned by different players.

Here we again use the specifications of the communication protocols that we also used for model checking, i.e., two ABP versions, CABP, PAR, Onebit and SWP. In addition we include a model of a buffer. We vary the capacity of the buffer, the number of messages that can be transmitted, and the window size in the sliding window protocol. We compare each pair of protocols using all four equivalences, resulting in both positive and negative cases. These cases are a superset of the ones described in [21,22].

In addition, we include a comparison of the implementation of the wait-free handshake register with a possible specification. The implementation is trace equivalent to the specification, but it is not equivalent with respect to the equivalences that we consider here.
Decision Procedures. Parity games can also be obtained from decision procedures for temporal logics such as LTL, CTL, CTL*, PDL and the $\mu$-calculus. Friedmann et al. presented a decision procedure that is based on a combination of infinite tableaux in which the existence of a tableau is coded as a parity game [33]. For a given formula, it is checked whether it is (1) valid, i.e., whether the formula holds in all models, or (2) satisfiable, i.e., whether the formula is satisfiable in some model.

Our benchmark set includes a number of scalable satisfiability and validity problems that are provided as examples for the MLSolver tool [32]. In particular, we include the benchmarks used in [32]: encoding that a deterministic parity condition is expressible as a nondeterministic Büchi condition, and nesting Kleene stars in different logics. Additionally we consider formulas that involve encodings of a binary counter in various logics.

Synthesis. Another problem that involves solving parity games is the LTL synthesis problem. Traditional synthesis approaches convert a formula into a nondeterministic Büchi automaton, which is, in turn, transformed into a deterministic parity automaton using Safra’s construction [66]. Emptiness of this deterministic parity automaton can then be checked using parity games with three priorities. Synthesis tools have been implemented that employ parity games internally, most notably GOAL [74] and Gist [16]. All synthesis tools that we are aware of, however, are research quality tools, of which we have not been able to obtain working versions on current computing platforms. As a result, our benchmark set currently does not include parity games obtained from the synthesis problem. We plan to extend our benchmarks with such games, and update [46] accordingly.

3.2 Hard Games

The interesting complexity of solving parity games, and its link to the model checking problem, have led to the conception of a large number of parity game solving algorithms. For most of these algorithms it has long been an open problem whether they have exponential lower bounds.

We consider the games described by Jurdziński that shows the exponential lower bound for small progress measures [43], the ladder games described by Friedmann [28] defeating strategy guessing heuristics, recursive ladder games that give a lower bound for the recursive algorithms, and model checker ladder games [27] for which the algorithm by Stevens and Stirling [72] behaves exponentially.

3.3 Random Games

The final class of games that is typically used in publications that empirically evaluate the performance of algorithms on parity games are random parity games [6,69,68,49,30]. We study three classes of random games. We expect that the structural properties of random games are, typically, different from parity games.
obtained in the previous classes. This class is, therefore, unlikely to give insights in the performance of parity game algorithms on practical problems.

4 Implementation

All games were generated on a 1TB main memory, 56-core Linux machine, where each core was running at 2.27GHz. Executions of tools generating and solving parity games, and tools collecting statistics about parity games, were limited to running times of 1 hour and their memory usage was limited to 32GB.

To systematically generate the benchmarks, we have implemented tooling that allows the parallel execution of individual cases. Here a case is either generating or solving a game, or collecting a single measure. Each individual case only uses a single core. The tools are implemented in an extensible way, i.e., additional parity games, additional encodings, as well as additional measures can be added straightforwardly. The tools are available for download from https://github.com/jkeiren/paritygame-generator.

4.1 Generating Parity Games

For the generation of our benchmarks we rely on a number of external tools: version 3.3 of PGSolver [31] for generating random games, and games that prove to be hard for certain algorithms; version 1.2 of MLSolver to generate the games for satisfiability and validity problems [32]; and revision 11703 of the mCRL2 toolset [20] for the model checking and equivalence checking problems. For all games we have collected the information described in Section 2 to the extent in which this is feasible.

4.2 Collecting Statistics

We developed the tool pginfo for collecting structural information from parity games. The tool is available from https://github.com/jkeiren/pginfo and accepts parity games in the file format used by PGSolver. The tool reads a parity game, and writes statistics to a file in a structured way.

The implementation is built on top of the Boost Graph library [70], which provides data structures and basic algorithms for manipulating graphs. Computing the exact value for the width-measures is problematic: it is known to be NP-complete [3]. Approximation algorithms are known that compute upper- and lower bound for these measures; especially for treewidth these have been thoroughly studied [12,13]. To determine feasibility of computing width-measures for our benchmarks we have implemented three approximation algorithms. For computing upper and lower bounds on treewidth we implemented the greedy degree algorithm [12] and the minor min-width algorithm [36], respectively. For computing an upper bound of the Kelly-width we implemented the elimination ordering described in [40]. Even these approximation algorithms have proven to be impractical due to their complexity. Computing (bounds) on the other width measures is equally complex.
4.3 Availability of Parity Games

All parity games that are described in this paper are available for download from http://www.github.com/jkeiren/paritygame-generator in bzip2 compressed PG-Solver format [31]. The dataset is approximately 10GB in size, and includes the structural information that was collected from these games.

5 Analysis of Benchmarks

We have presented benchmarks originating from different problems. Next we analyse them with respect to the measures described in Section 2. This analysis illustrates that our benchmarks exhibit a wide variety of properties. Furthermore, this gives us some insights in the characteristics of typical parity games. For each of the statistics, we only consider games for which that specific statistic could be computed within an hour, and we only include those statistics that can feasibly be computed for the majority of games, as a consequence the width measure are excluded from the analysis we present here. We used this selection to avoid timeouts for computing the measures that are expensive to compute. All graphs in this section are labelled by their class. Note that the satisfiability and validity problems are labelled by “mlsolver” and the games that are hard for some solving algorithms are labelled by “specialcases”. The full data presented in this chapter is also available from http://www.github.com/jkeiren/paritygame-generator. Due to lack of space, we cannot present an analysis of all measures.

Our data set contains 1037 parity games that range from 2 vertices to 40 million vertices, and on average they have about 95,000 vertices. The number of edges ranges from 2 to 167 million, with an average of about 3.1 million. The 59 parity games are games in which all vertices are owned by a single player, the so-called solitaire games [8], the rest are parity games in which both players own non-empty sets of vertices. The parity games that we consider have differing degrees. There are instances in which the average degree is 1, the average degree is maximally 9999, but it is typically below 10. The ratio between the number of vertices and the number of edges is, therefore, relatively small in general. This can also be observed from Figure 1a, which displays the correlation between the two. The games in which these numbers coincide are on the line $x = y$, the other games lie around this line due to the log scale that we use. Our parity games generally contain a vertex with in-degree 0, which is the starting vertex. Most of the games contain vertices with a high in-degree—typically representing vertices that are trivially won by either of the players—, and vertices with a high out-degree.

In general, the SCC quotient height ranges up to 513 for the parity games that we consider with an average of around 14. The number of non-trivial SCCs can grow large, up to 1.4 million for our games.

We have included parity games with alternation depths up to 50,000 as shown in Figure 1b. Observe that the games for model checking and equivalence checking included in our benchmarks all have alternation depth at most 2. Model
checking problems could be formulated that have a higher alternation depth—up to arbitrary numbers—however, in practice properties have limited alternation depth because they become too hard to understand otherwise. The satisfiability and validity properties have alternation depths between 1 and 4. The alternation depths of the random games are between 10 and 15. All parity games with more than 50 priorities represent special cases. Closer investigation shows that these special cases are the clique games and recursive ladder games.

To summarise, we have presented a large set of parity games. For a selection of the structural properties introduced in Section 2 we have shown that the games cover a large range of values. Due to space restrictions we have not covered all structural properties here, we refer to [46] for a more detailed analysis. Also observe that, for parity game specific properties such as alternation depth, higher values are only available for smaller games due to generation times. Unsurprisingly, the random games considered in this paper are not structurally similar to parity games that represent encodings of verification problems.

6 Closing Remarks

No standard benchmarks for parity game algorithms existed. As a consequence, it was virtually impossible to make a good comparison between algorithms and applications described in the literature. In this paper we have addressed this issue by presenting a comprehensive set of parity game benchmarks. Our benchmarks include the games that appear in the literature, and provides a first step towards standardising experimental evaluation of parity game algorithms. All games have been generated in an extensible way, and are available on-line.

We also presented a set of structural properties for parity games, and analysed our benchmarks with respect to these properties. Of particular interest is a
new notion of alternation depth for parity games, that is always at most the number of priorities in a parity game, and that is bounded also by the alternation depth of \( \mu \)-calculus formulae given a reasonable translation of the model checking problem.

**Future work.** Some of the structural properties, such as treewidth, cannot be computed for all games in the benchmark suite due to their complexity. An interesting algorithmic question is, therefore, whether algorithms or heuristics can be devised that can compute or approximate these measures for large graphs.

Additionally, we have presented a selection of structural properties in this paper. One can wonder whether there are other structural properties of parity games that are relevant to the practical performance of parity game algorithms. The question whether the theoretical complexity of existing parity game algorithms can be made tighter using structural properties, such as our notion of alternation depth is left open.

We believe our work also paves the way for a full-scale comparison of parity game algorithms and the effect of heuristics in the spirit of [30], including the comparison of alternative implementations of algorithms [20,23]. Here also the impact of the structural properties on the performance of implementations should be studied, since we have only scratched the surface of this aspect in this paper.

Finally, we welcome the addition of problems and properties to our benchmark suite to establish and maintain a corpus for experimentation with parity game algorithms. In particular parity games with a large number of priorities and a high alternation depth stemming from encodings of, e.g., verification and synthesis problems form a welcome addition.

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A Theory of Integrating Tamper Evidence with Stabilization

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Abstract. We propose the notion of tamper-evident stabilization –that combines stabilization with the concept of tamper evidence– for computing systems. On the first glance, these notions are contradictory; stabilization requires that eventually the system functionality is fully restored whereas tamper evidence requires that the system functionality is permanently degraded in the event of tampering. Tamper-evident stabilization captures the intuition that the system will tolerate perturbation up to a limit. In the event that it is perturbed beyond that limit, it will exhibit permanent evidence of tampering, where it may provide reduced (possibly none) functionality. We compare tamper-evident stabilization with (conventional) stabilization and with active stabilization and propose an approach to verify tamper-evident stabilizing programs in polynomial time. We demonstrate tamper-evident stabilization with two examples and argue how approaches for designing stabilization can be used to design tamper-evident stabilization. We also study issues of composition in tamper-evident stabilization. Finally, we point out how tamper-evident stabilization can effectively be used to provide tradeoff between fault-prevention and fault tolerance.

Keywords: Self-stabilization, reactive systems, adversary, formal methods

1 Introduction

In this paper, we introduce the notion of tamper-evident stabilizing systems, and study these systems in the context of composition, verification, and synthesis. The notion of tamper-evident stabilizing systems is motivated by the need for

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tamper-resistant systems that also stabilize. A tamper-resistant system ensures that an effort to tamper with the system makes the system less useful/inoperable (e.g., by zeroing out sensitive data in a chip or voiding the warranty). The notion of tamper resistance is contradictory to the notion of stabilization in that the notion of stabilization requires that in spite of any possible tampering the system inherently acquires its usefulness eventually.

Intuitively, the notion of tamper-evident stabilization is based on the observation that all tamper-resistant systems tolerate some level of tampering without making the system less useful/inoperable. For example, a tamper-resistant chip may have a circuitry that does some rudimentary checks on the input and discards the input if the check fails. A communication protocol may use CRC to ensure that most random bit-flips in the message are tolerated without affecting the system. However, if the tampering is beyond acceptable level then they become less useful/inoperable. Based on this intuition, we observe that a tamper-evident stabilizing system will recover to its legitimate state if its perturbation is within an acceptable limit. However, if it is perturbed outside this boundary, it will make itself inoperable. Moreover, when the system enters the mode of making itself inoperable, it is necessary that it cannot be prevented.

Thus, if the system is outside its normal legitimate states, it is in one of two modes: recovery mode, where it is trying to restore itself to a legitimate state, or tamper-evident mode, where it is trying to make itself inoperable. The recovery mode is similar to the typical stabilizing systems in that the recovery should be guaranteed after external perturbations stop. However, in the tamper-evident mode, it is essential that the system makes itself inoperable even if outside perturbations continue.

To realize the last requirement, we need to make certain assumptions about what external perturbations can be performed during tamper-evident mode. For example, if these perturbations could restore the system to a legitimate state then designing tamper-evident stabilizing systems is impossible. Hence, we view the system execution to consist of (1) program executions (in the absence of fault and adversary); (2) program executions in the presence of faults; and (3) program execution in the presence of adversary.

Faults are random events that perturb the system randomly and rarely. By contrast, the adversary is actively preventing the system from making itself inoperable. However, unlike faults, the adversary may not be able to perturb the system to an arbitrary state. Also, unlike faults, adversary may continue to execute forever. Even if the adversary executes forever, it is necessary that system actions have some fairness during execution. Hence, we assume that the system can make some number (in our formal definitions, we have this as strictly greater than 1) of steps between two steps of the adversary.

The contributions of the paper are as follows. We

- formally define the notion of tamper-evident stabilization;
- compare the notion of tamper-evident stabilization with (conventional) stabilization and active stabilization, where a system stabilizes in spite of the interference of an adversary [7];
explanation of automated verification of tamper-evident stabilization;
- present some theorems about composing tamper-evident stabilizing systems;
- identify how methods for designing stabilizing programs can be used in designing tamper-evident stabilizing systems. We also identify potential obstacles in using those methods, and
- identify potential applications of tamper-evident stabilization and illustrate it with two examples.

**Organization.** The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we present the preliminary concepts on stabilization. We introduce the notion of tamper-evident stabilization, illustrate it with two examples, and compare it with (conventional) stabilization and active stabilization in Section 3. Section 4 represents an algorithm for automatic verification of tamper-evident stabilizing programs. We evaluate the composition of tamper-evident stabilizing systems in Section 5 and discuss a design methodology for tamper-evident stabilizing programs in Section 6. The relationship between tamper-evident stabilization and other stabilizing techniques is discussed in Section 7, and finally, Section 8 concludes our paper.

## 2 Preliminaries

Our program modeling utilizes standard approach for defining interleaving programs, stabilization [3, 11, 12], and active stabilization [7]. A program includes a finite set of variables with finite (or any finite abstraction of an infinite state system) domain. It also includes guarded commands (a.k.a. actions) [11] that update those program variables atomically. Since these internal variables are not needed in the definitions involved in this section, we describe a program in terms of its state space $S_p$, and its transitions $\delta_p \subseteq S_p \times S_p$, where $S_p$ is obtained by assigning each variable in $p$ a value from its domain.

**Definition 1 (Program).** A program $p$ is of the form $(S_p, \delta_p)$ where $S_p$ is the state space of program $p$ and $\delta_p \subseteq S_p \times S_p$.

**Definition 2 (State Predicate).** A state predicate of $p$ is any subset of $S_p$.

**Definition 3 (Computation).** Let $p$ be a program with state space $S_p$ and transitions $\delta_p$. We say that a sequence $\langle s_0, s_1, s_2, \ldots \rangle$ is a computation iff

- $\forall j \geq 0 :: (s_j, s_{j+1}) \in \delta_p$

**Definition 4 (Closure).** A state predicate $S$ of $p = (S_p, \delta_p)$ is closed in $p$ iff $\forall s_0, s_1 \in S_p :: (s_0 \in S \land (s_0, s_1) \in \delta_p) \Rightarrow (s_1 \in S)$.

**Definition 5 (Invariant).** A state predicate $S$ is an invariant of $p$ iff $S$ is closed in $p$. 

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Remark 1. Normally, the definition of invariant (legitimate states) also includes a requirement that computations of $p$ that start from an invariant state are correct with respect to its specification. The theory of tamper-evident stabilization is independent of the behaviors of the program inside legitimate states. Instead, it only focuses on the behavior of $p$ outside its legitimate states. We have defined the invariant in terms of the closure property alone since it is the only relevant property in the definitions/theorems/examples in this paper.

Definition 6 (Convergence). Let $p$ be a program with state space $S_p$ and transitions $\delta_p$. Let $S$ and $T$ be state predicates of $p$. We say that $T$ converges to $S$ in $p$ iff

- $S \subseteq T$,
- $S$ is closed in $p$,
- $T$ is closed in $p$, and
- For any computation $\sigma = (s_0, s_1, s_2, \ldots)$ of $p$ if $s_0 \in T$ then there exists $l$ such that $s_l \in S$.

Definition 7 (Stabilization). Let $p$ be a program with state space $S_p$ and transitions $\delta_p$. We say that program $p$ is stabilizing for invariant $S$ iff $S_p$ converges to $S$ in $p$.

Using the approach in [7, 15], we define the adversary as follows and define the notion of tamper-evident stabilization with respect to the capabilities of the given adversary in Section 3.

Definition 8 (Adversary). We define an adversary for program $p = (S_p, \delta_p)$ to be a subset of $S_p \times S_p$.

Next, we define a computation of the program, say $p$, in the presence of the adversary, say $adv$.

Definition 9 ($\langle p, adv, k \rangle$-computation). Let $p$ be a program with state space $S_p$ and transitions $\delta_p$. Let $adv$ be an adversary for program $p$ and $k$ be an integer greater than 1. We say that a sequence $(s_0, s_1, s_2, \ldots)$ is a $\langle p, adv, k \rangle$-computation iff

- $\forall j \geq 0 :: s_j \in S_p$, and
- $\forall j \geq 0 :: (s_j, s_{j+1}) \in \delta_p \cup adv$, and
- $\forall j \geq 0 :: ((s_j, s_{j+1}) \notin \delta_p) \Rightarrow (\forall l \mid j < l < j + k :: (s_l, s_{l+1}) \in \delta_p)$

Observe that a $\langle p, adv, k \rangle$-computation guarantees that there are at least $k - 1$ program transitions/actions between any two adversary actions for $k > 1$. Moreover, the adversary is not required to execute in a $\langle p, adv, k \rangle$-computation.

Remark 2 (Fairness among program transitions). The above definition and definition 3 only consider fairness between program actions and adversary actions. If a program requires fairness among its actions to ensure stabilization, they can be strengthened accordingly. For reasons of space, this issue is outside the scope of this paper.
Definition 10 (Convergence in the presence of adversary). Let $p$ be a program with state space $S_p$ and transitions $\delta_p$. Let $S$ and $T$ be state predicates of $p$. Let $adv$ be an adversary for $p$ and let $k$ be an integer greater than 1. We say that $T$ ($adv; k$)-converges to $S$ in $p$ in the presence of adversary $adv$ iff:

- $S \subseteq T$,
- $S$ is closed in $p \cup adv$,
- $T$ is closed in $p \cup adv$, and
- For any $(p, adv, k)$-computation $\sigma = (s_0, s_1, s_2, ...)$ if $s_0 \in T$ then there exists $l$ such that $s_l \in S$.

Definition 11 (Active stabilization). Let $p$ be a program with state space $S_p$ and transitions $\delta_p$. Let $adv$ be an adversary for program $p$ and $k$ be an integer greater than 1. We say that program $p$ is $k$-active stabilizing with adversary $adv$ for invariant $S$ iff $S_p$ ($p, adv, k$)-converges to $S$ in $p$.

3 Tamper-Evident Stabilization

This section defines the notion of tamper-evident stabilization, illustrates it in the context of two examples, and compares it with the notion of (conventional) stabilization and active stabilization.

3.1 The Definition of Tamper-Evident Stabilization

In this section, we define the notion of tamper-evident stabilization.

Definition 12 (Tamper-evident stabilization). Let $p$ be a program with state space $S_p$ and transitions $\delta_p$. Let $adv$ be an adversary for program $p$. And let $k$ be an integer greater than 1. We say that program $p$ is $k$-tamper-evident stabilizing with adversary $adv$ for invariants $(S_1, S_2)$ iff there exists a state predicate $T$ of $p$ such that:

- $T$ converges to $S_1$ in $p$;
- $\neg T$ ($adv, k$)-converges to $S_2$ in $p$.

From the above definition (especially closure of $T$ and $\neg T$), it follows that $S_1$ and $S_2$ must be disjoint (See Figure 1(a)). In addition, tamper-evident stabilization provides no guarantees about program behaviors if the adversary executes in $T$.

Remark 3. Observe that in the above definition $k$ must be greater than 1, as $k=1$ allows the adversary to prevent the program from executing entirely. In terms of permitted values of $k$, $k = 2$ provides the maximum power to the adversary. Hence, in most cases, in this paper we will consider $k=2$. In this case, we will omit the value of $k$. In other words tamper-evident stabilizing is the same as 2-tamper-evident stabilizing.
Fig. 1. (a) Structure of a tamper-evident stabilizing system, (b) Tamper-evident stabilizing traffic controller program

Remark 4. Based on the definition of convergence, in the above definition, \( S_1 \) should be a subset of \( T \). Given this constraint, if \( S_1 = T \) then it corresponds to a pure tamper evident system. If such a system is perturbed to a non-legitimate state then it is guaranteed to recover to \( S_2 \) even in the presence of an adversary. And, if \( T = S_p \), then it corresponds to a stabilizing program (cf. Theorem 3). Thus, tamper-evident stabilization captures a range of systems from the ones that are pure tamper-evident and that are pure stabilizing.

The notion of tamper-evident stabilization prescribes the behavior of the program from all possible states. In this respect, it is similar to the notion of stabilizing fault tolerance. In [3], authors introduce the notion of nonmasking fault tolerance; it only prescribes behaviors in a subset of states. We can extend the notion of tamper-evident stabilization in a similar manner. We do so by simply overloading the definition of tamper-evident stabilization.

Definition 13 (Tamper-evident stabilization in environment \( U \)). Let \( p \) be a program with state space \( S_p \) and transitions \( \delta_p \). Let \( adv \) be an adversary for program \( p \), and \( U \) be a state predicate. Moreover, let \( k \) be an integer greater than 1. We say that program \( p \) is \( k \)-tamper-evident stabilizing with adversary \( adv \) for invariants \( (S_1, S_2) \) in environment \( U \) iff there exists a state predicate \( T \) such that

- \( S_1, S_2, \) and \( T \) are subsets of \( U \),
- \( U \) is closed in \( p \cup adv \),
- \( U \Rightarrow (T \text{ converges to } S_1 \text{ in } p) \),
- \( U \Rightarrow \neg T \text{ (adv, } k \text{-converges to } S_2 \text{ in } p) \).

Observe that if \( U \) equals \( true \) then the above definition is identical to that of Definition 12.

3.2 The Token Ring Program

This section describes the well-known token ring program [10] and then represent that this program is tamper-evident stabilizing. The program consists of \( N \)
processes arranged in a ring. Each process $j$, $0 \leq j \leq N - 1$, has a variable $x.j$ with the domain \{0, 1, \cdots, N - 1\}. To model the impact of adversary actions on a process $j$, we add an auxiliary variable $up.j$, where process $j$ has failed iff $up.j$ is false. We say, a process $j$, $1 \leq j \leq N - 1$, has the token iff processes $j$ and $j - 1$ have not failed and $x.j \neq x.(j - 1)$. If process $j$, $1 \leq j \leq N - 1$, has a token then it copies the value of $x.(j - 1)$ to $x.j$. The process 0 has the token iff processes 0 and $N - 1$ have not failed and $x.(N - 1) = x.0$. If process 0 has the token then it increments its value in modulo $N$ arithmetic (we show modulo $N$ arithmetic by notation $+_N$). Thus, the actions of the program are as follows:

$$
TR_0 ::= \quad \begin{cases} 
up.0 \land up.(N - 1) \land x.0 = x.(N - 1) & \rightarrow x.0 := (x.(N - 1) +_N 1) \\
up.j \land up.(j - 1) \land x.j \neq x.(j - 1) & \rightarrow x.j := x.(j - 1);
\end{cases}
$$

**Adversary action.** The adversary can cause any process to fail. Hence, the adversary action can be represented as

$$
TR_{adv} ::= up.j \rightarrow up.j := false
$$

**Tamper-evident stabilization of the program.** To show that the token ring program $TR$ is tamper-evident stabilizing in the presence of the adversary $TR_{adv}$, we define the predicate $T_{tr}$ and invariants $S_{1tr}$ and $S_{2tr}$, as follows:

$$
T_{tr} = \forall j : up.j
$$

$$
S_{1tr} = T_{tr} \land (\forall j : 1 \leq j \leq N - 1 : (x.j = x.(j - 1)) \lor (x.(j - 1) = x.j + _N 1))
\land ((x.0 = x.(N - 1)) \lor (x.0 = x.(N - 1) + _N 1))
$$

$$
S_{2tr} = \neg T_{tr} \land (\forall j : 1 \leq j \leq N - 1 : (up.j \land up.(j - 1)) \Rightarrow x.j = x.(j - 1))
\land ((up.0 \land up.(N - 1)) \Rightarrow (x.0 \neq x.(N - 1)))
$$

**Theorem 1.** The token ring program $TR$ is tamper-evident stabilizing with adversary $TR_{adv}$ for invariants $(S_{1tr}, S_{2tr})$.

**Proof.** If $T_{tr}$ is true then the program is essentially the same as the token ring program from [11] and, hence, it stabilizes to $S_{1tr}$. If $T_{tr}$ is violated then the token cannot go past failed process(es). Hence, $S_{2tr}$ would eventually be satisfied. Note that for the second constraint, adversary action (that may fail a process) cannot prevent the program from reaching $S_{2tr}$. \hfill \Box

### 3.3 Tamper-Evident Stabilizing Traffic Controller Program

This section describes another tamper-evident stabilizing program that illustrates a traffic light program that (1) recovers to normal operation from perturbations that do not cause the system to reach an unsafe state, and (2) permanently preserves the evidence of tampering if perturbations cause the system to reach an unsafe state. This example also illustrates why tamper-evident stabilization is desirable over (conventional) stabilization in some circumstances. Moreover, it can be used as a part of multiphase recovery [6] where a quick recovery is provided to safe states and complete recovery to legitimate states can be obtained later (or with human intervention).
Description of the program. In this program, we have an intersection with two one-way roads [5]. Each road is associated with a signal that can be either green (G), yellow (Y), red (R), or flashing (F). As expected, in any normal state, at least one of the signals should be red to ensure that traffic accidents do not occur.

If such a system is perturbed by an adversary where an adversary can somehow affect the signal operation causing safety violations then it is crucial that such an occurrence is noted for potential investigation. (These adversary actions can be triggered with simple transient faults that reset clock variables. For simplicity, we omit the cause of such adversary actions and only consider their effects.) In this example, we consider the requirement that if both signals are simultaneously yellow or green then the system must reach a state where both signals are flashing to indicate a signal malfunction due to adversary.

Thus, this program consists of two variables \( \text{sig}_0 \) and \( \text{sig}_1 \). The program consists of five actions: The first two actions are responsible for normal operation where a signal changes from \( G \) to \( Y \) to \( R \) and back to \( G \). The third action considers the case where the system is perturbed outside legitimate states (e.g., by transient faults) and it is desirable that the system recovers from that state. The fourth action considers the case where the adversary actions perturb the system beyond an acceptable level and, hence, it is necessary that the system enters the tamper-evident state. Thus, the program actions are as follows: (In this program, \( j \) is instantiated to be either 0 or 1, and \( k \) is instantiated to be \( 1 - j \).)

\[
\begin{align*}
TC_{1j} &:: (\text{sig}_j = G) \land (\text{sig}_k = R) \rightarrow \text{sig}_j = Y \\
TC_{2j} &:: (\text{sig}_j = Y) \land (\text{sig}_k = R) \rightarrow (\text{sig}_j = R) \land (\text{sig}_k = G) \\
TC_{3j} &:: (\text{sig}_j = R) \land (\text{sig}_k = R) \rightarrow (\text{sig}_j = G) \\
TC_{4j} &:: ((\text{sig}_j \neq R) \land (\text{sig}_k \neq R)) \lor (\text{sig}_k = F) \rightarrow (\text{sig}_j = F) \\
TC_{5j} &:: (\text{sig}_j = F) \land (\text{sig}_k = F) \rightarrow \{\text{notify the user that the system is in } S2\}
\end{align*}
\]

Adversary actions. The adversary \( TC_{adv} \) can cause a red signal to become either yellow or green. Hence, the adversary actions can be represented as \( (j = 0, 1) \):

\[
\begin{align*}
TC_{adv1} &:: \text{sig}_j = R \rightarrow \text{sig}_j = Y \\
TC_{adv2} &:: \text{sig}_j = R \rightarrow \text{sig}_j = G
\end{align*}
\]

Tamper-evident stabilization of the program. To show that the program \( TC \) is tamper-evident stabilizing in the presence of adversary \( TC_{adv} \), we define the predicate \( T_{tc} \) and invariants \( S_{1tc} \) and \( S_{2tc} \) as follows:

\[
\begin{align*}
T_{tc} &= ((G, R), (Y, R), (R, G), (R, Y)), (R, R)) \\
S_{1tc} &= ((G, R), (Y, R), (R, G), (R, Y)) \\
S_{2tc} &= ((F, F))
\end{align*}
\]

Theorem 2. The traffic controller program \( TC \) is tamper-evident stabilizing with adversary \( TC_{adv} \) for invariants \( (S_{1tc}, S_{2tc}) \).
Proof. If $T_{tc}$ is true then the program is essentially the same as the traffic control program from [5] and, hence, it stabilizes to $S_{1_{tc}}$. If the adversary $TC_{adv}$ violates $T_{tc}$, the action $TC4$ can execute and one of the signals will be flashing. As a result, the other signal would eventually become flashing and $S_{2_{tc}}$ would be satisfied (See Figure 1(b)). □

3.4 Stabilization, Tamper-evident Stabilization, and Active Stabilization

In this section, we compare the notion of (conventional) stabilization, active stabilization and tamper-evident stabilization. Specifically, Theorem 3 considers the case where $p$ is stabilizing and evaluates whether it is tamper-evident stabilizing, and Theorem 4 considers the reverse direction. Relation with active stabilization follows trivially from these theorems.

Theorem 3. If a program $p$ is stabilizing for invariant $S$, then $p$ is $k$-tamper-evident stabilizing with adversary $adv$ for invariants $\langle S, \emptyset \rangle$, for any adversary $adv$ and $k \geq 2$.

Proof. To prove tamper-evident stabilization, we need to identify a value of $T$. We set $T = true$, representing the state space of $p$. Now, we need to show that $S_p$ converges to $S$ in $p$ and $\neg true\langle adv, k \rangle$-converges to $\emptyset$ in $p$. Of these, the former is satisfied since $p$ is stabilizing for invariant $S$, and the latter is trivially satisfied since $\neg true$ corresponds to the empty set. □

Corollary 1. If program $p$ is $k$-active stabilizing with adversary $adv$ and $k \geq 2$ for invariant $S$, then $p$ is $k$-tamper-evident stabilizing with adversary $adv$ for invariants $\langle S, \emptyset \rangle$.

Note that, if there exists $k$ and $adv$ such that program $p$ is $k$-active stabilizing with adversary $adv$ for invariant $S$, then $p$ is stabilizing for invariant $S$.

Theorem 4. If program $p = \langle S_p, \delta_p \rangle$ is $k$-tamper-evident stabilizing with adversary $adv$ for invariants $\langle S_1, S_2 \rangle$, then $p$ is stabilizing for invariant $(S_1 \lor S_2)$.

Proof. Since program $p$ is tamper-evident stabilizing, the two constraints in the definition of tamper-evident stabilizing are true. If the program $p$ starts from $T$, it converges to $S_1$. If $p$ starts from $\neg T$, in the presence or absence of adversary $adv$, it converges to $S_2$. This completes the proof. □

However, a similar result relating tamper-evident stabilization and active stabilization is not valid. In other words, it is possible to have a program $p$ that is $k$-tamper-evident stabilizing with adversary $adv$ for invariants $\langle S_1, S_2 \rangle$ but it is not $k$-active stabilizing with adversary $adv$ for invariant $\langle S_1 \lor S_2 \rangle$. This is due to the fact that if the program begins in $T$ then in the presence of the adversary, there is no guarantee that it would recover to $S_1$. 

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4 Verification of Tamper-evident Stabilization

To prove tamper-evident stabilization of a given program, we need to determine the predicate $T$ (from Definition 12). Based on Definition 12, from every state in $\neg T$, we must eventually reach a state in $S^2$. Hence, from $\neg T$, we cannot reach a state in $S^1$. Also, from every state in $T$, we must reach a state in $S^1$. Thus, the only possible choice for $T$ is the states from where the program can reach $S^1$. Therefore, Algorithm 1 starts with the construction of $T$ (Lines 1-3) and checking the closure property of predicates $T$ and $\neg T$, and invariants $S^1$ and $S^2$ (Lines 4-6). Thereafter, we utilize CheckCycle() to detect if program $p$ has cycles in $T - S^1$. Notice that if there is a cycle in a state predicate $T$, then the following is true for any state $s_0$ in the cycle: $\exists s_1 \in Y : (s_0, s_1) \in p$. As such, the absence of any cycles in $Y$ would require the negation of the aforementioned expression to hold (see Line 16). This is the basic idea behind the CheckCycle routine (Lines 15-19). If any states in $T - S^1$ is not removed, it implies that some of them form a cycle. If such a cycle exists then $p$ is not tamper-evident stabilizing.

Utilizing the ideas in [7], we construct $p_1$ that considers the effect of adversary $adv$ and checks for cycles of $p_1$ in $T - S^2$ (Line 8-9). In this construction, $\text{reach}(s_0, s_1, l)$ denotes that $s_1$ can be reached from $s_0$ by execution of exactly $l$ transitions of $T$. If such cycles of $p_1$ do not exist then $p$ is tamper-evident stabilizing.

Algorithm 1 Verification of tamper-evident stabilization

```
Input: program $p = (S_p, \delta_p)$, invariants $S^1$ and $S^2$, adversary $adv$.
Output: true or false.
1: $T = S^1$
2: repeat $T_1 = T$: $T = T_1 \cup \{s_0 \mid (s_0, s_1) \in \delta_p \land s_1 \in T\}$
3: until ($T_1 = T$)
4: if ($\neg \text{CheckClosure}(T, p) \land \text{CheckClosure}(\neg T, p) \land \text{CheckClosure}(S^1, p) \land \text{CheckClosure}(S^2, p)$) then
5: return false
6: end if
7: if $\text{CheckCycle}(T - S^1, p) \neq \emptyset$ then return false end if
8: $p_1 = \{(s_0, s_1) \mid (\exists l : l \geq k - 1 : \text{reach}(s_0, s_1, l) \lor (\exists s_2 : \text{reach}(s_0, s_2, l) \land (s_2, s_1) \in adv)\}$
9: if $\text{CheckCycle}(\neg T - S^2, p_1) \neq \emptyset$ then return false end if
10: return true
11: function CheckClosure(X, p)
12: if $\forall s_0, s_1 \in X : (s_0 \in X \land (s_0, s_1) \in \delta_p) \Rightarrow (s_1 \in X)$ then return true
13: else return false end if
14: end function
15: function CheckCycle(Y, p)
16: repeat $Y_1 = Y$, $Y = Y_1 - \{s_0 \mid \forall s_1 \in Y : (s_0, s_1) \notin \delta_p\}$
17: until ($Y_1 = Y$) return $Y$
18: end function
```

Theorem 5. The following problem can be solved in polynomial time in $|S_p|^3$.

---

3 For reason of space, proofs appear in [17].
5 Composing Tamper-evident Stabilization

In this section, we evaluate the composition of tamper-evident stabilizing systems by investigating different types of compositions considered for stabilizing systems.

Parallel Composition. A parallel composition of two programs considers the case where two independent programs are run in parallel on a weakly fair scheduler so that each program is guaranteed to execute its enabled actions. Weak fairness ensures that any action that is continuously enabled will be executed infinitely often. Thus, during the parallel execution, the behavior of one program does not affect the behavior of the other. Hence, if we have two programs \( p \) and \( q \) that do not share any variables such that \( p \) is stabilizing for \( S \) and \( q \) is stabilizing for \( R \) then parallel composition of \( p \) and \( q \) is stabilizing for \( S \land R \).

Now, we consider the case where we have two programs \( p \) and \( q \) that are tamper-evident stabilizing for \( \langle S_1, S_2 \rangle \) and \( \langle S_1', S_2' \rangle \), and \( p \) and \( q \) do not share any variables. Is the parallel composition of \( p \) and \( q \) (denoted by \( p \parallel q \)) also tamper-evident stabilizing?

**Theorem 6 (Parallel Composition).** Given programs \( p \) and \( q \) that do not share variables.

\[
p \text{ is tamper-evident stabilizing with adversary } \text{adv} \text{ for } \langle S_1, S_2 \rangle \land \\
q \text{ is tamper-evident stabilizing with adversary } \text{adv} \text{ for } \langle S_1', S_2' \rangle \\
\Rightarrow \\
p \parallel q \text{ is tamper-evident stabilizing with adversary } \text{adv} \text{ for } \langle S_1 \land S_1', S_2 \lor S_2' \rangle
\]

Note that in parallel composition of two tamper-evident stabilizing programs, the first predicate is combined by conjunction whereas the second one is combined by disjunction. However, we could make \( p \parallel q \) tamper-evident stabilizing for \( \langle S_1 \land S_1', S_2 \land S_2' \rangle \) provided we add actions to \( p \) (respectively \( q \)) so that it checks if \( q \) (respectively, \( p \)) is in a state in \( S_2' \) (respectively, \( S_2 \)). Accordingly, \( p \) can change its own state to be in \( S_2 \) (respectively, \( S_2' \)).

Superposition. We can also superpose two tamper-evident stabilizing systems in a similar manner. For example, consider the case where program \( p \) is superposed on program \( q \), i.e., \( p \) has read-only access to variables of \( q \) and \( q \) does not have access to variables of \( p \).

**Theorem 7 (Superposition).**

\[
p \text{ is tamper-evident stabilizing with adversary } \text{adv} \text{ for } \langle S_1, S_2 \rangle \text{ in } S_1' \land \\
q \text{ is active stabilizing with adversary } \text{adv} \text{ for } S_1' \land \\
q \text{ is tamper-evident stabilizing with adversary } \text{adv} \text{ for } \langle S_1', S_2' \rangle \land \\
q \text{ is silent in } S_1', \text{i.e., } q \text{ has no transition (except self-loops) in } S_1'
\]
Transitivity. Tamper-evident stabilization preserves transitivity in a manner similar to stabilizing programs. Specifically,

\[ p \text{ is tamper-evident stabilizing with adversary } \text{adv for } \langle S_1, S_2 \lor S_2' \rangle. \]

\[ \Rightarrow \]

\[ p \text{ is tamper-evident stabilizing with adversary } \text{adv for } \langle S_1', S_2 \lor S_2' \rangle \text{ in } U. \]

We can also infer transitivity property by the following theorem.

Theorem 9 (Transitivity 2).

\[ p \text{ is tamper-evident stabilizing with adversary } \text{adv for } \langle S_1, S_2 \rangle \land S_1 \text{ converges to } S_1' \text{ in } p \land S_2 \text{ } \langle \text{adv, } k \rangle\text{-converges to } S_2' \text{ in } p \]

\[ \Rightarrow \]

\[ p \text{ is tamper-evident stabilizing with adversary } \text{adv for } \langle S_1', S_2' \rangle. \]

6 Designing Tamper-evident Stabilization by Local Detection and Global/Local Correction

In this section, we identify some possible approaches for designing tamper-evident stabilization. Specifically, we evaluate the use of some of the existing approaches for designing stabilization in designing tamper-evident stabilization.

Local Detection and Global Correction One approach for designing stabilization is via local detection and global correction. In such a system, the invariant \( S \) of the system is of the form \( \forall j : S.j \), where \( S.j \) is a local predicate that can be checked by process \( j \). Each process \( j \) is responsible for checking its own predicate. If the system is outside the legitimate state then the local predicate of at least one process is violated. Hence, this process is responsible for initiating a global correction (such as distributed reset [19]) to restore the system to a legitimate state.

A similar approach is also applicable for tamper-evident stabilization. For example, consider the case where the predicates involved in defining tamper-evident stabilization are \( S_1 = \forall j : S_1.j, S_2 = \forall j : S_2.j, \text{ and } T = \forall j : T.j. \) Based on the problem of tamper-evident stabilization, we have \( \forall j : (S_1.j \Rightarrow T.j) \land (S_2.j \Rightarrow \neg T.j) \land (S_1.j \land S_2.j). \)

In this case, the actions of process \( j \) to obtain tamper-evident stabilization is as follows:

\( \neg T.j \land \neg S_2.j \rightarrow \text{Satisfy } S_2.j \)
To utilize such an approach to design tamper-evident stabilization, we need to make some changes to global correction and put some reasonable constraints on what an adversary can do. In particular, the global correction to restore $S_1$ involves changes to all processes. For tamper-evident stabilization, however, process $j$ will execute its part in global correction only if $T_j$ is true. Also, if process $j$ observes that $T_k$ is false for some neighbor $k$ then $j$ will satisfy $S_2$. This will guarantee that if $T_j$ is false for some process then the program will eventually reach a state in $S_2$. The definition of tamper-evident stabilization requires that $\neg T$ is closed in the adversary actions. This assumption is essential since if the adversary could move the system from a state in $\neg T$ to $T$ then the system would have forgotten that it was tampered beyond acceptable levels. In the context of this example, it would be necessary that the adversary cannot cause the program to start in a state where $T_j$ is false for some process $j$ and the adversary causes $j$ to move to a state where $T_j$ is true.

**Local Detection and Local Correction** We can also utilize the above approach in the context of local detection and local correction [3] to add tamper-evident-stabilization if invariant $S_1$ is of the form $\forall j :: S_1.j$, predicates of different processes are arranged in a partial order, and actions that correct $S_1.j$ preserve all predicates that come earlier in the order. In such a system when process $j$ finds that $T_j \land \neg S_1.j$ is true it only locally satisfies $S_1.j$. Given that we have a partial order, eventually we reach a state where $S_j$ is true in all states.

**Effect of the structure of the predicate $T$.** Intuitively, in tamper-evident stabilization, we have two convergence requirements. $T$ converges to $S_1$ and $\neg T$ converges to $S_2$ in the presence of an adversary. If $T$ is a conjunctive predicate then $\neg T$ is a disjunctive predicate. Hence, a reader may wonder what would happen if $T$ were a disjunctive predicate instead of a conjunctive predicate. We argue that this is likely to be a harder problem than the case where $T$ is a conjunctive predicate.

7 **The Relationship between Tamper-evident Stabilization and other Stabilization Techniques**

Starting with Dijkstra’s seminal work [10] on stabilizing algorithms for token circulation, several variations of stabilizing algorithms have been proposed during the past decades. These algorithms can be classified into two categories: stronger stabilizing and weaker stabilizing algorithms.

The algorithms in the first category not only guarantee stabilization but also satisfy some additional properties. Examples of this category include fault-containment stabilization, byzantine stabilization, Fault-Tolerant Self Stabilization (FTSS), multitolerance, and active stabilization. Fault-containment stabilization (e.g., [14, 25]) refers to stabilizing programs that ensure that if one (respectively small number of) fault occurs then quick recovery is provided to the invariant. Byzantine stabilizing (e.g., [21, 22]) programs tolerate the sce-
narios where a subset of processes is byzantine. FTSS (e.g., [4]) covers stabilizing programs that tolerate permanent crash faults. Multitolerant stabilizing (e.g., [13, 19]) systems ensure that, in addition to stabilization, the program masks a certain class of faults. Finally, active stabilization [7] requires that the program should recover to the invariant even if it is constantly perturbed by an adversary.

By contrast, a stabilizing program satisfies the constraints of weaker versions of stabilization. However, a program that provides a weaker version of stabilization may not be stabilizing. Examples of this include weak stabilization, probabilistic stabilization, and pseudo stabilization. Weak stabilization (e.g., [9, 16]) requires that starting from any initial configuration, there exists an execution that eventually reaches a point from which its behavior is correct. However, the program may execute on a path where such a legitimate state is never reached. Probabilistic stabilization [18] refers to problems that ensure that starting from any initial configuration, the program converges to its legitimate states with probability 1. Nonmasking fault tolerance (e.g., [1, 2]) targets the programs where the program recovers from states reached in the presence of a limited class of faults. However, this limited set of states may not cover the set of all states. Pseudo stabilization [8] relaxes the notion of points in the execution from which the behavior is correct. In other words, every execution has a suffix that exhibits correct behavior, yet time before reaching this suffix is unbounded.

The aforementioned stabilizing algorithms consider several problems including mutual exclusion, leader election, consensus, graph coloring, clustering, routing, and overlay construction. However, none of them considers problem of tampering (e.g., [20, 23, 24]). In part, this is due to the fact that stabilization and tamper evidence are potentially conflicting requirements.

Tamper-evident stabilization is in some sense a weaker version of stabilization in that from Theorem 3 every stabilizing program is also tamper-evident stabilizing. In particular, a stabilizing program guarantees that from all states program would eventually recover to legitimate states. By contrast, tamper-evident stabilizing program gives the option of recovering to tamper-evident states. (Although Theorem 4 suggests that every tamper-evident stabilizing program can be thought of as a stabilizing program, the invariant of such a stabilizing program is of the form \(S_1, S_2\), where \(S_2\) includes states that the system has no/reduced functionality.)

Tamper-evident stabilization is stronger than the notion of nonmasking fault tolerance. In particular, nonmasking fault-tolerance also has the notion of fault-span (similar to \(T\) in Definition 12) from where recovery to the invariant is provided. In tamper-evident stabilization, if the program reaches a state in \(\neg T\), it is required that it stays in \(\neg T\). By contrast, in nonmasking fault-tolerance, the program may recover from \(\neg T\) to \(T\).

Tamper-evident stabilization can be considered as a special case of nonmasking-failsafe multitolerance, where a program that is subject to two types of faults \(F_f\) and \(F_n\) provides (i) failsafe fault tolerance when \(F_f\) occurs, (ii) nonmasking tolerance in the presence of \(F_n\), and (iii) no guarantees if both \(F_f\) and \(F_n\) occur.
in the same computation. We have previously identified [13] sufficient conditions for efficient stepwise design of failsafe-nonmasking multitolerant systems, where \( F_f \) and \( F_n \) do not occur simultaneously and their scopes of perturbation outside the invariant are disjoint. Based on the role of \( T \) in Definition 12, we can ensure that these conditions are satisfied (Due to reasons of space, this proof is beyond the scope of the paper) for tamper-evident stabilization. This suggests that efficient algorithms can be designed for tamper-evident stabilization based on the approach in [13].

8 Conclusion and Future Work

This paper introduces the notion of tamper-evident stabilization that captures the requirement that if a system is perturbed within an acceptable limit then it restores itself to legitimate states. However, if it is perturbed beyond this boundary then it permanently preserves evidence of tampering. Moreover, the latter operation is unaffected even if the adversary attempts to stop it. We formally defined tamper-evident stabilization and investigated how it relates to stabilization and active stabilization. We argued that tamper-evident stabilization is weaker than stabilization in that every stabilizing system is indeed tamper-evident stabilizing. Also, tamper-evident stabilization captures a spectrum of systems from pure tamper-evident systems to pure stabilizing systems. We also demonstrated two examples where we design tamper-evident stabilizing token passing and traffic control protocols. We identified how methods for designing stabilizing programs can be leveraged to design tamper-evident stabilizing programs. We showed that the problem of verifying whether a given program is tamper-evident stabilizing is polynomial in the state space of the given program. We note that the problem of adding tamper-evident stabilization to a given high atomicity program can be solved in polynomial time. However, the problem is NP-hard for distributed programs. Moreover, we find that parallel composition of tamper-evident stabilizing systems works in a manner similar to that of stabilizing systems. Nevertheless, superposition or transitivity requirements of tamper-evident stabilization are somewhat different than that for stabilizing systems.

We are currently investigating the design and analysis of tamper-evident stabilizing System-on-Chip (SoC) systems in the context of the IEEE SystemC language. Our objective here is to design systems that facilitate reasoning about what they do and what they do not do in the event of tampering. Second, we will leverage our existing work on model repair and synthesis of stabilization in automated design of tamper-evident stabilization. Third, we plan to study the application of tamper-evident stabilization in game theory (and vice versa).

References

Incremental Realization of Safety Requirements:
Non-Determinism vs. Modularity

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Abstract. This paper investigates the impact of non-determinism and modularity on the complexity of incremental incorporation of safety requirements while preserving liveness (a.k.a. the problem of incremental synthesis). Previous work shows that realizing safety in non-deterministic programs under limited observability is an NP-complete problem (in the state space of the program), where limited observability imposes read restrictions on program components with respect to the local state of other components. In this paper, we present a surprising result that synthesizing safety remains an NP-complete problem even for deterministic programs! The results of this paper imply that non-determinism is not the source of the hardness of synthesizing safety in concurrent programs; instead, limited observability has a major impact on the complexity of realizing safety. We also provide a roadmap for future research on exploiting the benefits of modularization while keeping the complexity of incremental synthesis manageable.

Keywords: Program Synthesis, Safety Specifications, Non-Determinism, Modularity

1 Introduction

Understanding the complexity of realizing new (safety/liveness) properties is of paramount importance since today’s systems often have to adapt to new requirements while preserving some existing functionalities. Safety stipulates that nothing bad ever happens (e.g., at most one process/thread accesses shared resources at any moment), and liveness states that something good will eventually occur (e.g., each process eventually gets access to shared resources). New requirements are raised due to changes in platform, environmental faults, design flaws, new user requirements (e.g., non-functional concerns), porting, etc. Thus, it is important to enhance our understanding of what complicates behavioral changes. Towards this end, this paper investigates the complexity of redesigning finite-state programs towards capturing new safety requirements while preserving liveness, called the problem of incremental synthesis.

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Several approaches exist for capturing safety most of which lack a thorough complexity analysis. For example, aspect-oriented approaches [5, 17, 16, 10, 13, 6] provide a method for capturing and verifying cross-cutting functionalities. Control-theoretic techniques [25, 12] realize new safety requirements by generating controllers that implement safety in different components of a system. Techniques based on transformation automata [24] enforce safety and/or security policies. Our previous work [7, 3] shows that incremental synthesis for non-deterministic programs can be done in polynomial time (in the size of program state space) if we consider unlimited observability, where program components/processes can atomically read the state of other processes. Nonetheless, the authors of [4] demonstrate that incremental synthesis of safety in non-deterministic programs under limited observability is NP-complete (in the size of the program state space). Limited observability imposes restrictions on processes with regard to reading the state of other processes. Vechev et al. [27] present an exponential algorithm for synthesizing synchronization mechanisms under limited observability, but they provide no results on the general case hardness of synthesizing synchronization mechanisms. Now, the open questions are: What role do non-determinism and observability/modularization play in the complexity of incremental synthesis? Is incremental synthesis of safety easier for deterministic programs?

In this paper, we prove that non-determinism is not the major source of the complexity of incremental synthesis; rather it is modularization constraints that complicate the incremental synthesis of safety properties. We consider Alpern and Schneider’s [1] definition of safety/liveness properties, where a property is a set of sequences of states. Their definition of a safety property $P$ can be represented as a set of finite sequences that cannot be extended to be in $P$, which we call them bad sequences. We also investigate a special case of safety properties that can be specified as a set of Bad Transitions (BT) (introduced in [18]). The BT model is more general than the usual notion of Bad States (BS) in that every transition reaching a bad state is considered to be a bad transition, whereas not every bad transition reaches a bad state [20]. Previous work [7, 3] shows that incremental synthesis of safety (for deterministic and non-deterministic programs) can be done in polynomial time (in the size of the state space) under unlimited observability. Nonetheless, we show that under limited observability the general case complexity of synthesizing safety in deterministic programs increases to NP-complete! Our results imply that limited observability has a major impact on the complexity of incremental synthesis of safety (see Figure 1) regardless of non-determinism/determinism. While modularity is a powerful design concept, design for change [22] is also an important goal. To achieve this goal, research should be focused on identifying the kind of modularization techniques that facilitate incremental synthesis.

Organization. Section 2 presents preliminary concepts. Section 3 formulates the problem of incremental synthesis of safety. Section 4 shows that the general case complexity of incremental synthesis of safety in deterministic programs increases to NP-complete if we assume limited observability. Finally, in Section 5, we make concluding remarks and present a roadmap for future research.
2 Preliminaries

In this section, we present formal definitions of finite-state programs, program components\(^1\), computations and safety specifications. The definition of specification is adapted from Alpern and Schneider [1]. We use a read/write model from [2, 19].

**Programs.** A program \( p = (V_p, C_p, I_p, F_p) \) is a tuple of a finite set \( V_p \) of variables and a finite set \( C_p \) of computing components \( C_1, \ldots, C_k \), where \( k \geq 1 \). Each variable \( v_i \in V_p \), for \( 1 \leq i \leq N \), has a finite non-empty domain \( D_i \). A state \( s \) of \( p \) is a valuation \( (d_1, d_2, \ldots, d_N) \) of program variables \( (v_1, v_2, \ldots, v_N) \), where \( d_i \in D_i \). \( I_p \) denotes a finite set of initial states, and \( F_p \) represents a finite set of accepting/final states. For a variable \( v \) and a state \( s \), \( v(s) \) denotes the value of \( v \) in \( s \). The state space \( S_p \) is the set of all possible states of \( p \) and \( |S_p| \) denotes the size of \( S_p \). A state predicate is a subset of \( S_p \). A transition is an ordered pair \( (s, s') \), where \( s \) and \( s' \) are program states. A component \( C_j \) is a triple \( (\delta_j, r_j, w_j) \), where \( 1 \leq j \leq k \) and \( \delta_j \subseteq S_p \times S_p \) denotes the set of transitions of \( C_j \). We shall define \( r_j \) and \( w_j \) below. The set of transitions of a program \( p \), denoted \( \delta_p \), is the union of the sets of transitions of its components; i.e., \( \delta_p = \bigcup_{j=1}^{k} \delta_j \). A program \( p \) is non-deterministic if (and only if) the transition function \( \delta_p \) is defined as \( \delta_p : S_p \rightarrow 2^{S_p} \). A deterministic program is a special case where from each state there is at most one outgoing transition. That is, the set \( \delta_p \) defines a partial (transition) function from \( S_p \) to \( S_p \). Thus, given a state \( s \in S_p \), \( \delta_p \) returns at most one state \( s' \in S_p \). This is a property that each \( \delta_j \) inherits from \( \delta_p \).

**Notation.** For simplicity, we shall misuse \( p \) and \( \delta_p \) interchangeably.

**Read/Write Model.** In order to model the access rights of each component \( C_j \) \((1 \leq j \leq k)\) with respect to program variables, we define a set of variables that \( C_j \) is allowed to read, denoted \( r_j \), and a set of variables that \( C_j \) can write, denoted \( w_j \). Notice that, if a variable \( v \) of some component \( C_i \) is read/written through the interface of \( C_i \), then \( v \) is considered readable/writable for the component that invokes the interface of \( C_i \). We assume that \( w_j \subseteq r_j \); i.e., a component cannot blindly write a variable it cannot read. The write restrictions of a component \( C_j \) identify a set of transitions \( \{ (s, s') \mid \exists v : v \notin w_j \land v(s) \neq v(s') \} \) that \( \delta_j \) excludes, where \( v \) denotes a variable. For example, consider a program \( p_r \) with two components \( C_1 \) and \( C_2 \) and two binary variables \( v_1 \) and \( v_2 \). The component \( C_1 \) (respectively, \( C_2 \)) can read and write the variable \( v_1 \) (respectively, \( v_2 \)), but it

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\(^1\) The term component can capture objects in object-oriented program, threads/processes in concurrent programming, nodes of network protocols, etc.
cannot read (or write) \( v_2 \) (respectively, \( v_1 \)). Let \( \langle v_1, v_2 \rangle \) denote the state of the program \( p \). A transition \( t_1 \), represented as \( \langle 0,0 \rangle, (1,1) \), does not belong to \( C_1 \) because \( v_2 \not\in w_1 \) and the value of \( v_2 \) is being updated. For similar reasons, \( t_1 \) does not belong to \( C_2 \) either.

The effect of read restrictions is that, during the synthesis of safety, \( \delta_1 \) of a component \( C_j \) includes (respectively, excludes) a transition \( t \) iff a group of transitions associated with \( t \) is included (respectively, excluded) in \( \delta_j \) [19,2]. In the aforementioned example, consider the transition \( t_2 \) as \( \langle 0,0 \rangle, (1,0) \). If \( C_1 \) includes only \( t_2 \), then the execution of \( t_2 \) can be interpreted as the atomic execution of the following if statement: ‘if \( (v_1 = 0) \land (v_2 = 0) \) then \( v_1 := 1 \); i.e., \( C_1 \) needs to read \( v_2 \). Including both transitions \( \langle 0,0 \rangle, (1,0) \) and \( \langle 0,1 \rangle, (1,1) \) makes the value of \( v_2 \) irrelevant, thereby eliminating the need for reading \( v_2 \) by \( C_1 \). Thus, the component \( C_1 \) must either include or exclude both transitions as a group. Formally, a component \( C_j \) can include a transition \( (s,s') \) if and only if \( C_j \) also includes any transition \( (s_p,s_p') \) such that for all variables \( v \in r_j \), we have \( v(s) = v(s_p) \) and \( v(s') = v(s_p') \), and for all variables \( u \not\in r_j \), we have \( u(s) = u(s') \).

**Computations.** A computation of a program \( p = \langle V_p, C_p, I_p, F_p \rangle \) is a sequence of states \( \sigma = \langle s_0, s_1, \cdots, s_m \rangle \), where each transition \( (s_i, s_{i+1}) \) in \( \sigma \) \( i \geq 0 \) belongs to some component \( C_j \), \( 1 \leq j \leq k \), i.e., \( C_j \) executes the transition \( (s_i, s_{i+1}) \), and \( \sigma \) is maximal. That is, either \( \sigma \) is infinite, or if \( \sigma \) is finite and terminates in a state \( s_f \), then there is no component of \( p \) that executes a transition \( (s_f, s) \) for any state \( s \). A computation prefix of \( p \) is a finite sequence \( \sigma = \langle s_0, s_1, \cdots, s_m \rangle \) of states in which every transition \( (s_i, s_{i+1}) \), for \( 0 \leq i < m \), is executed by some component \( C_j \), \( 1 \leq j \leq k \).

**Properties and Specifications.** Intuitively, a safety property/requirement states that nothing bad ever happens. Formally, we follow Alpern and Schneider [1] in defining a property as a set of sequences of states. A safety property \( \mathcal{P} \) can be represented by a set of finite sequences of states, denoted \( \mathcal{B} \), that cannot be extended to be in \( \mathcal{P} \). Each sequence in \( \mathcal{B} \) represents a scenario of the occurrence of something bad. For example, a safety property of a program with an integer variable \( x \) could stipulate that an increment of \( x \) must not immediately be followed by a decrement in the value of \( x \). Such a safety property can be represented by a set of bad sequences of three states (i.e., two immediate transitions; one that increments \( x \) and the subsequent one that decrements \( x \)). In this paper, a liveness property states that something good eventually happens, including good things that occur infinitely often. Formally, a liveness property, denoted \( \mathcal{L} \), is a set of sequences of states, where each sequence in \( \mathcal{L} \) either terminates in a state belonging to a state predicate \( \mathcal{F} \) (representing the good thing that should happen), or infinitely often visits some states in \( \mathcal{F} \). This notion of liveness is sufficiently general to capture stutter-invariant Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) [8] properties [11,23]. Following Alpern and Schneider [1], we define a specification, denoted \( \text{spec} \), as a set of safety and liveness properties. A computation \( \sigma = \langle s_0, s_1, \cdots, s_m \rangle \) of a program \( p = \langle V_p, C_p, I_p, F_p \rangle \) satisfies a specification \( \text{spec} \) from \( I_p \) iff (1) \( s_0 \in I_p \), (2) no sequence of the safety of \( \text{spec} \), denoted \( \mathcal{B} \), appears
in $\sigma$, and (3) if $\sigma$ terminates in a state $s_f$, then $s_f \in F_p$; otherwise, some states in $F_p$ are reached infinitely often in $\sigma$. A program $p$ satisfies its specification $\text{spec}$ from $I_p$ iff all computations of $p$ satisfy $\text{spec}$ from any state in $I_p$. Given a finite computation $\sigma = \langle s_0, s_1, \ldots, s_d \rangle$, if no program component executes from $s_d$ and $s_d \notin F_p$, then $\sigma$ is a deadlocked computation and $s_d$ is a deadlock state. A computation $\sigma = \langle s_0, s_1, \ldots \rangle$ of $p$ is a non-progress computation iff $\sigma$ does not infinitely often reach some state in $F_p$ nor does it terminate in a state in $F_p$. A deadlocked computation is an instance of a non-progress computation.

Another example is the case where a computation of $p$ includes a cycle in which no state belongs to $F_p$, called a non-progress cycle. If a computation $\sigma$ includes a sequence in $B$, then $\sigma$ is a safety-violating computation. A computation $\sigma$ of $p$ violates $\text{spec}$ from a state $s_0$ iff $\sigma$ starts at $s_0$ and $\sigma$ is either a non-progress computation or a safety-violating computation. A program $p$ violates $\text{spec}$ from $I_p$ iff there exists a computation of $p$ that violates $\text{spec}$ from some state $s_0$ in $I_p$.

**Notation.** Whenever it is clear from the context, we abbreviate ‘$p$ satisfies $\text{spec}$ from $I_p$’ as ‘$p$ satisfies $\text{spec}$’.

**Bad Transitions (BT) model.** Consider a special case in which safety specifications are modeled as a set of finite sequences of length 2; i.e., a sequence has only two states. That is, the safety specification rules out a set of transitions that must not appear in program computations, called bad transitions [18]. For instance, the safety specification of a program with an integer variable $x$ may stipulate that $x$ can be decremented only if its value is positive. Consider a state $s_0$, where $x(s_0) = -2$. State $s_0$ can be reached either by incrementing $x$ from $s_1$, where $x(s_1) = -3$, or by decrementing $x$ from $s_2$, where $x(s_2) = -1$. Observe that the transitions $(s_2, s_0)$ is a bad transition, whereas $(s_1, s_0)$ is not. In this model, reaching $s_0$ does not necessarily violate safety and it depends on how $s_0$ is reached. Such a model of safety specification is a restricted version of the general model of safety specifications presented by Alpern and Schneider [1], but it is more general than the usual model of bad states often specified in the literature in terms of the always operator (or invariance properties) in temporal logic [8].

**Remark.** We investigate incremental synthesis under “no fairness”.

### 3 Problem Statement

In this section, we formally define the problem of incremental synthesis of safety. Let $p = \langle V_p, C_p, I_p, F_p \rangle$ be a program that satisfies a specification $\text{spec}$. Moreover, let $B$ denote the safety of $\text{spec}$, and $B_{\text{new}}$ represent a new safety property (e.g., data race-freedom) that $p$ does not satisfy. Our goal is to redesign $p$ to a program $p_r = \langle V_{p_r}, C_{p_r}, I_{p_r}, F_{p_r} \rangle$, such that $p_r$ satisfies $B \land B_{\text{new}}$ and the liveness of $\text{spec}$ from $F_{p_r}$. For simplicity, during such redesign, we do not expand the state space of $p$; i.e., no new variables are added to $V_p$. Thus, we have $V_{p_r} = V_p$ and $S_{p_r} = S_p$. Since $p_r$ must still satisfy $\text{spec}$ from all states in $I_p$, we should preserve all initial states of $p$. Thus, we require that $I_p = I_{p_r}$. We state the problem as follows:
Problem 1. Incremental Synthesis of Safety

- **Input**: A program \( p = \langle V_p, C_p, I_p, F_p \rangle \) with its specification \( \text{spec} \), its set of safety properties \( B \), a new safety property \( B_{\text{new}} \) and a set of read/write restrictions for all components in \( C_p \).
  - **Input Assumptions**: The program \( p \) satisfies \( \text{spec} \) from \( I_p \), but \( p \) may not satisfy \( B_{\text{new}} \) from \( I_p \).
- **Output**: A redesigned program \( p_r = \langle V_r, C_r, I_r, F_r \rangle \).
- **Constraints**:
  1. \( V_r = V_p \) (i.e., \( S_r = S_p \))
  2. \( I_r = I_p \)
  3. \( F_r \subseteq F_p \) and \( F_r \neq \emptyset \)
  4. The number of components and the read/write restrictions of each component in \( C_p \) remain the same in \( C_r \), but \( \delta_r \) of each component \( C_j \) may change in \( C_r \)
  5. \( \delta_r \neq \emptyset \), and \( p_r \) satisfies \( B \land B_{\text{new}} \) from \( I_p \)
  6. Starting from any initial state \( s_0 \in I_p \), the revised program \( p_r \) satisfies its liveness specifications.

We now define the decision problem of incremental synthesis in the BT model.

Problem 2. Decision Problem of Incremental Synthesis

- **Instance**: A program \( p = \langle V_p, C_p, I_p, F_p \rangle \) with its specification \( \text{spec} \), its set of safety properties \( B \), a new safety property \( B_{\text{new}} \) and a set of read/write restrictions for all components in \( C_p \), where \( B \) and \( B_{\text{new}} \) are specified in the BT model of safety.
- **Question**: Does there exist a program \( p_r = \langle V_r, C_r, I_r, F_r \rangle \) that meets the constraints of Problem 1?

**Significance of Problem 1.** Several activities (e.g., debugging, porting, composition) during software development are instances of Problem 1. A few examples are as follows:

- **Debugging**: Consider the debugging of concurrent programs for data races between multiple threads. That is, multiple threads access shared data where at least one of them performs a write operation. Data race-freedom is a safety property whereas ensuring that each thread eventually gains access to the shared data (i.e., makes progress) is a liveness property. Eliminating data races while preserving the progress of each thread is a clear example of synthesizing safety [27].

- **Porting**: Consider a scenario in which a distributed application designed to be deployed on a traditional wireless network is considered for deployment on a wireless sensor network. The sensor nodes have a power-saving mode in which a node automatically turns off its radio (i.e., sleep mode) if no network activities are detected for a specific time interval. To port an existing wireless application to this new platform, one has to revise the application considering the sleep mode. That is, some of the activities would be forbidden in the sleep mode (e.g., sending messages). This is an additional safety constraint that should be met while preserving all other safety/liveness properties.
– **Composition and incremental development**: While in this paper we investigate Problem 1 in the same state space (i.e., no new variables are added while adding safety), we will investigate the synthesis of safety under more relaxed conditions where the redesigned program may include new variables. Such a generalized formulation of Problem 1 captures software composition. Several approaches in software engineering (e.g., aspect-oriented programming [15]) rely on incremental design of software where modules/components that implement features/aspects are incrementally composed with an existing base system [15, 14, 26, 16]. Moreover, there are numerous applications where software behaviors should evolve by composing plug-in components (e.g., Mozilla extensions) or by integrating mobile code (e.g., Java applets, composable proxy filters [21]). While some researchers have investigated type safety of compositions [26], dynamic safety properties of compositions are also of paramount importance.

4 **Hardness of Incremental Synthesis**

In this section, we illustrate that the general case complexity of synthesizing safety in deterministic programs increases significantly if program components have limited observability with respect to the state of other components. The intuition behind our complexity result lies in the difficulty of redesigning program computations towards capturing a new safety property while preserving liveness. Consider a computation $\sigma = \ll s_0, \ldots, s_{i-1}, s_i, \ldots \gg$, where $i > 0$, in a program $p$ and a new safety property $B_{\text{new}}$ that forbids the execution of the transition $t = (s_{i-1}, s_i)$; i.e., $t$ must not be executed in the redesigned program. As such, we have to remove $t$. If $s_{i-1} \notin F_p$, then $\sigma$ becomes a deadlocked computation. To resolve the deadlock state $s_{i-1}$, we systematically synthesize a new sequence of states $\sigma_r = \ll s_0', \ldots, s_k' \gg$, for $k \geq 0$, that is inserted between $s_{i-1}$ and $s_i$ to satisfy $B_{\text{new}}$ (i.e., avoid executing $t$). Note that while a direct transition from $s_{i-1}$ to $s_i$ violates $B_{\text{new}}$, there may be another sequence of states that can be traversed from $s_{i-1}$ to $s_i$ without violating $B_{\text{new}}$. The same argument holds about building a computation prefix between any predecessor of $s_{i-1}$ and any successor of $s_i$; there is nothing particular about $s_{i-1}$ and $s_i$.

Additionally, the synthesized sequence $\sigma_r$ must not preclude the reachability of the accepting states in $\sigma$. To meet this requirement, no transition $(s, s')$ in $\sigma_r$ should be grouped with a transition $(s_g, s_g')$ such that $s_g$ is reachable in some computation of $p_r$ and the execution of the transition $(s_g, s_g')$ causes one of the following problems: (1) $s_g'$ is a deadlock state, (2) $(s_g, s_g')$ is a safety-violating transition that must not be executed, and (3) $s_g'$ is a predecessor state of $s_g$ in $\sigma$, thereby creating a non-progress cycle\(^2\). To ensure that the above cases do not occur, we should examine (i) all transitions selected to be in $\sigma_r$, (ii) all transitions used to connect $\sigma_r$ to $s_{i-1}$ and $s_i$ along with their associated transition groups, and (iii) the transitions of other computations. Intuitively, this leads to exploring an exponential number of possible combinations of the

\(^2\) If $s_g'$ is a successor of $s_g$ in $\sigma$ or is reachable in a different computation, then $s_g$ should not have any other outgoing transition due to the determinism constraints.
safe transitions (and their transition groups) that can potentially be selected to
be in $\sigma_r$. With this intuition, we prove that synthesizing safety in deterministic
programs in the BT model of safety under limited observability is NP-complete
(using a reduction from the 3-SAT problem [9]).

**Problem 3. The 3-SAT Decision Problem**

- **Instance:** A set of propositional variables, $x_1, x_2, \ldots, x_n$, and a Boolean
  formula $\Phi = C_1 \land C_2 \land \ldots \land C_m$, where $m, n > 1$ and each clause
  $C_j$ ($1 \leq j \leq m$) is a disjunction of exactly three literals. Wlog, we assume that the literals
  $x_i$ and $\neg x_i$ do not simultaneously appear in the same clause ($1 \leq i \leq n$).
- **Question:** Does there exist an assignment of truth values to $x_1, x_2, \ldots, x_n$
such that $\Phi$ is satisfiable?

In Subsection 4.1, we present a polynomial mapping from an arbitrary in-
stance of 3-SAT to an instance of Problem 2. In Subsection 4.2, we illustrate that
the instance of 3-SAT is satisfiable iff safety can be synthesized in the instance
of Problem 2.

### 4.1 Polynomial Mapping from 3-SAT

In this section, we illustrate how for each instance of 3-SAT, we create an in-
stance of Problem 2, which includes a program $p = (V_p, C_p, \mathcal{F}_p, \mathcal{F}_p)$, and its safety
specification $\mathcal{B}$ and the new safety property $\mathcal{B}_{new}$ that should be captured by the
redesigned program. We build the instance of Problem 2 by considering states
and transitions corresponding to each propositional variable and each clause in
the instance of 3-SAT.

**States and transitions.** Corresponding to each propositional variable $x_i$, where $1 \leq i \leq n$, we consider the states $a_i, a'_i, b_i, b'_i, c_i, c'_i$ and $d_i$
(as illustrated in Figure 2). We also include an additional state $a_{n+1}$.

For each variable $x_i$, the instance of Problem 2 includes the transitions
$\langle a_i, d_i \rangle, \langle a_i, b_i \rangle, \langle a_i, a'_i \rangle, \langle b_i, c_i \rangle, \langle b_i, c'_i \rangle, \langle c_i, b'_i \rangle, \langle c_i, a'_i \rangle, \langle c'_i, a'_i \rangle$ and
$\langle d_i, a'_i \rangle$.

Corresponding to each clause $C_r = x_i \lor \neg x_j \lor x_k$, where $1 \leq r \leq m$ and
$1 \leq i, j, k \leq n$, program $p$ includes 8 states $z_r, z_{r1}, z_{r1}', z_{rj}, z_{rj}', z_{rk}, z_{rk}'$ and $z_r'$,
and 7 transitions $\langle z_r, z_{r1} \rangle, \langle z_{r1}, z_{r1}' \rangle, \langle z_{r1}', z_{rj} \rangle, \langle z_{rj}, z_{rj}' \rangle, \langle z_{rj}', z_{rk} \rangle, \langle z_{rk}, z_{rk}' \rangle$ and
$\langle z_{rk}', z_r' \rangle$ depicted in Figure 3. Notice that the transitions in Figures 2 and 3
belong to different program components, which we shall explain later.

**Input program.** The input program $p$ includes the transitions $\langle a_i, d_i \rangle$ and
$\langle d_i, a'_i \rangle$, for $1 \leq i \leq n$ and the transitions $\langle a_n, a_{n+1} \rangle$ and $\langle a_{n+1}, a_1 \rangle$ (see Figure
4). Starting from $a_1$, the input program $p$ executes transitions $\langle a_i, d_i \rangle, \langle d_i, a'_i \rangle$
and $\langle a'_i, a_{i+1} \rangle$, where $1 \leq i \leq n$. From $a_{n+1}$, the program returns to $a_1$.

**Initial and final states.** The states $a_1$ and $z_r$ ($1 \leq r \leq m$) are initial states,
and $a_{n+1}$ is an accepting/final state. Moreover, the states $z_{r1}, z_{rj}, z_{rk}$ and $z_r'$ are
accepting states, where $1 \leq r \leq m$ and $1 \leq i, j, k \leq n$. Starting from $a_1$, the final
state $a_{n+1}$ is infinitely often reached. Further, if the program starts at $z_r$, then it
will halt in the accepting state $z_r'$. Since all transitions $\langle a_i, d_i \rangle, \langle d_i, a'_i \rangle, \langle a'_i, a_{i+1} \rangle$
and $\langle a_{n+1}, a_1 \rangle$ satisfy $\mathcal{B}$, the program $p$ satisfies its safety and liveness specifications
from $a_1$. In summary, we have
Fig. 2. The set of states and safe transitions corresponding to each propositional variable $x_i$ in the instance of 3-SAT. Each state is annotated with the values assigned to program variables in that state.

Fig. 3. States and transitions considered in the instance of Problem 2 corresponding to each clause $C_r = x_i \lor \neg x_j \lor x_k$ along with the values of variables.

Safety specifications. The safety specification $B$ rules out any transition other than the transitions in Figures 2 and 3. Notice that while these transitions are permitted by the safety specification $B$, the input program $p$ does not necessarily include all of them. The new safety property $B_{new}$ rules out the transitions $(a_i, d_i)$ and $(z'_r, z'_k)$, where $1 \leq i, k \leq n$ and $1 \leq r \leq m$. Thus, in the revised version of the instance of Problem 2, denoted $p_r$, these transitions must not be executed.

Program variables. The instance of Problem 2, denoted $p$, has four variables $e, f, g$ and $h$. We denote a program state by $\langle e, f, g, h \rangle$. Figure 2 illustrates the values of variables in the states included corresponding to each variable $x_i$. Figure 3 presents the values of variables in the states included corresponding to each clause $C_r = x_i \lor \neg x_j \lor x_k$. As such, the domains of the variables are as follows:

- The variable $e$ has the domain $\{0, \cdots, n\} \cup \{m + n + 1, \cdots, 2m + n\}$. 

Legend: 
$\langle e, f, g, h \rangle$ denotes program state, where $e, f, g$ and $h$ are program variables
The domain of variable $f$ is equal to $\{0, 1\}$.
- The variable $g$ has a domain of $\{0, \ldots, n + 1\}$.
- The domain of the variable $h$ is $\{0, 1\} \cup \{m + n + 1, \ldots, 2m + n\}$.

**Program components.** The program $p$ includes seven components $C_1$-$C_7$ whose transitions have been depicted in Figure 5. The read and write restrictions of each component are as follows:

- The first component $C_1$ includes the transitions $(a_i, d_i)$ and $(a_i, b_i)$, for all $1 \leq i \leq n$ (see Figures 2 and 5). The set of readable variables of $C_1$, denoted $r_1$, is equal to $\{e, f, g, h\}$ and its set of writable variables is $w_1 = \{f, g, h\}$.
- The set of transitions $(a_i, b'_i)$ and $(a'_i, a_{i+1})$ comprises the component $C_2$ (see the arrow with a crossed line on it in Figures 2 and 5). We have $r_2 = \{c, f, g, h\}$ and $w_2 = \{c, g, h\}$.
- The component $C_3$ includes the transitions $(b_i, c_i)$ for $1 \leq i \leq n$ (see the arrow with two parallel lines on it in Figures 2 and 5). We have $r_3 = \{e, f, g, h\}$ and $w_3 = \{e, h\}$.
- The fourth component, denoted $C_4$, includes transitions $(b'_i, c'_i)$ for $1 \leq i \leq n$, $r_4 = \{e, f, g, h\}$ and $w_4 = \{f, g\}$ (see the arrow with three parallel lines on it in Figures 2 and 5).
- For component $C_5$, we have $r_5 = w_5 = \{e, f, g\}$; i.e., $C_5$ cannot read $h$. The component $C_5$ includes transition $(c_i, a'_i)$, which is grouped with $(c'_i, b'_i)$ (see Figures 2 and 3) due to inability of reading $h$, where $(z_{q_i}, z'_{q_i})$ corresponds to a clause $C_q$ in which the literal $\neg x_i$ appears (see the dashed arrow $(x_r, x'_r)$ in Figure 3). Notice that in these three transitions, the values of the readable variables $c, f$ and $g$ are the same in the source states (and in the destination states) and the value of $h$ does not change during these transitions because it is not readable for $C_5$.
- The sixth component $C_6$ can read/write $r_6 = w_6 = \{f, g, h\}$, but cannot read $e$. Its set of transitions includes $(c'_i, a'_i), (b_i, a_i)$ and $(z_{ri}, z'_{ri})$ (see Figures 2 and 3) that are grouped due to inability of reading $e$, where $(z_{ri}, z'_{ri})$ corresponds to a clause $C_r$ in which the literal $x_i$ appears.
- The component $C_7$ can read and write all variables and its set of transitions includes $(d_i, a'_i), (a_{i+1}, a_1), (b_i, c'_i)$ and $(c'_i, c_i)$ for $1 \leq i \leq n$. Moreover, for each clause $C_r = x_i \lor \neg x_j \lor x_k$, where $1 \leq r \leq m$ and $1 \leq i, j, k \leq n$, component $C_7$ includes the following transitions: $(z_r, z_{ri}), (z'_{ri}, z_{rj}), (z_{rj}, z_{rk})$ and $(z'_{rk}, z'_{ri})$ (see Figure 3).
Theorem 1. The complexity of the mapping is polynomial. (Proof is straightforward; hence omitted.)

4.2 Correctness of Reduction

In this section, we show that the instance of 3-SAT is satisfiable iff the instance of Problem 2 (created by the mapping in Section 4.1) can be redesigned to meet the safety properties $B$ and $B_{\text{new}}$ while preserving its liveness.

Lemma 1. If the instance of 3-SAT is satisfiable, then the instance of Problem 2, denoted $p$, can be redesigned to another program $p_r$ for the safety property $B_{\text{new}}$ such that $p_r$ meets the requirements of Problem 1.

Proof. If the 3-SAT instance is satisfiable, then there must exist a value assignment to the propositional variables $x_1, \ldots, x_n$ such that all clauses $C_r$, for $1 \leq r \leq m$, evaluate to true. Corresponding to the value assignment to a variable $x_i$, for $1 \leq i \leq n$, we include a set of transitions in the redesigned program as follows:

- If $x_i$ is assigned true, then we include transitions $(a_i, b_i, c_i, a'_i)$. Thus the computation prefix $\ll a_i, b_i, c_i, a'_i, a_{i+1} \gg$ is synthesized between $a_i$ and $a_{i+1}$. Since we have included the transition $(c_i, a'_i)$, and transition $(c_i, a'_i)$ is grouped with $(z_{q_i}, z'_{q_i})$, where $1 \leq q \leq m$ for any clause $C_q$ in which $\neg x_i$ appears, we must include $(z_{q_i}, z'_{q_i})$ as well (see the dashed arrow $(z_{r_j}, z'_{r_j})$ in Figure 3).

- If $x_i$ is assigned false, then we include transitions $(a_i, b'_i, c'_i, a'_i)$, thereby synthesizing the computation prefix $\ll a_i, b'_i, c'_i, a'_i, a_{i+1} \gg$ between $a_i$ and $a_{i+1}$. Due to the inability of reading $e$, including the transition $(c'_i, a'_i)$

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component</th>
<th>Transition</th>
<th>Read/Write Restrictions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$C_1$</td>
<td></td>
<td>Read all; permitted to write $f$, $g$ and $h$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$C_2$</td>
<td></td>
<td>Read all; permitted to write $e$, $g$ and $h$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$C_3$</td>
<td></td>
<td>Read all; permitted to write $e$ and $h$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$C_4$</td>
<td></td>
<td>Read all; permitted to write $f$ and $g$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$C_5$</td>
<td></td>
<td>Read and write $e$, $f$ and $g$; cannot read $h$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$C_6$</td>
<td></td>
<td>Read and write $f$, $g$ and $h$; cannot read $e$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$C_7$</td>
<td></td>
<td>Read and write all</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Fig. 5. Program components, their read/write restrictions and the annotation of their transitions.
results in the inclusion of the transitions \((z_{li}, z'_{li})\), where \(1 \leq l \leq m\), for any clause \(C_l\) in which \(x_i\) appears (see the dotted arrows \((z_{ri}, z'_{ri})\) and \((z_{rk}, z'_{rk})\) in Figure 3).

- For each clause \(C_r = x_i \lor \neg x_j \lor x_k\), the transition \((z_{ri}, z'_{ri})\) (respectively, \((z_{rk}, z'_{rk})\)) is included iff \(x_i\) (respectively, \(x_k\)) is assigned \textit{false}. The transition \((z_{rj}, z'_{rj})\) is included iff \(x_j\) is assigned \textit{true}.

Figure 6 depicts a partial structure of a redesigned program for the value assignment \(x_1 = \text{false}, x_2 = \text{true}\) and \(x_3 = \text{true}\) in an example clause \(C_5 = x_1 \lor \neg x_2 \lor x_3\). Note that the bad transition \((z'_{53}, z'_{5})\) is not reached because \(x_3 = \text{true}\) and the transition \((z_{53}, z'_{53})\) is excluded.

**Fig. 6.** A partial structure of the redesigned program corresponding to the value assignment \(x_1 = \text{false}, x_2 = \text{true}\) and \(x_3 = \text{true}\) for an example clause \(C_5 = x_1 \lor \neg x_2 \lor x_3\).

Now, we illustrate that the redesigned program in fact meets the requirements of Problem 1. The state space remains obviously the same as no new variables have been introduced; i.e., \(V_p = V'_p\). During the selection of transitions based on value assignment to propositional variables, we do not remove any initial states. Thus, we have \(I_p = I'_p\).

**Satisfying safety properties.** Since the new safety property rules out transitions \((a_i, d_i)\) and \((z'_{rk}, z'_{rk}')\), we have to ensure that the redesigned program does not execute them. From \(a_i\), the program either transitions to \(b_i\) or to \(b'_i\). Thus, safety is not violated from \(a_i\). Moreover, since all clauses are satisfied, at least one literal in each clause \(C_r = x_i \lor \neg x_j \lor x_k\) must be true. Thus, at least one of the three transitions \((z_{ri}, z'_{ri})\), \((z_{rj}, z'_{rj})\) or \((z_{rk}, z'_{rk})\) is excluded, thereby preventing the reachability of \(z'_{rk}\); i.e., the safety-violating transition \((z'_{rk}, z'_{r})\) will not be executed.

**Reachability of accepting states (satisfying liveness specifications).** While the accepting state \(z'_{r}\) is no longer reachable, the redesigned program halts in one of the accepting state \(z_{ri}, z_{rj}\) or \(z_{rk}\). Moreover, the accepting state \(a_{n+1}\) is reached infinitely often due to the way we have synthesized the sequences of
states $\ll a_i, b_i, c_i, a'_{i+1} \gg$ or $\ll a_i, b'_i, a'_i, a'_{i+1} \gg$ between $a_i$ and $a_{i+1}$. That is, (non-)terminating computations remains (non-)terminating. Thus, starting from any initial state, some accepting states will be visited infinitely often; i.e., $\mathcal{F}_p^c \subseteq \mathcal{F}_p$. Therefore, if the instance of 3-SAT is satisfiable, then there exists a redesigned program for the instance of Problem 2 that satisfies the requirements of Problem 1.

**Lemma 2.** If there exists a redesigned version of the instance of Problem 2 that meets the requirements of Problem 1, then the instance of 3-SAT is satisfiable.

**Proof.** Let $p_r$ be a redesigned version of the instance of Problem 2 that meets all the requirements of Problem 1. As such, the set of initial states $T_r$ must be equal to the set $\{a_1\} \cup \{z_r | 1 \leq r \leq m\}$. Starting from $a_1$, $p_r$ must execute a safe transition. Otherwise, we reach a contradiction; i.e., either $a_1$ is a deadlock state or the transition $(a_1, d_1)$, which violates the new safety specification is executed. Thus, $p_r$ either includes $(a_1, b_1)$ or $(a_1, b'_1)$, but not both (because $p_r$ is a deterministic program). If $p_r$ includes $(a_1, b_1)$, then we set $x_1$ to true in the 3-SAT formula. If $p_r$ includes $(a_1, b'_1)$, then we set $x_1$ to false.

We assign truth values to each $x_i$, for $1 \leq i \leq n$, depending on the presence of $(a_i, b_i)$ or $(a_i, b'_i)$ at state $a_i$ (similar to the way we assign a value to $x_1$). Such a value assignment strategy results in a unique truth-value assigned to each variable $x_i$. If $p_r$ includes $(a_i, b_i)$, then, from $b_i$, $p_r$ includes either $(b_i, c_i)$ or $(b_i, c'_i)$ (see Figure 2), but not both (because of determinism). If $p_r$ includes $(b_i, c_i)$, then, from $c_i$, $p_r$ must include either $(c_i, c_i)$ or $(c_i, a'_i)$. If $p_r$ includes $(c_i, a'_i)$, then it must include $(b_i, a'_i)$ since these two transitions are grouped due to inability of $C_b$ in reading $c$. As such, the two transitions $(a_i, b_i)$ and $(b_i, a_i)$ make a non-progress cycle in $p_r$ (see Figure 2), which is unacceptable as it violates liveness. Now, we show that, from $c_i$, $p_r$ cannot include $(c_i, c_i)$ either. If $p_r$ includes $(c'_i, c_i)$, then it must include $(c_i, a'_i)$, which is grouped with $(c'_i, b'_i)$ due to inability of $C_b$ in reading $c$ (see Figure 2). Thus, $p_r$ may reach $b'_i$ from $c'_i$ and deadlock in $b'_i$. Thus, if $p_r$ includes $(a_i, b_i)$ from $a_i$, then it must include $(b_i, c_i)$ and $(c_i, a'_i)$. In case where $p_r$ includes $(a_i, b'_i)$ from $a_i$, the transition $(b'_i, c'_i)$ must also be included; otherwise $p_r$ deadlocks in $b'_i$ (Figure 2). From $c'_i$, $p_r$ cannot include $(c'_i, c_i)$ because it has to include $(c_i, a'_i)$ that is grouped with $(c'_i, b'_i)$, which creates a non-progress cycle. Thus, $p_r$ must include $(c'_i, a'_i)$ from $c'_i$.

We also illustrate that each clause in the 3-SAT formula evaluates to true. Consider a clause $C_r = x_i \lor \neg x_j \lor x_k$. Starting from the initial state $z_r$, the transition $(z_r, z_{r_1})$ must be present in $p_r$; otherwise $z_r$ is a deadlock state. Moreover, from $z_{r_1}$, the safety-violating transition $(z'_{r_k}, z'_r)$ must not be executed. Thus, at least one of the transitions $(z_{r_1}, z'_{r_1}), (z'_{r_1}, z_{r_2}), (z_{r_2}, z'_{r_2}), (z'_{r_2}, z_{r_k})$ or $(z_{r_k}, z'_{r_k})$ must be excluded in $p_r$. However, if one of the transitions $(z_{r_1}, z_{r_2}), (z_{r_2}, z_{r_k})$ or $(z'_{r_k}, z'_{r_k})$ is excluded, then a reachable deadlock state could be created as their source states are not accepting states. Thus, if either $z'_{r_1}$ or $z'_{r_2}$ is reached from $z_r$, then the corresponding transition $(z'_{r_1}, z_{r_1})$ or $(z'_{r_2}, z_{r_2})$ must be present in $p_r$. Hence, at least one of the transitions $(z_{r_1}, z'_{r_1}), (z_{r_2}, z'_{r_2})$ or $(z_{r_k}, z'_{r_k})$ must be excluded in $p_r$; i.e., at least one literal in $C_r$ must be true, thereby satisfying $C_r$. 

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Theorem 2. Synthesizing safety (under limited observability) in deterministic programs in the BT model of safety specifications is NP-hard in $|S_p|$. (Proof follows from Lemmas 1 and 2.)

Theorem 3. Synthesizing safety (under limited observability) in deterministic programs in the BT model of safety specifications is NP-complete (in $|S_p|$).

Proof. The proof of NP-hardness follows from Theorem 2. The proof of membership in NP is straightforward; given a revised program one can verify the constraints of Problem 1 (in the BT model) in polynomial time.

Theorem 4. Synthesizing safety (under limited observability) in deterministic programs in the Bad State (BS) model of safety specifications is also NP-complete (in $|S_p|$).

Proof. The proof of NP-hardness works for the case where the safety specification rules out the reachability of states $d_i$ and $z'_r$ in the instance of Problem 2. The proof of NP membership is straightforward.

5 Conclusions and Future Work

This paper investigates the problem of capturing new safety requirements/properties while preserving existing safety and liveness properties, called the problem of incremental synthesis. Previous work [7, 3] shows that incremental synthesis for non-deterministic programs can be done in polynomial time (in the size of program state space) under unlimited observability. Moreover, it is known [4] that the complexity of incremental synthesis of safety for non-deterministic programs would increase to NP-complete under limited observability. In this paper, we illustrated that even for deterministic programs the complexity of incremental synthesis of safety is NP-complete (in program state space). Our NP-hardness proof illustrates that the read inabilities of each component with respect to the local state of other components is a major cause of complexity. Such read inabilities are mainly created because of encapsulation/modularization of functionalities at early stages of design. On one hand, encapsulation/modularity enables designers to create good abstractions while capturing different functionalities. On the other hand, encapsulation exacerbates the complexity of behavioral changes [22] when new crosscutting requirements have to be realized across the components of an existing program. To facilitate change while reaping the benefits of modularization in design, we will extend the work presented in this paper in the following directions:

- Sound polynomial-time heuristics. We will concentrate on devising polynomial-time heuristics that reduce the complexity of synthesizing safety at the expense of completeness. That is, if heuristics succeed in generating a redesigned program, then the generated program will capture the new safety property while preserving liveness. However, such heuristics may fail to generate a redesigned program while one exists.
Sufficient conditions. We will identify conditions under which safety can be synthesized in polynomial time. Specifically, we would like to address the following questions: (i) What kinds of inter-component topologies (i.e., read/write restrictions) should a program have such that a new safety requirement can be captured in it efficiently? (ii) For which types of programs and safety specifications the complexity of synthesizing safety is polynomial?

Backtracking. We will implement a backtracking algorithm for synthesizing safety under limited observability. While we showed that it is unlikely that safety can efficiently be synthesized under limited observability, in many practical contexts the worst case exponential complexity may not be experienced. Thus, we expect that a backtracking algorithm can explore the entire state space in a reasonable amount of time. Moreover, we will implement a parallel version of the backtracking algorithm that will benefit from randomization for search diversification.

An extensible software framework. We will develop a framework that provides automated assistance in synthesizing safety. Such a framework will include a repository of reusable heuristics that facilitate the synthesis of safety in an automated fashion. We foresee two categories of users for our extensible framework, namely, (1) developers of heuristics who will focus on designing new heuristics and integrating them into our framework, and (2) mainstream programmers who will use the built-in heuristics to capture new safety properties in programs.

References

Abstract. The well-known coordinated snapshot algorithm of mutable checkpointing [7–9] is studied. We equip it with a concise formal model and analyze its operational behavior via an invariant characterizing the snapshot computation. By this we obtain a clear understanding of the intermediate behavior and a correctness proof of the final snapshot based on a strong notion of consistency (reachability within the partial order representing the underlying computation). The formal model further enables a comparison with the blocking queue algorithm [13] introduced for the same scenario and with the same objective.

From a broader perspective, we advocate the use of formal semantics to formulate and prove correctness of distributed algorithms.

1 Introduction

The on-the-fly calculation of a snapshot, a consistent global state, is a known means to enhance fault tolerance and system diagnosis of distributed systems. Coordinated snapshot algorithms exchange coordination messages to orchestrate the checkpointing. One of these is mutable checkpointing ([7–9]) which aims at a reduced coordination overhead - both in number of checkpoints to be taken and coordination messages to be sent. It is known from [7] that there is no algorithm which minimizes the number of checkpoints without blocking processes.

To avoid the blocking, in mutable checkpointing, local checkpoints may be taken which may be discarded later. The presence of such checkpoints and an additional feature to further reduce the number of coordination messages hinder an easy analysis of the algorithm. With this paper, we equip mutable checkpointing with a precise formal model and make it amenable to a formal analysis. We establish an invariant to obtain deeper insight into the intermediate behavior of the algorithm and establish the consistency of the final snapshot. The model can further be used as a common ground for qualitative comparisons of snapshot algorithms. We give such a comparison with the conceptually different blocking queue algorithm [13] which, as mutable checkpointing, had been set up to reduce the coordination overhead.

Unlike other coordinated snapshot algorithms (eg. Chandy/ Lamport’s seminal algorithm [10]), mutable checkpointing algorithms do not monotonously
build up the snapshot with the underlying computation. In mutable checkpoint-
ing, checkpoints of local states may be taken from which the underlying compu-
tation had already progressed. The computation of the snapshot, thus, involves
forward and backward reasoning and the correctness of the algorithm, the consis-
tency of the final snapshot, is not obvious. The proofs provided in the literature
[7–9] are based on contradiction, use absence of orphans (messages recorded as
received but not as being sent) as consistency notion, and lack a formal model.
The formal proof provided in this paper is based on an invariant which char-
acterizes the snapshot partially computed. We use a stronger but well-accepted
notion of consistency [17]: reachability within the partial order representing the
underlying distributed computation. It implies the absence of orphans.

In case of a snapshot algorithm the invariant should explain how the snap-
shot gradually builds up on course of the underlying computation. For a global
state \( S \) of the underlying computation, the invariant should provide the snap-
shot calculated so far. We call the latter the potential snapshot \( \text{psn}(S) \) of \( S \). For
a snapshot algorithm which simply freezes local processes at certain points of
their computation, the potential snapshot consists of these checkpoints and the
current states of the none-frozen processes. In mutable checkpointing, local pro-
cesses may be frozen to states – the so-called mutable checkpoints - from which
they had already progressed. Reachability of \( \text{psn}(S) \) can therefore not simply
be obtained from a simultaneous progression of \( \text{psn}(S) \) and \( S \). We solve this
problem by extracting a set of global states from \( S \) of which each corresponds to
a different prediction of which of the mutable checkpoints will be frozen. These
states collectively define the \( \text{psn}(S) \). We then show how each of the states in
\( \text{psn}(S) \) progresses together with \( S \), where the progress may be partial, only,
due to the frozen processes. Using this result we provide a direct proof for the
consistency of the final snapshot. The potential snapshot, however, – or more
precisely the predicted states of it -, in general, are shown not to be consistent.
This implies that if the run of a mutable checkpointing algorithm needs to be
 interrupted then the entire checkpointing needs to be started afresh.

The proof is based on the specification of the operational behavior of what
we consider the essence of mutable checkpointing. We extracted it from the
pseudocode given in [9] by removing all details not related to the basic concept
taking a mutable checkpoint upon receiving a flagged message for the first time
(and before a checkpoint) – where the flag indicates that the sender had taken a
checkpoint or a mutable checkpoint. In this way we obtained a concise description
of the core of mutable checkpointing which we see as another contribution of this
paper.

With this formal model and analysis we relate mutable checkpointing to the
blocking queue algorithm introduced in [13]. In fact, this paper can be seen as
a companion paper as it deploys the proof technique developed there (however,
setting up the invariant for mutual checkpointing was a much more demanding
task). Having fixed the underlying computation, the two snapshot algorithms
can directly be compared due to the same underlying formal model. We show
that the respective final snapshots, in general, are incomparable and discuss the differences between the algorithms.

The paper is structured as follows. Basic terminology is introduced in Section 2, followed by a short description of mutable checkpointing in Section 3. Section 4 specifies the operational behavior of the algorithm defined in terms of predicates and rules. The rules we deduced from the pseudocode of [9] where we abstracted away as many details as possible to get the essence of mutable checkpointing. In Section 5 we introduce the potential snapshot, show its progression with the underlying computation and prove the consistency of the final snapshot. Section 6 gives the comparison with the blocking queue algorithm of [13]. The conclusion is given in Section 7.

2 Preliminaries

We assume a finite number of processes $P_1, ..., P_n$ which communicate solely by message passing via FIFO channels $C_{ij}$. Channel $C_{ij}$ leads from $P_i$ to $P_j$ and for each pair of processes there is such a unidirectional channel. Channels are assumed not to lose or reorder messages. There is no assumption on the state space of processes.

A state $S = (p_1, ..., p_n, Chan)$ of a distributed computation is given by the histories (events performed so far) of the local processes and the current contents of the channels where $Chan : \{C_{ij} \mid i, j \leq n, i \neq j\} \rightarrow MSG^*$ and $p_i \in Events^*$. To ease readability, for a global state $S$ we attach $S$ as a superscript to the histories and channels and abbreviate $Chan(C_{ij})^S$ by $C_{ij}^S$. In the initial state $S_0$, $p_i^S_0 = \varepsilon$, and $C_{ij}^S_0 = \varepsilon$ for all $i, j$. A distributed computation is a sequence $\pi = S_0 \rightarrow e_1 \rightarrow S_1 \rightarrow e_2 \rightarrow S_2 \rightarrow \cdots \rightarrow e_k \rightarrow S_k$ where each $S_i$ is obtained from updating $S_{i-1}$ according to the semantics of event $e_i$. We also write $\pi = S_0 \rightarrow^* S_k$ to mention the initial and final states of $\pi$, explicitly.

The notion of consistency of a state with a computation $\pi$ is best understood in terms of $\pi$’s space-time diagram (its partial order representation, see [14], [17] or [4]). A state is consistent with $\pi$ if it is a cut of $\pi$ closed under the *happens-before* ordering in the space-time diagram. Equivalently, a consistent state $S$ of $\pi$ can be characterized by that all local histories of $S$ are prefixes of the corresponding histories of $\pi$’s final state $S_k$, and if a message occurs as received in a history of $S$ then it also needs to occur as having been sent in a history (that is there are no orphans).

Snapshot algorithms are superimposed on a distributed computation $\pi$ on course of which a state consistent with $\pi$ is to be calculated. We will only describe the behavior of the snapshot algorithm which, if it is non blocking, should allow for send and receive events induced by the underlying computation at any point of time. All other events of the snapshot algorithm are coordination events.
3 Mutable Checkpoint Algorithms

Mutable checkpoint algorithms are coordinated snapshot algorithms which reduce the coordination overhead (compared to [10]) by combining message flags (indicating whether messages have been sent before or after a checkpoint, cf. [15]) with the new concept of mutable checkpoints. Mutable checkpoints are taken on a tentative basis (on volatile storage) and are only finalized (on non-volatile storage) when the need for a local checkpoint has been confirmed.

The Algorithm in short

The initiating process requests the processes it depends on (from which it had received a message) to take a checkpoint. Any process receiving such a request takes a checkpoint and propagates the request further to the up to its knowledge so far uninformed processes it itself depends on. After a process has taken a checkpoint all the messages sent out by this process carry a flag (bb=1). A process which hasn’t received a checkpoint request but a message with flag (bb=1), takes a mutable checkpoint indicating that it must convert the current local state to a checkpoint, if in future it receives a checkpoint request. This is done before the received message is processed and only if it hadn’t taken a mutable checkpoint earlier. Under certain progress assumptions, all processes which, in principle, need to take a checkpoint will finally have done so and this completes phase I of the algorithm. Phase II would deal with the confirmation that the checkpointing is complete and the dissemination of this information to the local processes. However, in this paper we only investigate phase I.

With minor modifications the algorithm has widely been published see [7–9], our reference algorithm is [9]. We specify the operational behavior of the algorithm in terms of predicates and transition rules which an implementation would need to satisfy. To be able to focus on the essence of mutable checkpointing, in the translation we omitted everything related to earlier checkpointing and a feature to reduce the number of coordination messages further (the sent_i condition). We also assume that the initiating process is always P_1 and as in [9] do not consider concurrent checkpointing. Finally, all details relating to termination (the completion of taking checkpoints) of phase I are omitted.

The Algorithm in detail

Rule numbers in brackets refer to corresponding rules given in the next section.

1. As part of their computations, processes send messages to each other which come attached with a flag (Rules 1.1 and 1.2). If the flag is set, this indicates that the sending process has already taken its checkpoint (instantly or belated via a mutable checkpoint).
2. Every process maintains a dependency vector which provides all the processes it depends on. A process $P_i$ depends on process $P_j$ if $P_i$ has received a message from $P_j$. This is a dynamic notion of dependency as at the time of initiation of the checkpointing all dependencies may not be known. The checkpointing will involve all processes which are dependent in a transitive way. Say at the time of initiation, the checkpointing process $P_1$ depends on $P_2$ and $P_3$, and $P_3$ depends on $P_4$. Then, $P_4$ needs to be included in the checkpointing.

3. The initiator takes its checkpoint and sends the checkpoint request to the processes it depends on using its dependency vector. It attaches the dependency vector to its request (Rule 3).

4. If a process $P_j$ receives a checkpoint request from a process $P_i$ then either of the following will happen:
   - If it has already taken a checkpoint ($cp_{\text{taken}}_j$ is true), then the request is ignored (Rule 4.1).
   - If it has not taken a checkpoint but has taken a mutable checkpoint ($mcp_{\text{taken}}_j$ is true), then by receiving the request it converts the mutable checkpoint into a checkpoint. This conversion is not explicitly modeled but from now on $cp_{\text{taken}}_j$ will be true. Further, $P_j$ propagates the checkpoint request to processes as follows. For each process $P_k$ on which $P_i$ does not depend on, but on which $P_j$ depended when it took the mutable checkpoint, $P_j$ sends a request to $P_k$ ($P_i$ has already sent a request to the processes on which it depends, Rule 4.2).
   - If it has neither taken a checkpoint or a mutable checkpoint, then it takes a checkpoint and propagates the request as in the previous case (Rule 4.3).

5. If a process $P_j$ removes a message (with attached flag) from a channel then either of the following will happen:
   - If the received message has flag 0, then $P_j$ processes the message (Rule 2.1, Rule 2.2). If this happens before a mutable checkpoint or checkpoint is taken, then $P_j$ depends on $P_i$ and the dependency vector might need to be updated (Rule 2.1).
   - If the flag is 1 and $P_j$ has already taken a checkpoint, then $P_j$ processes the message (Rule 2.3).
   - If the flag is 1 and $P_j$ has neither taken a checkpoint nor mutable checkpoint, then it takes a mutable checkpoint and immediately after that processes the message (Rule 2.4). Taking the mutable checkpoint and processing the message is one atomic action.
   - If the flag is 1 and $P_j$ has taken a mutable checkpoint but not a checkpoint, then $P_j$ processes the message (Rule 2.5).

4 The Operational Behavior of Mutable Checkpointing

We specify the algorithm’s behavior by a set of predicates and rules describing how the global state of the system changes with a transition. The rules of the following format:
If a global state $S$ satisfies the precondition of a rule, then the event may occur and $S$ is updated to $T$ as specified in the field of postconditions. The occurrence of event $e$ is written as $S \xrightarrow{e} T$. So a distributed computation $\pi = S_0 \xrightarrow{e_1} S_1 \xrightarrow{e_2} S_2 \cdots \xrightarrow{e_k} S_k$ is a sequence of such events where each of the transitions is justified by one of the rules. In some of the rules (Rules 1.2 and 2.2) the preconditions are split into two rows. These should be read as a disjunction, that is, each of these rules presents two rules with the same event name and postconditions.

The possible events and messages of the mutable checkpointing algorithm are given by the following table.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>mcp_taken_i</th>
<th>process $P_i$ takes a mutable checkpoint</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>cp_taken_i</td>
<td>$P_i$ takes the checkpoint</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>send_ij(.)</td>
<td>$P_i$ adds a message to channel $C_{ij}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rec_ij(.)</td>
<td>$P_j$ receives a message or checkpoint request from channel $C_{ij}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(cpr_i, dep)</td>
<td>the message that $P_i$ has taken a checkpoint with attached dependency vector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(msg, bb)</td>
<td>a message and attached flag</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the algorithm every local process maintains a dependency vector $dep$ in which it keeps the dependencies to other processes: $dep_i(j) = 1$ if $P_i$ has received a message from $P_j$ before a mutable checkpoint has been taken. This dependency vector can be retrieved from the history of a process at any state. However, for clarity we explicitly mention it in the semantics.

The first element of a channel is at the rightmost position and provided by \textit{first} and the remainder by \textit{rem}. We use the simple dot to separate letters in a word. For the concatenation of words we use \textit{e}. If an event occurs in the history of a process at state $S$ then we state this as a predicate $event_i^S$. For example, $\neg mcp\_taken\_i^S$ stands for that $mcp\_taken\_i$ does not occur in the history $p_i^S$. It represents that $P_i$ has not taken a mutable checkpoint so far. The $cp\_taken\_i^S$ predicate, however, is more general as it also needs to cover the conversion of a mutable checkpoint to a (proper) checkpoint. Hence, $cp\_taken\_i^S$ if and only if either $cp\_taken\_i$ occurs in the history of $P_i$ or $mcp\_taken\_i^S$ and $rec_{ji}((cpr\_j, dep))^S$ for some $j$.

Rules are grouped according to their functionality.

5 Main Results

We here define the potential snapshot and show how it progresses with the underlying computation. With this invariant result we will show the reachability of the snapshot finally calculated.

As already discussed, in mutable checkpointing the potential snapshot $psn(S)$ extracted from an intermediate state $S$ of the underlying computation cannot simply be a global state containing the current local checkpoints. At $S$ there is
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rule</th>
<th>Preconditions</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Postconditions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>¬(cp_taken)²</td>
<td>S&lt;sub&gt;t&lt;/sub&gt;sendᵢᵣ((msg₀,0)) → T</td>
<td>(1) pᵢ&lt;sup&gt;T&lt;/sup&gt; = pᵢ&lt;sup&gt;S&lt;/sup&gt;.sendᵢᵣ((msg₀,0))&lt;br&gt;(2) Cᵢᵣ = (msg₀,0).Cᵢᵣ&lt;sup&gt;S&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>¬(mcp_taken)²</td>
<td>S&lt;sub&gt;t&lt;/sub&gt;sendᵢᵣ((msg₁,1)) → T</td>
<td>(1) pᵢ&lt;sup&gt;T&lt;/sup&gt; = pᵢ&lt;sup&gt;S&lt;/sup&gt;.sendᵢᵣ((msg₁,1))&lt;br&gt;(2) Cᵢᵣ = (msg₁,1).Cᵢᵣ&lt;sup&gt;S&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>first(Cᵢᵣ&lt;sub&gt;j&lt;/sub&gt;) = (msg₀)</td>
<td>S&lt;sub&gt;t&lt;/sub&gt;recᵢᵣ((msg₀,0)) → T</td>
<td>(1) pᵢ&lt;sup&gt;T&lt;/sup&gt; = pᵢ&lt;sup&gt;S&lt;/sup&gt;.recᵢᵣ((msg₀,0))&lt;br&gt;(2) Cᵢᵣ = rem(Cᵢᵣ&lt;sup&gt;S&lt;/sup&gt;)&lt;br&gt;(3) depᵢᵣ(⟨msg₀,0⟩) = 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>first(Cᵢᵣ&lt;sub&gt;j&lt;/sub&gt;) = (msg₀)</td>
<td>S&lt;sub&gt;t&lt;/sub&gt;recᵢᵣ((msg₀,1)) → T</td>
<td>(1) pᵢ&lt;sup&gt;T&lt;/sup&gt; = pᵢ&lt;sup&gt;S&lt;/sup&gt;.recᵢᵣ((msg₀,1))&lt;br&gt;(2) Cᵢᵣ = rem(Cᵢᵣ&lt;sup&gt;S&lt;/sup&gt;)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>first(Cᵢᵣ&lt;sub&gt;j&lt;/sub&gt;) = (msg₁)</td>
<td>S&lt;sub&gt;t&lt;/sub&gt;recᵢᵣ((msg₁,0)) → T</td>
<td>(1) pᵢ&lt;sup&gt;T&lt;/sup&gt; = pᵢ&lt;sup&gt;S&lt;/sup&gt;.recᵢᵣ((msg₁,0))&lt;br&gt;(2) Cᵢᵣ = rem(Cᵢᵣ&lt;sup&gt;S&lt;/sup&gt;)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>first(Cᵢᵣ&lt;sub&gt;j&lt;/sub&gt;) = (msg₁)</td>
<td>S&lt;sub&gt;t&lt;/sub&gt;recᵢᵣ((msg₁,1)) → T</td>
<td>(1) pᵢ&lt;sup&gt;T&lt;/sup&gt; = pᵢ&lt;sup&gt;S&lt;/sup&gt;.recᵢᵣ((msg₁,1))&lt;br&gt;(2) Cᵢᵣ = rem(Cᵢᵣ&lt;sup&gt;S&lt;/sup&gt;)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>first(Cᵢᵣ&lt;sub&gt;j&lt;/sub&gt;) = (msg₁)</td>
<td>S&lt;sub&gt;t&lt;/sub&gt;recᵢᵣ((msg₁,1)) → T</td>
<td>(1) pᵢ&lt;sup&gt;T&lt;/sup&gt; = pᵢ&lt;sup&gt;S&lt;/sup&gt;.recᵢᵣ((msg₁,1))&lt;br&gt;(2) Cᵢᵣ = rem(Cᵢᵣ&lt;sup&gt;S&lt;/sup&gt;)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>¬(cp_taken)²</td>
<td>S&lt;sub&gt;t&lt;/sub&gt;cp_taken₁ → T</td>
<td>(1) pᵢ&lt;sup&gt;T&lt;/sup&gt; = pᵢ&lt;sup&gt;S&lt;/sup&gt;.cp_taken₁&lt;br&gt;(2) C&lt;sub&gt;ᵣ₁&lt;/sub&gt; = (cpᵢᵣ₁, dep&lt;sub&gt;ᵣ₁&lt;/sub&gt;).C&lt;sub&gt;ᵣ₁&lt;/sub&gt;&lt;sup&gt;S&lt;/sup&gt; for all k &gt; 1 with dep&lt;sub&gt;ᵣ₁&lt;/sub&gt;(k) = 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>first(Cᵢᵣ&lt;sub&gt;j&lt;/sub&gt;) = (cpᵢᵣ₁, dep)</td>
<td>S&lt;sub&gt;t&lt;/sub&gt;recᵢᵣ((cpᵢᵣ₁, dep)) → T</td>
<td>(1) pᵢ&lt;sup&gt;T&lt;/sup&gt; = pᵢ&lt;sup&gt;S&lt;/sup&gt;.recᵢᵣ((cpᵢᵣ₁, dep))&lt;br&gt;(2) Cᵢᵣ = rem(Cᵢᵣ&lt;sup&gt;S&lt;/sup&gt;)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>first(Cᵢᵣ&lt;sub&gt;j&lt;/sub&gt;) = (cpᵢᵣ₁, dep)</td>
<td>S&lt;sub&gt;t&lt;/sub&gt;cp_taken₁ → T</td>
<td>(1) pᵢ&lt;sup&gt;T&lt;/sup&gt; = pᵢ&lt;sup&gt;S&lt;/sup&gt;.recᵢᵣ((cpᵢᵣ₁, dep)).cp_taken₁&lt;br&gt;(2) Cᵢᵣ = rem(Cᵢᵣ&lt;sup&gt;S&lt;/sup&gt;)&lt;br&gt;(3) C&lt;sub&gt;ᵣ₁&lt;/sub&gt; = (cpᵢᵣ₁, dep ∨ dep&lt;sub&gt;ᵣ₁&lt;/sub&gt;).C&lt;sub&gt;ᵣ₁&lt;/sub&gt;&lt;sup&gt;S&lt;/sup&gt; for all k with dep&lt;sub&gt;ᵣ₁&lt;/sub&gt;(k) = 0, dep&lt;sub&gt;ᵣ₁&lt;/sub&gt;(k) = 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>first(Cᵢᵣ&lt;sub&gt;j&lt;/sub&gt;) = (cpᵢᵣ₁, dep)</td>
<td>S&lt;sub&gt;t&lt;/sub&gt;cp_taken₁ → T</td>
<td>(1) pᵢ&lt;sup&gt;T&lt;/sup&gt; = pᵢ&lt;sup&gt;S&lt;/sup&gt;.recᵢᵣ((cpᵢᵣ₁, dep))&lt;br&gt;(2) Cᵢᵣ = rem(Cᵢᵣ&lt;sup&gt;S&lt;/sup&gt;)&lt;br&gt;(3) C&lt;sub&gt;ᵣ₁&lt;/sub&gt; = (cpᵢᵣ₁, dep ∨ dep&lt;sub&gt;ᵣ₁&lt;/sub&gt;).C&lt;sub&gt;ᵣ₁&lt;/sub&gt;&lt;sup&gt;S&lt;/sup&gt; for all k with dep&lt;sub&gt;ᵣ₁&lt;/sub&gt;(k) = 0, dep&lt;sub&gt;ᵣ₁&lt;/sub&gt;(k) = 1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1. Rules 1.1, 1.2: A message can be sent at any time and the attached flag shows whether this happened before (bb=0) or after (bb=1) a checkpoint or mutable checkpoint was taken. Rules 2.1–2.5: A mutable checkpoint is taken if the flag of the received message is 1 and the receiving process has neither taken a checkpoint nor a mutable checkpoint so far. Rule 3: We assume that the checkpointing will always be initiated by P₁. It sends the checkpoint request to all the processes it depends on and takes the checkpoint as part of one atomic action. Rules 4.1–4.3: Receiving, setting and propagating a checkpoint request is modeled as one atomic event. This event comprises of removing the request from the channel, taking the checkpoint and propagating the request and causal dependencies to the concerned processes. These are the processes on which the receiving process depends but which are not listed in the dependency array received with the incoming request. In case a mutable checkpoint had been taken, it is converted to a permanent one (this, however, is not explicitly modeled).
no clarity whether a mutable checkpoint should be considered as a checkpoint or simply be discarded since the future computation steps cannot be foreseen. In \( psn(S) \) all options have to be simultaneously considered. Accordingly, \( psn(S) \) is a set of global states of which each corresponds to a different prediction with respect to the final conversion of mutable checkpoints to (proper) checkpoints.

The formal definitions are given next. Note that all projection functions used in this paper are summarized in Figure 1. The freeze function allows one to cut down the history of individual processes to the point where they have taken a mutable checkpoint or a checkpoint. These points we call freeze points. In order to freeze a process \( P_i \) all events after the freeze point need to be deleted from the history. In general, the freezing of \( P_i \) may effect process \( P_j \) as the latter may have received a message from \( P_i \) sent after its freeze point. Processes that may be frozen are those in \( MCP(S) \) while those in \( CP(S) \) must be frozen if a freezing is to be conducted.

\[
MCP(S) = \{ P_i \mid \text{mcp}_i \text{taken} \land \neg \text{cp}_i \text{taken} \}
\]

\[
CP(S) = \{ P_i \mid \text{cp}_i \text{taken} \}
\]

Due to the various freezing options we obtain the set of potential snapshots:

\[
PSN(S) = \{ f(A,S) \mid CP(S) \subseteq A \subseteq MCP(S) \cup CP(S) \}
\]

Each \( f(A,S) \) provides a potential snapshot at state \( S \) of which the processes in \( A \) are frozen.

\[
f(A,S) = \langle p_1^{f(A,S)}, p_2^{f(A,S)}, \ldots, p_n^{f(A,S)}, Chan^{f(A,S)} \rangle
\]

\[
P_i^{f(A,S)} = \begin{cases} 
\text{mcp}_i \text{cp} & P_i \in A \\
\text{rem bb} = 1 & P_i \notin A 
\end{cases}
\]

\[
Chan^{f(A,S)} = \{ C_{ij}^{f(A,S)} \mid 1 \leq i,j \leq n \text{ and } i \neq j \}
\]

\[
C_{ij}^{f(A,S)} = \begin{cases} 
\text{rev}(p_j^{f(A,S)}) & P_i, P_j \in A \\
\text{rev}(p_j^{f(A,S)}) & P_i \notin A, P_j \in A \\
\text{rev}(p_j^{f(A,S)}) & P_i \in A, P_j \notin A \\
\text{rev}(p_j^{f(A,S)}) & P_i \notin A, P_j \notin A 
\end{cases}
\]

where \( \text{rev} \) reverses the string. Note that we do not explicitly remove the flag (which are used for coordination reasons only) from a message, but this is implied whenever coordination messages are removed.

To show the simultaneous progression of \( psn(S) \) with \( S \xrightarrow{\text{move}} S' \) each of the states in \( psn(S) \) needs to be considered with respect to its corresponding move. If a mutable checkpoint has to be frozen then those states in \( psn(S) \) which had not predicted this are discarded. This means that the size of \( psn(S) \) can shrink. It will, however, grow with every new mutable checkpoint taken as the
It is applied to the local history of a process and yields the string of send and receive events before \textit{mcp\_taken} or \textit{cp\_taken} in their respective order. Only one of the latter events can occur in a history.

\(\downarrow_{\text{mcp,cp}}\) It is applied to the local history of a process not in \(A\) and removes all coordination messages and messages with flag 1 received from a process in \(A\).

\(\uparrow_{\text{mcp,mb=1}}\) It is applied to the local history of a process \(P_i\) and yields the string of messages in \(\text{rec}_{P_i}(\langle \text{msg}, \text{bb} \rangle)\) events after \textit{mcp\_taken} or \textit{cp\_taken} in their respective order. Only one of the latter events can occur in a history.

\(\downarrow_{\text{mcp,mb=0}}\) It is applied to the local history of a process \(P_i\) and yields the string of messages in \(\text{rec}_{P_i}(\langle \text{msg}, \text{bb} \rangle)\) events after \textit{mcp\_taken} or \textit{cp\_taken} in their respective order. Only one of the latter events can occur in a history.

\(\downarrow_{\text{sent}}\) It is applied to the local history of a process \(P_i\) and yields the string of messages occurring in \(\text{send}_{P_i}(\langle \text{msg}, \text{bb} \rangle)\) events in their respective order.

\(\downarrow_{\text{bb}}\) This projection is applied to strings of messages, only. It removes from the string all coordination messages and messages with attached flag 1.

![Projection functions used in this paper.](image)

Fig. 1. Projection functions used in this paper.

Concerned process will now have to be considered as progressing and as frozen, simultaneously. The next lemma describes this progression in detail.

**Lemma 1.** Let \(S \xrightarrow{e} S'\) where \(e\) is an event of \(P_i, i \in \{1, \ldots, n\}\).

Then for all freeze sets \(A \subseteq S\) one of the following holds:

1. \(P_i \not\in A\) and \(f(A,S) = f(A,S')\) or
2. \(P_i \in A\) and one of the following applies:

   (a) \(e \notin \{\text{cptaken}_i, \text{rec}_{P_i}(\langle \text{cp}_j, \text{dep} \rangle), \text{rec}_{P_i}(\langle \text{msg}, 1 \rangle)\} | j \in \{1, \ldots, n\}\), and
   \(f(A,S) \xrightarrow{e} f(A,S')\)

   (b) \(e = \text{rec}_{P_i}(\langle \langle \text{cp}_j, \text{dep} \rangle, \text{mcp\_taken}_i^S\rangle), \text{mcp\_taken}_i^S\), and \(f(A \cup \{P_i\}, S) = f(A \cup \{P_i\}, S')\)

   (c) \(e = \text{cptaken}_i\), \(\neg\text{mcp\_taken}_i^S\), and \(f(A,S) = f(A \cup \{P_i\}, S')\)

   (d) \(e = \text{rec}_{P_i}(\langle \text{msg}, 1 \rangle)\), \(P_j \not\in A\), and
   \(f(A,S) \xrightarrow{e} f(A,S')\)

   (i) \(f(A,S) = f(A \cup \{P_i\}, S')\) if \(\neg\text{mcp\_taken}_i^S\)

   (ii) \(f(A,S) = f(A \cup \{P_i\}, S')\) if \(\neg\text{mcp\_taken}_i^S\)

   (e) \(e_i = \text{rec}_{P_i}(\langle \text{msg}, 1 \rangle)\), \(P_j \in A\), and
   \(f(A,S) = f(A,S')\)

   (i) \(f(A,S) = f(A \cup \{P_i\}, S')\) if \(\neg\text{mcp\_taken}_i^S\)

   (ii) \(f(A,S) = f(A \cup \{P_i\}, S')\) if \(\neg\text{mcp\_taken}_i^S\)

where \(A \cup \{P_i\}\) is a freeze set of the respective state whenever given as an argument to the freeze function.

**Proof.** By exploring for each freeze set of the current state all possible transitions case by case, see [2] for details.

Note again, that in the lemma notationally we did not distinguish between a message with or without flag. However, in all events performed by a frozen process the flags have been removed. Similarly, in the next lemma \(\subseteq\) denotes the prefix relation up to messages with or without flags. We further do not distinguish between \(S_0\) and \(f(\emptyset, S)\). Lemma 2 states the invariant property of reachable states on which the consistency proof of the final snapshot is based.
Lemma 2. Let \( \pi : S_0 \rightarrow^* S \).
If \( A \) is a freeze set of \( S \) then \( S_0 \rightarrow^* f(A, S) \) such that

1. \( p_k^{f(A, S)} \subseteq p_k^S \) for all \( p_k \in A \),
2. \( p_k^{f(A, S)} = p_k^S_{\text{rem bb}=1} \) for all \( p_k \notin A \).

Proof. By induction on the number of transitions leading from \( S_0 \) to \( S \). If there is no transition then \( S_0 = S \) and \( A = \emptyset \). So, suppose the induction hypothesis applies to \( S_0 \rightarrow^* S \) and there is one more transition \( S \rightarrow^* S' \). Let \( A \) be a freeze set of \( S' \). We inspect the possible transitions by considering the rules justifying them. Wlog let \( e \) be performed by \( P_i \). We give the proof for Rule 4.2: \( e = \text{cp\_taken}_i, \text{first}(C^S_{ij}) = (\text{cp}_r, \text{dep}), \text{¬cp\_taken}^S_i \) and \( \text{¬mcp\_taken}^S_i \). \( A \setminus \{P_i\} \) is a freeze set of \( S \), and by Lemma 1.2(c), \( f(A \setminus \{P_i\}, S) = f(A, S') \). Hence,

\[
\begin{align*}
p_i^{f(A, S')} &= p_i^{f(A \setminus \{P_i\}, S)} \\
&= p_i^{f(A \setminus \{P_i\})} \quad \text{Ind. Hyp.} \\
&= p_i^S_{\text{rem bb}=1} \quad \text{as } \text{cp\_taken}^S_i \\
&= (p_i^S\text{cp\_taken}_i)_{\text{rem bb}=1} \\
&= (p_i^S\text{cp\_taken}_i)_{\text{mcp, cp}} \quad \text{as } \text{mcp\_taken}^S_i \\
&= p_i^S_{\text{mcp, cp}}
\end{align*}
\]

\[\forall P_k \in A \setminus \{P_i\} : \]

\[
\begin{align*}
p_k^{f(A, S')} &= p_k^{f(A \setminus \{P_i\}, S)} \\
&= p_k^{f(A \setminus \{P_i\})} \quad \text{Ind. Hyp.} \\
&= p_k^S_{\text{mcp, cp}} \\
&= p_k^S_{\text{mcp, cp}}
\end{align*}
\]

\[\forall P_k \notin A : \]

\[
\begin{align*}
p_k^{f(A, S')} &= p_k^{f(A \setminus \{P_i\}, S)} \\
&= p_k^{f(A \setminus \{P_i\})} \quad \text{Ind. Hyp.} \\
&= p_k^S_{\text{rem bb}=1} \quad \text{as } \text{mcp\_taken}^S_i \\
&= p_k^S_{\text{rem bb}=1}
\end{align*}
\]

where one should recall that a mutable checkpoint is taken with the first flagged message received (while \( \text{¬cp\_taken}^S_i \)).

Lemma 2 shows that each \( f(A, S) \) is reachable. This, however, does not mean that \( f(A, S) \) is consistent with \( \pi \) since events of frozen processes are removed from the history and may create "holes". One may argue that the states to be considered here should be those with all none-frozen processes reset to their initial states. This would avoid the "hole" problem. For an arbitrary set of processes \( I, I \subseteq \{P_1, \ldots, P_n\} \), the reset of \( I \) at \( S \) is defined by

\[
p_i^{r(I, S)} = \begin{cases} p_i^S & \text{if } P_i \not\in I, \\ \varepsilon & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}
\]

\[
C^r_{ij}(I, S) = \begin{cases} C^S_{ij} & P_i, P_j \not\in I, \\ p_i^{r(S)}_{\text{sent}} & P_j \in I, \\ \varepsilon & P_i \in I. \end{cases}
\]

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In general, \( r(I, S) \) is not a consistent state. This is always the case if a process in \( I \) had sent a message to a process not in \( I \) and this message had been received before the resetting. It would become an orphan.

This problem does not occur if \( S \) is the final state of a computation with completed checkpointing. The checkpointing is complete if there is no coordination message in any of the channels (recall that taking a checkpoint and propagating it further is an atomic event). The final snapshot \( T \) is defined by resetting all processes that have not taken a checkpoint at \( S \) to their starting point. So, in this case \( I = CP(S) \), the complement set of \( CP(S) \).

**Theorem 1.** Let \( \pi \) be a distributed computation from \( S_0 \) to \( S \) with completed checkpointing. Then the final snapshot \( T \) obtained by resetting to the initial state all processes that have not taken a checkpoint at \( S \) is consistent with \( \pi \).

**Proof.** The final snapshot is defined by \( T := r(CP(S), f(CP(S), S)) \). The histories of \( T \) are given by

\[
p^I_t = \begin{cases} p^{I(CP(S), S)}_t & \text{if } P_t \in CP(S), \\ \epsilon & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}
\]

By Lemma 2 we know that \( f(CP(S), S) \) is reachable from \( S_0 \) as \( CP(S) \) is a freeze set of \( S \). So there is a computation

\[
\pi' = S_0 \overset{\epsilon_1}{\rightarrow} U_1 \overset{\epsilon_2}{\rightarrow} \ldots \overset{\epsilon_m}{\rightarrow} U_m = f(CP(S), S).
\]

Let \( I \) stand for \( CP(S) \). From \( \pi' \) we extract the computation which restricts to events performed by processes not in \( I \), only.

\[
S_0 \overset{\epsilon_1}{\rightarrow} r(I, U_1) \overset{\epsilon_2}{\rightarrow} \ldots \overset{\epsilon_m}{\rightarrow} r(I, U_m)
\]

where \( r(I, U_t) \overset{\epsilon_{t+1}}{\rightarrow} r(I, U_{t+1}) \) stands for \( r(I, U_t) = r(I, U_{t+1}) \) if \( \epsilon_{t+1} \) is an event of a process in \( I \), and for \( r(I, U_t) \overset{\epsilon_{t+1}}{\rightarrow} r(I, U_{t+1}) \) otherwise. For the former case there is nothing to prove, so consider the case \( \epsilon_{t+1} \) is performed by a process outside \( I \). Again, if \( \epsilon_{t+1} \) is not of the form \( \text{rec}_{ij}(\text{msg}) \) where \( P_i \in I, P_j \in CP(S) \), the transition can obviously be performed. For the case \( \epsilon_{t+1} = \text{rec}_{ij}(\text{msg}) \), \( P_i \in I, P_j \in CP(S) \) we show that it cannot occur. So suppose there was such an event, then

\[
\begin{align*}
(1) & \quad p^{U_t, \text{rec}_{ij}(\text{msg})}_{j} = p^{U_t, \text{rec}_{ij}(\text{msg})}_{j}^{r_{ij}(\text{msg})} \quad \text{by Rule 2.1} \\
(2) & \quad p^{f(CP(S), S)}_{j} \subseteq p^{S}_{j} \quad \text{by Lemma 2} \\
(3) & \quad p^{I(CP(S), S)}_{j} = p^{S}_{j} \downarrow \text{cpr, cp} \quad \text{by def.}
\end{align*}
\]

This implies \( \text{rec}_{ij}(\text{msg}, 0) \) is in the history of \( p^S_j \) (by (1) and (2)) and occurs before \( mcp_{\text{taken}}^S \) or \( cp_{\text{taken}}^S \) (by (1) and (3)). Hence, by Rule 2.1, \( \text{dep}^S_S(i) = 1 \). Thus, since \( P_j \) had taken a checkpoint after the receive event it had also sent a \( \text{cpr}_j \) to \( P_i \). Now, as \( P_i \in I \), this event had not been received and must therefore be in \( C^S_{ij} \). This, however, contradicts that the checkpointing was complete.
Like mutable checkpointing, the blocking queue algorithm in [13] aims at a reduced coordination overhead. It assumes the same system model. The main difference is that the receipt of flagged messages which would lead to mutable checkpoints are buffered in so-called blocking queues and are not processed until the necessary checkpoints have been taken. This can be viewed as blocking channels or blocking processes partially. Mutable checkpointing neither blocks channels nor processes but, in general, it takes mutable checkpoints which if not converted to checkpoints need to be discarded after completion of the checkpointing (i.e. after phase I). A garbage collection is not required in the blocking queue algorithm, but the blocking queues need to be cleared.

The snapshots determined by the two algorithms over the same underlying computation, in general, are incomparable. That is, it is not the case that a checkpoint taken in mutable computing is always equal or earlier than the corresponding checkpoint in the blocking queue setting, or vice versa. It may even happen that a process takes a checkpoint in one setting but not in the other. We discuss this next. It should be clear that a converted mutable checkpoint can be earlier than the corresponding checkpoint taken by the blocking queue algorithm. A computation in which a process takes a checkpoint in the blocking queue algorithm but not in mutable checkpointing is illustrated in Figure 2. We use \( M \) to depict a mutable checkpoint, \( M' \) for a mutable checkpoint converted to a checkpoint, and \( \otimes \) for a (regular) checkpoint. Arcs with numbers reflect messages and their flag. Checkpoint requests are indicated by \( cpr \). In Figure 2, the checkpoint of \( P_i \) in the blocking queue algorithm has no counterpart in mutable checkpointing. Such checkpoints, however, can lead to earlier checkpoints in the blocking queue algorithms and in turn lead to fewer checkpoints than in mutable checkpointing.

With regard to the potential snapshots, it has been established in [13] that the potential snapshots of the blocking queue algorithm are always consistent, contrasting the general inconsistency of the potential snapshots of mutable checkpointing shown here. In particular, the former implies that one can always only reset those processes for which a checkpoint has been taken without losing con-
Fig. 2. a) Mutable checkpointing, b) blocking queue algorithm. Process $P_i$ takes a checkpoint in in b), only.

7 Conclusions

In this paper we gave a concise specification of the operational behavior of mutable checkpointing, set up an invariant for the reachable states (Lemma 2) and utilized it for the correctness proof of the final snapshot. The specification of the operational behavior we extracted from the pseudo code in [9]. With our translation we omitted a feature not part of the mutable checkpointing concept (the $sent_i$ condition) and in this way obtained a more concise presentation of the algorithm. This feature, however, reduces the number of checkpoints further. It needs to be worked out how it reflects in the potential snapshot.

Taking aside the initial work [10] most papers on checkpointing prove correctness by contradiction. We believe that a direct approach provides more insight
into an algorithm. It can also form the basis of a tool-supported proof as recently shown in [3] for Chandy/Lamport’s snapshot algorithm (among others). The set-up in [3] is based on the Event-B modelling language [6] and very similar to ours. Whether the proof given in this paper can be mechanized in a similar way is subject of future work.

A concise formal model can be the base of qualitative comparisons which would add to existing quantitative comparisons based on simulations, like [1, 12]. We gave such a comparison with the blocking queue algorithm introduced in [13]. That algorithm is conceptually different – it employs partial buffering of channel contents – but the overall objective is the reduction of coordination overhead as for mutable checkpointing. We showed that for a given underlying computation the respective snapshots will be incomparable. The potential snapshots of [13] are always consistent unlike those of mutable checkpointing. Moreover, resetting processes and clearing blocking queues can be done in a localized way (that is involving only processes participating in the checkpointing). Hence, for computing environments in which the economic use of resources is crucial, the blocking queue algorithm seems preferable.

Recently, checkpointing has gained new attention in the area of high performance computing where fault tolerance techniques are essential [5, 11, 16]. As the reduction of the coordination overhead may help to improve the overall performance, the algorithm discussed in this paper may be of interest there.

References


Posters
Mechanical Verification of Avicenna’s Proof of
the Existence of the Necessary Existent

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Abstract. This paper presents a formalization of Avicenna’s argument for the existence of the Necessary Existent (NE). We use the Prototype Verification System (PVS) to specify Avicenna’s argument and to verify the soundness of his proof in the context of his axiomatic system of reasoning. We verify his proof for the existence of an NE thing that is unique in parts (i.e., it cannot be compound) and unique in numbers (i.e., there is a unique NE). We also make note that Avicenna was aware of the differences between type-theoretic and set-theoretic concepts as he cleverly addresses a criticism of his proof by relying on type theory.

1 Introduction

Mechanical verification of philosophical arguments has the potential to reveal flaws, discover knowledge and provide more confidence in the correctness of arguments. Amongst the proofs for the existence of God (e.g., cosmological, ontological and teleological), Avicenna’s proof [2] is an important and interesting one that is older than Anselm’s ontological argument (i.e., “that than which a greater cannot be conceived” [3,4]). His proof is abstract in that it is based on the modalities of existence, and other proofs (e.g., Aristotle’s unmoved mover [1]) can be considered as instantiations of his proof.

This paper proposes a formal specification and a mechanical verification of the consistency of Avicenna’s proof of the existent of a Necessary Existent (NE) in PVS. Avicenna’s proof is based on two modes of existence, namely possible and impossible things (see Figure 1). These two modes of existence are distinguished based on the essence of things, where an essence is a characteristic that if removed would lead to the non-existence of that thing. If the essence of something precludes its existence, then it is an impossible thing (e.g., a triangle with four corners). Otherwise, it is possible to exist. Possible things may or may not exist (in reality). Anything whose existence depends on another thing different from itself is called a contingent thing. Avicenna states that an NE thing is a thing whose non-existence would lead to a contradiction (Al-Najat, Page 261 [2]).

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Avicenna argues that the set of all contingent things cannot be necessary (because an NE thing cannot be compound); hence the existence of an NE thing that caused the existence of all contingent things (throughout history). An implication of his proof is that the set of all contingent things must be contingent itself (i.e., a set that has the same type as that of its members), which has become a focal point of criticism on his proof in a set-theoretic context. To address this concern, Avicenna provides a type-theoretic proof indicating that he was aware of the differences between sets and types. Our mechanical verification in PVS shows the soundness of his proof.

Fig. 1. Avicenna’s classification of things.

**Organization.** Section 2 presents the axioms of Avicenna’s system of reasoning, and Section 3 provides an outline of his proof. Section 4 makes concluding remarks and presents future extensions of this work.

2 Avicenna’s Axioms

Based on the modes of existence, Avicenna considers the following axioms in defining his system of reasoning. First, he states that the essence of a contingent thing allows it to exist but it does not have to exist unless something other than itself causes its existence.

**Axiom 1** Any contingent thing has a cause different than itself.

Moreover, if something is possible, then any one of its essences can be considered as a cause for its existence. Otherwise, it would not have existed or would have existed as a different thing.

**Axiom 2** Any essence of a possible thing is a cause of it.

By definition, an NE thing does not have a cause different from itself; otherwise, it would be a contingent thing.
**Axiom 3** The existence of an NE thing is not caused by anything different from itself.

If there are NE things then they share the property of “necessity”.

**Axiom 4** All NE things have the Necessity essence.

Axioms 5 and 6 state that any possible thing is either contingent or necessary, but not both. This is an important axiom in Avicenna’s argument as finding a third category of possible things (that is neither contingent nor necessary) defies reason.

**Axiom 5** A possible thing is either contingent or necessary.

The axioms 6 and 7 state that there cannot be a thing that is both contingent and necessary.

**Axiom 6** A possible thing cannot be both contingent and necessary.

Since the set of all possible things is not empty (because our world exist) and any possible thing is either contingent or necessary, the union of all contingent and all necessary things makes up the set of possible things.

**Axiom 7** The union of contingent and necessary things equals to the set of possible things.

3 Mechanical Verification of Avicenna’s Proof

Avicenna presents at least two proofs for the existence of an NE thing. In the first proof, he argues that any contingent thing cannot have a finite or an infinite set of contingent things as its causes (Al-Najat [2], Pages 271 and 272). Thus, the existence of any contingent thing is due to some NE thing (either directly or via some intermediate causes). For simplicity, we focus on his second argument for the existence of an NE thing (which he shows to be unique). Figure 2 illustrates an outline of his second proof. In this argument, first he proves that any NE thing (if exists) must be unique in parts (i.e., an NE thing cannot be composed of other things) and unique in numbers (i.e., there is exactly one NE thing). Then, he goes on and partitions the set of possible things into the set of contingent things (denoted SC) and the set of NE things. Since there are contingent things around us, the set SC is non-empty. Moreover, the set SC cannot be an NE thing because it is compositional. (Further, if SC were an NE thing, then the proof would be complete.) If SC is contingent then it should have a cause other than itself, denoted R. That is, R must be the cause of all contingent things and different from them. If R is the cause of all contingent things and different from them, then it must have an essence that is not in the set of essences of the things in SC. This means that R cannot be in SC; hence R is possible but not contingent. Therefore, the cause of SC must be an NE thing; i.e., some NE exists. The PVS specifications and the mechanical proofs generated by PVS are available at [http://asd.cs.mtu.edu/projects/mechVerif/specs.html](http://asd.cs.mtu.edu/projects/mechVerif/specs.html).
4 Conclusions and Future Work

This paper reports on the formalization and verification of the consistency of Avicenna’s proof [2] of the existence of the Necessary Existent (NE) using the PVS theorem prover [5, 6]. Our formalization entails the challenge of creating a correct and consistent translation of Avicenna’s Arabic text. We successfully showed that, in the context of Avicenna’s axiomatic system of reasoning, a unique NE thing must exist and the NE cannot be compound. Using PVS, we also proved that the set of all contingent things must be contingent itself, and the historical criticism on this claim of Avicenna is invalid. As an extension of this work, we are investigating the specification and verification of Avicenna’s philosophical arguments for the attributes of the NE such as immateriality, omniscient, omnipower, etc. Moreover, we would like to formalize all the criticisms put forward by Al Ghazaly and verify their validity in PVS, thereby shedding light on the important points of disagreements between these two great philosophers.

References

Model transformation design patterns for bidirectionality

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Abstract. In this paper we identify model transformation specification and design patterns which support the property of transformation bidirectionality: the ability of a single specification to be applied either as a source-to-target transformation or as a target-to-source transformation.

1 Introduction

Bidirectional transformations (bx) are considered important in a number of transformation scenarios such as maintaining consistency between two models which may both change, in order to implement round-trip engineering for model-driven development.

Design patterns have become an important tool in software engineering, providing a catalogue of ‘best practice’ solutions to design problems in software. Patterns for model transformations have also been identified [5], but patterns specifically for bx have not been defined. In this paper we will identify bx patterns which have been used in published examples of bx.

2 Criteria for bidirectionality

Bidirectional transformations are characterised by a binary relation \( R : SL \leftrightarrow TL \) between a source language (metamodel) \( SL \) and a target language \( TL \). \( R(m, n) \) holds for a pair of models \( m \) of \( SL \) and \( n \) of \( TL \) when the models consist of data which corresponds under \( R \).

It should be possible to automatically derive from the definition of \( R \) both forward and reverse transformations

\[
R^\rightarrow : SL \times TL \rightarrow TL \\
R^\leftarrow : SL \times TL \rightarrow SL
\]

which aim to establish \( R \) between their first (respectively second) and their result target (respectively source) models, given both existing source and target models.

Stevens [7] has identified two main conditions which bidirectional model transformations should satisfy:
1. Correctness: the forward and reverse transformations derived from a relation \( R \) do establish \( R: R(m, R\rightarrow(m, n)) \) and \( R(R^{-}(m, n), n) \) for each \( m: SL, n: TL \).

2. Hippocraticness: if source and target models already satisfy \( R \) then the forward and reverse transformations do not modify the models: \( R(m, n) \Rightarrow R^{-1}(m, n) = n \) and \( R(m, n) \Rightarrow R^{-1}(m, n) = m \) for each \( m: SL, n: TL \).

## 3 Patterns for bidirectional transformations

The following patterns can be identified in published bx examples:

**Auxiliary Correspondence Model**: maintain a detailed trace between source model and target model elements to facilitate change-propagation in source to target or target to source directions.

**Cleanup before Construct**: remove superfluous target model elements which are not in the transformation relation \( R \) with any source elements, before constructing target elements related to source elements. Similarly for change propagation from target to source.

**Unique Instantiation**: Do not recreate target objects which already satisfy the transformation relation with a source object. Use key attributes to identify when objects should be created or updated.

We define each of these patterns in detail in the following.

**Auxiliary Correspondence Model** This pattern defines auxiliary entity types and associations which link corresponding source and target elements. These are used to record the mappings performed by a bx, and to propagate modifications from source to related target objects or vice-versa, when one model changes.

Figure 1 shows a typical schematic structure of the pattern.

---

*Fig. 1. Auxiliary Correspondence Model pattern*

**Examples**: This mechanism is a key facility of Triple Graph Grammars (TGG) [2, 1], and correspondence traces are maintained by other MT languages such as
QVT-R [6]. This pattern could also be used to record sequences of rules applied, in the case of refactoring or other update-in-place transformations, in order to invert these transformations by applying inverse rules in reverse order (e.g., reversing a Pull-up Attribute refactoring by a Push-down Attribute refactoring). It could also be used to retain intermediate models to facilitate composition of bx transformations [7].

Related patterns: This pattern is a specialisation of the Auxiliary Metamodel pattern of [5].

Benefits: the pattern is a significant aid in change-propagation between models, and helps to ensure the correctness of a bx. Feature value changes to a source object \( s \) can be propagated to changes to its corresponding target object, and vice-versa, via the links. Deletion of an object may imply deletion of its corresponding object.

Disadvantages: the correspondence metamodel must be maintained (by the transformation engineer) together with the source and target languages, and the necessary actions in creating and accessing correspondence objects adds complexity to the transformation and adds to its execution time and memory requirements.

Cleanup before Construct This pattern defines a two-phase approach in both forward and reverse transformations associated with a bx with relation \( R \): the forward transformation \( R^- \) first removes all elements from the target model \( n \) which fail to satisfy \( R \) for any element of the source \( m \), and then constructs elements of \( n \) to satisfy \( R \) with respect to \( m \). The reverse transformation \( R^+ \) operates on \( m \) in the same manner.

Examples: An example is the Composers bx [3]. Implicit deletion in QVT operates in a similar manner, but can only modify models (domains) marked as enforced [6]. In UML-RSDS, explicit cleanup rules can be deduced from inverses of the construction rules, for mapping transformations [4].

Related patterns: This pattern is a specialisation of the Construction and Cleanup pattern of [5].

Benefits: The pattern is an effective way to ensure the correctness of separate-models bx.

Disadvantages: The use of deletion raises the issue of whether deletion propagation/cascaded deletion should be used and consequently if these deletion steps are confluent. There may be efficiency problems because for each target model element, a search through the source model for possibly corresponding source objects may be needed. Objects may be deleted in the Cleanup phase only to be reconstructed in the Construct phase: Auxilliary Correspondence Model may be an alternative strategy to avoid this, by enforcing that object feature values should change in response to a value change in a corresponding object, rather than deletion of objects.

Unique Instantiation This pattern avoids the creation of unnecessary elements of models and helps to resolve possible choices in reverse mappings. It uses various techniques such as traces and unique keys to identify when objects should be modified and reused instead of being created. In particular, unique
keys can be used to disallow creation of an object with a given key value if an object of the same class with the same key value already exists.

Examples: The key attributes and check-before-enforce semantics of QVT-R follow this pattern, whereby new elements of source or target models are not created if there are already elements which satisfy the specified relations of the transformation [7]. The $E \rightarrow \text{exists1}(e \mid P)$ quantifier in UML-RSDS is used in a similar way. It is procedurally interpreted as “create a new $e : E$ and establish $P$ for $e$, unless there already exists an $e : E$ satisfying $P$” [4].

Benefits: The pattern helps to ensure the Hippocraticness property of a bx by avoiding changes to a target model element if it is already in the transformation relation locally with a corresponding source model element.

Disadvantages: The need to test for existence of objects adds to the execution cost. This can be ameliorated by the use of the Object Indexing pattern [5] to provide fast lookup of objects by their primary key value.

4 Conclusion

We have described transformation patterns which may be used to structure bidirectional transformations. The derivation of reverse transformations using these patterns has been implemented in the UML-RSDS tools [4].

References

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Analysis of hybrid model transformation language specifications

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Abstract. The most widely-used model transformation languages, such as ATL and ETL, combine declarative and imperative aspects to define how one model is derived from another, or is updated in-place. General verification techniques for such languages must therefore be able to support reasoning about both declarative and imperative aspects. We define an analysis process which can, in principle, treat several different hybrid transformation languages, by making use of a common intermediate representation to express the semantics of transformations in any of these languages. Some analyses can be performed directly on the intermediate representation, and further semantic models in specific verification formalisms can be derived from it.

1 Introduction

ATL \cite{1} and ETL \cite{2} are two of the most popular model transformation languages because they use relatively simple notations which have both declarative and imperative elements. This gives a transformation developer freedom to use imperative coding for complex parts of a transformation which cannot be easily expressed in a declarative manner. UML-RSDS \cite{5} is another hybrid MT language, which uses standard UML concepts such as classes, use cases and constraints to express transformations. In \cite{3, 4} we have defined techniques for the verification of declarative UML-RSDS transformations using (i) syntactic analysis, (ii) translation to a verification formalism, (iii) correctness by construction. In \cite{6} we extended these techniques to analysis of standard mode ATL by mapping from ATL to UML-RSDS, using UML in UML-RSDS as a language-independent semantic representation of transformation specifications and designs. In this paper we extend the approach to the Epsilon language ETL \cite{2}.

Figure 1 shows our extended transformation verification process. MT specifications and implementations can be expressed in a language-independent manner as UML class diagrams, use cases and activities in UML-RSDS. These representations can then be mapped via semantic mappings to suitable formalisms which support verification (such as theorem provers or constraint satisfaction checkers).
2 Analysis of ETL

The Epsilon Transformation Language (ETL) is a hybrid transformation language similar in many respects to ATL, but with a more complex execution semantics [2]. Table 1 shows the mapping of ETL elements to UML-RSDS.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ETL</th>
<th>UML-RSDS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Module M</td>
<td>Use case M′</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre/Post block, Non-lazy rule</td>
<td>Operation, and use case postcondition invoking the operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lazy rule</td>
<td>Operation invoked from postcondition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implicit rule invocation</td>
<td>Object lookup using traces; object creation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Statement blocks</td>
<td>Operation with activity, invoked</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>from postcondition</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1. Correspondence of ETL and UML-RSDS

In order to model the semantics of target object lookup and implicit rule invocation using ETL equivalent(), equivalents() and := operators, a trace association is added between the source and target metamodels: a new superclass _IN of all the entity types appearing in source clauses of transformation rules is added, with a one-many ordered association $trace to a new class _TRACE, which in turn has a many-one association target to a new superclass _OUT of all the entity types appearing in ETL target clauses. The trace objects retain a record of which rule was used to create the trace link, and the name of the variable used for the target object.

The constraints expressing pre blocks of an ETL module M are listed first in the postcondition of the use case M′, in the order of their declaration in M. Then all mapping rules (non-lazy rules) are listed as constraints, followed by
the constraints for post blocks. The order of the ETL specification is preserved. Object lookup may implicitly result in the invocation of rules which create objects required by the calling rule/block. This leads to the semantics of Table 2 for an assignment \( y := x.\text{equivalents}() \). In each case, \( Rule_1, \ldots, Rule_k \) are all

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ETL</th>
<th>Interpretation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>( y := x.\text{equivalents}() )</td>
<td>if ( (x.$\text{trace} \rightarrow \text{notEmpty}()) ) then ( y := x.$\text{trace}.\text{target} )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>x single element</td>
<td>else ( (\text{execute } x.\text{Rule}_1; \ldots; \text{execute } x.\text{Rule}_k; \ y := x.$\text{trace}.\text{target}) )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( y := x.\text{equivalents}() )</td>
<td>if ( (x.$\text{trace} \rightarrow \text{notEmpty}()) ) then ( y := x.\rightarrow\text{collect}($\text{trace}.\text{target}) )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>x collection</td>
<td>else ( (\text{execute } x.\text{Rule}_1; \ldots; \text{execute } x.\text{Rule}_k; \ y := x.\rightarrow\text{collect}($\text{trace}.\text{target}) )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( y := x.\text{equivalent}() )</td>
<td>if ( (x.$\text{trace} \rightarrow \text{notEmpty}()) ) then ( y := x.$\text{trace}.\text{target} \rightarrow \text{first}() )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>x single element</td>
<td>else ( (\text{execute } x.\text{Rule}_1; \ldots; \text{execute } x.\text{Rule}_k; \ y := x.$\text{trace}.\text{target} \rightarrow \text{first}()) )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>or 0..1-multiplicity</td>
<td>( y := x.$\text{trace}.\text{target} \rightarrow \text{flatten}() )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>collection</td>
<td>( y := x.$\text{trace}.\text{target} \rightarrow \text{flatten}()) )</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2. Interpretation of ETL implicit invocation

the rules with input type equal to or with a non-empty intersection with the entity type \( T_x \) of \( x \), and with output types including the expected type \( T_y \) of \( y \). Primary rules are listed before other rules (lazy or non-lazy), in other respects the ordering of rules in the ETL specification is followed. \( \text{execute } x.P \) applies rule or predicate \( P \) to element(s) \( x \). For a collection \( x \), this is the application \( z.P \) for each element \( z \) of \( x \).

3 Evaluation

In this section we evaluate the approach by considering the ETL tree to graph example of [2].

This ETL specification uses trace lookup and implicit rule invocation:

```plaintext
rule Tree2Node
  transform t : Tree!Tree
to n : Graph!Node
  { n.label := t.label;
    if (t.parent.isDefined())
    { var edge := new Graph!Edge;
      edge.source := n;
      edge.target := t.parent.equivalent();
    }
  }
```

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Direct translation into UML-RSDS produces a use case with a single postcondition \textit{Tree2Node}, which invokes a recursive operation $IN$\textit{Tree} :: $Tree2Nodeop(n : OUT$\textit{Node}$).

The specification can be improved and made more verifiable by applying the Map Objects Before Links pattern \cite{7} to remove this recursive definition. Syntactic analysis establishes that the transformation is terminating and confluent. By translation to B, and internal consistency proof in B we can establish invariants (I1) that every node in the target model is derived from a tree with the same name, and (I2) that every edge is derived from a pair of a tree and its parent. From these invariants we can deduce properties of the target model (such as an absence of cycles in the graph) from corresponding properties of the source model. Table 3 shows the proof effort required to establish the invariants.

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|}
\hline
Property & \textit{ETL via UML-RSDS} \textit{(I1), (I2)} \textit{42 proof obligations, 31 automatically proved} \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Table 3. Proof effort for ETL transformation verification}
\end{table}

\textbf{References}

Toward Automatic Transformation of Service Choreography Specification into UML State Machine

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Abstract. WS-CDL describes collaborative business processes between service consumers and providers. Adapting the processes to runtime changes becomes a demanding challenge, because the WS-CDL has static technology-dependent structure, and does not support the separation of concerns. Here, we propose a model-driven approach to transform WS-CDL into UML state machine (behavioral and protocol models), and subsequently into implementation code. As a result, we can easily modify the process flow or change the management rules at run-time, and reflect their effects on the running process instances.

Keywords: Service Choreography. Model-driven transformation. Adaptation.

1 Introduction

The Web Service Choreography Description Language (WS-CDL) [1] is the W3C recommended language for specifying service-based CBPs. An adaptive CBP consists of dynamic elements and management rules which govern their run-time behaviors [2]. Since WS-CDL has a static structure, it is necessary to transform the service-based CBPs into adaptive models. Meanwhile, when a new requirement arises at choreography-level, it must be realized at orchestration-level. Therefore, the adaptive model must cover all choreography, and orchestration entities in different abstraction levels, and also consider the interoperability between them. We selected UML state machine as an adaptive model to achieve the adaptation requirements of CBPs. In this regard, it is possible to transform both WS-CDL and WSBPEL documents into state-based models, and then integrate them by using nested property of UML state machine. In this paper, we only propose transformation of WS-CDL into UML state machine. As shown in Fig. 1, first, a CBP is documented according to the WS-CDL specification. Then, the CBP document is transformed into behavioral and protocol state machines. Finally, implementation code is generated based on the state machines.
2 Transformation

We transformed ‘choreography elements and attributes’ into ‘state-transition and event-condition-action’. Table 1 summarizes the transformation rules.

Table 1. WS-CDL to UML state machine mapping table

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>WS-CDL</th>
<th>UML state machine</th>
<th>Label</th>
<th>Event [Guard]/Action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Root choreography</td>
<td>Initial state and composite state</td>
<td>Choreography name</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enclosed choreography</td>
<td>Initial state</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&lt;/Choreography&gt;</td>
<td>Final state</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interaction</td>
<td>Composite state with hidden decomposition</td>
<td>Interaction name</td>
<td>Exchange name [null] / operation name</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perform</td>
<td>Composite state</td>
<td>Choreography name</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No-action</td>
<td>Basic state</td>
<td>Waiting</td>
<td>Exception name [null] / null</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Silent-action</td>
<td>Basic state</td>
<td>Waiting</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sequence</td>
<td>Transitions</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parallel</td>
<td>Fork - Orthogonal regions - Join</td>
<td>Temporary name</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Choice</td>
<td>Choice</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finalizer block</td>
<td>Composite state</td>
<td>Finalizer block name</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exception block</td>
<td>Composite state</td>
<td>Exception block name</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work unit</td>
<td>Composite state</td>
<td>Work unit name</td>
<td>Null [guard name] / null</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3  Case study

Here, we adopt ‘itinerary purchase’ example [3] for prototyping the transformation rules. The itinerary purchase process is handled by the following independent and collaborating parties: Customer, Travel Agency, Airline, Hotel, and Payment system. The itinerary purchase scenario is as follows. First, the customer requests the travel agency for available itineraries, then the travel agency sends all available itineraries to the customer. Next, the customer selects desired itinerary and requests the travel agency for reservation. The travel agency starts two parallel choreographies with the hotel and airline parties, and waits until reservation responses arrive. If both of reservations are done, then the travel agency calculates total cost of itinerary locally (indeed, it calculates the airline, travel agency, hotel and other commissions plus the base costs). After the total cost is determined, the choreography between the travel agency and the payment system is started. Again, the travel agency waits until the payment is confirmed by the payment system. Finally a choreography is started to notify the customer about the payment and itinerary information. The choreographies of the mentioned ‘itinerary purchase’ CBP is shown below.

```xml
<choreography name="itineraryPurchase" root="true">
  <sequence>
    <interaction name="itinerary" operation="getItineraries">
      <participate relationshipType="Customer_TravelAgency"
                  fromRole="CustomerRole" toRole="TravelAgencyRole"/>
      <exchange name="requestItineraries" action="request">
        <send variable="tripProfile"/>
        <receive variable="tripProfile"/>
      </exchange>
      <exchange name="itinerariesList" action="respond">
        <send variable="itinerariesList"/>
        <receive variable="itinerariesList"/>
      </exchange>
    </interaction>
    <perform choreographyName="itineraryReservation"></perform>
    <perform choreographyName="paymentProcessing"></perform>
  </sequence>
  <finalizerBlock>
    <workunit name="finalizing">
      <perform choreographyName="successNotification"></perform>
    </workunit>
  </finalizerBlock>
</choreography>

<choreography name="itineraryReservation">
  <parallel>
    <perform choreographyName="flightReservation"></perform>
    <perform choreographyName="roomReservation"></perform>
  </parallel>
</choreography>
```

We applied the transformation rules to the itinerary purchase choreography to get its corresponding state machine. As a result, Fig. 2 shows the equivalent state machine of the above choreography.
4 Conclusion

In this paper, we selected UML state machine for modeling adaptive CBPs. We proposed a model-driven approach to transform the WS-CDL specification into UML state machine automatically. The benefits of the transformation include: 1) the adaptation strategies like reconfiguration, reselection are easily realized by modifying the behavioral and protocol state machines. For example, by adding / removing / merging / replacing states and transitions, 2) we can suspend the failed instance of a process for adaptation, and then, resume the instance to continue its execution, 3) we can separately develop the business process and policies, and reflect their effects on the running process instances. According to the reflective-state design pattern [4], we will deploy the state machines on meta-level, and their implementation on base-level.

References

Formalization of UML Activity Diagrams
Revisited: An Approach Based on SANs

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Abstract. One of the important steps in software performance evaluation is transforming software models to formal and mathematical models. In this paper, a set of rules are defined for transforming UML-MARTE activity diagrams to a hierarchical and colored extension of stochastic activity networks (SANs) for the purpose of performance evaluation.

Keywords: Quality attributes, quantitative evaluation, model transformation, stochastic activity networks (SANs), UML activity diagrams.

1 Introduction

Quantitative evaluation of software quality attributes at the architecture design stage not only provides a good basis for making objective decisions about design trade-offs, but also aids in discovering flaws in a shorter time and with lower cost than latter development stages.

UML is a language commonly used for modeling software architectures. MARTE is the most comprehensive UML profile for quantitative evaluation, which supports performance evaluation and has been extended for dependability [1] and security [2]. In this paper a set of mapping rules are defined for converting UML-MARTE activity diagrams to hierarchical colored stochastic activity networks (HCSANs) [3] for evaluating the performance of software architectures. SANs [4] are stochastic extensions of Petri nets, which are more powerful and flexible than other stochastic extensions such as GSPNs. HCSANs are extensions of SANs, whose hierarchical nature facilitates modular model construction and their support for colored tokens facilitates complex data manipulations.

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: in section 2 the related work is discussed. Section 3 presents the proposed mapping rules and finally section 4 presents the concluding remarks and outlines the future work.

2 Related Work

Several methods have been proposed in literature for converting UML activity diagrams to Petri nets. For example, in [5] some rules are defined to map UML-MARTE activity diagrams to timed colored Petri nets with inhibitor arcs
(TCPNIA). In [6] a two-step process is defined to convert activity diagrams to colored Petri nets (CPNs). At first, activity diagrams are converted to fundamental modeling concepts Petri net diagrams (FMC-PNDs), which are then converted to CPNs for execution and verification. Labeled generalized Petri nets (LGSPNs) are the target of transformations for activity diagrams in [7]. The resultant LGSPN models are then used for performance evaluation. The following features distinguish the method presented in this paper from the ones discussed above: (1) transformation rules are defined for all known elements of activity diagrams, (2) object identities are preserved and (3) any time distribution function can be associated with timed activities.

3 Mapping Rules

Each activity diagram is represented as a directed graph consisting of three kinds of nodes: executable, control and object. Executable nodes include action nodes representing atomic activities and different kinds of complex activity nodes. The graphical symbols of these nodes and their HCSAN models are shown in Fig. 1.

There are four kinds of object nodes defined in activity diagrams: input/output pins, parameter nodes, central buffer nodes and data store nodes. The mapping rules for these nodes are illustrated in Fig. 2.
Initial and final nodes are control nodes representing the start and end points of an activity respectively. Fork and join nodes are other kinds of control nodes used to model parallelism and synchronization. Additionally, decision and merge nodes are control nodes used to model conditional branches. The mapping rules for these nodes are illustrated in Fig. 3.

Interruptible regions and swimlanes are other modeling constructs defined in activity diagrams. Interruptible regions define a special part of a process which can be interrupted during execution. Swimlanes are defined to group actions or activities performed by the same actor. The HCSAN models corresponding to these elements are depicted in Fig. 4.

4 Conclusions and Future Work

In this paper, a method is introduced for transforming UML-MARTE activity diagrams to hierarchical colored stochastic activity networks (HCSANs) for performance evaluation. As future work, we intend to develop a software tool for automating the transformation process, simulating HCSAN models and evaluating performance measures.

References


Fig. 3. Mapping rules for control nodes
Fig. 4. Mapping rules for interruptible regions and swimlanes
Integration of Services Using a Data-Centric Approach

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Abstract. As the size of a system grows, and interoperability demands between its services is increased, achieving more scalable and dynamic integration of the services becomes a major challenge. Over the last few years, the notion of Rich Services has emerged as a technique for facilitating integration of services. In this paper, a Data-Centric Rich Services (DCRS) approach is proposed to improve the scalability and dynamicity of integration of services.

Keywords: Integration of Services, Data-Centric Middleware, Data Distribution Service Middleware

1 Introduction

The scale of systems is growing in the recent years dramatically. The consequence of the scale of systems makes a serious need to have a scalable and dynamic integration of its services. Traditional integration approaches involve very time-consuming processes bearing financial and technical risk. Over the last few years, the Rich Services architecture, which is a type of Service-Oriented Architecture, has emerged as an excellent technique for facilitating integration of services [1]. In this paper, a Data-Centric Rich Services (DCRS) approach is proposed to improve the scalability and dynamicity of integration of services. In the proposed approach, a data-centric publish-subscribe middleware is presented to implement a scalable communication infrastructure that manages orchestration of services.

The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the proposed Data-Centric Rich Services approach. Section 3 analyzes the performance of Data-Centric Rich Services and concludes the paper.

2 Data-Centric Rich Services

To improve the scalability and dynamicity of integration of services, a Data-Centric Rich Services approach is proposed in this section. Fig.1 depicts the Data-Centric Rich Services architectural pattern. Data-Centric Rich Services are classified in three types, called application services, crosscutting services, and administration services. Application services provide core application functionality, whose requests and replies are rerouted, filtered or modified by crosscutting services.
Fig. 1. The Data-Centric Rich Services architectural pattern

For example, an access control service is considered as a crosscutting service for other application services. Each Data-Centric Rich Service has one administration service that defines the needed conf and reconf information of that Rich Service. The conf and reconf information is used for configuring and reconfiguring services to successful integration of application and crosscutting services. Each Rich Service could be simple or composite. A simple service is a simple functionality block, while a composite service is hierarchically decomposed into further Rich Services. Rich Services architecture integrates services into a hierarchically structure model, which supports horizontal and vertical integration of services. Interaction between services at the same logical or deployment level is addresses by horizontal integration of services, while the hierarchical decomposition of one service into a set of sub-services is addressed by vertical integration of services. To tackle the horizontal integration of services, Data-Centric Rich Services architecture is organized around a data-centric communication infrastructure. This infrastructure is a two-layer middleware. The lower layer, named DL Layer, is a DDS middleware [2] used for data-centric, publish-subscribe, real-time, and loosely-coupled communication among services. Implementing data-centric services on top of DDS provides location transparency, scalability, availability, auditability, and Quality of service (QoS) policies for integration of services [3]. The upper layer, named CL layer, is used for configuration and reconfiguration of services. To tackle the vertical integration of services, each Data-Centric Rich Service is connected to the data-centric communication infrastructures via its Service/Data Connector (SDC). The connectors hide the internal structure of Rich Services and expose only the needed interfaces and descriptions. The connector of a simple service is a simple interface, while the connector of a composite service is a gateway service. The requests and replies entering the composite service are routed by the gateway service to the appropriate internal sub-services.

Fig.2 depicts the request-reply interaction between Data-Centric Rich Services. Each request or reply of a Data-Centric Rich Service corresponds to a content-filtered topic, which is included in the topics-list of that Rich Service.
Fig. 2. Interaction between Data-Centric Rich Services

The CL layer of a client may receive multiple replies for a request. Combining-algorithms are used to combine these replies to make a final-replay. The combining-algorithms may be used for the availability, composition, Consistency and Integrity purposes. The administration service is responsible for creating and sending needed conf and reconf information for services of its level. The CL layer gets the related conf and reconf information based on the roles of its service. The administration service defines and exploits the OASIS policies \[4\] to classify the services into named roles. The QoS policies of topics control the distribution of requests and replies, and reduce the complexity of administration. These polices are defined by administration services, according to Table 2, and are set by the CL layer of communication infrastructures. Latency-budget policy specifies the maximum acceptable delay from time a data-sample is written by a publisher until it is inserted in data-cache of a subscriber according the following formula.

\[
LB_1 > LB_2 > LB_3 \geq 0
\]  

Transport-priority allows the DL layer to optimize the transporting of data-samples of topics with different priorities according the following formula.

\[
TP_1 > TP_2 > TP_3
\]  

Table 1. Quality of Service policies of topics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OoS Policy</th>
<th>Value for Conf topics</th>
<th>Request &amp; Reply topics</th>
<th>Reconf topics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Durability</td>
<td>persistent</td>
<td>volatile</td>
<td>persistent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>History</td>
<td>keep-all</td>
<td>keep-last-one</td>
<td>keep-all</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reliability</td>
<td>reliable</td>
<td>reliable</td>
<td>reliable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lifespan</td>
<td>infinite</td>
<td>LS</td>
<td>infinite</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latency-budget</td>
<td>(LB_1)</td>
<td>(LB_2)</td>
<td>(LB_3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport-priority</td>
<td>(TP_1)</td>
<td>(TP_2)</td>
<td>(TP_3)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3 Performance Analysis and Conclusion

We used some parts of analysis of RTI connext DDS [5] to simulate requests and evaluate the response times of them in a Data-Centric Rich Service. Fig.3 and Fig.4 show the results of our simulation.

Fig. 3. Response time of requests (using a Data-Centric Rich Service with one level hierarchy and combining algorithms for availability)

Fig. 4. Response time of requests (using a Data-Centric Rich Service with 1000 services and combining algorithms for availability)

Extending Rich Services with DDS and OASIS in our approach provides more scalability, elasticity, availability, dynamicity, and anonymity for integration of services.

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